{"title":"Evaluating International Agreements: The Voluntarist Reply and Its Limits","authors":"O. Suttle","doi":"10.1111/jopp.12315","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12315","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"231 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139228944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Journal of Political Philosophy Index, Volume 31 (2023)","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jopp.12314","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12314","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"31 4","pages":"517-518"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68180860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The problem with police is not that they are fascist pigs but that our country is ruled by majoritarian pigs. Ta-Nehisi Coates To change the police without changing the police role in society is as futile as the labors of Sisyphus. John van Maanen This question is, I will argue, of considerable importance to political philosophy, because it exposes a tension in the liberal project as a whole. It has, unfortunately, been subject to relative neglect; there has until recently been very little philosophical or normative literature on policing, much less the policing of minorities.3 There are two reasons for this, both of them based ultimately on the perception that the problem is theoretically straightforward, and so does not raise any philosophically difficult questions.4 With respect to policing in general, many political philosophers appear to believe that the police are uninteresting, because they serve the purely instrumental role of enforcing statutory law. And with respect to minorities, widespread acceptance of the fascist pig theory leads to the perception that the problem is also normatively straightforward. If tensions between police and minorities are caused by the police being racist, then the solution is obviously for the police to become less racist. These two views, when combined, generate a highly simplistic account of the problem of policing minorities.5 It suggests that, since the police are there to enforce the law, all they need to do is enforce the law in a non-discriminatory way, treating all citizens equally, and the problem should go away. The argument, however, rests on a false premise, since the police do a great deal more than simply enforce the law, and it is primarily these other activities that give rise to problems. My preliminary contention in this article will be that both of the underlying theories about policing are false or misleading. Obviously, the police do enforce the law, but as several decades of work in the sociology of policing have shown, this is not all that they do, and, indeed, this does not even add up to a substantial fraction of what they do. And equally obviously, there are some police who are racist, both consciously and subconsciously, but this goes only part of the way to explaining the seriousness of the difficulties that practically every major police force experiences in its relations with particular minority groups.6 Indeed, a great deal of the motivation for the shift in emphasis toward “systemic racism” in expert discourse on the subject lies in the recognition that the emphasis on eliminating attitudinal racism or increasing officer diversity has reached the point of sharply diminishing returns in many jurisdictions.7 In order to understand the broader source of the problem, I will argue, it is necessary to see that effective policing is inherently communitarian. The result is that minority groups who are unable to implement a self-policing regime find themselves subject to coercive enfor
{"title":"The challenge of policing minorities in a liberal society","authors":"Joseph Heath","doi":"10.1111/jopp.12313","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12313","url":null,"abstract":"The problem with police is not that they are fascist pigs but that our country is ruled by majoritarian pigs. Ta-Nehisi Coates To change the police without changing the police role in society is as futile as the labors of Sisyphus. John van Maanen This question is, I will argue, of considerable importance to political philosophy, because it exposes a tension in the liberal project as a whole. It has, unfortunately, been subject to relative neglect; there has until recently been very little philosophical or normative literature on policing, much less the policing of minorities.3 There are two reasons for this, both of them based ultimately on the perception that the problem is theoretically straightforward, and so does not raise any philosophically difficult questions.4 With respect to policing in general, many political philosophers appear to believe that the police are uninteresting, because they serve the purely instrumental role of enforcing statutory law. And with respect to minorities, widespread acceptance of the fascist pig theory leads to the perception that the problem is also normatively straightforward. If tensions between police and minorities are caused by the police being racist, then the solution is obviously for the police to become less racist. These two views, when combined, generate a highly simplistic account of the problem of policing minorities.5 It suggests that, since the police are there to enforce the law, all they need to do is enforce the law in a non-discriminatory way, treating all citizens equally, and the problem should go away. The argument, however, rests on a false premise, since the police do a great deal more than simply enforce the law, and it is primarily these other activities that give rise to problems. My preliminary contention in this article will be that both of the underlying theories about policing are false or misleading. Obviously, the police do enforce the law, but as several decades of work in the sociology of policing have shown, this is not all that they do, and, indeed, this does not even add up to a substantial fraction of what they do. And equally obviously, there are some police who are racist, both consciously and subconsciously, but this goes only part of the way to explaining the seriousness of the difficulties that practically every major police force experiences in its relations with particular minority groups.6 Indeed, a great deal of the motivation for the shift in emphasis toward “systemic racism” in expert discourse on the subject lies in the recognition that the emphasis on eliminating attitudinal racism or increasing officer diversity has reached the point of sharply diminishing returns in many jurisdictions.7 In order to understand the broader source of the problem, I will argue, it is necessary to see that effective policing is inherently communitarian. The result is