Journal of Political Philosophy最新文献

英文中文

Evaluating International Agreements: The Voluntarist Reply and Its Limits 评估国际协定：自愿主义的答复及其局限性

IF 1.8 1区哲学 Q1 ETHICS

Journal of Political Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-11-27 DOI: 10.1111/jopp.12315

O. Suttle

引用次数: 0

The Journal of Political Philosophy Index, Volume 31 (2023) 《政治哲学杂志索引》第31卷（2023年）

IF 1.8 1区哲学 Q1 ETHICS

Journal of Political Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-10-26 DOI: 10.1111/jopp.12314

引用次数: 0

The challenge of policing minorities in a liberal society 在自由社会中监管少数族裔的挑战

1区哲学 Q1 ETHICS

Journal of Political Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-10-15 DOI: 10.1111/jopp.12313

Joseph Heath

The problem with police is not that they are fascist pigs but that our country is ruled by majoritarian pigs. Ta-Nehisi Coates To change the police without changing the police role in society is as futile as the labors of Sisyphus. John van Maanen This question is, I will argue, of considerable importance to political philosophy, because it exposes a tension in the liberal project as a whole. It has, unfortunately, been subject to relative neglect; there has until recently been very little philosophical or normative literature on policing, much less the policing of minorities.3 There are two reasons for this, both of them based ultimately on the perception that the problem is theoretically straightforward, and so does not raise any philosophically difficult questions.4 With respect to policing in general, many political philosophers appear to believe that the police are uninteresting, because they serve the purely instrumental role of enforcing statutory law. And with respect to minorities, widespread acceptance of the fascist pig theory leads to the perception that the problem is also normatively straightforward. If tensions between police and minorities are caused by the police being racist, then the solution is obviously for the police to become less racist. These two views, when combined, generate a highly simplistic account of the problem of policing minorities.5 It suggests that, since the police are there to enforce the law, all they need to do is enforce the law in a non-discriminatory way, treating all citizens equally, and the problem should go away. The argument, however, rests on a false premise, since the police do a great deal more than simply enforce the law, and it is primarily these other activities that give rise to problems. My preliminary contention in this article will be that both of the underlying theories about policing are false or misleading. Obviously, the police do enforce the law, but as several decades of work in the sociology of policing have shown, this is not all that they do, and, indeed, this does not even add up to a substantial fraction of what they do. And equally obviously, there are some police who are racist, both consciously and subconsciously, but this goes only part of the way to explaining the seriousness of the difficulties that practically every major police force experiences in its relations with particular minority groups.6 Indeed, a great deal of the motivation for the shift in emphasis toward “systemic racism” in expert discourse on the subject lies in the recognition that the emphasis on eliminating attitudinal racism or increasing officer diversity has reached the point of sharply diminishing returns in many jurisdictions.7 In order to understand the broader source of the problem, I will argue, it is necessary to see that effective policing is inherently communitarian. The result is that minority groups who are unable to implement a self-policing regime find themselves subject to coercive enfor

