Optimal menu when agents make mistakes

IF 1.2 Q3 ECONOMICS Research in Economics Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI:10.1016/j.rie.2022.12.001

Sergei Mikhalishchev

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper studies how an optimal menu chosen by a social planner depends on whether agents receive imperfect signals about their true tastes (imperfect self-knowledge) or the properties of available alternatives (imperfect information). Under imperfect self-knowledge, it is not optimal to offer fewer alternatives than the number of different tastes present in the population, unless noise is infinite (agents have no clue about their true preferences). As noise increases, the social planner offers menu items that are closer together (more similar). However, under imperfect information, as noise increases, it could be optimal to construct a menu with more distinct alternatives, restrict the number of options, or, for some finite noise, offer a single item.

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代理商犯错时的最佳菜单

本文研究了社会规划师选择的最佳菜单如何取决于代理人是否收到关于他们真实品味的不完美信号（不完美的自我认知）或可用替代品的性质（不完美信息）。在不完美的自我认知下，除非噪音是无限的（代理人对他们的真实偏好一无所知），否则提供比人群中不同口味的数量更少的替代品并不是最优的。随着噪音的增加，社交规划师会提供更接近（更相似）的菜单项。然而，在不完美的信息下，随着噪声的增加，构建一个具有更多不同选项的菜单，限制选项的数量，或者，对于某些有限的噪声，提供单个项目可能是最佳的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Research in Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

89 days

期刊介绍： Established in 1947, Research in Economics is one of the oldest general-interest economics journals in the world and the main one among those based in Italy. The purpose of the journal is to select original theoretical and empirical articles that will have high impact on the debate in the social sciences; since 1947, it has published important research contributions on a wide range of topics. A summary of our editorial policy is this: the editors make a preliminary assessment of whether the results of a paper, if correct, are worth publishing. If so one of the associate editors reviews the paper: from the reviewer we expect to learn if the paper is understandable and coherent and - within reasonable bounds - the results are correct. We believe that long lags in publication and multiple demands for revision simply slow scientific progress. Our goal is to provide you a definitive answer within one month of submission. We give the editors one week to judge the overall contribution and if acceptable send your paper to an associate editor. We expect the associate editor to provide a more detailed evaluation within three weeks so that the editors can make a final decision before the month expires. In the (rare) case of a revision we allow four months and in the case of conditional acceptance we allow two months to submit the final version. In both cases we expect a cover letter explaining how you met the requirements. For conditional acceptance the editors will verify that the requirements were met. In the case of revision the original associate editor will do so. If the revision cannot be at least conditionally accepted it is rejected: there is no second revision.