that minority groups who are unable to implement a self-policing regime find themselves subject to coercive enfor","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135759116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Political liberals argue that democratic citizens have a duty of public reason to ensure that important laws are justified by reasons fellow citizens can accept given their own moral and philosophical beliefs.1 In any real-world democracy, many will fail to comply with this duty. Most people have never heard of public reason, and many who have heard of it reject it. This raises an important question about the demands of public reason: is there ever a duty to ensure that laws are justifiable to those who are not willing to reciprocate? Most political liberals answer “no”—the duty of public reason is owed only to those who are themselves willing to comply.2 This reflects a more general view that has wide currency in democratic thought: individuals ought to moderate their political activity to accommodate disagreement with others, but only when others are willing to reciprocate. Many think, for example, that individuals ought to seek middle-ground policy compromises, but only with those who are willing to compromise. The prevailing view among political liberals is that the duty of public reason is always conditional on reciprocal compliance in this way. As Andrew Lister asks, “How could it be reasonable to ask me not to count a reason I think true and relevant on the basis that you reject it, if you are not likewise willing to exercise restraint with respect to reasons that you think true but which I reject?”.3 My aim in this article is to answer this question and, in doing so, to rethink the demands of public reason in the face of noncompliance. I argue that there is a wide range of political contexts in which citizens have duties to comply with public reason for the sake of others regardless of whether they reciprocate. This helps lay foundations for a non-ideal theory of political liberalism that gives public reason a more inclusive and morally significant role in the practice of democratic politics. In Section I, I examine what I take to be the strongest argument for the prevailing view that public reason is always conditional on reciprocal compliance. The civic friendship argument grounds the duty of public reason in the valuable communal relation that citizens realize when they reciprocally comply for the sake of one another. Because unreciprocated compliance with public reason lacks mutuality, it undermines rather than promotes relational equality. When individuals bear the “moral cost” of excluding what they take to be true reasons without demanding reciprocation from others, they allow themselves to be treated as subordinates.4 In Section II, I argue that the civic friendship argument misses an important truth about relational inequality—that whether unreciprocated sacrifice generates subordination depends on background features of the relationship in question, including the motivations of the parties and the history of their relationship. I identify two general political contexts—one with background equality and the other with inequality—i
{"title":"Noncompliance and the Demands of Public Reason","authors":"Sameer Bajaj","doi":"10.1111/jopp.12309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12309","url":null,"abstract":"Political liberals argue that democratic citizens have a duty of public reason to ensure that important laws are justified by reasons fellow citizens can accept given their own moral and philosophical beliefs.1 In any real-world democracy, many will fail to comply with this duty. Most people have never heard of public reason, and many who have heard of it reject it. This raises an important question about the demands of public reason: is there ever a duty to ensure that laws are justifiable to those who are not willing to reciprocate? Most political liberals answer “no”—the duty of public reason is owed only to those who are themselves willing to comply.2 This reflects a more general view that has wide currency in democratic thought: individuals ought to moderate their political activity to accommodate disagreement with others, but only when others are willing to reciprocate. Many think, for example, that individuals ought to seek middle-ground policy compromises, but only with those who are willing to compromise. The prevailing view among political liberals is that the duty of public reason is always conditional on reciprocal compliance in this way. As Andrew Lister asks, “How could it be reasonable to ask me not to count a reason I think true and relevant on the basis that you reject it, if you are not likewise willing to exercise restraint with respect to reasons that you think true but which I reject?”.3 My aim in this article is to answer this question and, in doing so, to rethink the demands of public reason in the face of noncompliance. I argue that there is a wide range of political contexts in which citizens have duties to comply with public reason for the sake of others regardless of whether they reciprocate. This helps lay foundations for a non-ideal theory of political liberalism that gives public reason a more inclusive and morally significant role in the practice of democratic politics. In Section I, I examine what I take to be the strongest argument for the prevailing view that public reason is always conditional on reciprocal compliance. The civic friendship argument grounds the duty of public reason in the valuable communal relation that citizens realize when they reciprocally comply for the sake of one another. Because unreciprocated compliance with public reason lacks mutuality, it undermines rather than promotes relational equality. When individuals bear the “moral cost” of excluding what they take to be true reasons without demanding reciprocation from others, they allow themselves to be treated as subordinates.4 In Section II, I argue that the civic friendship argument misses an important truth about relational inequality—that whether unreciprocated sacrifice generates subordination depends on background features of the relationship in question, including the motivations of the parties and the history of their relationship. I identify two general political contexts—one with background equality and the other with inequality—i","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"239 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136097503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Throughout the Covid-19 pandemic, protests against the public health measures instituted by governments have become a familiar sight on the streets of major cities across the world. The policies these protests challenge, and the kinds of claims