The 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami: The highest casualties and largest reconstruction funds—Characteristics of major disasters and future challenges in developed countries

Abstract

The 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake was a disaster that led to the greatest number of casualties related to any form of natural disaster seen in developed countries since World War II. Furthermore, this earthquake occurred in an area where tsunami countermeasures had been prioritized. This disaster, therefore, led to the question “Is it impossible to reduce the number of victims of huge catastrophes, even in cases in which advanced disaster prevention measures have been taken?” Part of the reason this particular earthquake caused the largest number of deaths was because the tsunami that followed—which exceeded the “design load” of the seawall—hit the urban area. In addition, the tsunami, which also exceeded the “estimated loads” of the established disaster prevention plan, caused many “evacuation failures.” Another factor that contributed to the deaths was that the disaster prevention measures, up to that point, had relied primarily on the recognition that disasters could be prevented by the development of “hard,” or tangible, disaster prevention facilities in addition to “soft,” or intangible, measures, such as issuing warnings, without imposing space restrictions. Another characteristic of the Great East Japan Earthquake was that the largest reconstruction budget associated with any disaster in postwar Japan was compiled for it. Although the reconstruction project was over-specified for the disaster-afflicted area in terms of scale, cost, and duration of reconstruction, many unused land areas were also created in the new urban areas created during the reconstruction project. Furthermore, the reconstruction projects undertaken with the huge reconstruction budget were not based on the “choice to rebuild the lives” of the disaster-afflicted areas and the victims, but were rather implemented while simultaneously “marginalizing” said victims and areas as a whole. The over-specified reconstruction projects and the associated marginalization of disaster victims tend to exist in a mutually regulated relationship. Therefore, there are concerns about the future sustainability of the noted disaster-afflicted areas, which are already suffering from a severe population decline. Based on the previously presented discussion, it is possible to highlight various issues associated with disaster measures implemented in developed countries. First, regardless of how advanced disaster measures are, a “surge in disaster damage” can occur, which can lead to a “black swan” event. Therefore, it is necessary to formulate disaster prevention measures based on the assumption that such crises will occur in the future. Second, it is necessary for developed countries to determine how best to formulate reconstruction policies to avoid marginalizing disaster victims as well as to prevent over-specified reconstruction. In examining these two issues, the common problem that arises is how to conduct “risk assessment and enable its acceptance” most calmly immediately after a disaster and then formulate disaster prevention measures based on such assessment. Finally, the future of disaster sociology is detailed in this work. More specifically, in order for disaster sociology to escape its “marginal” status in sociology, it is necessary to consider “disaster” in the context of both a social structure and a social change—similar to how risk theory views the issue.