A merely national ‘universal’ basic income and global justice

IF 2.9 1区 哲学 Q1 ETHICS Journal of Political Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-03-15 DOI:10.1111/jopp.12289
Martin Sticker
{"title":"A merely national ‘universal’ basic income and global justice","authors":"Martin Sticker","doi":"10.1111/jopp.12289","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this article, I raise a justice problem for a universal basic income (UBI) if implemented in one or a few nations, but not globally. I raise this objection from the perspective of someone who is ultimately sympathetic to a UBI, even a merely national one. My argument specifically problematizes the unconditionality of a UBI and the unprecedented benefits for those who receive it. UBI advocates themselves often draw attention to this unconditionality in order to justify the greater moral appeal of a UBI over other schemes. Thus, my argument has particular relevance for those sympathetic to a UBI. I argue that, in response to the justice problem I raise, a merely national UBI should be accompanied by compensation for non-UBI-recipients who contribute to what I will call the UBI's ‘effectiveness’.</p><p>In Section I, I explain what I mean by a merely national UBI, and in Section II, I develop a justice or exploitation problem that a merely national UBI faces. In Section III, I argue for a compensation scheme for non-recipient contributors. In Section IV, I clarify the scope of my argument, and in Section V, I discuss how my argument relates to a potential global UBI.</p><p>A UBI is income paid irrespective of willingness to work, of wealth, of other sources of income, and of personal circumstances. If a UBI is pitched at a sufficiently high level, it realizes a number of goods for its recipients: it frees them from the most basic forms of economic insecurity without conditions such as a work requirement,1 affords so-called ‘real freedom’, the freedom to choose the way recipients want to live,2 and allows recipients to exit unattractive jobs and even the job market altogether.3 If a UBI realizes these goods for a recipient, I will say that the UBI is <i>effective</i>. In the next section, I will argue that it is unjust if a merely national UBI is made more effective by the exploitative labour of those who do not receive a UBI and thus cannot opt out of their unattractive jobs, lack the freedom to live as they want, and are subject to basic economic insecurity.</p><p>A UBI is currently often presented as a radical yet feasible solution to pressing political and social problems, such as poverty,4 the demeaning nature of conditional welfare schemes,5 costly and overly bureaucratic welfare-state regulations,6 the drive for ever more growth and the resulting environmental destruction,7 the fact that much necessary care work is currently not financially rewarded,8 and that workers are increasingly being replaced by robots and computers.9</p><p>For my purpose, two things are especially significant. Firstly, a UBI is frequently presented as a non-utopian proposal that, from an economic perspective, could be implemented in some countries now or in the near future.10 Secondly, a <i>global</i> UBI, by contrast, would require major political, economic, and social changes worldwide. This is currently rather utopian, though perhaps ‘no longer a mere pipe dream’.11 A UBI, insofar as it is intended as a solution to some of the most pressing issues of our time and one that is financially and politically feasible now or in the near future, will be one implemented in only a few and, most likely, relatively wealthy countries.12 This raises the question of how a merely national UBI would be impacted by and, in turn, affect the current unequal und unjust global order.</p><p>The problem I raise in this section is a more pressing version of the already well-known exploitation or free-rider objection to UBI. My problem is concerned with the exploitation specifically of non-nationals or non-residents, who contribute to but do not benefit from a merely national UBI. The literature pays surprisingly little attention to injustices between different nations that a merely national UBI might amplify. In fact, discussions of exploitation and unfairness within the UBI literature take place almost exclusively on an intra-national level.13</p><p>The original exploitation objection is inspired by Rawls's claim that Malibu surfers are not entitled to public funds.14 The (in)famous surfer is someone who could contribute to society either via paid work or in other socially beneficial ways, but, instead, spends all his time surfing. While the surfer potentially poses a problem for all government schemes founded on cooperation between citizens, the objection is particularly pressing for a UBI, as here benefits are explicitly not conditional upon willingness to cooperate, for example by seeking paid employment. UBI advocates see this unconditionality as a feature, not a bug.15 Nonetheless, in the case of the surfer, a UBI seems to clash with ‘a widely accepted notion of justice: it is unfair for able bodied people to live off the labour of others’.16 This objection is sometimes phrased in terms of unfairness, sometimes in terms of exploitation or parasitism, since the surfer lives off the labour of others who (supposedly) do not receive adequate compensation for the services they perform. I take it that the underlying intuition is that it is unjust if one person's lifestyle is subsidized by the labour of other persons and there is no reciprocity in this subsidy, even though the first person could reciprocate.</p><p>There is a straightforward response to the surfer problem. Take Lazy (the surfer) and Crazy, who works hard and whose income and other taxes help fund a UBI that allows Lazy to spend all of his time surfing. Crazy cannot reasonably complain about this, since, if he finds the lifestyle of Lazy more appealing than his own, he could give up his job and become a surfer himself. After all, an effective UBI affords him the real freedom to live this way. If Crazy does not give up his job, then this is because he chooses the life of work and higher income—in which case both Lazy and Crazy live the life they chose, and the UBI is working out well for both. Thus, Lazy is not exploiting Crazy, since Crazy can withdraw his labour and is afforded the same economic security and freedom to live the life of his choosing as Lazy.</p><p>I find this response to the original surfer problem persuasive.17 Things would be different, however, if someone in Crazy's position <i>could not</i> choose to give up their job and become a (financially adequately supported) surfer, because they (I'll call them ‘Exploited’) are neither citizen nor resident18 of a country that pays a UBI. Given the globalized world that we live in, Exploited might well perform work that benefits Lazy as well as Crazy. Such work can be a subsidy of their lifestyles if Exploited's labour is cheaper than the labour of those in the same strong bargaining position as Lazy and Crazy to demand higher pay or better working conditions. After all, Lazy and Crazy have the freedom and security to opt out of work altogether. If it is unjust that someone's lifestyle is subsidized by the labour of another person and there is no adequate reciprocity in this subsidy, then a merely national UBI suffers from a justice problem with regard to the subsidies Lazy and Crazy receive from Exploited and the lack of reciprocity.</p><p>In the debate about the fairness of a UBI there is much concern about non-contributors, such as the Malibu surfer, receiving benefits. There is much less concern about people who <i>do</i> contribute, but do not receive benefits because they are of a different nationality or live in a different country.19 The latter, it seems to me, constitutes the most pressing justice problem.</p><p>Let me spell this out in more detail. A merely national UBI excludes certain people as recipients, even if they contribute to the effectiveness of the UBI in that country. They can make such a contribution by subsidizing UBI recipients with their cheap labour, which increases the relative value of the UBI for recipients, as it makes products and services more affordable than they would be if everyone received a UBI. This impacts what and how much those living off a UBI can afford, the opportunities open to them, and how attractive it is for them to exit jobs (or to reduce hours), and thus whether the UBI realizes the goods that it promises, and to what extent it does so.</p><p>These subsidies for UBI recipients would be, in one sense, not dissimilar from currently existing conditions. After all, the citizens of developed countries already benefit from global inequalities, poor working conditions, and low pay in developing countries where people are forced to work to meet their basic needs. However, there currently exists a work requirement even in wealthy countries, whereas there would be no such requirement for those enjoying an effective UBI. It is reasonable to assume that if non-recipient contributors were not forced to work for their subsistence, because they also enjoyed a UBI that frees them of the need to work for their subsistence, then some services and goods that are currently offered or produced cheaply would become more expensive. The subsidies would likely (at least in part) disappear, and the UBI thus become less effective for recipients.</p><p>A prime example for exploitation, that subsidizes the citizens of wealthy countries and that many individuals in developing countries would be unlikely to put up with if they were in a position to opt out, is so-called <i>sweatshop labour</i>.20 I take it that sweatshop labour is a relatively uncontroversial example of exploitation.21 The low pay and bad conditions in sweatshops are (part of) the reason why this work is profitable for their owners and why this mode of production can benefit end-consumers. Even after the introduction of a global UBI (or a merely national UBI in countries with sweatshops), there may be people willing to manufacture the type of products formerly produced in sweatshops, but they would presumably need stronger financial incentives and would be able to demand better working conditions that would make these products more expensive.</p><p>Now, imagine that Exploited works in a factory that builds surf equipment and, due to poor working conditions and low pay for her and her colleagues, this equipment is significantly cheaper than equipment produced by Lazy's fellow citizens who enjoy a UBI and lack strong financial incentives to work in a surfboard factory for low pay. In an extreme case, the only surf equipment Lazy can afford from his UBI is equipment produced by Exploited. Without this cheap supply of equipment, it would not be possible for Lazy to live the pure lifestyle of a surfer and he would have to take up (part-time) employment to afford his equipment. A UBI then allows Lazy to live the way he wants only because of the labour of Exploited, who, unlike Crazy, does not have the option to withdraw her labour and live off a UBI.</p><p>Even if Exploited does not manufacture the specific products that Lazy needs to live the pure lifestyle of a surfer, as long as she does manufacture products or render services that Lazy or Crazy want or need, and does so more cheaply than if she were able to opt out of work, the UBI that Lazy and Crazy enjoy goes further in terms of purchasing power than it otherwise would. Part of the value of a merely national UBI for recipients thus stems from the fact that this UBI is <i>merely</i> national and that it still leaves in place sources of cheap labour elsewhere.</p><p>One might respond that my empirical assumption that a global UBI would dry up sources of cheap labour and drive up prices is questionable. After all, one of the potential advantages of a UBI is that it removes financial disincentives to take up low-paid or precarious work; disincentives put in place by misjudged tax and welfare systems that leave people financially better off on welfare than in work or that effectively impose high taxes on low incomes. People might still want to work to top up their UBI and they would not need a subsistence wage in return. Thus, a UBI might even make certain products and services <i>cheaper</i>.</p><p>I think that intrinsically rewarding or meaningful work might become cheaper, if people enjoyed a UBI and could choose their occupations without having to earn a living. However, it is also plausible to assume that recipients of a subsistence-level UBI would be unlikely to take up a substantial amount of sweatshop-type labour, unless these jobs were paid significantly better and/or working conditions much improved (and would thus no longer qualify as sweatshop labour). After all, one of the main benefits of a UBI is that it grants recipients the freedom to decline or exit unattractive jobs and even escape ‘forced labor market participation’ altogether.22 What, if any, jobs would UBI recipients want to decline if not poorly paid, dangerous jobs, involving repetitive labour, coercion, and health risks? Thus, it is plausible to assume that many currently cheap products would become more expensive if, globally, everyone enjoyed a UBI.23 This would reduce the living standards of people in high-income countries subsisting on a fixed income in the form of a UBI, and might even reintroduce the necessity to work. The effectiveness of a UBI in providing basic financial security and allowing recipients to live as they wish depends in some measure on cheap (and exploitative) labour by those not enjoying a UBI.</p><p>My argument above notwithstanding, a merely national UBI would be an effective tool to combat many forms of injustice within that nation. After all, even in wealthy nations many citizens are in precarious and vulnerable financial positions that employers, corporations, loan sharks, and the government can exploit. A merely national UBI, if pitched at the right level and financed in the right way, would serve justice within that society, and it would therefore be premature to dismiss it.</p><p>There is a parallel case that demonstrates how defenders of a UBI can respond to the justice problem raised in the previous section: namely, the ethical debate about the harmful climate impact of Alaska's Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD). Since 1982 the US state of Alaska pays an annual dividend—$1,114 in 2021—to all its residents. The PFD represents the largest example of a UBI paid over a prolonged period (albeit not at subsistence level). Moreover, the Alaska financing model, taxing natural resource appropriation, is attractive to UBI advocates, since many other financing models, such as income tax or VAT, disproportionately affect working people and/or people on low incomes.24 Steve Winter, however, argues that the ‘PFD makes participating recipients complicit with grave wrongdoing because of its connection to the oil industry, a practice responsible for 150,000 deaths per annum’.25 Winter's argument is, in short, that the oil industry involves intrinsic wrongs, and that the Alaskan PFD makes recipients complicit in intrinsic wrongs. This complicity is itself wrongful.