made by protestors, have differed across jurisdiction and have evolved through different stages of the pandemic, with protests across Europe and North America focussing at various times on the supposed injustice of initial lockdown measures, the rollout of vaccines, and the implementation of vaccine mandates. A significant number of these protests have been, in various respects, legally prohibited; many of the earlier protests violated emergency legislation restricting the number of people or households permitted to gather in public, while later actions include occupations of the offices of media companies and refusal to pay taxes.1 At least some participants in these protests have been animated by false claims that the pandemic is a hoax, or that it is in some sense deliberate, or that it is being exploited by politicians and businesses to implement policies of radical social control. Many participants and commentators have described some of these actions as forms of civil disobedience; a placard displayed by one protestor in Bristol in November 2020 stated that ‘civil disobedience becomes a sacred duty when the state has become lawless or corrupt’,2 while a Canadian anti-lockdown campaigner compared his refusal to provide details of his vaccination status in a coffee shop to the actions of Rosa Parks.3 Similar claims have been made regarding the protests in Ottawa in late 2021/early 2022.4 These protests raise important questions regarding the conditions for permissible civil disobedience in a pandemic specifically,5 but also highlight some more general questions for theories of civil disobedience. Some of these relate to the use of civil disobedience in the pursuit of ‘anti-democratic and illiberal goals’, such as whether broadly liberal theories of civil disobedience effectively apply across these cases as well as the justice-promoting paradigm examples.6 In this article I focus on a slightly different issue: is the justification of civil disobedience conditional on dissenters satisfying some epistemic conditions? If so, what kinds of conditions? Perhaps surprisingly, the two most directly relevant philosophical literatures suggest quite different answers to these questions. Within broadly liberal theories of civil disobedience they have received little direct attention. Such accounts generally view the justification of civil disobedience as primarily relating to the conduct of the dissenters during and after disobedience. The justification of an act of civil disobedience just relates to the question of whether agents act in accordance with certain constraints, which may include non-violence, civility, and accepting punishment. However, there are some accounts within this literature, such as those deve
{"title":"The Epistemic Dimensions of Civil Disobedience","authors":"Alexander Bryan","doi":"10.1111/jopp.12310","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12310","url":null,"abstract":"Throughout the Covid-19 pandemic, protests against the public health measures instituted by governments have become a familiar sight on the streets of major cities across the world. The policies these protests challenge, and the kinds of claims made by protestors, have differed across jurisdiction and have evolved through different stages of the pandemic, with protests across Europe and North America focussing at various times on the supposed injustice of initial lockdown measures, the rollout of vaccines, and the implementation of vaccine mandates. A significant number of these protests have been, in various respects, legally prohibited; many of the earlier protests violated emergency legislation restricting the number of people or households permitted to gather in public, while later actions include occupations of the offices of media companies and refusal to pay taxes.1 At least some participants in these protests have been animated by false claims that the pandemic is a hoax, or that it is in some sense deliberate, or that it is being exploited by politicians and businesses to implement policies of radical social control. Many participants and commentators have described some of these actions as forms of civil disobedience; a placard displayed by one protestor in Bristol in November 2020 stated that ‘civil disobedience becomes a sacred duty when the state has become lawless or corrupt’,2 while a Canadian anti-lockdown campaigner compared his refusal to provide details of his vaccination status in a coffee shop to the actions of Rosa Parks.3 Similar claims have been made regarding the protests in Ottawa in late 2021/early 2022.4 These protests raise important questions regarding the conditions for permissible civil disobedience in a pandemic specifically,5 but also highlight some more general questions for theories of civil disobedience. Some of these relate to the use of civil disobedience in the pursuit of ‘anti-democratic and illiberal goals’, such as whether broadly liberal theories of civil disobedience effectively apply across these cases as well as the justice-promoting paradigm examples.6 In this article I focus on a slightly different issue: is the justification of civil disobedience conditional on dissenters satisfying some epistemic conditions? If so, what kinds of conditions? Perhaps surprisingly, the two most directly relevant philosophical literatures suggest quite different answers to these questions. Within broadly liberal theories of civil disobedience they have received little direct attention. Such accounts generally view the justification of civil disobedience as primarily relating to the conduct of the dissenters during and after disobedience. The justification of an act of civil disobedience just relates to the question of whether agents act in accordance with certain constraints, which may include non-violence, civility, and accepting punishment. However, there are some accounts within this literature, such as those deve","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135476984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Deciding whether a state has political authority is arguably the most fundamental judgment we can make about its moral standing. When a state possesses legitimate authority, it has the exclusive right to govern the occupants of its territory. Even when its decisions are inefficient, irrational, or morally mistaken, its subjects are expected to comply with the legal order it establishes, and outsiders are expected to refrain from attempting to interfere with its internal affairs. A state that lacks authority, on the other hand, enjoys no such protection: provided there is an adequate justification for doing so, its subjects are permitted to actively resist attempts to enforce the law, and outsiders are permitted to intervene in order to reform or replace