Exploring the dynamic evolutionary mechanism of game model on the protection of traditional villages

Abstract

With the rapid improvement of urbanization and industrialization in countries around the world, how to effectively solve the rapid demise of traditional villages is a social dilemma faced by all countries, which is why a series of relevant protection regulations have been promulgated in different historical periods. However, the formulation of relevant policies is still not scientific, universal, and long-term. In this study, we constructed an evolutionary game model of local governments and residents based on the evolutionary game theory (EGT), which is used to explore the evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) and stability conditions of stakeholders under the premise of mutual influence and restriction. Besides, the study also includes the analysis about the impacts of different influence factors on the evolution tendency of the game model. At the same time, numerical simulation examples were used to verify the theoretical results and three crucial conclusions have been drawn. Firstly, the strategic evolution of stakeholders is a dynamic process of continuous adjustment and optimization, and its results and speed show consistent interdependence. Secondly, the decision-making of stakeholders mainly depends on the basic cost, and the high cost of investment is not conducive to the protection of traditional villages. Thirdly, the dynamic evolutionary mechanism composed of different influence factors will have an impact on the direction and speed of decision-making of stakeholders, which provides the basis for them to effectively restrict the decision-making of each other. This study eliminates the weaknesses of existing research approaches and provides scientific and novel ideas for the protection of traditional villages, which can contribute to the formulation and improvement of the relevant laws and regulations.