警察的问题不在于他们是法西斯猪，而是我们的国家是由多数主义猪统治的。改变警察而不改变警察在社会中的角色是徒劳的，就像西西弗斯的劳动一样。这个问题，我认为，对政治哲学来说是相当重要的，因为它暴露了整个自由主义计划中的一种张力。不幸的是，它一直受到相对忽视;直到最近，关于治安的哲学或规范文献还很少，更不用说少数民族的治安了这有两个原因，它们最终都基于这样一种认识，即这个问题在理论上是直截了当地的，因此不会提出任何哲学上的难题就一般的警务而言，许多政治哲学家似乎认为警察是无趣的，因为他们纯粹是执行成文法的工具角色。至于少数民族，法西斯猪理论的广泛接受导致人们认为这个问题在规范上也是直截了当的。如果警察和少数民族之间的紧张关系是由警察的种族主义造成的，那么解决办法显然是让警察变得不那么种族主义。当这两种观点结合在一起时，就产生了对少数民族治安问题的高度简单化的解释这表明，既然警察是来执法的，他们所需要做的就是以一种非歧视的方式执法，平等对待所有公民，那么问题就会消失。然而，这一论点建立在一个错误的前提之上，因为警察所做的不仅仅是执行法律，而且主要是这些其他活动引起了问题。我在本文中的初步论点是，这两种关于警务的基本理论都是错误的或具有误导性的。显然，警察确实是在执行法律，但几十年的警务社会学研究表明，这并不是他们所做的全部工作，事实上，这甚至不是他们所做工作的很大一部分。同样明显的是，有些警察在意识上和潜意识里都是种族主义者，但这只能部分解释几乎每个主要警察部队在处理与特定少数群体的关系时所经历的困难的严重性事实上，在关于这一问题的专家论述中，把重点转向“系统性种族主义”的主要动机在于认识到，在许多司法管辖区，强调消除态度上的种族主义或增加官员多样性已经达到了收益急剧减少的地步为了更广泛地理解问题的根源，我认为，有必要看到有效的警务本质上是社群主义的。其结果是，无法实施自我监管制度的少数群体发现自己受制于强制执行的社会规范和体面标准，这些规范和标准反映了多数文化的狭隘方面，而他们往往抵制这些规范和标准。我引用Ta-Nehisi Coates的观点，将其称为压迫性警务的“多数主义猪”理论在某种程度上，自由主义只对成文法施加中立性约束，它无力直接解决这个问题，这就是为什么对少数群体的监管对自由社会构成了根本性挑战。简单地说就是:即使国家是自由的，社会也不是，而警察为了有效，必须向社会妥协文章的内容如下。首先，我将区分两种截然不同的警务规范模式，这两种模式源于对警察权威基础的不同看法。第一种观点，我称之为警察的法律主义模式，基于这样一种主张，即警察的权力应该局限于执法，狭义地解释(也就是说，防止正在进行的犯罪和逮捕那些违法的人)。与此相反，我将描述我所说的社区主义警务模式，它将成文法的有组织执行与非正式社会秩序的执行深深交织在一起。根据这种观点，警察的权力超出了执法的范围，还包括旨在补充社区维持秩序的努力的广泛干预。社区主义模式，作为警务最佳实践的重建，是广泛呼吁更多的“社区警务”作为对各种疾病的回应的基础然而，不难看出，这种做法在一个多元化的社会中造成了一些规范上的困难。这种对国家强制的思考方式产生了一种可以被描述为法律主义的治安理论，理由是它限制了警察使用武力来指导法律的执行这意味着警察不应该对普通公民有任何权力，只要这个人目前没有以非法方式行事，也没有涉嫌犯下其他罪行。它表明，如果没有相反的法律，个人没有义务与警察交谈，回答提出的任何问题，服从他们的命令，甚至没有义务表明自己的身份，除非这些行动与调查犯罪行为之间有某种直接联系。持这种观点的个人享有极其广泛的自由——比如在公共空间随意走动的自由，对他人使用攻击性语言或口头辱骂的自由，甚至挥舞致命武器的自由——只要他们没有犯罪，并且没有任何犯罪的合理怀疑。对美国宪法的某些流行解释鼓励了公众对法律主义警务理论的承诺，当美国公民拒绝服从警察的直接命令，拒绝表明自己的身份，拒绝离开他们的车辆，或者拒绝在公共场所流通或分散，理由是他们正在进行的活动没有直接违反任何法律限制时，这一点就很明显了。然而，由于在这种对警察权力的看法普遍存在的司法管辖区，立法者往往试图通过颁布极其宽泛的法律来破坏这种权力，这种法律的效果是在法律上禁止一切违背警察意愿的行为，因此情况变得极为复杂。在其他案件中，法院通过承认一类“普通法上的轻罪”达到了同样的效果，从而默认地扩展了刑法因此，在某些司法管辖区，侮辱或不尊重警察、不表明身份或妨碍调查都是一种犯罪行为。禁止游荡、流浪、滋扰、行为不端、公共恶作剧和公共场所醉酒的法律也可以被用来基本上凌驾于任何公民占据公共空间的权利之上。最后，不服从警察的犯罪行为——机动车法的一个共同特征——可以扩展到普通的互动环境中。其结果是“过度定罪”现象，在这种现象中，个人自由的范围基本上被法律对几乎所有行为的禁止所消灭但是，当然，在大多数司法管辖区，公民受到这种过度定罪，个人自由的领域在实践中很少被消灭，因为这些法律的目的并不是真正禁止有问题的活动，而是赋予警察自由裁量权来控制公众成员，以应对紧急情况。就我们的目的而言，重要的一点是，这些广泛禁令的存在可以使法家关于警察权力的理论变得微不足道。如果每个人都总是违反一些法律，那么警察权力的任何行使都可以被定性为仅仅是执法。然而，法律形式显然掩盖了基本实践的真实特征，即不是逮捕每一个违法的人。虽然警察确实在一定程度上照章执行成文法，特别是在可起诉的罪行方面，但他们也利用成文法赋予他们的权力来追求其他法定之外的目标。他们这样做是在立法者的充分了解和支持下进行的，这也是立法者经常通过制定扩大警察自由裁量权范围的法律来回应法院对警察权力的限制的原因之一。正如我们将看到的，对于警察追求的这个“其他目标”有不同的说法，但在此之前，重要的是要考虑为什么法律主义的警务模式没有得到更广泛的接受。虽然哲学家有时谈到法律和道德时，似乎它们是截然不同的，但当人们转向犯罪和执法的社会现实时，很难不被这些范畴的流动性所震惊。埃米尔·迪尔凯姆在他对犯罪的开创性社会学分析中认为，社会行为的规范应该被理解为一种单一的规则类别，即社会规范规范最重要的特征是它们都是强制执行的，尽管有些规范比其他规范更明显。这是因为，不从众引发的惩罚性制裁具有社交效应，通过这种效应，规范随着时间的推移被个人内化。通过这一社会化过程，个体获得了内在和外在的服从动机。因此，制裁变得越来越具有象征意义，更多的是为了激发内部的自我控制(如嘲弄、羞辱和道德谴责)。正因为如此，在社交良好的成年人中，只有在最极端的情况下，才会以奖惩的形式进行明确的制裁，在这种情况下，更微妙的社会控制手段已经失败了。在这种观点看来，道德规范并不构成一种自然的类型，而仅仅代表一个连续体的一端这使它们看起来纯粹是内部约束，尽管事实上它们像所有其他规范一样受到社会制裁的强制执行。与法律类似，一致性通常是通过内在动机和外在动机的结合而产生的。法律的独特之处不在于它是强制执行的，因为所有规范都是强制执行的，而在于它是通过国家有组织的制裁能力来强制执行的。在非正式的社会领域，对违反规范者的惩罚是分散的、特别的，而且常常以停止合作为基础相比之下，国家通过一套正式的机制来控制这一过程，包括规则的书面说明，

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引用次数: 0

Noncompliance and the Demands of Public Reason 不服从与公共理性的要求

1区哲学 Q1 ETHICS

Journal of Political Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-10-11 DOI: 10.1111/jopp.12309

Sameer Bajaj

Political liberals argue that democratic citizens have a duty of public reason to ensure that important laws are justified by reasons fellow citizens can accept given their own moral and philosophical beliefs.1 In any real-world democracy, many will fail to comply with this duty. Most people have never heard of public reason, and many who have heard of it reject it. This raises an important question about the demands of public reason: is there ever a duty to ensure that laws are justifiable to those who are not willing to reciprocate? Most political liberals answer “no”—the duty of public reason is owed only to those who are themselves willing to comply.2 This reflects a more general view that has wide currency in democratic thought: individuals ought to moderate their political activity to accommodate disagreement with others, but only when others are willing to reciprocate. Many think, for example, that individuals ought to seek middle-ground policy compromises, but only with those who are willing to compromise. The prevailing view among political liberals is that the duty of public reason is always conditional on reciprocal compliance in this way. As Andrew Lister asks, “How could it be reasonable to ask me not to count a reason I think true and relevant on the basis that you reject it, if you are not likewise willing to exercise restraint with respect to reasons that you think true but which I reject?”.3 My aim in this article is to answer this question and, in doing so, to rethink the demands of public reason in the face of noncompliance. I argue that there is a wide range of political contexts in which citizens have duties to comply with public reason for the sake of others regardless of whether they reciprocate. This helps lay foundations for a non-ideal theory of political liberalism that gives public reason a more inclusive and morally significant role in the practice of democratic politics. In Section I, I examine what I take to be the strongest argument for the prevailing view that public reason is always conditional on reciprocal compliance. The civic friendship argument grounds the duty of public reason in the valuable communal relation that citizens realize when they reciprocally comply for the sake of one another. Because unreciprocated compliance with public reason lacks mutuality, it undermines rather than promotes relational equality. When individuals bear the “moral cost” of excluding what they take to be true reasons without demanding reciprocation from others, they allow themselves to be treated as subordinates.4 In Section II, I argue that the civic friendship argument misses an important truth about relational inequality—that whether unreciprocated sacrifice generates subordination depends on background features of the relationship in question, including the motivations of the parties and the history of their relationship. I identify two general political contexts—one with background equality and the other with inequality—i