state institutions.1 Given these practical stakes, it's crucial to settle on a plausible account of the requirements for legitimate political authority that can guide our assessments of both nascent and established states. Recently, Alexander Motchoulski has developed a novel “hybrid” account of political authority2 that he claims is up to this task. This hybrid view, which combines elements from existing functionalist and fair-play accounts3, establishes the authority of particular states in two stages.4 In the first stage, we determine whether the state satisfies various functionalist criteria such as the consistent protection of basic rights, the maintenance of democratic institutions, and the reliable provision of essential public goods. If the state passes this test, we then examine whether the principle of fair play gives the territorially demarcated populations the state claims jurisdiction over reason to comply with its laws and support its institutions. This involves evaluating the goods provided by the state to see if they are either acceptable upon reflection or morally required. A good is acceptable if, given their interests, the recipients have reason to prefer acquiring the good plus a corresponding duty to reciprocate over not receiving this good at all. On the other hand, a good is morally required just in case the recipients have a moral duty to contribute to its provision regardless of whether the good is acceptable to them.5 If the aforementioned political goods meet either of these conditions, individuals benefiting from them have a duty to reciprocate the political cooperation of their co-citizens by obeying the laws of the state and doing their fair share to maintain its cooperative structure over time. It is this duty, owed by the citizens of a state to one another, that generates particularized relationships of authority between states and populations.6 According to Motchoulski, the primary attraction of his view is that, unlike orthodox functionalism, it is able to account for our beliefs that: (i) states generally lack authority over populations they incorporate through acts of non-consensual annexation or colonization, and (ii) historical injustices committed by the stat
{"title":"Debate: Political Authority, Functionalism, and the Problem of Annexation","authors":"Arthur Hill","doi":"10.1111/jopp.12311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12311","url":null,"abstract":"Deciding whether a state has political authority is arguably the most fundamental judgment we can make about its moral standing. When a state possesses legitimate authority, it has the exclusive right to govern the occupants of its territory. Even when its decisions are inefficient, irrational, or morally mistaken, its subjects are expected to comply with the legal order it establishes, and outsiders are expected to refrain from attempting to interfere with its internal affairs. A state that lacks authority, on the other hand, enjoys no such protection: provided there is an adequate justification for doing so, its subjects are permitted to actively resist attempts to enforce the law, and outsiders are permitted to intervene in order to reform or replace state institutions.1 Given these practical stakes, it's crucial to settle on a plausible account of the requirements for legitimate political authority that can guide our assessments of both nascent and established states. Recently, Alexander Motchoulski has developed a novel “hybrid” account of political authority2 that he claims is up to this task. This hybrid view, which combines elements from existing functionalist and fair-play accounts3, establishes the authority of particular states in two stages.4 In the first stage, we determine whether the state satisfies various functionalist criteria such as the consistent protection of basic rights, the maintenance of democratic institutions, and the reliable provision of essential public goods. If the state passes this test, we then examine whether the principle of fair play gives the territorially demarcated populations the state claims jurisdiction over reason to comply with its laws and support its institutions. This involves evaluating the goods provided by the state to see if they are either acceptable upon reflection or morally required. A good is acceptable if, given their interests, the recipients have reason to prefer acquiring the good plus a corresponding duty to reciprocate over not receiving this good at all. On the other hand, a good is morally required just in case the recipients have a moral duty to contribute to its provision regardless of whether the good is acceptable to them.5 If the aforementioned political goods meet either of these conditions, individuals benefiting from them have a duty to reciprocate the political cooperation of their co-citizens by obeying the laws of the state and doing their fair share to maintain its cooperative structure over time. It is this duty, owed by the citizens of a state to one another, that generates particularized relationships of authority between states and populations.6 According to Motchoulski, the primary attraction of his view is that, unlike orthodox functionalism, it is able to account for our beliefs that: (i) states generally lack authority over populations they incorporate through acts of non-consensual annexation or colonization, and (ii) historical injustices committed by the stat","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135769720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How should the injustices associated with the enduring segregation of Black Americans be addressed? In contemporary debates about racial justice, there are two broad answers to this question. “New integrationists” argue that integration is necessary for remedying racial inequalities.1 “Egalitarian pluralists” instead argue that we should promote strategies that seek to improve the material condition of Black Americans without integration.2 Political philosophers have also recently begun to examine an apparently unrelated phenomenon: gentrification. According to its critics, gentrification may undermine social equality, violate residents' occupancy rights, subject residents to domination, impede valuable forms of democratic communication and/or impinge upon self-respect.3 But so far—with some important exceptions that I discuss below—political theorists have not examined the relationship between gentrification and integration in much depth. This article explores how racialised contexts of gentrification relate to and can shed light on the debate between new integrationists and egalitarian pluralists. I take as my focal point the debate between Elizabeth Anderson and Tommie Shelby.4 I examine three arguments for residential integration that Anderson