Relational peace versus pacific primacy: Configuring US strategy for Asia's regional order

Abstract

This article challenges the presumption that American commitment to the greater Indo-Pacific region has positive effects on regional stability. It argues that the degree to which America's strategic choices in Asia embrittle or consolidate peace depends on how they intersect with relational configurations of regional order. An accommodative strategy of restraint and mutual threat reduction offers the greatest stability with the least risk either when China's ties to a unified Asia are predatory or when Asia is fractured but China's ties to it are cooperative. A balance-of-power strategy offers the greatest stability and least risk when China's ties to a fractured Asia are confrontational or predatory. And an institutional strategy offers the greatest stability with the least risk when China enjoys broadly cooperative ties to Asia regardless of whether Asian states are unified or fractured. Crucially, a strategy of primacy or containment embrittles regional peace because it conflicts with every foreseeable configuration of relational order. America's role as a Pacific Power should adapt to local relational conditions if it is to serve the greater purpose of regional peace.