<p>The capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by United States forces marks a watershed moment in the further erosion of rules based international order (RBIO) revealing once more the propensity of great powers to instrumentalize international law and human rights for strategic ends. For Asia, this episode is not a remote Western Hemisphere anomaly but a cautionary signal that the guardrails once thought to constrain great power behavior are increasingly contingent, contested, and conditional.</p><p>I touched on the RBIO's increasing fragility and weakness last year (Arugay <span>2025</span>). To the shock of many, 2026 started with this Venezuelan operation while even leaders like Putin were on holiday. The Venezuela operation illustrates the enduring logic of superpower exceptionalism, in which great powers claim latitude to reinterpret or suspend norms that otherwise bind the rest of the international system. Legal analyses overwhelmingly view the forcible seizure of a sitting head of state, on the territory of another sovereign without its consent or UN authorization, as a prima facie breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the customary rule of non‑intervention.</p><p>US officials have framed the action as a law‑enforcement–driven “extraction” grounded in criminal indictments and the illegitimacy of Maduro's regime, blurring the line between domestic jurisdiction and the Charter's strict regulation of the use of force. This move resembles earlier efforts to justify targeted killings or transborder operations as sui generis responses to “rogue” actors, thereby chipping away at the collective security framework that formally vests coercive authority in the UN Security Council.</p><p>The narrative surrounding Maduro's capture also reveals how human rights and democracy promotion can be mobilized as selective tools rather than consistent principles. Washington has long criticized Caracas for authoritarianism, corruption, and egregious human rights abuses, yet the means chosen to address these violations involve conduct that prominent jurists argue undermines due process guarantees, non‑refoulement protections, and the prohibition against arbitrary detention when viewed through an international human rights lens. Elsewhere in the world, particularly in Southeast Asia, widespread human rights violations have not resulted in military intervention like in Myanmar (Barber and Teitt <span>2021</span>).</p><p>Such selective universalism is familiar to observers in Asia who have seen rights‑based rhetoric invoked to justify certain interventions while comparable abuses by allies or strategic partners elicit muted responses. The Maduro precedent thus feeds broader perceptions, particularly in the Global South, that the liberal order's normative vocabulary is hierarchically applied, with great powers positioning themselves simultaneously as norm entrepreneurs, enforcers, and—increasingly—exceptions to the rules.</p><p>This signalling reverber
{"title":"Rules, Power, and Interests: Superpowers and a Turbulent World Order","authors":"Aries A. Arugay","doi":"10.1111/aspp.70063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.70063","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by United States forces marks a watershed moment in the further erosion of rules based international order (RBIO) revealing once more the propensity of great powers to instrumentalize international law and human rights for strategic ends. For Asia, this episode is not a remote Western Hemisphere anomaly but a cautionary signal that the guardrails once thought to constrain great power behavior are increasingly contingent, contested, and conditional.</p><p>I touched on the RBIO's increasing fragility and weakness last year (Arugay <span>2025</span>). To the shock of many, 2026 started with this Venezuelan operation while even leaders like Putin were on holiday. The Venezuela operation illustrates the enduring logic of superpower exceptionalism, in which great powers claim latitude to reinterpret or suspend norms that otherwise bind the rest of the international system. Legal analyses overwhelmingly view the forcible seizure of a sitting head of state, on the territory of another sovereign without its consent or UN authorization, as a prima facie breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the customary rule of non‑intervention.</p><p>US officials have framed the action as a law‑enforcement–driven “extraction” grounded in criminal indictments and the illegitimacy of Maduro's regime, blurring the line between domestic jurisdiction and the Charter's strict regulation of the use of force. This move resembles earlier efforts to justify targeted killings or transborder operations as sui generis responses to “rogue” actors, thereby chipping away at the collective security framework that formally vests coercive authority in the UN Security Council.</p><p>The narrative surrounding Maduro's capture also reveals how human rights and democracy promotion can be mobilized as selective tools rather than consistent principles. Washington has long criticized Caracas for authoritarianism, corruption, and egregious human rights abuses, yet the means chosen to address these violations involve conduct that prominent jurists argue undermines due process guarantees, non‑refoulement protections, and the prohibition against arbitrary detention when viewed through an international human rights lens. Elsewhere in the world, particularly in Southeast Asia, widespread human rights violations have not resulted in military intervention like in Myanmar (Barber and Teitt <span>2021</span>).</p><p>Such selective universalism is familiar to observers in Asia who have seen rights‑based rhetoric invoked to justify certain interventions while comparable abuses by allies or strategic partners elicit muted responses. The Maduro precedent thus feeds broader perceptions, particularly in the Global South, that the liberal order's normative vocabulary is hierarchically applied, with great powers positioning themselves simultaneously as norm entrepreneurs, enforcers, and—increasingly—exceptions to the rules.</p><p>This signalling reverber","PeriodicalId":44747,"journal":{"name":"Asian Politics & Policy","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/aspp.70063","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146136800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}