{"title":"Dynamics in environmental legislation","authors":"Nicolae Stef , Arvind Ashta","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2023.106170","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We analyze environmental laws and regulations enacted by 125 countries from 1990 to 2021. An examination of the legislation dynamics yields four principal observations. First, countries with a higher degree of development tend to enact more environmental legislation than less developed countries. Second, parliamentary systems are associated with a higher number of environmental regulations compared to presidential systems. Third, legal origin seems to be related to legislation dynamics. Systems of English legal origin generate less new environmental legislation than any other legal family. Fourth, our estimates point out that ruling parties have strong incentives to slow down the dynamics of environmental laws and regulations one year prior to the legislative elections. However, high levels of government effectiveness seem to favor the modernization of environmental legislation in developed countries and parliamentary systems.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"76 ","pages":"Article 106170"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Review of Law and Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818823000480","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We analyze environmental laws and regulations enacted by 125 countries from 1990 to 2021. An examination of the legislation dynamics yields four principal observations. First, countries with a higher degree of development tend to enact more environmental legislation than less developed countries. Second, parliamentary systems are associated with a higher number of environmental regulations compared to presidential systems. Third, legal origin seems to be related to legislation dynamics. Systems of English legal origin generate less new environmental legislation than any other legal family. Fourth, our estimates point out that ruling parties have strong incentives to slow down the dynamics of environmental laws and regulations one year prior to the legislative elections. However, high levels of government effectiveness seem to favor the modernization of environmental legislation in developed countries and parliamentary systems.
期刊介绍:
The International Review of Law and Economics provides a forum for interdisciplinary research at the interface of law and economics. IRLE is international in scope and audience and particularly welcomes both theoretical and empirical papers on comparative law and economics, globalization and legal harmonization, and the endogenous emergence of legal institutions, in addition to more traditional legal topics.