{"title":"India’s recognition as a nuclear power: A case of strategic cooptation","authors":"P. Frankenbach, Andreas Kruck, Bernhard Zangl","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2021.1920117","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In the mid-2000s, India turned from a nuclear pariah of the international community into a de facto recognized nuclear power. Why and how did this status elevation come about? Realist, liberal, and constructivist perspectives point to important motivations but fail to elucidate the process of India’s (re-)integration. Our strategic cooptation argument conceives of India’s status upgrade as an exchange of institutional privileges for institutional support. To stabilize the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the United States and other nuclear powers offered India the privilege of being recognized as nuclear power—and of taking part in international nuclear trade—in return for India’s promise to provide additional support to the non-proliferation regime. This deal materialized because India was able and willing to provide the needed support and because the institutional setting provided favorable conditions for circumventing and overcoming third-party resistance. We thus establish “strategic cooptation” as a mode of adapting international security institutions.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"42 1","pages":"530 - 553"},"PeriodicalIF":4.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/13523260.2021.1920117","citationCount":"5","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Contemporary Security Policy","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2021.1920117","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Abstract
ABSTRACT In the mid-2000s, India turned from a nuclear pariah of the international community into a de facto recognized nuclear power. Why and how did this status elevation come about? Realist, liberal, and constructivist perspectives point to important motivations but fail to elucidate the process of India’s (re-)integration. Our strategic cooptation argument conceives of India’s status upgrade as an exchange of institutional privileges for institutional support. To stabilize the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the United States and other nuclear powers offered India the privilege of being recognized as nuclear power—and of taking part in international nuclear trade—in return for India’s promise to provide additional support to the non-proliferation regime. This deal materialized because India was able and willing to provide the needed support and because the institutional setting provided favorable conditions for circumventing and overcoming third-party resistance. We thus establish “strategic cooptation” as a mode of adapting international security institutions.
期刊介绍:
One of the oldest peer-reviewed journals in international conflict and security, Contemporary Security Policy promotes theoretically-based research on policy problems of armed conflict, intervention and conflict resolution. Since it first appeared in 1980, CSP has established its unique place as a meeting ground for research at the nexus of theory and policy.
Spanning the gap between academic and policy approaches, CSP offers policy analysts a place to pursue fundamental issues, and academic writers a venue for addressing policy. Major fields of concern include:
War and armed conflict
Peacekeeping
Conflict resolution
Arms control and disarmament
Defense policy
Strategic culture
International institutions.
CSP is committed to a broad range of intellectual perspectives. Articles promote new analytical approaches, iconoclastic interpretations and previously overlooked perspectives. Its pages encourage novel contributions and outlooks, not particular methodologies or policy goals. Its geographical scope is worldwide and includes security challenges in Europe, Africa, the Middle-East and Asia. Authors are encouraged to examine established priorities in innovative ways and to apply traditional methods to new problems.