makes: the opportunity argument, the epistemic-democratic argument, and the relational-democratic argument. I argue that racialised contexts of gentrification reveal some important limits to each argument for integration. But the upshot of my argument is not that we should abandon integration in favour of egalitarian pluralism. Rather, my suggestion is that examining racialised contexts of gentrification gives us a better understanding of the conditions under which residential integration can—and cannot—promote racial justice. My argument leaves open space for a modified defence of integration that takes these conditions into account. Ultimately, however, I suggest that such a modified defence of integration faces some important challenges of its own. This article's second aim is to contribute to the emerging literature on gentrification in political philosophy by examining its racial dynamics. By analysing the racial dynamics of gentrification, I bring to light some features of gentrification beyond residential displacement—in particular, the dynamics of social interaction in gentrifying neighbourhoods—which are relevant to its moral evaluation. My argument also responds to some recent arguments made by Andrew Pierce and Hwa Young Kim and Andrew Walton to the effect that gentrification's benefits can be harnessed, and its burdens can be limited, for the project of integration.5 My focus in this article is primarily on residential integration, though I do also discuss its relationship to other forms of integration at points. Residential integration is usually taken to be a central component—and often the central component—of the broader project of racial integration, because of the central role that res
{"title":"Gentrification and Integration","authors":"Jamie Draper","doi":"10.1111/jopp.12312","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12312","url":null,"abstract":"How should the injustices associated with the enduring segregation of Black Americans be addressed? In contemporary debates about racial justice, there are two broad answers to this question. “New integrationists” argue that integration is necessary for remedying racial inequalities.1 “Egalitarian pluralists” instead argue that we should promote strategies that seek to improve the material condition of Black Americans without integration.2 Political philosophers have also recently begun to examine an apparently unrelated phenomenon: gentrification. According to its critics, gentrification may undermine social equality, violate residents' occupancy rights, subject residents to domination, impede valuable forms of democratic communication and/or impinge upon self-respect.3 But so far—with some important exceptions that I discuss below—political theorists have not examined the relationship between gentrification and integration in much depth. This article explores how racialised contexts of gentrification relate to and can shed light on the debate between new integrationists and egalitarian pluralists. I take as my focal point the debate between Elizabeth Anderson and Tommie Shelby.4 I examine three arguments for residential integration that Anderson makes: the opportunity argument, the epistemic-democratic argument, and the relational-democratic argument. I argue that racialised contexts of gentrification reveal some important limits to each argument for integration. But the upshot of my argument is not that we should abandon integration in favour of egalitarian pluralism. Rather, my suggestion is that examining racialised contexts of gentrification gives us a better understanding of the conditions under which residential integration can—and cannot—promote racial justice. My argument leaves open space for a modified defence of integration that takes these conditions into account. Ultimately, however, I suggest that such a modified defence of integration faces some important challenges of its own. This article's second aim is to contribute to the emerging literature on gentrification in political philosophy by examining its racial dynamics. By analysing the racial dynamics of gentrification, I bring to light some features of gentrification beyond residential displacement—in particular, the dynamics of social interaction in gentrifying neighbourhoods—which are relevant to its moral evaluation. My argument also responds to some recent arguments made by Andrew Pierce and Hwa Young Kim and Andrew Walton to the effect that gentrification's benefits can be harnessed, and its burdens can be limited, for the project of integration.5 My focus in this article is primarily on residential integration, though I do also discuss its relationship to other forms of integration at points. Residential integration is usually taken to be a central component—and often the central component—of the broader project of racial integration, because of the central role that res","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135107869","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Many of us will remember the sense of foreboding induced by the simple threat, usually uttered by a teacher: ‘It will go on your permanent record’. This administrative bogeyman exploits our early awareness of the importance of being able to leave some things in the past. While some of the things we do may go on public record at various points in our lives, it used to be possible to comfort ourselves with the thought that these would soon be buried deep in the archives, where most people would not care to look. In the digital age, however, search engines do the digging and can serve up previously long-forgotten results on a simple search of a person's name.</p><p>This article takes up the question of what kinds of claims we have against information being dug up from our past. Specifically, it focuses on information that is legitimately a matter of public record. When some information has been stored in an archive and has, in principle, been accessible to anyone, what claims, if any, do we have against that information being brought back to light? Many people would find it intrusive for someone to dig through archives and publicize afresh the information they found out about you there, but it is not clear what the basis of such a complaint would be. Moreover, it is this kind of complaint that is provided protection through data-protection provisions colloquially referred to as the right to be forgotten. Such measures are typically framed as privacy protections. While some have argued that we can have privacy rights over information that has been made public,1 I argue that appeals to privacy fail in cases concerning information that is legitimately a matter of public record.