政治自由主义者认为，民主国家的公民有公共理性的义务，以确保其他公民在他们自己的道德和哲学信仰下能够接受的理由来证明重要法律的正当性在任何现实世界的民主国家，许多人都无法履行这一义务。大多数人从未听说过公共理性，而许多听说过它的人也拒绝接受它。这就提出了一个关于公共理性要求的重要问题:对于那些不愿回报法律的人来说，是否有义务确保法律是合理的?大多数政治自由主义者的回答是“不”——公共理性的责任只属于那些自己愿意服从的人这反映了在民主思想中广泛流行的一种更普遍的观点:个人应该缓和自己的政治活动，以容纳与他人的分歧，但前提是其他人愿意回报。例如，许多人认为，个人应该寻求中间立场的政策妥协，但只与那些愿意妥协的人。政治自由主义者的主流观点是，公共理性的义务总是以这种方式的相互遵从为条件。正如安德鲁·李斯特(Andrew Lister)所问的那样，“如果你不愿意同样地对你认为正确但我拒绝的理由进行克制，那么要求我不考虑我认为正确和相关的理由，这怎么可能是合理的呢?我在这篇文章中的目的是回答这个问题，并在这样做的过程中，重新思考公共理性在面对违规行为时的需求。我认为，在广泛的政治背景下，公民有义务为了他人的利益而服从公共理由，而不管他们是否回报。这有助于为政治自由主义的非理想理论奠定基础，使公共理性在民主政治实践中发挥更具包容性和道德意义的作用。在第一节中，我考察了我认为最有力的论据，以支持公共理性总是以相互遵守为条件的主流观点。公民友谊论把公共理性的义务建立在有价值的社区关系之上，这种关系是公民为了彼此的利益而相互遵守时所认识到的。由于对公共理性的无条件服从缺乏相互性，它破坏而不是促进关系平等。当个人承担排除他们认为是真实原因的“道德成本”而不要求他人回报时，他们就允许自己被视为下属在第二节中，我认为，公民友谊的论点错过了一个关于关系不平等的重要事实——是否没有回报的牺牲会产生从属关系取决于所讨论的关系的背景特征，包括各方的动机和他们关系的历史。我确定了两种普遍的政治背景——一种是背景平等，另一种是背景不平等——在这种背景下，对公共理性的无条件服从促进了而不是破坏了平等主义关系。当公民致力于维持合作牺牲的公平整体平衡时，对公共理性的无条件服从可以在不使服从者服从的情况下显示出一种宝贵的尊重形式。在有背景压迫的情况下，遵从公共理性而不要求回报，有助于将政治关系修复到平等的基础上，并恢复信任纽带。我通过研究印度基于种姓的不公正现象来说明公共理性的修复价值。因此，在普通的政治环境中，公民可以有义务遵从公共理性，而不要求回报。我在第三节和第四节中认为，承认这些责任有助于重新定义公共理性在非理想环境中的作用。如果公共理性的义务总是以相互服从为条件，那么在以大量不服从和不公正为特征的民主国家，它的政治作用就会微乎其微。我所捍卫的观点赋予了公共理性一个更广泛、更具包容性的角色，以促进平等主义社会的理想。这并不意味着政治自由主义者必须放弃公民友谊具有特殊价值的观点。相反，公民友谊最好被理解为一种关系理想，多元民主国家的公民应该努力实现这种理想。传统上，自由主义者试图通过呼吁更广泛的道德或哲学真理来证明自由权利和制度的合理性。例如，密尔通过诉诸一种基于对人性的个人主义理解的人类繁荣理论来捍卫平等的自由政治自由主义者认为，对人性和密尔所呼吁的那种善的综合观点不能作为自由主义制度的公共辩护的适当基础。这是因为个人自由地、真诚地进行推理，不可避免地会在这些问题上产生分歧。这种“合理多元主义的事实”确保了没有任何一种全面的学说能够为自由主义制度提供一个双方都能接受的理由为什么公民能够接受其政治制度的公开辩护很重要?政治自由主义者回答说，公共理性原则要求重要的法律必须以所有理性的公民都能接受的理由为依据。罗尔斯主义者根据“政治”正义概念的“家族”确定了一套相互接受的公共理由，这些正义概念肯定并优先考虑基本的自由权利、机会和分配权利政治观念是“独立的”综合教义——它们是建立在民主政治文化中隐含的自由主义价值观之上的，而不依赖于全面的宗教、伦理或哲学主张公共理性原则意味着公共理性的个人道德义务，这要求公民和官员愿意通过诉诸政治正义概念来为他们的政治活动辩护在政治自由主义者中流行的观点是，公民必须服从公共理性，只是为了那些愿意相互服从的人这意味着，只有愿意适当遵守的公民才属于“合理”公民的正当选民，他们负有公共理性的义务目前还不清楚为什么这种观点是正确的。并不是所有的道德义务都以这种方式的相互遵守为条件。考虑慈善义务，以帮助防止对急需的第三方造成伤害。如果我和一个溺水的人一起走在池塘边，我可以以合理的代价救他，我似乎有义务这样做，不管他们是否愿意救我。为什么不认为我们可以对那些不愿意回报的人承担公共理性的责任呢?令人惊讶的是，政治自由主义者几乎没有回答这个问题。公共理性总是以相互服从为条件，这一观点往往是毫无争议的。然而，倡导公共理性的公民友谊的人已经发展出了我认为在文献中最有希望的观点。公民友谊论把公共理性的义务建立在相互尊重的社会关系之上，这种关系是公民为了彼此的利益而相互遵守时所认识到的安德鲁·李斯特(Andrew Lister)从“非异化”的角度理解了尊重的相关形式——除非法律是相互合理的，否则一些人会认为他们的政治联合条款“被他们认为根本陌生的目的所激发”。R. J.利兰呼吁相互“不强加”的价值。当我们试图推进他人的利益时，就会出现强加的情况，这种方式“取代了[e][我们]自己的判断，认为什么对接受者的判断是好的”。这是对我们打算帮助的人的不尊重公民之友通过确保每个人都能从自己的道德角度接受民主决定的正当性，避免了合作条件的疏远强加李斯特和利兰在公共理性义务具有约束力所需的社会遵从程度上存在分歧。李斯特为一种双边解释辩护——我们总是有责任向每一个愿意为我们的决定辩护的人证明我们的决定是正确的利兰为多边解释辩护——公共理性的义务只有在相当比例的公民遵守的情况下才具有约束力这场辩论涉及公共理性义务产生所需的背景条件。我在回答一个不同的问题:当公共理性的义务出现时，它应该对谁负责?特别是，为什么要接受这种普遍的观点，即只有那些愿意履行义务的人才有义务?公民友谊的论点支持两个答案。第一，因为对公共理性的无条件服从无法实现公民友谊;这在道德上是毫无意义的，不能被证明是正当的。李斯特认为，从一个人的综合主义的立场来看，遵从公共理性需要付出“道德代价”——它需要放弃追求人们所认为的真正正义，以确保一种相互合理的政治秩序只有当遵守规定能产生重大的道德利益时，这种成本才有可能是合理的。但这种观点认为，没有回报的服从不会产生这样的好处，因为只有对公共理性的互惠服从才能实现公民友谊的价值。李斯特提出了一种不同的观点，即公共理性是以互惠性为条件的，他认为“拒绝履行对我知道不会回报的人的义务涉及到肯定我自己的尊严”这一点可以从关系平等的理想角度来理解。当一方允许他人利用自己牺牲利益的意愿来推进自己的利益时，社会不平等就会出现在关系中。有时有人认为，在考虑重大政治问题时，个人有兴趣能够诉诸于他们全部的道德信念。公共理性要求公民维护他们的基本信念，以确保一个相互公正的政治秩序当X为Y承担这个成本，但Y不愿意回报时，Y对X表现出“认可失败”。22而