</p><p>Winter does not think that his objection is ‘devastating’ for the Alaska model.26 He proposes ‘to combine basic income payments with sufficient funding to stop the killings’.27 Since the oil industry28 does not kill anyone directly, but rather costs lives due to indirect effects such as disease, extreme weather events, and other foreseeable effects of global warming, adequate preventive and remedial measures could be taken to remove the reason to object to the Alaska model. The Alaska model would then have two components: ‘Funding derived from natural resource appropriation would provide monies for a basic income and to prevent the deaths that would otherwise occur due to climate change’.29 This latter scheme would not have to prevent <i>all</i> deaths that occur from climate change, as Alaska is globally only a relatively minor source of oil. It would merely have to mitigate ‘those negative effects (we are focusing on unjustifiable deaths) that could be attributed to the industry in question’30—meaning, specifically the Alaskan oil industry. Winter calculates that averting 405 killings per year would be sufficient to ‘discharge Alaskans’ “fair share” of responsibility’ for the wrongful killings.31 He also emphasizes that this move is applicable to all models of financing a UBI based on harmful resource extraction.32 He does not, however, generalize his argument to other ethical challenges for a UBI.</p><p>The general intuition behind Winter's idea is that those who benefit from unjust arrangements have stringent obligations to compensate victims. This principle is not limited to a merely national UBI made (more) effective by exploitation. In the next section, I will discuss whether it makes a moral difference if exploitation specifically props up a merely national UBI. For now, I will show that a plausible reply to the problem I discussed in the previous section is to take up a modified version of Winter's suggestion of providing what he calls ‘avert-funding’. I will phrase my own proposal in terms of <i>compensation</i>, specifically for those who contribute to a merely national UBI but do not receive a UBI. To better understand this proposal, let us look at four salient points of comparison between the problems of the Alaska model and the global justice problem from the previous section.</p><p>Firstly, Winter stresses that ‘Alaskans are not <i>guilty</i> of’ the deaths resulting from the oil industry.33 Mere complicity in a wrong is less severe than committing the wrong itself. This point is important, since avert-funding or compensation usually would not be an adequate response to wrongs that an agent herself commits. If I murder you, I cannot plausibly compensate for this by donating money to buy medicine that saves someone else's life. Compensation schemes are appropriate for wrongs which I am complicit in or benefit from, but of which I am not the perpetrator. The perpetrator's primary duty is to refrain from wrongdoing, not to offset the negative effects or avert harm elsewhere.</p><p>Winter suggests that complicity in the Alaska PFD is ‘equivalent in veniality with wearing sweatshop clothing’.34 This is quite a contentious claim, since being complicit in killing is commonly considered much worse than complicity in various forms of exploitation. Presumably, Winter's point is here not about the impact of killing and exploitation on victims, but about illustrating the structure of moral responsibility. The idea is that agents are not actively harming anyone themselves, but they are complicit. Importantly, this is already the case for the globally affluent who do not receive a UBI, but who are buying sweatshop products, making them complicit in exploitation. There would, however, be an important sense in which merely national UBI recipients’ complicity had an additional dimension. As I suggested in the previous section, if it were not for cheap foreign labour that benefits the citizens of wealthy nations, a merely national UBI might not be sufficient to cover the basic needs of recipients, and thus to perform some of its most beneficial functions. Moreover, even if a merely national UBI covered basic needs without cheap labour from abroad, its relative value increases due to this cheap labour. UBI recipients’ real freedom is subsidized by the labour of those forced to work for their subsistence.</p><p>Secondly, Winter thinks that mere <i>benefiting</i> from wrongful actions is not sufficient for complicity in an ethically relevant sense. He stresses that ‘[t]he wrongfulness exposed by the complicity argument does not depend on benefits but rather upon wrongful agency’.35 By contrast, the problem I bring up draws on both wrongful agency and benefiting. <i>Wrongful agency</i>, for instance, obtains in consumer choices when we knowingly buy products produced under exploitative conditions. Moreover, we <i>benefit</i> from wrongful structures, if we receive a UBI the effectiveness of which is enhanced by exploitation. Wrongful agency and benefiting raise several complicated issues concerning voluntariness. After all, one might argue that you are not morally responsible for benefiting from something that you have no say in—for instance, because your government transfers money to your bank account every month whether you want it or not.36</p><p>One way to address the global justice problem I brought up in the previous section would be to give potential recipients the opportunity to <i>opt out</i> of the UBI, an opportunity that exists for the Alaska PFD.37 However, unlike a compensation scheme, opting out of the UBI would not leave non-recipient contributors materially any better off. Moreover, it might still be a problem if certain (already privileged) people <i>can</i> opt in or out, an opportunity denied to non-recipient contributors. Finally, if people opted out of the UBI, then this might necessitate the reintroduction of welfare schemes that secure their subsistence if they become indigent. This would presumably leave unsatisfied those UBI advocates who emphasize the benefits of the <i>universal</i> coverage of a UBI.38</p><p>Thirdly, Winter maintains that ‘<i>Oil exploitation</i> is not wrongful in itself’, but that the production of greenhouse gas, which causes additional deaths, ‘is a <i>normal</i> component of the industry’.39 In the case of exploitation of people, as in sweatshop labour, early deaths, due to workplace accidents, are fairly abnormal, but other impacts, such as negative long-term health consequences for workers, lost time with family and friends due to long shifts, lost opportunities, and so on, are inextricable features of the industry. The exploitation I am concerned with is not an unintended by-product, but essential to the high profit margins of sweatshop labour. Thus, the problem I raised is, in one sense, more worrying than the rather indirect effects of the oil industry. It is, I take it, plausible that someone who benefits from exploiting people has a more stringent duty to compensate victims than someone who benefits from resource extraction that, as a normal or even necessary side-effect, is also harmful to some people. However, my proposal does not hinge on this specific intuition.</p><p>Fourthly, there is an important sense in which a merely national UBI, as well as the Alaska PFD, are both innocuous. In both cases the victims (of climate change or exploitation) are not made worse off by the redistribution of revenues in the form of a merely national UBI. The victims of climate change would die even if a private corporation pocketed Alaska's oil revenue. Analogously, whether consumers do or do not receive a UBI leaves sweatshop workers’ working conditions and pay untouched, or at least there is no immediate connection here. This might well impact the stringency of duties of compensation that those benefiting from their labour have. In fact, I think that, since a merely national UBI does not make victims of exploitation worse off, a compensation scheme is the right middle ground between, on the one hand, opposing a merely national UBI on ethical grounds and, on the other hand, leaving the exploitation problem of a merely national UBI unaddressed.</p><p>Winter proposes avert-funding that would save as many lives from the effects of climate change as the Alaska oil industry is responsible for taking, and he presents a clear number for this: namely, 405 lives. By contrast, it is very difficult to quantify how many people would have to be exploited for a merely national UBI to be effective, and this would greatly depend on the circumstances of the recipients as well as the contributors, and on overall political and economic conditions. It is therefore impossible to determine a concrete number of people that an avert mechanism must protect from exploitation. Furthermore, unlike those killed by climate change, the current victims of exploitation are still alive.40 In addition, whereas the effects of climate change are random, in the sense that we do not know which specific individuals will die or otherwise suffer from it (though we do know that some groups and regions are much more likely to be affected than others), there are concrete individuals whose work would benefit the recipients of a merely national UBI. These non-recipient contributors are owed something, and it would not be adequate to merely combat or avert exploitation <i>somewhere</i>, if we can at least approximately identify these contributors.</p><p>My proposed compensation scheme, therefore, is not a form of avert-funding, but rather funding that aims to benefit specifically <i>non-recipient contributors</i> to a merely national UBI. This can take the relatively general form of benefiting anyone from whose exploitation recipients of a UBI benefit. For instance, fair-trade practices or even higher standards could be made legally mandatory and appropriate resources could be allocated to enforce these standards.41 We can also imagine more targeted measures that specifically benefit workers in developing countries manufacturing products and providing services crucial to the citizens of the country that introduced a merely national UBI, insofar as it is possible to single out specific factories or regions where this labour is performed. One such targeted measure could be direct money transfers to workers who have worked a set number of years or who have become unable to work. Another could be to relax immigration restrictions for non-recipient contributors, so that it becomes easier for them to become residents or citizens of the country that implemented the merely national UBI, and to set up funds to help them make the journey and settle in. This, of course, should not happen only once, but for each successive generation of non-recipient contributors replacing those who have retired or migrated.</p><p>There are, admittedly, major problems of application here, since global supply and production chains are complex and often cross more than one border. Moreover, one might wonder whether our conception of who contributes to the effectiveness of a merely national UBI should include not only workers who manufacture cheap products, but also people who produce food and other necessary goods and services for these workers, or who perform unpaid reproductive labour that allows workers to produce goods and services as cheaply as they do. I cannot address these problems here. Maybe the best we could do would be to start with a few cases of exploitative labour that clearly benefit many UBI recipients and then extend the compensation scheme gradually, according to our best understanding of global supply chains.42</p><p>To clarify the scope of my scheme, I should note that my concern is not poverty and inequality—as is, for instance the focus of Thomas Pogge's Global Resource Dividend43—but <i>exploitation</i> that contributes to the effectiveness of a merely national UBI. Not all of the globally poor would contribute to a merely national UBI, and not all non-recipient contributors are among the world's poorest. My proposal leaves open the prospect that there are additional duties to compensate, because global poverty is due to structures put in place by the globally affluent and from which the affluent benefit regardless of whether they enjoy a UBI. In fact, I believe that my argument does not reveal an entirely new duty to compensate, but rather that it amplifies pre-existing duties to compensate for global injustices.</p><p>It seems relatively uncontroversial that there are duties to compensate for exploitation or to try to reset (international) relationships so that they become non-exploitative. This is so regardless of whether nations have implemented a merely national UBI. This raises the question of what exactly is the role of a merely national UBI for my argument.44</p><p>At the very least, my argument functions as a prod to make global justice issues more central to the debate about the prospects and drawbacks of a merely national UBI. This is potentially already quite powerful, since some of the most persuasive arguments for a UBI are explicitly <i>moral</i> ones. A UBI is presented as something that individuals are owed as a matter of justice qua entitlement to the commons,45 or as a matter of social and economic justice.46 If there are significant moral reasons for adopting a UBI, then any discussion of the moral advantages of a UBI should consider how it might impact and interact with unjust global structures.</p><p>My argument also provides <i>additional reasons</i> for compensating exploited workers. It thus amplifies the duty that privileged Westerners already have to compensate those from whose exploitation they benefit. How strong these additional reasons are, and to what extent a pre-existing duty is intensified, depend on why one thinks that a UBI is better than other ways of distributing resources (some of which were obtained unfairly). Those who advocate for a UBI assume that it offers concomitant goods or benefits that other schemes, such as conditional welfare provision, participation income, and so on, do not provide, though a UBI may not be the only scheme that provides some of those special goods.