</p><p>Paying attention to the reasons we have to object to the dredging up of outdated information reveals a new category of claims that are distinct from claims to privacy, but serve the same general interest in self-presentation that privacy scholars have long been concerned with. I call these claims against distortion. We can understand such claims as falling under a general principle of reputational control embedded in the historic right of personality. That general principle provides the basis for claims to privacy, claims against defamation, and, as I will argue, claims against distortion.</p><p>The purpose of invoking the right of personality is to identify a general principle embedded in that concept, and to then draw out a taxonomy of claims that serve that principle in distinct ways. One advantage of separating these three categories of claims is that it allows us to retain clear boundaries around the concept of privacy, which has often come under fire for suffering from a plethora of meanings.2</p><p>On my account, claims to privacy are claims to prevent certain information from becoming publicly available beyond one's audience of choice. Privacy provides one aspect of reputational control by allowing us to decide who we share various aspects of oneself with. Claim
{"title":"Privacy, Publicity, and the Right to Be Forgotten","authors":"Hannah Carnegy-Arbuthnott","doi":"10.1111/jopp.12308","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12308","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many of us will remember the sense of foreboding induced by the simple threat, usually uttered by a teacher: ‘It will go on your permanent record’. This administrative bogeyman exploits our early awareness of the importance of being able to leave some things in the past. While some of the things we do may go on public record at various points in our lives, it used to be possible to comfort ourselves with the thought that these would soon be buried deep in the archives, where most people would not care to look. In the digital age, however, search engines do the digging and can serve up previously long-forgotten results on a simple search of a person's name.</p><p>This article takes up the question of what kinds of claims we have against information being dug up from our past. Specifically, it focuses on information that is legitimately a matter of public record. When some information has been stored in an archive and has, in principle, been accessible to anyone, what claims, if any, do we have against that information being brought back to light? Many people would find it intrusive for someone to dig through archives and publicize afresh the information they found out about you there, but it is not clear what the basis of such a complaint would be. Moreover, it is this kind of complaint that is provided protection through data-protection provisions colloquially referred to as the right to be forgotten. Such measures are typically framed as privacy protections. While some have argued that we can have privacy rights over information that has been made public,1 I argue that appeals to privacy fail in cases concerning information that is legitimately a matter of public record.</p><p>Paying attention to the reasons we have to object to the dredging up of outdated information reveals a new category of claims that are distinct from claims to privacy, but serve the same general interest in self-presentation that privacy scholars have long been concerned with. I call these claims against distortion. We can understand such claims as falling under a general principle of reputational control embedded in the historic right of personality. That general principle provides the basis for claims to privacy, claims against defamation, and, as I will argue, claims against distortion.</p><p>The purpose of invoking the right of personality is to identify a general principle embedded in that concept, and to then draw out a taxonomy of claims that serve that principle in distinct ways. One advantage of separating these three categories of claims is that it allows us to retain clear boundaries around the concept of privacy, which has often come under fire for suffering from a plethora of meanings.2</p><p>On my account, claims to privacy are claims to prevent certain information from becoming publicly available beyond one's audience of choice. Privacy provides one aspect of reputational control by allowing us to decide who we share various aspects of oneself with. Claim","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"31 4","pages":"494-516"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jopp.12308","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68179332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Suppose that in a jurisdiction there are 2,000,001 white voters and 1,000,000 black voters, all of whom enjoy equally weighted votes. The question of white supremacy is routinely put to a majority-rule plebiscite. In each such plebiscite, all white voters vote <i>yes</i> for white supremacy and all black voters vote <i>no</i>. This has been going on as long as anyone can remember, and it will continue for as long as anyone can foresee. This is a paradigm of a persistent minority, to which, intuitively, each black voter has an objection.</p><p>What is their objection? One answer is that black voters don't get their preferences satisfied. Another answer is that black voters are oppressed by the eventuating policies of white supremacy. Yet another answer considers the white majority <i>as a group</i>. As a group, they have greater power to determine the outcome than have the blacks as a group. Indeed, the white majority as a group is always decisive. In the last plebiscite, all the whites voted for white supremacy and it passed; and if all the whites had voted against, it would have failed. By contrast, the black minority as a group is never decisive. They voted against and it passed; and if any assemblage of them had voted <i>yes</i>, it would still have passed.</p><p>In this article, we raise a number of doubts about Abizadeh's suggestion that the power-of-numbers thesis can vindicate the thought that members of the minority as individuals have less voting power and thereby account for their objection to belonging to a persistent minority. Perhaps the most serious doubt is that while Abizadeh correctly holds that voting power must be assessed in part by counterfactualizing on votes—by asking what would have happened if a voter had voted otherwise than he in fact did—he does not counterfactualize in the right way.</p><p>We cannot vindicate the thought that members of the minority have less voting power if we assume an a priori measure of voting power that abstracts from information about the distribution of political preferences and its causes. An example is the Banzhaf (or Penrose–Banzhaf) measure of voting power, according to which a voter's power is her probability of casting a decisive vote if all other voters vote independently and with equal probability for either alternative.4 (A voter's vote in favor of (or against) a measure is <i>decisive</i> if the measure passes (fails), but would have failed (passed) if the voter had instead voted against (in favor).) An a priori measure of voting power will not register any differences between members of the persistent minority and anyone else, because it ignores, by construction, the facts about the distribution of preferences and its causes, in virtue of which some voters qualify as members of a persistent minority.</p><p>Abizadeh therefore seeks to vindicate the power-of-numbers thesis with an a posteriori measure: power is calculated on the basis of, rather than in abstraction from, information