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引用次数: 0

The Epistemic Dimensions of Civil Disobedience 公民不服从的认知维度

1区哲学 Q1 ETHICS

Journal of Political Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-09-27 DOI: 10.1111/jopp.12310

Alexander Bryan

Throughout the Covid-19 pandemic, protests against the public health measures instituted by governments have become a familiar sight on the streets of major cities across the world. The policies these protests challenge, and the kinds of claims made by protestors, have differed across jurisdiction and have evolved through different stages of the pandemic, with protests across Europe and North America focussing at various times on the supposed injustice of initial lockdown measures, the rollout of vaccines, and the implementation of vaccine mandates. A significant number of these protests have been, in various respects, legally prohibited; many of the earlier protests violated emergency legislation restricting the number of people or households permitted to gather in public, while later actions include occupations of the offices of media companies and refusal to pay taxes.1 At least some participants in these protests have been animated by false claims that the pandemic is a hoax, or that it is in some sense deliberate, or that it is being exploited by politicians and businesses to implement policies of radical social control. Many participants and commentators have described some of these actions as forms of civil disobedience; a placard displayed by one protestor in Bristol in November 2020 stated that ‘civil disobedience becomes a sacred duty when the state has become lawless or corrupt’,2 while a Canadian anti-lockdown campaigner compared his refusal to provide details of his vaccination status in a coffee shop to the actions of Rosa Parks.3 Similar claims have been made regarding the protests in Ottawa in late 2021/early 2022.4 These protests raise important questions regarding the conditions for permissible civil disobedience in a pandemic specifically,5 but also highlight some more general questions for theories of civil disobedience. Some of these relate to the use of civil disobedience in the pursuit of ‘anti-democratic and illiberal goals’, such as whether broadly liberal theories of civil disobedience effectively apply across these cases as well as the justice-promoting paradigm examples.6 In this article I focus on a slightly different issue: is the justification of civil disobedience conditional on dissenters satisfying some epistemic conditions? If so, what kinds of conditions? Perhaps surprisingly, the two most directly relevant philosophical literatures suggest quite different answers to these questions. Within broadly liberal theories of civil disobedience they have received little direct attention. Such accounts generally view the justification of civil disobedience as primarily relating to the conduct of the dissenters during and after disobedience. The justification of an act of civil disobedience just relates to the question of whether agents act in accordance with certain constraints, which may include non-violence, civility, and accepting punishment. However, there are some accounts within this literature, such as those deve