</p><p>As I pointed out at the beginning of this article, various UBI advocates emphasize different, albeit often in practice overlapping, goods. An effective UBI frees recipients from the most basic forms of economic insecurity and does so without a work requirement, affords real freedom, and allows recipients to say no to employment. If one thinks that a UBI is to be preferred over (many or all) other schemes because it can realize special goods, then, I take it, one should be very concerned if these special goods are not available to some people who contribute to the effectiveness of the UBI. These additional goods that some enjoy at the expense of others exacerbate existing exploitation problems, since the privileged here do not merely obtain more of the same—for example, more purchasing power due to the labour of workers with already lower purchasing power. Rather, goods, exceeding what is currently provided by existing schemes, are now enjoyed by some, in part due to the work of others who lack these goods entirely.</p><p>If a wealthy nation distributes (partly) ill-gotten gains in some other way than through a merely national UBI—for example, as a work-tested minimum-income guarantee—then we could not level the specific criticism I propose, because, in this case, workers in the wealthy nation would (also) lack basic economic security no matter what, lack the freedom to opt out of paid employment, and would have less real freedom than a UBI would provide. However, in this case, the wealthy nation would still benefit to the same extent, in aggregate market-value terms, from the exploitation as in the UBI case and the workers in the poorer nation would be rendered as badly off by this exploitation as in the UBI case.</p><p>In fact, many other policies might be subject to kinds of objections structurally similar to a UBI-specific one. For example, living-wage demands in rich nations are necessarily tied to some measure of subsistence and therefore also implicated in the exploitation of workers in poorer countries, insofar as this exploitation lowers real prices in the rich nation and thereby makes the demand for a living wage easier to meet. Moreover, national welfare-state provisions that benefit the citizens of one country, such as a national health care system, frequently benefit from contributions from those who are not covered under these structures. For instance, medical equipment for the UK's NHS might be produced cheaply abroad by workers who are not covered under the NHS or any government-provided health-care system, and part of the reason why the equipment is cheap is lack of health-care provisions for workers. The justice issues I raise, it seems, would apply not only to a merely national UBI, but also to many welfare-state provisions, if their quality or viability is predicated on exploitation elsewhere.47</p><p>I am in principle open to these implications. Whether and in what sense my argument extends to policies and provisions other than a merely national UBI is beyond the scope of this article. However, let me make two remarks that will, I hope, illustrate why international exploitation raises especial problems for a merely national UBI.</p><p>Firstly, there might in fact be an important difference between the function of <i>welfare-state provisions</i> and a UBI. UBI advocates emphasize that the currently existing welfare state is an ‘ultimate safety net for people in need: it involves a means test, requires willingness to work’.48 Welfare-state provisions aim to distribute across society the (financial and other) burdens imposed by foreseeable and unforeseeable contingencies of life, such as unemployment, illness, disability, and old age. They are not intended to provide the freedom to live as one wants or economic security without conditions. Distributing the burdens of life is hardly unprecedented. Every society (not merely wealthy Western ones) has norms and provisions pertaining to solidarity with others (family members, colleagues, fellow citizens), helping the needy, taking care of the elderly and the sick. These provisions are often informal and considered the responsibility of the family, local community, or religious or charitable institutions, rather than the state. They afford a level of security that even most people not living under a relatively well-functioning welfare state enjoy.49</p><p>A UBI protects individuals against the contingencies of life, but it also detaches the ability to meet basic needs from any necessity to work and to endure others’ (employers’ or the state's) control. It thus creates a level of security and freedom that is, on a societal level, unparalleled.50 A UBI is intended to enable its recipients to live a self-determined life in a way that a welfare state is not.51 While many existing schemes ‘can already be called “unconditional” in a number of weaker senses’,52 a UBI is unconditional in a stronger sense: it is neither income- nor means-tested and imposes no obligation to work or seek work. This strong unconditionality has the potential ‘not just to soothe misery but to liberate us all’.53 There is thus an important difference in what a UBI is supposed to achieve versus the more moderate goals of welfare-state provisions. This, I believe, makes a difference to the compensation that non-recipient contributors are due. After all, these contributors likely benefit from certain (informal) provisions that soothe their misery (if contingency or old age strikes), but they entirely lack the additional liberation that a UBI affords. This makes a merely national UBI harder to justify than welfare-state provisions to those forced to work because they lack anything even close to a UBI.</p><p>Ultimately, the question here is whether UBI should be seen as an extension of or a departure from already existing welfare-state provisions. In the latter case, there might be a principled difference between a merely national UBI and welfare-state provisions. One of the striking features of the current philosophical debate on the merits of UBI is, I think, an ambivalent stance towards the welfare state, reflected in the rhetoric of many UBI advocates. Depending on which types of challenges for a UBI they are addressing, they tend to stress either how ‘radically distinct’ their proposal is from public assistance and social insurance models,54 or how it is, in fact, in line with, and indeed an extension of, already existing elements of the welfare state.55 The former is often supposed to present normative arguments in favour of UBI over existing welfare-state provisions, whereas the latter is typically supposed to stress the financial and political feasibility of a UBI.56 More conceptual clarity concerning the continuities and discontinuities between UBI and the welfare state is required in order to understand fully to what extent a merely national UBI would amplify duties that those who enjoy strong welfare-state provisions might already have. This greater clarity would also benefit debates about the merits and feasibility of a UBI more generally.</p><p>Secondly, there may be structural similarities between the justice problem I presented for a merely national UBI and policies such as <i>work-tested minimum-income guarantees</i> and a national <i>living wage</i>. Exploitation might lower real prices in rich nations and thereby make minimum-income guarantees and the demand for a living wage easier to meet. However, these policies do not provide all the benefits of a UBI. For example, they do not afford unconditional economic security (they only do so if you undertake a sufficient amount of paid work); they do not promote real freedom to the extent that a UBI does;57 and they certainly do not allow recipients to exit the job market. It might still be the case that implementing a national living wage would amplify existing duties, but it is not the case that a national living wage would unconditionally afford everyone within a country goods such as basic economic security. Thus, the gap between beneficiaries of a national living wage and those who contribute to its feasibility is less pronounced. The more one believes in the superiority of a UBI over policies such as a work-tested national living wage, the larger this gap will be and the more worrisome the justice concern I raise should be.</p><p>UBI advocates typically think that the ultimate goal is a global UBI.58 Thus, one might point out, as Van Parijs and Vanderborght have done,59 that a UBI in one or a few wealthy countries (or any country)60 is an important and possibly necessary step in the transition to a global UBI. While there might be a period during which a UBI grants some individuals privileges subsidized by the labour of the less privileged, this could be justified by the good that will ultimately be achieved without any need for compensation during the transitional period. After all, exploited workers (as well as the materially worst off and everyone else) anywhere on earth will ultimately benefit from a global UBI. Moreover, to achieve a successful transition to a global UBI, it might be more important to set up a financially viable and sustainable UBI in one or a few countries and diverting resources towards a compensation scheme might hinder this goal.</p><p>This line of thought is to some extent plausible. In fact, one reason why I think that a compensation scheme can be an adequate response to the justice problem I raised is because the victims of exploitation are not made worse off by a merely national UBI and might benefit from it in the long run. Moreover, the potentially positive global impact of a merely national UBI is not limited to its contribution to creating a global UBI. A merely national UBI might increase economic security in nations that have implemented it, and this might enable other measures that advance global justice—for example, lowering trade barriers, which might lead to more exports, a greater demand for labour, and higher wages, thus improving the position of workers in poorer countries. It could well be that a merely national UBI makes non-recipient contributors better off through indirect effects.</p><p>However, this is speculative. Moreover, even if non-recipient contributors did indirectly benefit from a merely national UBI, the fact remains that some people would receive a UBI (whether they make a contribution or not) and all the benefits that such a UBI grants, whereas others who do make a contribution would merely benefit in indirect ways. This should still leave us feeling uneasy, at least if we think that the added benefits of a UBI are substantial.61</p><p>Furthermore, the transitional period to a global UBI might last a very long time. After all, during the last decades several nations have created advanced and sophisticated democratic institutions and welfare provisions that are, largely, in the interests of their citizens and serve justice, albeit often imperfectly. Yet it would be hopelessly optimistic to think that all nations are necessarily moving in this direction and that they will establish the same or similar institutions and provisions any time soon. Likewise, it would be naïve to assume that just because a UBI is implemented and works well in one or a few nations, other nations would introduce it as well. As a matter of fact, given the current nature of many nations’ media and public discourse, there is a danger that a merely national UBI could even be counterproductive. It is conceivable, albeit I will not speculate how likely, that a UBI is introduced in country X and works very well there, but that, due to dishonest reporting, media biases, and vested interests, country X nonetheless becomes a largely negative example in international perception (‘We cannot possibly introduce a UBI here. They did that in X and look at the place now, what a nightmare!’). Analogous rhetoric is, for instance, sometimes found in (conservative) US reports about European universal health-care systems.</p><p>There is a real danger that some victims of exploitation will not receive the blessings of a global UBI in their lifetimes. They, not merely their offspring, are owed something for their contribution.</p><p>The first aim of my article was to raise an often-overlooked justice problem for a merely national UBI: that not everyone who contributes to the scheme's effectiveness receives a UBI. This is a more pressing version of the surfer problem. It amplifies duties to compensate victims of exploitation who contribute to the effectiveness of a merely national UBI. The second aim was to propose that a merely national UBI be accompanied by a compensation scheme for non-recipient contributors. This proposal is intended to strike the right balance between addressing exploitation and preserving the positive achievements of a merely national UBI, increasing justice within one society and moving towards a more comprehensive UBI.</p><p>For discussion, feedback, and criticism, I am grateful to Christian Barry, Chris Bertram, Joanna Burch-Brown, Robert Chapman, Max Jones, Seiriol Morgan, João Pinheiro, Felix Pinkert, Joe Saunders, Janis Schaab, Irina Schumski, Dean Shiels, Joe Slater, Philipp Stehr, Karl Widerquist, Garrath Williams, Alan Wilson, Jo Wolff, Lena Zuchowski, an anonymous referee, and students from my 2020 Universal Basic Income seminar at the University of Bochum. Versions of this article have been presented at the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN) Congress, Glasgow; the Ethics of UBI in a Changing Economy workshop, Kings College London; the 10th European Congress of Analytic Philosophy, Utrecht; the Joint Sessions of the Aristotelian and the Mind Association, Durham; the Association for Social and Political Philosophy annual conference, Newcastle; and the University of Bristol. I wish to thank the organizers and audiences of these events, and in particular Corinna Mieth, who hosted me in Bochum.</p><p>Work on this article was supported by the University of Bristol and by an Ethics–Economics, Law and Politics Guest Chair at the Ruhr-University Bochum, financed by the German Academic Exchange Service.</p><p>There are no potential conflicts of interest relevant to this article.</p><p>The author declares human ethics approval was not needed for this study.</p>","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"31 2","pages":"158-176"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9000,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jopp.12289","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Political Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jopp.12289","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

