When the message hurts: The unintended impacts of nudges on saving

IF 2.8 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Journal of Comparative Economics Pub Date : 2023-06-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jce.2023.01.002
Alin Marius Andrieş , Sarah Walker
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Abstract

We implement a field experiment in Romania to elucidate how informational nudges and goal setting impact saving. We find no evidence that text message reminders, either in the form of a general reminder or information about the saving goals of peers, encourage saving. Further, both types of messages discourage saving for participants who set a goal, particularly among high goal setters. We posit that informational nudges unintentionally increase the salience of unrealistic goals and engender boomerang effects that discourage high goal setters from saving. Among participants who received no messages, those who set goals save more, suggesting a tradeoff between commitment devices and informational nudges in this context.

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当信息受到伤害:轻推对储蓄的意外影响
我们在罗马尼亚进行了一项实地实验,以阐明信息推动和目标设定如何影响节约。我们没有发现任何证据表明短信提醒,无论是以一般提醒的形式,还是关于同龄人储蓄目标的信息,都会鼓励储蓄。此外,这两种类型的信息都不鼓励为设定目标的参与者储蓄,尤其是在高目标制定者中。我们认为,信息推送无意中增加了不切实际目标的显著性,并产生了回旋镖效应,阻碍了高目标制定者储蓄。在没有收到信息的参与者中,那些设定目标的人节省了更多,这表明在这种情况下,承诺手段和信息推送之间存在权衡。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
66
审稿时长
45 days
期刊介绍: The mission of the Journal of Comparative Economics is to lead the new orientations of research in comparative economics. Before 1989, the core of comparative economics was the comparison of economic systems with in particular the economic analysis of socialism in its different forms. In the last fifteen years, the main focus of interest of comparative economists has been the transition from socialism to capitalism.
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