在2019冠状病毒病大流行期间，反对政府制定的公共卫生措施的抗议活动已成为世界各大城市街头常见的景象。这些抗议活动挑战的政策，以及抗议者提出的各种主张，在不同的司法管辖区有所不同，并在大流行的不同阶段有所演变，欧洲和北美各地的抗议活动在不同时期集中在所谓的初步封锁措施、疫苗的推出和疫苗任务的执行方面的不公正。这些抗议活动中有相当一部分在各个方面都受到法律禁止;许多早期的抗议活动违反了限制公众集会人数或家庭数量的紧急立法，而后来的行动包括占领媒体公司的办公室和拒绝纳税至少这些抗议活动的一些参与者受到虚假说法的鼓舞，这些说法认为，疫情是一场骗局，或者在某种意义上是蓄意的，或者是政客和企业正在利用疫情来实施激进的社会控制政策。许多参与者和评论员将其中一些行动描述为公民不服从的形式;2020年11月，一名抗议者在布里斯托尔展示的一张标语上写道，“当国家变得无法无天或腐败时，公民不服从成为一项神圣的职责”，2而加拿大一名反封锁活动人士将他在咖啡店拒绝提供疫苗接种情况的细节与罗莎·帕克斯的行为进行了比较。3类似的说法也适用于2021年底/ 2022年初在渥太华发生的抗议活动特别是在流行病中的不服从，但也强调了一些更普遍的问题，关于公民不服从的理论。其中一些与公民不服从在追求“反民主和非自由目标”中的使用有关，例如公民不服从的广义自由主义理论是否有效地适用于这些案例以及促进正义的范例例子在这篇文章中，我关注的是一个稍微不同的问题:公民不服从的正当性是否以持不同政见者满足某些认知条件为条件?如果有，是什么样的条件?也许令人惊讶的是，两种最直接相关的哲学文献对这些问题给出了截然不同的答案。在广泛自由主义的公民不服从理论中，他们很少受到直接关注。这种说法通常认为，公民不服从的正当性主要与不服从期间和之后持不同政见者的行为有关。公民不服从行为的正当性只是与行为主体的行为是否符合某些约束有关，这些约束可能包括非暴力、文明和接受惩罚。然而，在这些文献中有一些描述，比如罗纳德·德沃金和金伯利·布朗利提出的那些描述，其中包含了明确的认知约束。这些规定将这些限制作为检验，通过这些检验，我们可以确定代理人的要求是否有资格作为一种信念，从而作为一种承诺，在自由民主社会中值得特别考虑。因此，这些约束被视为对连贯性的相对最低限度的测试，而不是对认识责任的测试。关于政治认识论的文献呈现出一幅截然不同的图景。政治认识论家对民主政体中公民的认识论义务或责任的性质和规模持不同意见。但他们普遍认为，公民在以各种方式进行政治行为(包括投票、参与公共讨论，甚至持不同意见)时，确实负有一定的认知责任。如果民主政体中的公民在选举投票或公开讨论政治问题时有责任以认知上负责任的方式行事，那么这些责任也会限制他们的公民不服从，这似乎是直截了当的。我认为政治认识论论者是正确的，我们的政治行为的正当性对我们的认识论行为是敏感的，并概述了一种将认识论约束纳入公民不服从理论的特殊方法。本文有三个目的。第一个是证明，即使是那些包含明确认知要求的公民不服从的自由主义理论，也会产生一幅令人难以置信的画面，说明被误导的不服从是错的。仅仅将认识论条件纳入信念的概念中，就会产生一种难以置信的信念本身的图景，并依赖于一种关于信念主张如何与政治秩序相关联的站不住脚的观点。我的第二个目标是提供一个更合理的替代方案。我认为，行为主体对其公民同胞有一种可行的认知义务，即采取措施，尽量减少他们打算不服从的主张是错误的风险。就像持不同政见者有义务确保他们的行为在合理的成功机会范围内尽可能少地造成伤害一样，采取这些步骤的义务与民事不服从行为的正当性有关。我展示了这种义务是如何与普通政治行动的认知义务相延续的，但由于不服从所产生的负担的不同辩护条件而变得更加强大。最后，我想说明的是，这种说法并没有对持不同政见者施加不合理的严格限制。这一义务的严格性对相互竞争的考虑很敏感:当代理人在公正的制度和合理健康的认知环境下具有有意义和广泛平等的政治影响力时，以及当提议的不服从造成更严重的代价时，这种义务就会以更强的形式出现;在一种较弱的形式下，在某些情况下，在相反的情况下，不再适用。探索在不同情况下可以减轻这一义务的因素，还有一个额外的好处，那就是阐明大多数持不同政见者所处的不完善的认知条件，以及这些条件与公民不服从正当性问题的相关性。在继续之前，请注意我对“公民不服从”概念的使用。这一概念，尤其是在其最具影响力的表述中，近年来受到了政治理论家和哲学家的一系列重要批评，包括它作为一种“反抵抗意识形态”的功能，它假设了宪法秩序的基本合法性，并将那些参与范例不服从运动(如美国的民权斗争)的人所做的战略承诺重新包装为可允许的不服从的必要特征尽管我发现这些批评的某些方面令人信服，但我更乐观地认为，保留了自由主义概念的一些核心维度的公民不服从概念，当被修改为包括更广泛的不服从行为和更广泛的抱怨，并被视为一种，而不是唯一的，被允许的不服从行为形式时，仍然是一个有用的类别。在这里，我没有对这个概念进行充分的辩护，而是指出了在本文中坚持使用它的广泛传统用法的两个原因。第一个是，我的重点是这一概念的精确目标领域的那种行为——即“有原则的和故意的违反法律，旨在抗议不公正的法律、政策、制度或实践，并由广泛致力于文明的基本规范的代理人承担”，在这种情况下，“文明”在非暴力、公开、愿意接受惩罚或其他形式的公共责任等条件下得到不同的解释我认为有充分的理由认为，所提出的一些论点适用于其他一些“不文明”的有原则的不服从形式，但我不在这里争论。其次，呼吁公民不服从和参与我在文章开头概述的各种抗议活动以及许多其他活动的人对该术语本身的使用的突出表明，关于该概念的一致性和应用的学术争议并没有破坏它在公共领域被授予的规范性地位。这些抗议者中的许多人认为自己参与的是被允许的公民不服从;这种说法是对还是错，以及为什么是对的，对民主理论和实践具有重要意义很少有公民不服从的哲学理论包含明确的、实质性的认知成分。在20世纪60年代和70年代初由雨果·贝道和约翰·罗尔斯发展的有影响力的自由主义理论中，没有任何有意义的认识论要求。这些理论声称，参与公民不服从的行动者必须认真行事(即，表现出对国家法律和政治制度的权威和合法性的认可)，并支持他们“真诚和深思熟虑的意见”的主张，但显然不打算让这些要求具有认识论的内容。前者可以简单地通过表明“对法律的忠诚”的方式来满足，例如接受对异议行为的惩罚，而后者则最合理地解释为对诚信的要求，它排除了仅仅是机会主义的或战略性的不服从那些在这一传统内工作(实际上是反对)的人总体上保持着对持不同政见者的行为和他们事业的正义性的关注。根据这些说法，我们的公民不服从行为可能在很多方面出错，但不是由于我们的认知行为。但是，那些在抗议COVID-19公共卫生措施时提出不符合这些标准的主张的人——他们自己认为这是公民不服从，而且似乎相当容易符合这一类别的大多数定义——不是发起不合理的公民不服从，或者他们没有权利执行的公民不服从，而只是做了别的事情，这似乎非常奇怪。布朗利的描述错误地描述了这些案例中涉及的认知错误。另一方面，布朗利的描述也过于重视信念，在任何真正的信念的基础上，给予参与公民不服从的道德权利，而没有参考更广泛的政治背

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引用次数: 0

Debate: Political Authority, Functionalism, and the Problem of Annexation 辩论:政治权威、功能主义和兼并问题

1区哲学 Q1 ETHICS

Journal of Political Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-09-25 DOI: 10.1111/jopp.12311