In this article, I raise a justice problem for a universal basic income (UBI) if implemented in one or a few nations, but not globally. I raise this objection from the perspective of someone who is ultimately sympathetic to a UBI, even a merely national one. My argument specifically problematizes the unconditionality of a UBI and the unprecedented benefits for those who receive it. UBI advocates themselves often draw attention to this unconditionality in order to justify the greater moral appeal of a UBI over other schemes. Thus, my argument has particular relevance for those sympathetic to a UBI. I argue that, in response to the justice problem I raise, a merely national UBI should be accompanied by compensation for non-UBI-recipients who contribute to what I will call the UBI's ‘effectiveness’.

In Section I, I explain what I mean by a merely national UBI, and in Section II, I develop a justice or exploitation problem that a merely national UBI faces. In Section III, I argue for a compensation scheme for non-recipient contributors. In Section IV, I clarify the scope of my argument, and in Section V, I discuss how my argument relates to a potential global UBI.

A UBI is income paid irrespective of willingness to work, of wealth, of other sources of income, and of personal circumstances. If a UBI is pitched at a sufficiently high level, it realizes a number of goods for its recipients: it frees them from the most basic forms of economic insecurity without conditions such as a work requirement,1 affords so-called ‘real freedom’, the freedom to choose the way recipients want to live,2 and allows recipients to exit unattractive jobs and even the job market altogether.3 If a UBI realizes these goods for a recipient, I will say that the UBI is effective. In the next section, I will argue that it is unjust if a merely national UBI is made more effective by the exploitative labour of those who do not receive a UBI and thus cannot opt out of their unattractive jobs, lack the freedom to live as they want, and are subject to basic economic insecurity.

A UBI is currently often presented as a radical yet feasible solution to pressing political and social problems, such as poverty,4 the demeaning nature of conditional welfare schemes,5 costly and overly bureaucratic welfare-state regulations,6 the drive for ever more growth and the resulting environmental destruction,7 the fact that much necessary care work is currently not financially rewarded,8 and that workers are increasingly being replaced by robots and computers.9

For my purpose, two things are especially significant. Firstly, a UBI is frequently presented as a non-utopian proposal that, from an economic perspective, could be implemented in some countries now or in the near future.10 Secondly, a global UBI, by contrast, would require major political, economic, and social changes worldwide. This is currently rather utopian, though perhaps ‘no longer a mere pipe dream’.11 A UBI, insofar as it is intended as a solution to some of the most pressing issues of our time and one that is financially and politically feasible now or in the near future, will be one implemented in only a few and, most likely, relatively wealthy countries.12 This raises the question of how a merely national UBI would be impacted by and, in turn, affect the current unequal und unjust global order.

The problem I raise in this section is a more pressing version of the already well-known exploitation or free-rider objection to UBI. My problem is concerned with the exploitation specifically of non-nationals or non-residents, who contribute to but do not benefit from a merely national UBI. The literature pays surprisingly little attention to injustices between different nations that a merely national UBI might amplify. In fact, discussions of exploitation and unfairness within the UBI literature take place almost exclusively on an intra-national level.13

The original exploitation objection is inspired by Rawls's claim that Malibu surfers are not entitled to public funds.14 The (in)famous surfer is someone who could contribute to society either via paid work or in other socially beneficial ways, but, instead, spends all his time surfing. While the surfer potentially poses a problem for all government schemes founded on cooperation between citizens, the objection is particularly pressing for a UBI, as here benefits are explicitly not conditional upon willingness to cooperate, for example by seeking paid employment. UBI advocates see this unconditionality as a feature, not a bug.15 Nonetheless, in the case of the surfer, a UBI seems to clash with ‘a widely accepted notion of justice: it is unfair for able bodied people to live off the labour of others’.16 This objection is sometimes phrased in terms of unfairness, sometimes in terms of exploitation or parasitism, since the surfer lives off the labour of others who (supposedly) do not receive adequate compensation for the services they perform. I take it that the underlying intuition is that it is unjust if one person's lifestyle is subsidized by the labour of other persons and there is no reciprocity in this subsidy, even though the first person could reciprocate.

There is a straightforward response to the surfer problem. Take Lazy (the surfer) and Crazy, who works hard and whose income and other taxes help fund a UBI that allows Lazy to spend all of his time surfing. Crazy cannot reasonably complain about this, since, if he finds the lifestyle of Lazy more appealing than his own, he could give up his job and become a surfer himself. After all, an effective UBI affords him the real freedom to live this way. If Crazy does not give up his job, then this is because he chooses the life of work and higher income—in which case both Lazy and Crazy live the life they chose, and the UBI is working out well for both. Thus, Lazy is not exploiting Crazy, since Crazy can withdraw his labour and is afforded the same economic security and freedom to live the life of his choosing as Lazy.

I find this response to the original surfer problem persuasive.17 Things would be different, however, if someone in Crazy's position could not choose to give up their job and become a (financially adequately supported) surfer, because they (I'll call them ‘Exploited’) are neither citizen nor resident18 of a country that pays a UBI. Given the globalized world that we live in, Exploited might well perform work that benefits Lazy as well as Crazy. Such work can be a subsidy of their lifestyles if Exploited's labour is cheaper than the labour of those in the same strong bargaining position as Lazy and Crazy to demand higher pay or better working conditions. After all, Lazy and Crazy have the freedom and security to opt out of work altogether. If it is unjust that someone's lifestyle is subsidized by the labour of another person and there is no adequate reciprocity in this subsidy, then a merely national UBI suffers from a justice problem with regard to the subsidies Lazy and Crazy receive from Exploited and the lack of reciprocity.

In the debate about the fairness of a UBI there is much concern about non-contributors, such as the Malibu surfer, receiving benefits. There is much less concern about people who do contribute, but do not receive benefits because they are of a different nationality or live in a different country.19 The latter, it seems to me, constitutes the most pressing justice problem.

Let me spell this out in more detail. A merely national UBI excludes certain people as recipients, even if they contribute to the effectiveness of the UBI in that country. They can make such a contribution by subsidizing UBI recipients with their cheap labour, which increases the relative value of the UBI for recipients, as it makes products and services more affordable than they would be if everyone received a UBI. This impacts what and how much those living off a UBI can afford, the opportunities open to them, and how attractive it is for them to exit jobs (or to reduce hours), and thus whether the UBI realizes the goods that it promises, and to what extent it does so.

These subsidies for UBI recipients would be, in one sense, not dissimilar from currently existing conditions. After all, the citizens of developed countries already benefit from global inequalities, poor working conditions, and low pay in developing countries where people are forced to work to meet their basic needs. However, there currently exists a work requirement even in wealthy countries, whereas there would be no such requirement for those enjoying an effective UBI. It is reasonable to assume that if non-recipient contributors were not forced to work for their subsistence, because they also enjoyed a UBI that frees them of the need to work for their subsistence, then some services and goods that are currently offered or produced cheaply would become more expensive. The subsidies would likely (at least in part) disappear, and the UBI thus become less effective for recipients.

A prime example for exploitation, that subsidizes the citizens of wealthy countries and that many individuals in developing countries would be unlikely to put up with if they were in a position to opt out, is so-called sweatshop labour.20 I take it that sweatshop labour is a relatively uncontroversial example of exploitation.21 The low pay and bad conditions in sweatshops are (part of) the reason why this work is profitable for their owners and why this mode of production can benefit end-consumers. Even after the introduction of a global UBI (or a merely national UBI in countries with sweatshops), there may be people willing to manufacture the type of products formerly produced in sweatshops, but they would presumably need stronger financial incentives and would be able to demand better working conditions that would make these products more expensive.

Now, imagine that Exploited works in a factory that builds surf equipment and, due to poor working conditions and low pay for her and her colleagues, this equipment is significantly cheaper than equipment produced by Lazy's fellow citizens who enjoy a UBI and lack strong financial incentives to work in a surfboard factory for low pay. In an extreme case, the only surf equipment Lazy can afford from his UBI is equipment produced by Exploited. Without this cheap supply of equipment, it would not be possible for Lazy to live the pure lifestyle of a surfer and he would have to take up (part-time) employment to afford his equipment. A UBI then allows Lazy to live the way he wants only because of the labour of Exploited, who, unlike Crazy, does not have the option to withdraw her labour and live off a UBI.

Even if Exploited does not manufacture the specific products that Lazy needs to live the pure lifestyle of a surfer, as long as she does manufacture products or render services that Lazy or Crazy want or need, and does so more cheaply than if she were able to opt out of work, the UBI that Lazy and Crazy enjoy goes further in terms of purchasing power than it otherwise would. Part of the value of a merely national UBI for recipients thus stems from the fact that this UBI is merely national and that it still leaves in place sources of cheap labour elsewhere.

One might respond that my empirical assumption that a global UBI would dry up sources of cheap labour and drive up prices is questionable. After all, one of the potential advantages of a UBI is that it removes financial disincentives to take up low-paid or precarious work; disincentives put in place by misjudged tax and welfare systems that leave people financially better off on welfare than in work or that effectively impose high taxes on low incomes. People might still want to work to top up their UBI and they would not need a subsistence wage in return. Thus, a UBI might even make certain products and services cheaper.

I think that intrinsically rewarding or meaningful work might become cheaper, if people enjoyed a UBI and could choose their occupations without having to earn a living. However, it is also plausible to assume that recipients of a subsistence-level UBI would be unlikely to take up a substantial amount of sweatshop-type labour, unless these jobs were paid significantly better and/or working conditions much improved (and would thus no longer qualify as sweatshop labour). After all, one of the main benefits of a UBI is that it grants recipients the freedom to decline or exit unattractive jobs and even escape ‘forced labor market participation’ altogether.22 What, if any, jobs would UBI recipients want to decline if not poorly paid, dangerous jobs, involving repetitive labour, coercion, and health risks? Thus, it is plausible to assume that many currently cheap products would become more expensive if, globally, everyone enjoyed a UBI.23 This would reduce the living standards of people in high-income countries subsisting on a fixed income in the form of a UBI, and might even reintroduce the necessity to work. The effectiveness of a UBI in providing basic financial security and allowing recipients to live as they wish depends in some measure on cheap (and exploitative) labour by those not enjoying a UBI.

My argument above notwithstanding, a merely national UBI would be an effective tool to combat many forms of injustice within that nation. After all, even in wealthy nations many citizens are in precarious and vulnerable financial positions that employers, corporations, loan sharks, and the government can exploit. A merely national UBI, if pitched at the right level and financed in the right way, would serve justice within that society, and it would therefore be premature to dismiss it.

There is a parallel case that demonstrates how defenders of a UBI can respond to the justice problem raised in the previous section: namely, the ethical debate about the harmful climate impact of Alaska's Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD). Since 1982 the US state of Alaska pays an annual dividend—$1,114 in 2021—to all its residents. The PFD represents the largest example of a UBI paid over a prolonged period (albeit not at subsistence level). Moreover, the Alaska financing model, taxing natural resource appropriation, is attractive to UBI advocates, since many other financing models, such as income tax or VAT, disproportionately affect working people and/or people on low incomes.24 Steve Winter, however, argues that the ‘PFD makes participating recipients complicit with grave wrongdoing because of its connection to the oil industry, a practice responsible for 150,000 deaths per annum’.25 Winter's argument is, in short, that the oil industry involves intrinsic wrongs, and that the Alaskan PFD makes recipients complicit in intrinsic wrongs. This complicity is itself wrongful.

Winter does not think that his objection is ‘devastating’ for the Alaska model.26 He proposes ‘to combine basic income payments with sufficient funding to stop the killings’.27 Since the oil industry28 does not kill anyone directly, but rather costs lives due to indirect effects such as disease, extreme weather events, and other foreseeable effects of global warming, adequate preventive and remedial measures could be taken to remove the reason to object to the Alaska model. The Alaska model would then have two components: ‘Funding derived from natural resource appropriation would provide monies for a basic income and to prevent the deaths that would otherwise occur due to climate change’.29 This latter scheme would not have to prevent all deaths that occur from climate change, as Alaska is globally only a relatively minor source of oil. It would merely have to mitigate ‘those negative effects (we are focusing on unjustifiable deaths) that could be attributed to the industry in question’30—meaning, specifically the Alaskan oil industry. Winter calculates that averting 405 killings per year would be sufficient to ‘discharge Alaskans’ “fair share” of responsibility’ for the wrongful killings.31 He also emphasizes that this move is applicable to all models of financing a UBI based on harmful resource extraction.32 He does not, however, generalize his argument to other ethical challenges for a UBI.