因此，如果选民的权力与投出决定性选票的概率相对应（Penrose-Banzhaf衡量标准背后的假设），那么每个选民，无论白人还是黑人，都拥有相同的权力。如果在阿比扎德之后，我们承认获胜一方的一名成员可以享有部分效力，即使他们不是决定性的，该怎么办？当每个人都投下同等权重的选票时，正如我们所有的例子一样，我们可以假设部分效力的程度是获胜联盟规模（相对于选民规模）的函数。在光谱的一端，有人和其他选民一起投票给获胜的一方；他们的投票有一定的部分效果，但不如获胜联盟的相对规模较小时那么有效。另一端是完全决定性的选民，他投票给获胜的一方，是最小决定性联盟的一部分（例如，简单多数规则下的绝对多数）。在我们的例子中，当白人选民投票给获胜联盟，支持白人至上主义时，他的投票具有一定的部分效力，即在3000001名选民中，与2000000名其他选民一起投票选出获胜的备选方案相对应的部分效力程度。如果白人选民投票反对白人至上主义，他的投票效果将为零。如果一名黑人选民投票支持获胜的联盟，支持白人至上主义，那么她的选票将具有一定的部分效力，即在3000001名选民中，与2000001名其他选民一起投票支持获胜候选人的部分效力程度。当黑人选民投票反对白人至上主义时，她的投票效果将为零。他们的部分疗效评分几乎相同。这些说法建立在一种默认的假设之上，即如果选民的投票方式与他们实际的投票方式不同，那么其他人的投票方式仍然与他们实际投票的方式相同。如果一个人想为数字的幂理论辩护，就必须拒绝这种假设。有些人可能会基于以下理由反对这种默认假设。鉴于我们对此案的规定，所有白人选民肯定会以同样的方式投票。因此，如果一个特定的白人选民投票反对白人至上主义，而不是支持，那么所有其他白人选民也会投票反对。但事实并非如此。假设A报和B报总是报道同样的事件；当丑闻爆发时，他们每个人都一定会举报。这并不是说如果A不举报丑闻，那么B也会不举报。概率依赖并不意味着反事实依赖。5如果一名选民关于如何投票的决定对其他选民的决定产生了因果影响，人们会有充分的理由拒绝默认假设。但让我们假设，没有人的投票对其他人的投票有任何因果影响。如果你愿意，假设每个人都同时秘密投票。数字理论的力量不应该取决于选民相互影响的能力。人们可能会拒绝这一假设的另一个原因是，如果人们认为投票权的衡量不仅应该反映选民的行为，还应该反映过去对选民行为以及其他选民行为产生因果影响的事件。原因可能如下。这个例子假设所有白人选民总是作为一个群体投票，所有黑人选民总是作为群体投票。这种相关性模式只有在潜在的社会结构原因的作用下才能成立，这些原因对白人选民的偏好有一个（完全决定的）影响，而对黑人选民的偏好则有相反的（完全决定）影响。如果某个白人选民投票反对拟议的投票措施，那一定是因为潜在的社会结构影响导致他和所有其他白人选民反对。因此，如果一个特定的白人选民投反对票，他们会发现自己站在获胜的一边，并会享有一些部分效力，就像他们投赞成票时享有一些部分功效一样；相比之下，如果一位黑人选民投了赞成票，她仍然会输，她的投票仍然无效，就像她实际投的反对票无效一样。因此，白人选民比黑人选民享有更大的权力。这种推理涉及“回溯”反事实：假设当一个人对白人选民的行为进行反事实化，并寻找他投反对票的最接近的世界时，应该包括在投票前具有不同历史的世界。 她投票支持工会的最接近的世界可能是老板从未发出威胁，也没有人因为投票支持工会而面临失业的前景，在这种情况下，其他人也会投票支持工会，工会提案就会通过。因此，如果她投赞成工会提案的票，然后——回溯和反实现老板过去的行为——它就会通过，在这种情况下，她会和其他人一起通过提案。或者假设一位美国足球教练正在决定是在第四次落后时触地得分，还是让他的踢球者踢出一个界外球。当他做出这样的决定时，一个考虑因素是风：如果风太大，踢球者将没有力量射门，因此在这种情况下，教练决定触地得分。假设事实上风很大，所以他决定触地得分。在他们失败后，他的批评者说：“教练做出了错误的决定。踢球者确实有能力在球场上进球。在他踢球的最接近的世界里，他踢球是因为教练告诉他，教练告诉他这样做是因为风的条件很好，既然风的条件好，踢球者就进球了。”我们把周一早上的四分卫提升到了一个全新的水平。到目前为止，我们已经考虑了一个例子，在这个例子中，投票权的衡量是基于完全可以预测每个人投票行为的信息。在这种假设下，持续多数派的个人成员和持续少数派的个人会员之间的投票权差异可以忽略不计。如果人们放松这一假设，转而根据仅部分预测选票分布的信息来衡量权力，那么在某些情况下，结构性少数群体的成员比结构性多数群体的成员在预期中拥有更大的权力——同样，前提是人们不用回溯的反事实来衡量权力。选民1属于结构性少数，选民2、3、4和5属于结构性多数。对于每一次公民投票，都有一个社会结构变量S t影响所有五名选民的投票行为。S t=0 或S t=1。如果 S t=1，则选民1、2和3将支持该措施，而选民4和5将反对该措施的概率为p；选民1支持，但选民2、3、4和5反对的概率为1−p。如果 S t=0，则选民1、2和3将反对该措施，而选民4和5将支持该措施的概率为p；选民1反对，但选民2、3、4和5支持的概率为1−p。9假设0<；p<；1/2。大多数情况下（一小部分1−p>；1/2的时间），选民1发现自己处于少数，而选民2、3、4和5发现自己处于多数。 但选民1属于结构性少数，选民5属于结构性多数。选民1占少数，而选民5占多数，分数为1-p>；1/2的时间，由于他们在社会结构中的地位及其对投票行为的影响。在不失普遍性的情况下，我们假设我们正在进行公民投票，1号选民支持这项措施。但如果我们假设选民1反对，我们也会得出同样的结论。因此，我们的结论并不取决于公民投票前的实际历史（特别是社会结构变量ST的实际实现）。它只依赖于这样一个假设，即公民投票是由简单多数规则决定的，并且社会结构变量S t以所描述的方式在投票行为中引起概率依赖。结果的直觉很简单。选民1比选民5更有可能成为少数派，尽管她也有更高的概率投出决定性的一票。如果后一种概率足够高（在我们的例子中，如果p＞3/23），则结论将是投票者1更强大。关键的假设是，我们评估了关于选民1行为的反事实假设，而没有反事实化她的历史特征（s t的已实现值），这些特征固定了其他选民行为的概率分布从而确定她的投票具有决定性的可能性。关于必须如何定义顽固的少数群体的说法很重要，因为Abizadeh所援引的一切都是为了避免数字力量论“荒谬地要求以民主平等为由补偿政治怪癖”的结果。这是他对为什么“如果自由意志主义者或布尔什维克的人数持续超过他们，民主平等就不需要正式的程序不平等来补偿他们。”13根据实际偏好来定义“持续的少数群体”到底有什么问题？令人担忧的
{"title":"Is One More Powerful with Numbers on One's Side?","authors":"Sean Ingham, Niko Kolodny","doi":"10.1111/jopp.12307","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12307","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Suppose that in a jurisdiction there are 2,000,001 white voters and 1,000,000 black voters, all of whom enjoy equally weighted votes. The question of white supremacy is routinely put to a majority-rule plebiscite. In each such plebiscite, all white voters vote <i>yes</i> for white supremacy and all black voters vote <i>no</i>. This has been going on as long as anyone can remember, and it will continue for as long as anyone can foresee. This is a paradigm of a persistent minority, to which, intuitively, each black voter has an objection.</p><p>What is their objection? One answer is that black voters don't get their preferences satisfied. Another answer is that black voters are oppressed by the eventuating policies of white supremacy. Yet another answer considers the white majority <i>as a group</i>. As a group, they have greater power to determine the outcome than have the blacks as a group. Indeed, the white majority as a group is always decisive. In the last plebiscite, all the whites voted for white supremacy and it passed; and if all the whites had voted against, it would have failed. By contrast, the black minority as a group is never decisive. They voted against and it passed; and if any assemblage of them had voted <i>yes</i>, it would still have passed.</p><p>In this article, we raise a number of doubts about Abizadeh's suggestion that the power-of-numbers thesis can vindicate the thought that members of the minority as individuals have less voting power and thereby account for their objection to belonging to a persistent minority. Perhaps the most serious doubt is that while Abizadeh correctly holds that voting power must be assessed in part by counterfactualizing on votes—by asking what would have happened if a voter had voted otherwise than he in fact did—he does not counterfactualize in the right way.</p><p>We cannot vindicate the thought that members of the minority have less voting power if we assume an a priori measure of voting power that abstracts from information about the distribution of political preferences and its causes. An example is the Banzhaf (or Penrose–Banzhaf) measure of voting power, according to which a voter's power is her probability of casting a decisive vote if all other voters vote independently and with equal probability for either alternative.4 (A voter's vote in favor of (or against) a measure is <i>decisive</i> if the measure passes (fails), but would have failed (passed) if the voter had instead voted against (in favor).) An a priori measure of voting power will not register any differences between members of the persistent minority and anyone else, because it ignores, by construction, the facts about the distribution of preferences and its causes, in virtue of which some voters qualify as members of a persistent minority.