Arthur Hill

Deciding whether a state has political authority is arguably the most fundamental judgment we can make about its moral standing. When a state possesses legitimate authority, it has the exclusive right to govern the occupants of its territory. Even when its decisions are inefficient, irrational, or morally mistaken, its subjects are expected to comply with the legal order it establishes, and outsiders are expected to refrain from attempting to interfere with its internal affairs. A state that lacks authority, on the other hand, enjoys no such protection: provided there is an adequate justification for doing so, its subjects are permitted to actively resist attempts to enforce the law, and outsiders are permitted to intervene in order to reform or replace state institutions.1 Given these practical stakes, it's crucial to settle on a plausible account of the requirements for legitimate political authority that can guide our assessments of both nascent and established states. Recently, Alexander Motchoulski has developed a novel “hybrid” account of political authority2 that he claims is up to this task. This hybrid view, which combines elements from existing functionalist and fair-play accounts3, establishes the authority of particular states in two stages.4 In the first stage, we determine whether the state satisfies various functionalist criteria such as the consistent protection of basic rights, the maintenance of democratic institutions, and the reliable provision of essential public goods. If the state passes this test, we then examine whether the principle of fair play gives the territorially demarcated populations the state claims jurisdiction over reason to comply with its laws and support its institutions. This involves evaluating the goods provided by the state to see if they are either acceptable upon reflection or morally required. A good is acceptable if, given their interests, the recipients have reason to prefer acquiring the good plus a corresponding duty to reciprocate over not receiving this good at all. On the other hand, a good is morally required just in case the recipients have a moral duty to contribute to its provision regardless of whether the good is acceptable to them.5 If the aforementioned political goods meet either of these conditions, individuals benefiting from them have a duty to reciprocate the political cooperation of their co-citizens by obeying the laws of the state and doing their fair share to maintain its cooperative structure over time. It is this duty, owed by the citizens of a state to one another, that generates particularized relationships of authority between states and populations.6 According to Motchoulski, the primary attraction of his view is that, unlike orthodox functionalism, it is able to account for our beliefs that: (i) states generally lack authority over populations they incorporate through acts of non-consensual annexation or colonization, and (ii) historical injustices committed by the stat

虽然我同意，在某些条件下，历史的不公正不再威胁到特定国家的合法性，但从道德上讲，声称一个国家可以对一个民族的后代拥有权威，而这个民族的领土被它强行吞并，仅仅是因为这个国家在压制这个群体的传统政治实践方面非常有效，他们的后代别无选择，只能融入压迫者的政治团体。让我们回顾一下到目前为止的讨论。Motchoulski的混合理论的目的是提供一种政治权威的解释，能够充分解决边界问题和历史不公正问题，同时“保持基本的功能主义承诺”在前面的章节中，我认为他的观点在这两个目标上都有不足之处。将公平竞争原则纳入功能主义框架确实允许我们解释为什么个人对特定国家负有义务。然而，它并没有使功能主义能够避免对兼并的反对，也没有为我们提供一个合理的解释，说明过去的不公正何时不再与国家权力问题相关。在这一点上，我们可以寻找其他的方法来拯救功能主义从这些问题。但我认为，更有用的做法是，首先确定道德考量是如何激发我们对涉及单方面吞并和历史不公的案例的直觉反应的，然后研究如何将这些考量整合到政治权威理论中。像玛格丽特·摩尔和安娜·斯提兹一样，我相信我们对这些问题的直觉反映了我们对共同政治身份的道德意义以及对集体自决的相关兴趣的认识与功能主义理论似乎暗示的相反，一个国家的公民和长期居民通常不认为自己是原子的、自利的行动者，对他们来说，政治只是保障个人权利和避免人际统治的一种手段。相反，他们往往认同并重视自己作为一个特定社区成员的地位，这个社区是由在其领土上的独特合作历史所界定的，并通过相互承认的过程得以维持。简而言之，他们认为自己是一个独特的政治“民族”的一部分一般来说，个人在实现这种共同的政治认同与他们所服从的政治制度之间的契合方面有很大的利益。22 .作为一个民族的一员，当我们能够支持我们的法律时，我们的生活就会更加自主和充实，因为这些法律是我们根据我们共同的承诺和信念制定的但是，当一个国家未经同意吞并另一个国家时，这种对集体自决的兴趣不可避免地受挫。由于这一行为必然涉及由不分享其政治合作历史的外来者强加一种新的政治秩序，因此在吞并之后，新合并的人口将不再能够轻易确认他们参与构成其大部分生活的政治机构。因此，有一种方式是单方面吞并是对被吞并人口的错误，即使在对其个人权利或互惠义务没有影响的情况下也是如此。这种错误的存在是否足以证明我们的直觉是正确的，即国家对其吞并的人口缺乏政治权威?我想是的。除非出现某种道德紧急情况，否则根本没有理由指望一个曾经享有自决等重大政治利益的群体，突然接受剥夺他们这种利益的新机构的权威，从而接受更少的利益。当我们把注意力转向历史上的不公正与政治权威之间的关系时，这里的道德逻辑似乎同样适用。如果被吞并人口的后代保持他们作为一个独特的政治群体的身份，并继续认为这种身份与被吞并国家的制度不匹配，他们就有资格像他们的祖先一样抱怨他们目前的政治地位削弱了他们对集体自治的兴趣。然而，随着时间的推移，这种不匹配显然有可能得到解决。在某些情况下，这将是由于这些后代随着后代在这个新的社会背景下长大并形成依恋而逐渐认同吞并国。在其他情况下，后代将保留其原有的群体身份，吞并的国家最终将做出制度上的让步——通常是通过实施一种联邦制形式——使他们能够拥有一定程度的政治自治，他们认为这是可以接受的。无论哪种方式，结果都是个人不再遭受使单方面吞并后的政治统治令人反感的独特伤害，因此过去的吞并行为不再对国家当前的政治权威产生影响关于历史上的不公正何时以及如何逐渐消失的叙述，很容易解释Motchoulski在涉及几个世纪前领土被占领的民族的后裔(例如，麦西亚人)的案件和涉及一个民族的后裔的案件之间的直观区别(例如，土著居民)。在前一组案例中，我们通常得出结论，过去的不公正不会破坏国家的权威，因为受影响者的后代通常不再将自己视为一个独特的民族。相比之下，在后一种情况下，很明显，后代保持了他们作为一个独特的政治民族的地位，并反对他们当前的政治状况，因此我们通常认为，国家对他们的权威主张是非法的。此外，与Motchoulski的观点不同的是，它在第二节讨论的兼并和征服的修改版本等案例中也得出了直观正确的结论。这是因为，虽然与国家竞争的剩余合作实践可以成为更大自决愿望的证据，但它们的存在并不是因此而对国家权威提出申诉的必要依据。所有必要的是，后代们确实遭受了他们的群体身份和政治制度之间缺乏契合的痛苦，据推测，阿列克雅那人就是这样。考虑到集体自决的价值在我们对这些问题的道德判断中所起的核心作用，有一个强有力的理由来采用一种政治权威的解释，即将尊重自决视为与其他各种要求一起存在的国家合法性的独立要求毕竟，如果拒绝自决是一个严重的错误，以至于在吞并的情况下，负责任的国家对被吞并的人口及其潜在后代缺乏政治权威，那么，如果一个国家一直以其他方式挫败这种利益，那么它的权威主张也应该被拒绝。然而，也许Motchoulski可以建议我们将自决的价值纳入他的公平竞争/功能主义的混合框架中，通过规定政治利益只有在不以这种价值为代价的情况下，才能在责任产生的意义上被接受。这样，他就能够解释我们关于单方面吞并和历史不公正的直觉，因此，本文中提出的批评将不再是对他观点的根本挑战。但最终，我认为这一让步会让莫彻尔斯基得不宜失。功能主义的吸引力与这种观点的单一关注点密切相关，即国家应该在确保少数基本的、无争议的政治利益方面发挥作用。通过将对权威的主张建立在这个相对适度的目标上，功能主义的解释为那些怀疑将政治合法性与更苛刻的程序或关系理想(包括我们一直在讨论的集体自决理想)的成就联系起来的人提供了另一种选择。事实上，功能主义的捍卫者经常强调，将集体自决视为合法性的必要条件，会带来潜在的问题。因此，例如，Jonathan Quong表达了这样的担忧，即将国家视为一个国家或人民自决的工具与自由中立的承诺是不相容的25，而Kjartan Koch Mikalsen则认为，将政治权威取决于国家的管辖边界是否尊重群体的自决，将破坏许多国家确保“合法条件”的能力，从而威胁到个人的自由26虽然我相信这些问题是可以解决的，但对于那些不能解决的问题，在判断一个国家的合法性时，采用功能主义的标准自然是有吸引力的。但是，由于显而易见的原因，如果我们重新配置功能主义，最终迫使它考虑到集体自决的理想，这种吸引力就会削弱。因此，尽管莫彻尔斯基的叙述结构确实允许他朝这个方向发展，但这样做会给他留下一个不令人满意的观点，如果不是无法辨认的话，可能是它的支持者。在讨论了最后一个潜在的回应之后，我认为可以肯定的是，Motchoulski的公平竞争与功能主义的混合体无法兑现其承诺。那么，假设我们不想放弃我们对单方面吞并和历史不公正的直觉，这个结论是否意味着我们应该完全放弃功能主义框架?不完全是。人们可以争辩说，虽然我们有理由把尊重自决视为合法政治权威的一个独立条件，但这一要求只适用于人民确实认为自己是一个渴望自治的政治人民的情况。在另一些情况下，如果一个地区内的人口如此分散，以至于连一个不成熟的人都无法确定，那么在评估政治权威候选人时，采用功能主义的观点似乎是合理的，因为我们的主要重点应该是确保个人权利得到保护然而，重要的是不要忽视采用这种语境观点和支持功能主义作为政治权威的独立理论之间的区别。即使