The general intuition behind Winter's idea is that those who benefit from unjust arrangements have stringent obligations to compensate victims. This principle is not limited to a merely national UBI made (more) effective by exploitation. In the next section, I will discuss whether it makes a moral difference if exploitation specifically props up a merely national UBI. For now, I will show that a plausible reply to the problem I discussed in the previous section is to take up a modified version of Winter's suggestion of providing what he calls ‘avert-funding’. I will phrase my own proposal in terms of compensation, specifically for those who contribute to a merely national UBI but do not receive a UBI. To better understand this proposal, let us look at four salient points of comparison between the problems of the Alaska model and the global justice problem from the previous section.

Firstly, Winter stresses that ‘Alaskans are not guilty of’ the deaths resulting from the oil industry.33 Mere complicity in a wrong is less severe than committing the wrong itself. This point is important, since avert-funding or compensation usually would not be an adequate response to wrongs that an agent herself commits. If I murder you, I cannot plausibly compensate for this by donating money to buy medicine that saves someone else's life. Compensation schemes are appropriate for wrongs which I am complicit in or benefit from, but of which I am not the perpetrator. The perpetrator's primary duty is to refrain from wrongdoing, not to offset the negative effects or avert harm elsewhere.

Winter suggests that complicity in the Alaska PFD is ‘equivalent in veniality with wearing sweatshop clothing’.34 This is quite a contentious claim, since being complicit in killing is commonly considered much worse than complicity in various forms of exploitation. Presumably, Winter's point is here not about the impact of killing and exploitation on victims, but about illustrating the structure of moral responsibility. The idea is that agents are not actively harming anyone themselves, but they are complicit. Importantly, this is already the case for the globally affluent who do not receive a UBI, but who are buying sweatshop products, making them complicit in exploitation. There would, however, be an important sense in which merely national UBI recipients’ complicity had an additional dimension. As I suggested in the previous section, if it were not for cheap foreign labour that benefits the citizens of wealthy nations, a merely national UBI might not be sufficient to cover the basic needs of recipients, and thus to perform some of its most beneficial functions. Moreover, even if a merely national UBI covered basic needs without cheap labour from abroad, its relative value increases due to this cheap labour. UBI recipients’ real freedom is subsidized by the labour of those forced to work for their subsistence.

Secondly, Winter thinks that mere benefiting from wrongful actions is not sufficient for complicity in an ethically relevant sense. He stresses that ‘[t]he wrongfulness exposed by the complicity argument does not depend on benefits but rather upon wrongful agency’.35 By contrast, the problem I bring up draws on both wrongful agency and benefiting. Wrongful agency, for instance, obtains in consumer choices when we knowingly buy products produced under exploitative conditions. Moreover, we benefit from wrongful structures, if we receive a UBI the effectiveness of which is enhanced by exploitation. Wrongful agency and benefiting raise several complicated issues concerning voluntariness. After all, one might argue that you are not morally responsible for benefiting from something that you have no say in—for instance, because your government transfers money to your bank account every month whether you want it or not.36

One way to address the global justice problem I brought up in the previous section would be to give potential recipients the opportunity to opt out of the UBI, an opportunity that exists for the Alaska PFD.37 However, unlike a compensation scheme, opting out of the UBI would not leave non-recipient contributors materially any better off. Moreover, it might still be a problem if certain (already privileged) people can opt in or out, an opportunity denied to non-recipient contributors. Finally, if people opted out of the UBI, then this might necessitate the reintroduction of welfare schemes that secure their subsistence if they become indigent. This would presumably leave unsatisfied those UBI advocates who emphasize the benefits of the universal coverage of a UBI.38

Thirdly, Winter maintains that ‘Oil exploitation is not wrongful in itself’, but that the production of greenhouse gas, which causes additional deaths, ‘is a normal component of the industry’.39 In the case of exploitation of people, as in sweatshop labour, early deaths, due to workplace accidents, are fairly abnormal, but other impacts, such as negative long-term health consequences for workers, lost time with family and friends due to long shifts, lost opportunities, and so on, are inextricable features of the industry. The exploitation I am concerned with is not an unintended by-product, but essential to the high profit margins of sweatshop labour. Thus, the problem I raised is, in one sense, more worrying than the rather indirect effects of the oil industry. It is, I take it, plausible that someone who benefits from exploiting people has a more stringent duty to compensate victims than someone who benefits from resource extraction that, as a normal or even necessary side-effect, is also harmful to some people. However, my proposal does not hinge on this specific intuition.

Fourthly, there is an important sense in which a merely national UBI, as well as the Alaska PFD, are both innocuous. In both cases the victims (of climate change or exploitation) are not made worse off by the redistribution of revenues in the form of a merely national UBI. The victims of climate change would die even if a private corporation pocketed Alaska's oil revenue. Analogously, whether consumers do or do not receive a UBI leaves sweatshop workers’ working conditions and pay untouched, or at least there is no immediate connection here. This might well impact the stringency of duties of compensation that those benefiting from their labour have. In fact, I think that, since a merely national UBI does not make victims of exploitation worse off, a compensation scheme is the right middle ground between, on the one hand, opposing a merely national UBI on ethical grounds and, on the other hand, leaving the exploitation problem of a merely national UBI unaddressed.

Winter proposes avert-funding that would save as many lives from the effects of climate change as the Alaska oil industry is responsible for taking, and he presents a clear number for this: namely, 405 lives. By contrast, it is very difficult to quantify how many people would have to be exploited for a merely national UBI to be effective, and this would greatly depend on the circumstances of the recipients as well as the contributors, and on overall political and economic conditions. It is therefore impossible to determine a concrete number of people that an avert mechanism must protect from exploitation. Furthermore, unlike those killed by climate change, the current victims of exploitation are still alive.40 In addition, whereas the effects of climate change are random, in the sense that we do not know which specific individuals will die or otherwise suffer from it (though we do know that some groups and regions are much more likely to be affected than others), there are concrete individuals whose work would benefit the recipients of a merely national UBI. These non-recipient contributors are owed something, and it would not be adequate to merely combat or avert exploitation somewhere, if we can at least approximately identify these contributors.

My proposed compensation scheme, therefore, is not a form of avert-funding, but rather funding that aims to benefit specifically non-recipient contributors to a merely national UBI. This can take the relatively general form of benefiting anyone from whose exploitation recipients of a UBI benefit. For instance, fair-trade practices or even higher standards could be made legally mandatory and appropriate resources could be allocated to enforce these standards.41 We can also imagine more targeted measures that specifically benefit workers in developing countries manufacturing products and providing services crucial to the citizens of the country that introduced a merely national UBI, insofar as it is possible to single out specific factories or regions where this labour is performed. One such targeted measure could be direct money transfers to workers who have worked a set number of years or who have become unable to work. Another could be to relax immigration restrictions for non-recipient contributors, so that it becomes easier for them to become residents or citizens of the country that implemented the merely national UBI, and to set up funds to help them make the journey and settle in. This, of course, should not happen only once, but for each successive generation of non-recipient contributors replacing those who have retired or migrated.

There are, admittedly, major problems of application here, since global supply and production chains are complex and often cross more than one border. Moreover, one might wonder whether our conception of who contributes to the effectiveness of a merely national UBI should include not only workers who manufacture cheap products, but also people who produce food and other necessary goods and services for these workers, or who perform unpaid reproductive labour that allows workers to produce goods and services as cheaply as they do. I cannot address these problems here. Maybe the best we could do would be to start with a few cases of exploitative labour that clearly benefit many UBI recipients and then extend the compensation scheme gradually, according to our best understanding of global supply chains.42

To clarify the scope of my scheme, I should note that my concern is not poverty and inequality—as is, for instance the focus of Thomas Pogge's Global Resource Dividend43—but exploitation that contributes to the effectiveness of a merely national UBI. Not all of the globally poor would contribute to a merely national UBI, and not all non-recipient contributors are among the world's poorest. My proposal leaves open the prospect that there are additional duties to compensate, because global poverty is due to structures put in place by the globally affluent and from which the affluent benefit regardless of whether they enjoy a UBI. In fact, I believe that my argument does not reveal an entirely new duty to compensate, but rather that it amplifies pre-existing duties to compensate for global injustices.

It seems relatively uncontroversial that there are duties to compensate for exploitation or to try to reset (international) relationships so that they become non-exploitative. This is so regardless of whether nations have implemented a merely national UBI. This raises the question of what exactly is the role of a merely national UBI for my argument.44

At the very least, my argument functions as a prod to make global justice issues more central to the debate about the prospects and drawbacks of a merely national UBI. This is potentially already quite powerful, since some of the most persuasive arguments for a UBI are explicitly moral ones. A UBI is presented as something that individuals are owed as a matter of justice qua entitlement to the commons,45 or as a matter of social and economic justice.46 If there are significant moral reasons for adopting a UBI, then any discussion of the moral advantages of a UBI should consider how it might impact and interact with unjust global structures.

My argument also provides additional reasons for compensating exploited workers. It thus amplifies the duty that privileged Westerners already have to compensate those from whose exploitation they benefit. How strong these additional reasons are, and to what extent a pre-existing duty is intensified, depend on why one thinks that a UBI is better than other ways of distributing resources (some of which were obtained unfairly). Those who advocate for a UBI assume that it offers concomitant goods or benefits that other schemes, such as conditional welfare provision, participation income, and so on, do not provide, though a UBI may not be the only scheme that provides some of those special goods.

As I pointed out at the beginning of this article, various UBI advocates emphasize different, albeit often in practice overlapping, goods. An effective UBI frees recipients from the most basic forms of economic insecurity and does so without a work requirement, affords real freedom, and allows recipients to say no to employment. If one thinks that a UBI is to be preferred over (many or all) other schemes because it can realize special goods, then, I take it, one should be very concerned if these special goods are not available to some people who contribute to the effectiveness of the UBI. These additional goods that some enjoy at the expense of others exacerbate existing exploitation problems, since the privileged here do not merely obtain more of the same—for example, more purchasing power due to the labour of workers with already lower purchasing power. Rather, goods, exceeding what is currently provided by existing schemes, are now enjoyed by some, in part due to the work of others who lack these goods entirely.

If a wealthy nation distributes (partly) ill-gotten gains in some other way than through a merely national UBI—for example, as a work-tested minimum-income guarantee—then we could not level the specific criticism I propose, because, in this case, workers in the wealthy nation would (also) lack basic economic security no matter what, lack the freedom to opt out of paid employment, and would have less real freedom than a UBI would provide. However, in this case, the wealthy nation would still benefit to the same extent, in aggregate market-value terms, from the exploitation as in the UBI case and the workers in the poorer nation would be rendered as badly off by this exploitation as in the UBI case.

In fact, many other policies might be subject to kinds of objections structurally similar to a UBI-specific one. For example, living-wage demands in rich nations are necessarily tied to some measure of subsistence and therefore also implicated in the exploitation of workers in poorer countries, insofar as this exploitation lowers real prices in the rich nation and thereby makes the demand for a living wage easier to meet. Moreover, national welfare-state provisions that benefit the citizens of one country, such as a national health care system, frequently benefit from contributions from those who are not covered under these structures. For instance, medical equipment for the UK's NHS might be produced cheaply abroad by workers who are not covered under the NHS or any government-provided health-care system, and part of the reason why the equipment is cheap is lack of health-care provisions for workers. The justice issues I raise, it seems, would apply not only to a merely national UBI, but also to many welfare-state provisions, if their quality or viability is predicated on exploitation elsewhere.47

I am in principle open to these implications. Whether and in what sense my argument extends to policies and provisions other than a merely national UBI is beyond the scope of this article. However, let me make two remarks that will, I hope, illustrate why international exploitation raises especial problems for a merely national UBI.