</p><p>Abizadeh therefore seeks to vindicate the power-of-numbers thesis with an a posteriori measure: power is calculated on the basis of, rather than in abstraction from, information","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"31 4","pages":"452-469"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jopp.12307","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68179287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>The notion of rights is ubiquitous in philosophical discourse. As Allen Buchanan put it over thirty years ago, ‘Future historians of moral and political philosophy may well label our period the <i>Age of Rights</i>’.1 This notion is not only popular, but also complex. As the legal scholar W. N. Hohfeld famously suggested, rights are susceptible to multiple interpretations: they can be claims, liberties, powers, or immunities.2 Despite this variation, the consensus view is that the core instance of a right is a claim right.3</p><p>In the moral domain, claim rights designate a binary relation between a right-holder and a duty-bearer, where the former stands in a <i>distinctive moral position</i> vis-à-vis the latter.4 While there is controversy as to what, precisely, this distinctive moral position amounts to, the idea that claim rights capture it is seldom put into question.</p><p>In this article, I challenge this way of thinking. I argue that the language of claim rights is ill suited for the purpose of picking out a distinctive moral position.5 I show that the notion of a claim right is susceptible to several disambiguations, just as the notion of a right itself is. From this, I conclude that we should <i>either</i> no longer appeal to the concept of a claim right in moral theorizing <i>or</i> rethink its purpose.</p><p>The article proceeds as follows. In Section II, I set out two desiderata that a plausible definition of moral claim rights should satisfy. The definition should: (a) capture a distinctive moral position and (b) account for paradigmatic instances of claim rights in our ordinary language. In Section III, I show that the two most prominent accounts of claim rights fail to meet desideratum (b). Of course, the fact that prominent accounts are unsatisfactory does not mean that no satisfactory account could be developed. To support this stronger claim, in Section IV, I offer a systematization of our language of claim rights. I suggest that the greatest common denominator of such language is the idea of empowerment, and show that paradigmatic statements about claim rights track either the justification for certain forms of empowerment (<i>justification rights statements</i>) or empowerment itself and the particular status it confers on individuals (<i>status rights statements</i>).</p><p>As I explain in Section V, this twofold connection between claim rights and empowerment reveals that, for structural reasons, our desiderata cannot be jointly satisfied. No notion of claim rights can <i>both</i> capture justification as well as status rights statements <i>and</i> pick out a distinctive moral position. In Section VI, I consider three possible implications of this conclusion. One is that we should abandon the notion of claim rights in moral theorizing. Another, less drastic possibility is that, in light of its disjunctive structure, the notion of claim rights should be given a different purpose. A third possibility, for those not persua
{"title":"Rethinking moral claim rights","authors":"Laura Valentini","doi":"10.1111/jopp.12306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12306","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The notion of rights is ubiquitous in philosophical discourse. As Allen Buchanan put it over thirty years ago, ‘Future historians of moral and political philosophy may well label our period the <i>Age of Rights</i>’.1 This notion is not only popular, but also complex. As the legal scholar W. N. Hohfeld famously suggested, rights are susceptible to multiple interpretations: they can be claims, liberties, powers, or immunities.2 Despite this variation, the consensus view is that the core instance of a right is a claim right.3</p><p>In the moral domain, claim rights designate a binary relation between a right-holder and a duty-bearer, where the former stands in a <i>distinctive moral position</i> vis-à-vis the latter.4 While there is controversy as to what, precisely, this distinctive moral position amounts to, the idea that claim rights capture it is seldom put into question.</p><p>In this article, I challenge this way of thinking. I argue that the language of claim rights is ill suited for the purpose of picking out a distinctive moral position.5 I show that the notion of a claim right is susceptible to several disambiguations, just as the notion of a right itself is. From this, I conclude that we should <i>either</i> no longer appeal to the concept of a claim right in moral theorizing <i>or</i> rethink its purpose.</p><p>The article proceeds as follows. In Section II, I set out two desiderata that a plausible definition of moral claim rights should satisfy. The definition should: (a) capture a distinctive moral position and (b) account for paradigmatic instances of claim rights in our ordinary language. In Section III, I show that the two most prominent accounts of claim rights fail to meet desideratum (b). Of course, the fact that prominent accounts are unsatisfactory does not mean that no satisfactory account could be developed. To support this stronger claim, in Section IV, I offer a systematization of our language of claim rights. I suggest that the greatest common denominator of such language is the idea of empowerment, and show that paradigmatic statements about claim rights track either the justification for certain forms of empowerment (<i>justification rights statements</i>) or empowerment itself and the particular status it confers on individuals (<i>status rights statements</i>).</p><p>As I explain in Section V, this twofold connection between claim rights and empowerment reveals that, for structural reasons, our desiderata cannot be jointly satisfied. No notion of claim rights can <i>both</i> capture justification as well as status rights statements <i>and</i> pick out a distinctive moral position. In Section VI, I consider three possible implications of this conclusion. One is that we should abandon the notion of claim rights in moral theorizing. Another, less drastic possibility is that, in light of its disjunctive structure, the notion of claim rights should be given a different purpose. A third possibility, for those not persua","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"31 4","pages":"433-451"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jopp.12306","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68179911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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