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引用次数: 0

Gentrification and Integration 中产阶级化和一体化

1区哲学 Q1 ETHICS

Journal of Political Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-09-19 DOI: 10.1111/jopp.12312

Jamie Draper

How should the injustices associated with the enduring segregation of Black Americans be addressed? In contemporary debates about racial justice, there are two broad answers to this question. “New integrationists” argue that integration is necessary for remedying racial inequalities.1 “Egalitarian pluralists” instead argue that we should promote strategies that seek to improve the material condition of Black Americans without integration.2 Political philosophers have also recently begun to examine an apparently unrelated phenomenon: gentrification. According to its critics, gentrification may undermine social equality, violate residents' occupancy rights, subject residents to domination, impede valuable forms of democratic communication and/or impinge upon self-respect.3 But so far—with some important exceptions that I discuss below—political theorists have not examined the relationship between gentrification and integration in much depth. This article explores how racialised contexts of gentrification relate to and can shed light on the debate between new integrationists and egalitarian pluralists. I take as my focal point the debate between Elizabeth Anderson and Tommie Shelby.4 I examine three arguments for residential integration that Anderson makes: the opportunity argument, the epistemic-democratic argument, and the relational-democratic argument. I argue that racialised contexts of gentrification reveal some important limits to each argument for integration. But the upshot of my argument is not that we should abandon integration in favour of egalitarian pluralism. Rather, my suggestion is that examining racialised contexts of gentrification gives us a better understanding of the conditions under which residential integration can—and cannot—promote racial justice. My argument leaves open space for a modified defence of integration that takes these conditions into account. Ultimately, however, I suggest that such a modified defence of integration faces some important challenges of its own. This article's second aim is to contribute to the emerging literature on gentrification in political philosophy by examining its racial dynamics. By analysing the racial dynamics of gentrification, I bring to light some features of gentrification beyond residential displacement—in particular, the dynamics of social interaction in gentrifying neighbourhoods—which are relevant to its moral evaluation. My argument also responds to some recent arguments made by Andrew Pierce and Hwa Young Kim and Andrew Walton to the effect that gentrification's benefits can be harnessed, and its burdens can be limited, for the project of integration.5 My focus in this article is primarily on residential integration, though I do also discuss its relationship to other forms of integration at points. Residential integration is usually taken to be a central component—and often the central component—of the broader project of racial integration, because of the central role that res

因此，它延续了米尔斯称之为“白人无知”的认知现象——一种基于群体的系统性误解，这种误解由白人种族统治所维持，并使其自身延续下去安德森认为，有意地解决种族不公正问题需要谈判和审议，而“谈判和审议反过来又需要融合”。为了克服白人的无知，谈判和审议必须纳入美国黑人的观点。一体化促进了各种形式的“索赔人和索赔对象之间的直接对抗”，使精英们能够承担责任安德森认为民主实践可以作为集体解决问题的工具，这一点是正确的。但是我们应该。

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引用次数: 0

Privacy, Publicity, and the Right to Be Forgotten 隐私、公开和被遗忘权

IF 1.8 1区哲学 Q1 ETHICS

Journal of Political Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-09-14 DOI: 10.1111/jopp.12308