Firstly, there might in fact be an important difference between the function of welfare-state provisions and a UBI. UBI advocates emphasize that the currently existing welfare state is an ‘ultimate safety net for people in need: it involves a means test, requires willingness to work’.48 Welfare-state provisions aim to distribute across society the (financial and other) burdens imposed by foreseeable and unforeseeable contingencies of life, such as unemployment, illness, disability, and old age. They are not intended to provide the freedom to live as one wants or economic security without conditions. Distributing the burdens of life is hardly unprecedented. Every society (not merely wealthy Western ones) has norms and provisions pertaining to solidarity with others (family members, colleagues, fellow citizens), helping the needy, taking care of the elderly and the sick. These provisions are often informal and considered the responsibility of the family, local community, or religious or charitable institutions, rather than the state. They afford a level of security that even most people not living under a relatively well-functioning welfare state enjoy.49

A UBI protects individuals against the contingencies of life, but it also detaches the ability to meet basic needs from any necessity to work and to endure others’ (employers’ or the state's) control. It thus creates a level of security and freedom that is, on a societal level, unparalleled.50 A UBI is intended to enable its recipients to live a self-determined life in a way that a welfare state is not.51 While many existing schemes ‘can already be called “unconditional” in a number of weaker senses’,52 a UBI is unconditional in a stronger sense: it is neither income- nor means-tested and imposes no obligation to work or seek work. This strong unconditionality has the potential ‘not just to soothe misery but to liberate us all’.53 There is thus an important difference in what a UBI is supposed to achieve versus the more moderate goals of welfare-state provisions. This, I believe, makes a difference to the compensation that non-recipient contributors are due. After all, these contributors likely benefit from certain (informal) provisions that soothe their misery (if contingency or old age strikes), but they entirely lack the additional liberation that a UBI affords. This makes a merely national UBI harder to justify than welfare-state provisions to those forced to work because they lack anything even close to a UBI.

Ultimately, the question here is whether UBI should be seen as an extension of or a departure from already existing welfare-state provisions. In the latter case, there might be a principled difference between a merely national UBI and welfare-state provisions. One of the striking features of the current philosophical debate on the merits of UBI is, I think, an ambivalent stance towards the welfare state, reflected in the rhetoric of many UBI advocates. Depending on which types of challenges for a UBI they are addressing, they tend to stress either how ‘radically distinct’ their proposal is from public assistance and social insurance models,54 or how it is, in fact, in line with, and indeed an extension of, already existing elements of the welfare state.55 The former is often supposed to present normative arguments in favour of UBI over existing welfare-state provisions, whereas the latter is typically supposed to stress the financial and political feasibility of a UBI.56 More conceptual clarity concerning the continuities and discontinuities between UBI and the welfare state is required in order to understand fully to what extent a merely national UBI would amplify duties that those who enjoy strong welfare-state provisions might already have. This greater clarity would also benefit debates about the merits and feasibility of a UBI more generally.

Secondly, there may be structural similarities between the justice problem I presented for a merely national UBI and policies such as work-tested minimum-income guarantees and a national living wage. Exploitation might lower real prices in rich nations and thereby make minimum-income guarantees and the demand for a living wage easier to meet. However, these policies do not provide all the benefits of a UBI. For example, they do not afford unconditional economic security (they only do so if you undertake a sufficient amount of paid work); they do not promote real freedom to the extent that a UBI does;57 and they certainly do not allow recipients to exit the job market. It might still be the case that implementing a national living wage would amplify existing duties, but it is not the case that a national living wage would unconditionally afford everyone within a country goods such as basic economic security. Thus, the gap between beneficiaries of a national living wage and those who contribute to its feasibility is less pronounced. The more one believes in the superiority of a UBI over policies such as a work-tested national living wage, the larger this gap will be and the more worrisome the justice concern I raise should be.

UBI advocates typically think that the ultimate goal is a global UBI.58 Thus, one might point out, as Van Parijs and Vanderborght have done,59 that a UBI in one or a few wealthy countries (or any country)60 is an important and possibly necessary step in the transition to a global UBI. While there might be a period during which a UBI grants some individuals privileges subsidized by the labour of the less privileged, this could be justified by the good that will ultimately be achieved without any need for compensation during the transitional period. After all, exploited workers (as well as the materially worst off and everyone else) anywhere on earth will ultimately benefit from a global UBI. Moreover, to achieve a successful transition to a global UBI, it might be more important to set up a financially viable and sustainable UBI in one or a few countries and diverting resources towards a compensation scheme might hinder this goal.

This line of thought is to some extent plausible. In fact, one reason why I think that a compensation scheme can be an adequate response to the justice problem I raised is because the victims of exploitation are not made worse off by a merely national UBI and might benefit from it in the long run. Moreover, the potentially positive global impact of a merely national UBI is not limited to its contribution to creating a global UBI. A merely national UBI might increase economic security in nations that have implemented it, and this might enable other measures that advance global justice—for example, lowering trade barriers, which might lead to more exports, a greater demand for labour, and higher wages, thus improving the position of workers in poorer countries. It could well be that a merely national UBI makes non-recipient contributors better off through indirect effects.

However, this is speculative. Moreover, even if non-recipient contributors did indirectly benefit from a merely national UBI, the fact remains that some people would receive a UBI (whether they make a contribution or not) and all the benefits that such a UBI grants, whereas others who do make a contribution would merely benefit in indirect ways. This should still leave us feeling uneasy, at least if we think that the added benefits of a UBI are substantial.61

Furthermore, the transitional period to a global UBI might last a very long time. After all, during the last decades several nations have created advanced and sophisticated democratic institutions and welfare provisions that are, largely, in the interests of their citizens and serve justice, albeit often imperfectly. Yet it would be hopelessly optimistic to think that all nations are necessarily moving in this direction and that they will establish the same or similar institutions and provisions any time soon. Likewise, it would be naïve to assume that just because a UBI is implemented and works well in one or a few nations, other nations would introduce it as well. As a matter of fact, given the current nature of many nations’ media and public discourse, there is a danger that a merely national UBI could even be counterproductive. It is conceivable, albeit I will not speculate how likely, that a UBI is introduced in country X and works very well there, but that, due to dishonest reporting, media biases, and vested interests, country X nonetheless becomes a largely negative example in international perception (‘We cannot possibly introduce a UBI here. They did that in X and look at the place now, what a nightmare!’). Analogous rhetoric is, for instance, sometimes found in (conservative) US reports about European universal health-care systems.

There is a real danger that some victims of exploitation will not receive the blessings of a global UBI in their lifetimes. They, not merely their offspring, are owed something for their contribution.

The first aim of my article was to raise an often-overlooked justice problem for a merely national UBI: that not everyone who contributes to the scheme's effectiveness receives a UBI. This is a more pressing version of the surfer problem. It amplifies duties to compensate victims of exploitation who contribute to the effectiveness of a merely national UBI. The second aim was to propose that a merely national UBI be accompanied by a compensation scheme for non-recipient contributors. This proposal is intended to strike the right balance between addressing exploitation and preserving the positive achievements of a merely national UBI, increasing justice within one society and moving towards a more comprehensive UBI.

For discussion, feedback, and criticism, I am grateful to Christian Barry, Chris Bertram, Joanna Burch-Brown, Robert Chapman, Max Jones, Seiriol Morgan, João Pinheiro, Felix Pinkert, Joe Saunders, Janis Schaab, Irina Schumski, Dean Shiels, Joe Slater, Philipp Stehr, Karl Widerquist, Garrath Williams, Alan Wilson, Jo Wolff, Lena Zuchowski, an anonymous referee, and students from my 2020 Universal Basic Income seminar at the University of Bochum. Versions of this article have been presented at the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN) Congress, Glasgow; the Ethics of UBI in a Changing Economy workshop, Kings College London; the 10th European Congress of Analytic Philosophy, Utrecht; the Joint Sessions of the Aristotelian and the Mind Association, Durham; the Association for Social and Political Philosophy annual conference, Newcastle; and the University of Bristol. I wish to thank the organizers and audiences of these events, and in particular Corinna Mieth, who hosted me in Bochum.

Work on this article was supported by the University of Bristol and by an Ethics–Economics, Law and Politics Guest Chair at the Ruhr-University Bochum, financed by the German Academic Exchange Service.

There are no potential conflicts of interest relevant to this article.

The author declares human ethics approval was not needed for this study.

