Contracting in the Dark: The rise of public-side lenders in the syndicated loan market

IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101586
Hami Amiraslani , John Donovan , Matthew A. Phillips , Regina Wittenberg-Moerman
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

We document a novel trend in syndicated lending where some participants voluntarily waive their rights to borrowers' private information. We posit that “public-side” lending emerged to facilitate broad lender participation in the syndicated loan market by mitigating concerns about the leakage of borrowers' private information into public securities markets. In line with this proposition, we find that public-side lending facilitates the loan market participation of lenders for which maintaining robust information barriers is particularly costly. Furthermore, while public-side lending increases within-syndicate information asymmetry, our findings indicate that it does not materially increase interest spreads and is associated with lower coordination costs among syndicate participants. Collectively, we document how debt contracting practices evolved to address frictions associated with the protection of borrowers’ private information and the related changes in loan contracting equilibria.

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黑暗中的契约:银团贷款市场中公共贷款机构的崛起
我们记录了银团贷款的一个新趋势,一些参与者自愿放弃对借款人私人信息的权利。我们认为,“公共方”贷款的出现是为了缓解对借款人私人信息泄露到公共证券市场的担忧,从而促进贷款人广泛参与银团贷款市场。根据这一主张,我们发现公共借贷促进了贷款人的贷款市场参与,而保持强大的信息壁垒尤其昂贵。此外,尽管银团内部的公共借贷信息不对称增加,但我们的研究结果表明,它不会显著增加息差,并且与银团参与者之间较低的协调成本有关。我们共同记录了债务契约实践是如何演变的,以解决与保护借款人私人信息相关的摩擦以及贷款契约平衡的相关变化。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.70
自引率
6.80%
发文量
68
期刊介绍: The Journal of Accounting and Economics encourages the application of economic theory to the explanation of accounting phenomena. It provides a forum for the publication of the highest quality manuscripts which employ economic analyses of accounting problems. A wide range of methodologies and topics are encouraged and covered: * The role of accounting within the firm; * The information content and role of accounting numbers in capital markets; * The role of accounting in financial contracts and in monitoring agency relationships; * The determination of accounting standards; * Government regulation of corporate disclosure and/or the Accounting profession; * The theory of the accounting firm.
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