Asian Politics & Policy最新文献

How do small states navigate the current geostrategic rivalry between the United States (US) and China? If one solely takes the view of realpolitik or power politics, there seems to be very few options for weaker states. The history of international relations showed us that they played derivative roles as proxies for great powers, sites or theaters of conflict, and worst, possible victims of collateral damage in superpower clashes. A known African proverb resembles small states as the grass that gets trampled by elephants (superpowers) regardless whether they fight (conflict) or make love (cooperation). And in times of deep and pernicious polarization between great powers, the precarity of small states are heightened to unprecedented degrees.

Nonetheless, attempts to mitigate the negative repercussions stemming from the Sino-US geostrategic rivalry from the collective of small states have not gathered sufficient success thus far. On the contrary, there is increasing pressure for states to choose a side despite the benefits of taking an ambiguous stance given superpower competition. In a recent keynote speech in the 2024 Shangri-La Dialogue, Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. admitted that superpower rivalry has constrained the choices of small powers and has exacerbated regional flashpoints. He warned that small states could be included in new geopolitical spheres of influence and become buffer states. Instead, small and middle powers have the agency to forge consensus, build bridges, and even shape the rules. Instead of paws, another perspective offers that small states can be credible pathfinder, trusted partners, and committed peacemakers. To fulfill these potentials, there is a need for small states to assert their agency but to also collectively organize and band together.

Previous articles published in Asian Politics & Policy emphasized the moments where the agency of small states can be seen. For example, the hedging strategy between competing regional powers has been the default approach of small Arab Gulf states to address their respective security dilemmas (Hamdi & Salman, 2020). Using Malaysia as a case study, Kuik (2016) also argued that hedging is the strategy of smaller powers, especially those that hedge on a wide variety of security risks, rather than focused on any major power. Using other countries in Southeast Asia like Cambodia and Vietnam, Železný (2022) revealed the diverse types of hedging behavior given US-China competition during the Obama administration. These research articles suggest the states can creatively navigate the competition between great powers. It remains to be seen whether these strategies are sustainable as the rivalry between US and China intensifies.

In this issue of APP, we also feature similar studies that reflect on the ability of Asian states to manoeuvre around superpower rivalry. The articles written by

The dependency relationship in economic and trade cooperation between countries has long been a subject of ongoing debate among scholars of international relations. Albert Hirschman proposed his theory, known as the “Hirschman effect,” which examines how profit-making groups influence the foreign policies of nations. However, this article contends that interest groups alone cannot fully account for the Hirschman effect. Through examining cases involving Southeast Asian countries and China, it becomes evident that security needs and interest preferences collectively influence the strength of the Hirschman effect between small and large countries. Specifically, Cambodia, Malaysia, and the Philippines illustrate varying degrees of the Hirschman effect, with Cambodia exhibiting a positive effect, Malaysia demonstrating a composite effect, and the Philippines displaying a negative effect.

On August 31, 2021, 20 years after the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, President Biden announced the completion of the United States (US) withdrawal from Afghanistan. The difficult conditions of the withdrawal raised major questions about US credibility, as images from Kabul were broadcasted around the world. Pundits, scholars, and former decision makers warned that reputational damages incurred by Washington could lead Chinese decision makers to reassess the credibility of US commitments in the Indo-Pacific. Few studies have, however, examined how China interpreted the Afghanistan withdrawal. This article proposes to fill this gap. It argues that though Chinese observers did see the Afghanistan withdrawal as caused by a lack of US resolve, this perceived lack of resolve did not translate into general reputational costs for the United States and, consequently, calculations made by Chinese observers about US credibility in the Indo-Pacific region remain largely unimpacted by the Afghanistan setback.

What explains the exponential growth of the number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in China during the recent decades? Moving beyond the extant literature that focuses on the strategic relationship between NGOs and the local state, this article argues that the growth can be also attributed to the central state which has focused on the promotion of different types of NGOs throughout time. The proactive role of the central state has become more conspicuous under the Xi Jinping administration where the party-state plays a more active role in maneuvering the growth of a service-oriented third sector. This adaptive strategy has led to the counterintuitive phenomenon of an increase in institutional space for NGOs in authoritarian China, especially the social service-oriented NGOs in recent years. This article draws from theories of institutional change to explain the process through which the central state has expanded institutional space for NGOs throughout time.

The Indonesian governments developed the Upsus Pajale policy to achieve a goal and solve the problem of food self-sufficiency. Rice, corn, and soybean were the main commodities in the plan of Upsus Pajale Policy implementation. UPSUS Pajale improve rice, corn, and soybean production for food self-sufficiency. This study examined UPSUS Pajale policy implementation at the province, district, subdistrict, and farmer levels. This study examined rice growing in Banyuasin's tidal lowlands, Ogan Komering Ilir's swamplands, and East Ogan Komering Ulu's irrigated rice fields. The research method used a combination model of quantitative and qualitative (mixed method). Sampling data used purposive sampling. NVivo 12 software examined provincial, district, subdistrict, farmer interviews, and group discussions. Results affected typology management constraints differently. Production input costs were the most common issue. This study found that policy was differently implemented at various levels. It would be impacted to the success of the policy.