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仅仅是国家的“普遍”基本收入和全球正义
在这篇文章中,我提出了一个普遍基本收入(UBI)的正义问题,如果在一个或几个国家实施,但不是在全球范围内。我是从一个最终同情UBI的人的角度提出这一反对意见的,即使只是一个全国性的UBI。我的论点特别质疑UBI的无条件性以及接受UBI的人所获得的前所未有的好处。UBI倡导者自己经常提请人们注意这种无条件性,以证明UBI比其他计划更有道德吸引力。因此,我的论点对那些同情UBI的人来说尤其重要。我认为,为了回应我提出的司法问题,一个仅仅是国家的UBI应该伴随着对非UBI接受者的补偿,这些接受者对我所说的UBI的“有效性”做出了贡献。在第一节中,我解释了我所说仅仅是国家UBI的意思,在第二节中,我们提出了一个仅仅国家UBI面临的司法或剥削问题。在第三节中,我主张对非受援者提供补偿。在第四节,我澄清了我的论点的范围,在第五节,我讨论了我的观点与潜在的全球UBI的关系。UBI是指无论工作意愿、财富、其他收入来源和个人情况如何支付的收入。如果UBI被定位在足够高的水平,它会为接受者实现许多商品:它使他们在没有工作要求等条件的情况下摆脱最基本形式的经济不安全,1提供了所谓的“真正的自由”,即选择接受者想要的生活方式的自由,2并允许接受者退出没有吸引力的工作,甚至完全退出就业市场。3如果UBI为接受者实现了这些商品,我会说UBI是有效的。在下一节中,我将辩称,如果那些没有获得UBI的人的剥削性劳动使仅仅是全国性的UBI变得更加有效,从而无法选择放弃他们没有吸引力的工作,缺乏随心所欲的生活自由,并且受到基本经济不安全的影响,这是不公平的。UBI目前通常被认为是解决紧迫的政治和社会问题的一个激进但可行的解决方案,如贫困、4有条件福利计划的贬低性质、5昂贵且过于官僚的福利国家法规、6推动更多增长和由此造成的环境破坏、7许多必要的护理工作目前没有得到经济回报,8工人正越来越多地被机器人和计算机所取代。9就我而言,有两件事特别重要。首先,UBI经常被认为是一个非乌托邦式的提议,从经济角度来看,它可以在现在或不久的将来在一些国家实施。10其次,相比之下,全球UBI需要在全球范围内进行重大的政治、经济和社会变革。这目前相当乌托邦,尽管可能“不再只是白日梦”,12这就提出了一个问题,即仅仅是一个国家的UBI将如何受到当前不平等和不公正的全球秩序的影响,进而影响当前的全球秩序。我在本节中提出的问题是一个更紧迫的版本,即已经众所周知的对UBI的剥削或搭便车反对。我的问题涉及对非国民或非居民的剥削,他们为仅仅是国家UBI做出了贡献,但没有从中受益。令人惊讶的是,文献很少关注不同国家之间的不公正现象,而仅仅是一个国家的UBI可能会放大这种不公正现象。事实上,UBI文献中关于剥削和不公平的讨论几乎完全是在国内层面上进行的。13最初的剥削反对意见是受罗尔斯的主张启发的,即马里布冲浪者无权获得公共资金。14著名冲浪者是指可以通过有偿工作或其他有益于社会的方式为社会做出贡献的人,他把所有的时间都花在冲浪上。虽然冲浪者可能会给所有建立在公民合作基础上的政府计划带来问题,但反对UBI的呼声尤其强烈,因为在这里,福利显然不以合作意愿为条件,例如寻求有偿就业。UBI的倡导者将这种无条件性视为一种特征,而不是一种错误。15尽管如此,就冲浪者而言,UBI似乎与“一种被广泛接受的正义观念相冲突:身体健全的人靠他人的劳动生活是不公平的”,因为冲浪者靠其他人的劳动生活,而这些人(据说)并没有因为他们所提供的服务而获得足够的补偿。 我认为,潜在的直觉是,如果一个人的生活方式由其他人的劳动补贴,而这种补贴没有互惠性,即使第一个人可以回报,这是不公平的。对冲浪者的问题有一个直接的回应。以Lazy(冲浪者)和Crazy为例,他们工作努力,收入和其他税收帮助资助了一项UBI,让Lazy可以把所有的时间都花在冲浪上。Crazy不能合理地抱怨这一点,因为如果他发现Lazy的生活方式比他自己的更有吸引力,他可以放弃工作,自己成为一名冲浪者。毕竟,有效的UBI为他提供了以这种方式生活的真正自由。如果Crazy没有放弃他的工作,那么这是因为他选择了工作和更高收入的生活——在这种情况下,Lazy和Crazy都过着他们选择的生活,UBI对他们来说都很好。因此,Lazy并没有剥削Crazy,因为Crazy可以撤回他的劳动,并获得与Lazy一样的经济保障和自由来过他选择的生活,因为他们(我称他们为“被剥削者”)既不是支付UBI的国家的公民,也不是该国的居民18。考虑到我们生活的全球化世界,Exploited很可能会从事有利于懒惰和疯狂的工作。如果Exploited的劳动力比那些与Lazy和Crazy有着同样强大议价能力的人的劳动力更便宜,要求更高的工资或更好的工作条件,那么这种工作可以成为他们生活方式的补贴。毕竟,懒惰和疯狂有选择完全不工作的自由和安全感。如果一个人的生活方式由另一个人的劳动补贴是不公平的,而这种补贴没有足够的互惠性,那么一个仅仅是国家的UBI就面临着懒惰和疯狂从剥削者那里获得的补贴以及缺乏互惠性的公正问题。在关于UBI公平性的辩论中,人们非常担心非贡献者,如马里布冲浪者,获得福利。对于那些确实捐款但由于国籍不同或生活在不同国家而没有获得福利的人,人们的担忧要少得多。19在我看来,后者构成了最紧迫的司法问题。让我更详细地解释一下。仅仅是国家UBI就将某些人排除在外,即使他们有助于该国UBI的有效性。他们可以通过用廉价劳动力补贴UBI接受者来做出这样的贡献,这增加了UBI对接受者的相对价值,因为这使产品和服务比每个人都获得UBI时更实惠。这影响了那些靠UBI生活的人能负担得起什么和多少,他们可以获得的机会,以及他们离职(或减少工作时间)的吸引力,从而影响了UBI是否实现了其承诺的商品,以及实现的程度。从某种意义上说,这些对UBI接受者的补贴与目前的条件没有什么不同。毕竟,发达国家的公民已经从全球不平等、恶劣的工作条件和发展中国家的低工资中受益,因为发展中国家的人们被迫工作以满足他们的基本需求。然而,目前即使在富裕国家也有工作要求,而那些享受有效UBI的人则没有这样的要求。可以合理地假设,如果非受援国不被迫为维持生计而工作,因为他们还享有UBI,使他们无需为维持生计工作,那么目前提供或生产的一些服务和商品将变得更加昂贵。补贴可能(至少部分)会消失,因此UBI对接受者的效果会降低。剥削是一个典型的例子,它补贴富裕国家的公民,如果发展中国家的许多人能够选择退出,他们就不太可能忍受,所谓的血汗工厂劳动。20我认为血汗工厂劳动是一个相对没有争议的剥削例子。21血汗工厂的低工资和恶劣条件是这项工作对其所有者有利的部分原因,也是这种生产模式能够惠及最终消费者的部分原因。即使在引入全球UBI(或者在有血汗工厂的国家仅为国家UBI)之后,也可能有人愿意制造以前在血汗工厂生产的那种产品,但他们可能需要更强有力的经济激励,并且能够要求更好的工作条件,这将使这些产品更加昂贵。 26他建议“将基本收入支付与足够的资金相结合,以阻止杀戮”。27由于石油行业28不会直接杀死任何人,而是由于疾病、极端天气事件和全球变暖的其他可预见影响等间接影响而付出生命代价,可以采取充分的预防和补救措施,消除反对阿拉斯加模式的理由。阿拉斯加模式将有两个组成部分:“从自然资源拨款中获得的资金将为基本收入提供资金,并防止因气候变化而导致的死亡”。29后一种方案不必防止所有因气候变化导致的死亡,因为阿拉斯加在全球范围内只是一个相对较小的石油来源。它只需要减轻“那些可能归因于相关行业的负面影响(我们关注的是不合理的死亡)”30,特别是阿拉斯加石油行业。Winter计算出,每年避免405起谋杀案就足以“免除阿拉斯加人对不当谋杀的“公平份额”责任。31他还强调,这一举措适用于基于有害资源开采的UBI融资的所有模式。32然而,他并不认为,将他的论点推广到UBI的其他道德挑战。Winter想法背后的普遍直觉是,那些从不公正安排中受益的人有严格的义务赔偿受害者。这一原则不仅限于通过剥削使(更)有效的国家UBI。在下一节中,我将讨论如果剥削专门支持一个仅仅是全国性的UBI,是否会产生道德差异。目前,我将表明,对于我在上一节中讨论的问题,一个合理的答案是接受温特建议的修改版本,即提供他所说的“避免资助”。我将在赔偿方面提出我自己的建议,特别是针对那些只为国家UBI捐款但没有获得UBI的人。为了更好地理解这一提议,让我们看看阿拉斯加模式的问题与上一节中的全球司法问题之间的四个显著比较点。首先,Winter强调,“阿拉斯加人对石油行业造成的死亡没有过错”。33仅仅是共谋错误不如犯错误本身严重。这一点很重要,因为避免资金或赔偿通常不是对代理人自己犯下的错误的充分回应。如果我谋杀了你,我就无法通过捐款购买拯救他人生命的药物来弥补这一点。赔偿计划适用于我同谋或从中受益的错误,但我不是肇事者。行为人的首要职责是避免不当行为,而不是抵消负面影响或避免在其他地方造成伤害。Winter认为,在阿拉斯加PFD中的共谋“相当于穿着血汗工厂的衣服”。34这是一个相当有争议的说法,因为共谋杀人通常被认为比共谋各种形式的剥削更糟糕。据推测,温特的观点不是关于杀戮和剥削对受害者的影响,而是关于说明道德责任的结构。这个想法是,特工本身并没有积极伤害任何人,但他们是同谋。重要的是,对于那些没有获得UBI,但却购买血汗工厂产品的全球富人来说,情况已经如此,他们成为剥削的同谋。然而,在一个重要意义上,仅仅是国家UBI接受者的共谋就具有额外的层面。正如我在上一节中所建议的那样,如果不是廉价的外国劳动力使富裕国家的公民受益,仅仅的国家UBI可能不足以满足接受者的基本需求,从而履行其一些最有益的职能。此外,即使仅仅是国家UBI在没有来自国外的廉价劳动力的情况下满足了基本需求,其相对价值也会因这种廉价劳动力而增加。UBI接受者的真正自由是由那些被迫为生计工作的人的劳动补贴的。其次,温特认为,仅仅从不法行为中获益不足以构成与道德相关的共谋。他强调,“共谋论点暴露出的不法性并不取决于利益,而是取决于不法行为”。35相比之下,我提出的问题同时涉及不法行为和利益。例如,当我们在知情的情况下购买在剥削条件下生产的产品时,错误的代理会获得消费者的选择。此外,如果我们收到UBI,其有效性会因剥削而增强,我们就会从错误的结构中受益。错误的代理和利益引发了几个涉及自愿的复杂问题。 毕竟,有人可能会争辩说,你在道德上没有责任从你没有发言权的事情中获益——例如,因为无论你愿不愿意,你的政府每个月都会把钱转移到你的银行账户。36解决我在上一节中提出的全球司法问题的一种方法是,让潜在的接受者有机会选择退出UBI,阿拉斯加PFD.37存在一个机会。然而,与补偿计划不同,选择退出UBI不会让非受援者的生活有实质性的改善。此外,如果某些(已经享有特权的)人可以选择加入或退出,这可能仍然是一个问题,而非受援人则无法获得这个机会。最后,如果人们选择退出UBI,那么这可能需要重新引入福利计划,以确保他们在贫困时的生存。这可能会让那些强调普遍覆盖UBI的好处的UBI倡导者感到不满。38第三,Winter坚持认为“石油开采本身并不是错误的”,但导致更多死亡的温室气体生产“是该行业的正常组成部分”,由于工作场所事故导致的早期死亡是相当不正常的,但其他影响,如对工人的负面长期健康后果、因长时间轮班而失去与家人和朋友的时间、失去机会等,是该行业不可分割的特征。我所关注的剥削并不是一种意外的副产品,而是血汗工厂劳动力高利润率的关键。因此,从某种意义上说,我提出的问题比石油工业的间接影响更令人担忧。我认为,与从资源开采中受益的人相比,从剥削人民中获益的人有更严格的义务赔偿受害者,这是合理的,而资源开采作为一种正常甚至必要的副作用,对一些人来说也是有害的。然而,我的建议并不取决于这种具体的直觉。第四,有一个重要的意义,即仅仅是国家UBI和阿拉斯加PFD都是无害的。在这两种情况下,(气候变化或剥削的)受害者并没有因为仅仅以国家UBI的形式重新分配收入而变得更糟。即使一家私营公司将阿拉斯加的石油收入收入囊中,气候变化的受害者也会死亡。类似地,无论消费者是否获得UBI,血汗工厂工人的工作条件和工资都不会受到影响,或者至少在这方面没有直接联系。这很可能会影响那些从劳动中受益的人所承担的严格赔偿义务。事实上,我认为,由于仅仅是全国性的UBI并不会让剥削受害者的境况变得更糟,因此补偿计划是介于一方面基于道德理由反对仅仅是全国的UBI,另一方面不解决仅仅是全国UBI的剥削问题之间的正确中间立场。温特建议避免提供资金,以挽救阿拉斯加石油行业负责承担的气候变化影响下的生命,他提出了一个明确的数字:即405人的生命。相比之下,很难量化有多少人需要被剥削才能使仅仅是全国性的UBI有效,这在很大程度上取决于接受者和贡献者的情况,以及总体政治和经济条件。因此,不可能确定一个回避机制必须保护多少人免受剥削。此外,与那些因气候变化而死亡的人不同,目前的剥削受害者仍然活着。40此外,尽管气候变化的影响是随机的,从某种意义上说,我们不知道哪些特定的个人会死于或遭受这种影响(尽管我们知道,一些群体和地区比其他群体和地区更容易受到影响),有些具体的个人的工作将使仅仅是国家UBI的接受者受益。这些非受援国应该得到一些东西,如果我们至少能够大致确定这些捐助国,那么仅仅打击或避免在某个地方的剥削是不够的。因此,我提出的补偿计划并不是一种避免资金的形式,而是旨在使仅仅是国家UBI的非受援国受益的资金。这可以采取一种相对普遍的形式,即让任何人从其剥削中获得UBI福利。例如,公平贸易做法或更高的标准可以在法律上成为强制性的,并可以分配适当的资源来执行这些标准。 41我们还可以想象,只要有可能挑出从事这种劳动的特定工厂或地区,就可以采取更有针对性的措施,专门惠及发展中国家的工人,这些工人生产产品,并提供对该国公民至关重要的服务。其中一项有针对性的措施可能是直接向工作了一定年限或无法工作的工人转移资金。另一个可能是放宽对非受援国的移民限制,让他们更容易成为实施仅全国UBI的国家的居民或公民,并设立资金帮助他们旅行和定居。当然,这不应该只发生一次,但对于取代退休或移民的每一代非受援国捐款人。诚然,这里的应用存在重大问题,因为全球供应链和生产链很复杂,往往跨越不止一个边界。此外,人们可能会想,我们对谁有助于仅仅是国家UBI的有效性的概念是否不仅应该包括制造廉价产品的工人,还应该包括为这些工人生产食品和其他必要商品和服务的人,或者那些从事无薪生殖劳动的人,这些劳动使工人能够以尽可能低的成本生产商品和服务。我不能在这里解决这些问题。也许我们能做的最好的事情是从几个剥削性劳动的案例开始,这些案例显然使许多UBI接受者受益,然后根据我们对全球供应链的最佳理解,逐步扩大补偿计划。42为了澄清我的计划的范围,我应该注意到,我关心的不是贫困和不平等——事实上,例如,托马斯·波格(Thomas Pogge)的《全球资源鸿沟》(Global Resource Dividend43)的重点——但开采有助于提高仅仅是国家UBI的有效性。并非所有全球穷人都会为仅仅是国家UBI做出贡献,也并非所有非受援国都是世界上最贫穷的国家之一。我的提议留下了一个前景,即有额外的责任需要补偿,因为全球贫困是由全球富人建立的结构造成的,无论富人是否享有UBI,他们都能从中受益。事实上,我认为我的论点并没有揭示一种全新的赔偿义务,而是放大了先前存在的赔偿全球不公正的义务。有义务补偿剥削或试图重置(国际)关系,使其成为非剥削性的,这似乎相对没有争议。无论各国是否仅仅实施了国家UBI,情况都是如此。这就提出了一个问题,即在我的论点中,仅仅是国家的UBI究竟扮演着什么角色。44至少,我的论点起到了推动作用,促使全球司法问题在关于仅仅是国家UBI的前景和缺点的辩论中更为核心。这可能已经相当有力了,因为UBI的一些最有说服力的论点都是明确的道德论点。UBI被认为是个人作为公域权利的正义问题,45或作为社会和经济正义问题而应承担的义务。46如果采用UBI有重大的道德原因,那么任何关于UBI道德优势的讨论都应该考虑它可能如何影响和影响不公正的全球结构。我的论点还提供了补偿受剥削工人的其他理由。因此,它扩大了享有特权的西方人已经有义务补偿那些从剥削中受益的人。这些额外的理由有多有力,以及在多大程度上强化了预先存在的义务,取决于为什么人们认为UBI比其他分配资源的方式更好(其中一些是不公平获得的)。那些主张UBI的人认为,它提供了其他计划(如有条件福利提供、参与收入等)没有提供的附带商品或福利,尽管UBI可能不是唯一提供这些特殊商品的计划。正如我在本文开头所指出的,各种UBI倡导者强调不同的商品,尽管在实践中经常重叠。有效的UBI将接受者从最基本形式的经济不安全中解放出来,而且不需要工作,提供了真正的自由,并允许接受者拒绝就业。如果有人认为UBI比(许多或所有)其他计划更受欢迎,因为它可以实现特殊商品,那么,我认为,如果一些对UBI的有效性有贡献的人无法获得这些特殊商品,人们应该非常担心。 这使得对于那些因为缺乏任何接近UBI的东西而被迫工作的人来说,仅仅是国家UBI比福利国家条款更难证明其合理性。最终,这里的问题是UBI是否应该被视为对现有福利国家条款的延伸或背离。在后一种情况下,仅仅是国家UBI和福利国家条款之间可能存在原则性差异。我认为,当前关于UBI优点的哲学辩论的一个显著特点是,对福利国家的矛盾立场,这反映在许多UBI倡导者的言论中。根据他们正在应对的UBI的挑战类型,他们倾向于强调他们的提案与公共援助和社会保险模式有多么“根本不同”,54或者它实际上是如何与,福利国家的现有要素。55前者通常被认为是支持UBI而非现有福利国家条款的规范性论点,而后者通常应该强调UBI的财政和政治可行性。56需要对UBI和福利国家之间的连续性和不连续性进行更多的概念澄清,以便充分理解仅仅是国家UBI会在多大程度上扩大那些享受强大福利国家条款的人可能已经承担的义务。这种更清晰的表述也有利于更广泛地讨论UBI的优点和可行性。其次,我为仅仅是国家UBI提出的司法问题与经过工作考验的最低收入保障和国家生活工资等政策之间可能存在结构性相似之处。剥削可能会降低富裕国家的实际价格,从而使最低收入保障和生活工资需求更容易满足。然而,这些政策并没有提供UBI的所有好处。例如,他们没有提供无条件的经济保障(只有当你承担了足够数量的带薪工作时,他们才会这样做);它们并没有像UBI那样促进真正的自由;57,他们当然不允许求职者退出就业市场。实施国民生活工资可能仍然会扩大现有的义务,但国民生活工资并不会无条件地为一个国家的每个人提供基本经济保障等商品。因此,国民生活工资的受益者和为其可行性做出贡献的人之间的差距就不那么明显了。人们越是相信UBI相对于经过工作测试的国民生活工资等政策的优越性,这一差距就越大,我提出的正义问题就越令人担忧。UBI的倡导者通常认为最终目标是全球UBI。58因此,有人可能会指出,正如Van Parijs和Vanderberght所做的那样,59一个或几个富裕国家(或任何国家)的UBI 60是向全球UBI过渡的重要且可能必要的一步。虽然UBI可能会在一段时间内授予一些由弱势群体劳动力补贴的个人特权,但这可以通过在过渡期内最终实现的利益来证明,而无需任何补偿。毕竟,世界上任何地方被剥削的工人(以及物质最差的人和其他人)最终都将从全球UBI中受益。此外,为了成功过渡到全球UBI,在一个或几个国家建立一个财政上可行和可持续的UBI可能更为重要,而将资源转向补偿计划可能会阻碍这一目标。这种思路在某种程度上是合理的。事实上,我认为赔偿计划可以充分回应我提出的司法问题的一个原因是,剥削受害者并没有因为仅仅是全国性的UBI而变得更糟,从长远来看,他们可能会从中受益。此外,仅仅是国家UBI的潜在积极全球影响并不局限于它对创建全球UBI的贡献。仅仅是一个国家的UBI可能会提高实施该倡议的国家的经济安全,这可能会使其他措施能够促进全球正义——例如,降低贸易壁垒,这可能导致更多的出口、更大的劳动力需求和更高的工资,从而改善较贫穷国家工人的地位。很可能仅仅是一个国家的UBI通过间接影响使非受援国的境况更好。然而,这是推测性的。此外,即使非受援国确实从仅仅是国家UBI中间接受益,事实仍然是,一些人会获得UBI(无论他们是否捐款)和此类UBI提供的所有福利,而其他捐款人只会以间接方式受益。 这仍然会让我们感到不安,至少如果我们认为UBI的额外好处是实质性的。61此外,向全球UBI的过渡期可能会持续很长时间。毕竟,在过去的几十年里,几个国家建立了先进而复杂的民主制度和福利条款,这些制度和条款在很大程度上符合其公民的利益,并为正义服务,尽管往往不完美。然而,如果认为所有国家都必然朝着这个方向前进,并且它们将在短期内建立相同或类似的机构和规定,那就太乐观了。同样,如果认为仅仅因为UBI在一个或几个国家得到了实施并运行良好,其他国家也会引入它,那就太天真了。事实上,鉴于许多国家媒体和公共话语的当前性质,仅仅是全国性的UBI甚至可能适得其反。可以想象,尽管我不会猜测UBI在X国引入的可能性有多大,而且在那里效果很好,但由于不诚实的报道、媒体偏见和既得利益,X国在国际上仍然成为了一个很大程度上负面的例子(“我们不可能在这里引入UBI。他们在X国这样做了,现在看看这个地方,真是一场噩梦!”)。例如,在(保守的)美国关于欧洲全民医疗体系的报告中,有时也会出现类似的言论。一些剥削受害者的一生将无法得到全球UBI的祝福,这是一个真正的危险。他们,不仅仅是他们的后代,应该为他们的贡献付出一些代价。我这篇文章的第一个目的是为仅仅是全国性的UBI提出一个经常被忽视的司法问题:并不是每个为该计划的有效性做出贡献的人都能获得UBI。这是冲浪者问题的一个更紧迫的版本。它扩大了赔偿剥削受害者的义务,这些受害者为仅仅是国家UBI的有效性做出了贡献。第二个目的是提议,在只制定国家UBI的同时,为非受援国提供补偿计划。这项提案旨在在解决剥削问题和维护仅仅是国家性的UBI的积极成就、增加一个社会内部的正义和迈向更全面的UBI之间取得正确的平衡。我感谢Christian Barry、Chris Bertram、Joanna Burch Brown、Robert Chapman、Max Jones、Seiriol Morgan,João Pinheiro、Felix Pinkert、Joe Saunders、Janis Schaab、Irina Schumski、Dean Shiels、Joe Slater、Philipp Stehr、Karl Widerquist、Garrath Williams、Alan Wilson、Jo Wolff、Lena Zuchowski,一位匿名裁判,以及我在波鸿大学2020年全民基本收入研讨会上的学生。这篇文章的版本已经在格拉斯哥的基本收入地球网络大会上发表;伦敦国王学院经济变化中的UBI伦理研讨会;第十届欧洲分析哲学大会,乌得勒支;亚里士多德与心智协会联席会议,达勒姆;社会和政治哲学协会年会,纽卡斯尔;以及布里斯托尔大学。我要感谢这些活动的组织者和观众,特别是在波鸿接待我的Corinna Mieth。这篇文章的撰写得到了布里斯托尔大学和波鸿鲁尔大学伦理、经济、法律和政治客座主席的支持,该客座主席由德国学术交流服务局资助。本文不存在潜在的利益冲突。作者宣称这项研究不需要人类伦理的批准。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.10
自引率
5.60%
发文量
17
期刊介绍: The Journal of Political Philosophy is an international journal devoted to the study of theoretical issues arising out of moral, legal and political life. It welcomes, and hopes to foster, work cutting across a variety of disciplinary concerns, among them philosophy, sociology, history, economics and political science. The journal encourages new approaches, including (but not limited to): feminism; environmentalism; critical theory, post-modernism and analytical Marxism; social and public choice theory; law and economics, critical legal studies and critical race studies; and game theoretic, socio-biological and anthropological approaches to politics. It also welcomes work in the history of political thought which builds to a larger philosophical point and work in the philosophy of the social sciences and applied ethics with broader political implications. Featuring a distinguished editorial board from major centres of thought from around the globe, the journal draws equally upon the work of non-philosophers and philosophers and provides a forum of debate between disparate factions who usually keep to their own separate journals.
期刊最新文献
Evaluating International Agreements: The Voluntarist Reply and Its Limits Issue Information The Journal of Political Philosophy Index, Volume 31 (2023) The challenge of policing minorities in a liberal society Noncompliance and the Demands of Public Reason
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