Asia's contribution will be decisive for the global effort to mitigate climate change. But Asia lacks a country that could take the lead and inspire the rest of the region to accelerate its climate action. To identify countries that could fulfill such a role, this article takes a two-step, mixed-methods approach. First, an index is created to identify some potentially leading countries. Second, the top countries identified by the index are assessed in greater detail qualitatively. The analysis finds that China, Japan, and Singapore are the most plausible candidates to take the lead. By doing so, these countries could potentially inspire their neighbors to step up their own efforts as climate change becomes an increasingly important issue in international affairs. However, to become a leader and influence their peers, they will have to make a conscious choice and dedicated effort.

The phrase “action-reaction” has been frequently reiterated in public speeches by Malaysian leaders, formal documents, and behind-the-scenes discussions. This article contends that this expression operates as a manifestation of Malaysian policymakers' comprehension of the security dilemma and their strategic assessment of their position within a security ecosystem. As part of the interconnected web of relationships among regional actors, any disturbance has the potential to draw Malaysia, as a small state, into an extended cycle of crises. This article draws on Malaysia's conduct in the South China Sea (1970–2023). To mitigate risks, in alignment with various scholarly perspectives, Malaysia adopts a hedging strategy involving tradeoffs and contingency plans. Beyond hedging, a more proactive perspective is also emphasized: when Malaysia identifies affordances or opportunities to act within the security ecosystem, it endeavors to leverage them for its benefit.

Does the Philippines have a grand strategy? The question is biased in favor of a negative answer. Odds are stacked against detecting a grand strategy in non-great-power states. Operationalizing grand strategy as a consistent pattern of behavior reduces bias, but odds are also stacked against observing policy continuities in the Philippines. Increasing the level of analysis, emphasizing outcomes over intentions, and enlarging the time scale can help. Applying these analytical techniques, I argue that a Philippine grand strategy is evident in continuities in the country's foreign and security policies on the South China Sea from 1995 to 2022 under the successive administrations of Ramos, Estrada, Arroyo, Aquino III, and Duterte. The grand strategy has five component policies: (1) bilateral diplomacy with China, (2) multilateral diplomacy through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), (3) grounding in the law of the sea, (4) maintaining the alliance with the US, and (5) modernizing the military.

Regions are social constructs. What constitutes “Asia” is an evolving label and the region's consensual name has evolved over the decades. This can be thorny debate and the current campaign to decolonize epistemic handles has led to interesting discourses on why the region is now more called “Indo-Pacific” than Asia-Pacific, for example.

Last month, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Australia commemorated its 50th year of diplomatic relations with a special summit that gathered leaders and sectoral members of these two important entities. The meeting had the increasing regional uncertainty and turbulence as its backdrop. The United States (US)-China rivalry remains a strategic challenge that both ASEAN and Australia must face together.

As a long standing partner, Australia is perceived to be one of the more reliable and dependable partners of Southeast Asian states individually and ASEAN collectively. Australia has cultivated comprehensive and strategic partnerships with ASEAN member-states, invested heavily in economic, security, and people-to-people exchanges. Unlike other major powers, its visibility and reliability was seldom questioned by ASEAN. What was notable is Australia's perspective of the relationship with ASEAN as one that is defined by equanimity, mutual respect, reciprocity, and shared values. As Australia has regularly declared, its interest and therefore identity is with the Asia-Pacific. It has consistently matched this rhetoric with concrete actions and investment in the region. Australia has also been seen as a middle power who genuinely listens to Southeast Asian states and uses them as inputs for meaningful engagement.

Asian Politics & Policy has provided the epistemic space to probe intro Australia's relationship with Asia. For example, Kim and Raswant (2023) looked into Australia's relationship with South Korea as another important pillar in buttressing the former's Indo-Pacific strategy. On the other hand, Snyder (2015) studied the Australia-Malaysia relationship and how closer security cooperation has improved bilateral relations previously defined by thorny sociopolitical issues. Finally, Taylor (2020) examined Australia's Indo-Pacific concept and how it seeks to engage it as a middle power. His conclusion that Australia should strategize its engagement in the region with careful monitoring and tempered patience has been the middle power's paradigm as it seeks to further enhance its relationship with ASEAN.

Our April 2024 issue continues this scholarly gaze on Australia's engagement with the Asia-Pacific. Yoshimatsu and Maso (2024) differentiated between Australia and China's economic relationship with Pacific Island countries. Contrary to China, they argued that Australia employed economic statecraft defined by multilateralism and normative considerations. Dell'Era and Martín (2024) compared two a