Hannah Carnegy-Arbuthnott

Many of us will remember the sense of foreboding induced by the simple threat, usually uttered by a teacher: ‘It will go on your permanent record’. This administrative bogeyman exploits our early awareness of the importance of being able to leave some things in the past. While some of the things we do may go on public record at various points in our lives, it used to be possible to comfort ourselves with the thought that these would soon be buried deep in the archives, where most people would not care to look. In the digital age, however, search engines do the digging and can serve up previously long-forgotten results on a simple search of a person's name.This article takes up the question of what kinds of claims we have against information being dug up from our past. Specifically, it focuses on information that is legitimately a matter of public record. When some information has been stored in an archive and has, in principle, been accessible to anyone, what claims, if any, do we have against that information being brought back to light? Many people would find it intrusive for someone to dig through archives and publicize afresh the information they found out about you there, but it is not clear what the basis of such a complaint would be. Moreover, it is this kind of complaint that is provided protection through data-protection provisions colloquially referred to as the right to be forgotten. Such measures are typically framed as privacy protections. While some have argued that we can have privacy rights over information that has been made public,1 I argue that appeals to privacy fail in cases concerning information that is legitimately a matter of public record.Paying attention to the reasons we have to object to the dredging up of outdated information reveals a new category of claims that are distinct from claims to privacy, but serve the same general interest in self-presentation that privacy scholars have long been concerned with. I call these claims against distortion. We can understand such claims as falling under a general principle of reputational control embedded in the historic right of personality. That general principle provides the basis for claims to privacy, claims against defamation, and, as I will argue, claims against distortion.The purpose of invoking the right of personality is to identify a general principle embedded in that concept, and to then draw out a taxonomy of claims that serve that principle in distinct ways. One advantage of separating these three categories of claims is that it allows us to retain clear boundaries around the concept of privacy, which has often come under fire for suffering from a plethora of meanings.2On my account, claims to privacy are claims to prevent certain information from becoming publicly available beyond one's audience of choice. Privacy provides one aspect of reputational control by allowing us to decide who we share various aspects of oneself with. Claim

我们中的许多人都会记得，通常由老师发出的简单威胁所引发的不祥预感：“它会记录在你的永久记录中”。这个行政怪物利用了我们早期对能够把一些事情留在过去的重要性的认识。虽然我们所做的一些事情可能会在我们生活的各个阶段被公开记录，但过去我们可以安慰自己，这些事情很快就会被深深地埋在档案中，大多数人都不愿意去看。然而，在数字时代，搜索引擎会进行挖掘，只需简单搜索一个人的名字，就可以提供以前被遗忘已久的结果。这篇文章探讨了一个问题，即我们对从过去挖掘出来的信息有什么样的主张。具体而言，它侧重于合法的公共记录信息。当一些信息被存储在档案中，并且原则上任何人都可以访问时，我们对这些信息被曝光有什么主张（如果有的话）？许多人会发现，有人在那里挖掘档案并重新公布他们发现的关于你的信息是一种侵扰，但目前尚不清楚这种投诉的依据是什么。此外，正是这种投诉通过数据保护条款提供保护，通俗地称为“被遗忘的权利”。这些措施通常被界定为隐私保护。虽然有人认为我们可以对公开的信息享有隐私权，1但我认为，在涉及合法公共记录的信息的情况下，对隐私的上诉是失败的。关注我们必须反对挖掘过时信息的原因，揭示了一类新的权利要求，这些权利要求不同于隐私权要求，但与隐私学者长期以来关注的自我呈现的普遍利益相同。我称这些说法是歪曲事实。我们可以将此类主张理解为属于历史人格权中的声誉控制的一般原则。这一一般原则为隐私权主张、针对诽谤的主张以及我将要指出的针对歪曲事实的主张提供了基础。援引人格权的目的是确定这一概念中包含的一项一般原则，然后对以不同方式服务于该原则的权利要求进行分类。将这三类权利要求分开的一个好处是，它使我们能够围绕隐私的概念保持明确的界限，隐私的概念经常因含义过多而受到抨击。隐私提供了声誉控制的一个方面，允许我们决定与谁分享自己的各个方面。针对诽谤的索赔是针对以损害名誉的方式对自己进行虚假陈述的索赔。针对失真的索赔是指以传播真实信息的方式扭曲个人公众形象的索赔。当某人过去的真实信息以某种方式呈现时，这种扭曲可能会发生，这种方式表明追究他们的责任是合适的，当不再适合这样做时。确定针对失真的索赔类别，并分析其与隐私索赔和诽谤索赔的位置，使我们能够扩大数据保护条款的正当性基础的范围。通过这样做，它扩大了关于我们何时以及为什么有理由让个人对其个人信息拥有更多控制权的辩论范围。数据保护条款往往被视为保护个人隐私权的措施来制定和捍卫。数据保护法规有一个重要的位置，可以实现这一目的。然而，并不是所有的数据保护法规都可以被理解或证明是隐私保护。因此，试图从隐私的角度分析所有数据保护，不适当地限制了我们对如何在为个人提供重要保护的基础上证明此类监管的合理性的思考。主要论点通过审查被称为“被遗忘权”的数据保护条款来进行。具体来说，它解决了这项规定的一个方面，即当个人的名字被输入搜索引擎时，个人可以要求删除显示的某些结果。被遗忘权需要解释的一个方面是，删除指向某些内容的搜索引擎结果，同时在原始来源公开相同内容的理由。虽然任何给定搜索词的结果配置由搜索引擎运营商的算法决定，但公司或个人可以通过搜索引擎优化过程对其搜索结果施加一定程度的控制。对于那些有足够时间、资源和专业知识的人来说，这使他们能够通过确保其他更积极的内容排名更高，将不方便或令人尴尬的搜索结果推到给定搜索词（例如，他们的名字）的搜索结果排名中。事实上，一些人可以通过这种方式使用在线声誉管理服务来操纵自己的搜索页面，而另一些人则缺乏这样做的资源，这让我们有更多的理由支持数据保护法规，该法规将为每个人提供更公平的保护，使其免受扭曲。然而，这种做法的有效性确实表明，可以通过要求搜索引擎在结果列表中不那么突出地显示某些搜索结果来满足针对失真的索赔，而不是要求在所有情况下删除搜索结果。45更广泛的担忧是，搜索引擎运营商不仅获得了扭曲个人公众形象的权力，而且还改变了我们制定问责制的条件。让个人对自己的公共信息档案有更多的控制权，是抵制这种权力过于集中在相对少数的大公司手中的一种方式。我主张一类针对扭曲的索赔，这类索赔与针对隐私和诽谤的索赔不同，但在声誉控制方面符合同样的普遍利益。如果某些合法属于公共记录事项的真实信息以某种方式传播，意味着这是追究个人责任的相关信息，而这些信息已经过时或与现有的问责规范无关，则适用对失真的索赔。我所概述的方法为个人提供了一个保护，使其免受网络公众资料失真的影响，并为如何评估哪些类型的信息呈现构成失真提供了一些指导。还有一个问题是，这将如何帮助解决谷歌西班牙公司看似不一致的问题。在这种情况下，本应处于紧张状态的三件事是：（1）谷歌被要求从搜索结果页面上删除Costeja名字的原始报纸文章链接；（2）原文章被允许保留在该报的网站上；以及（3）随后的搜索结果链接到报道欧盟法院裁决的报纸文章，包括原始债务止赎的所有细节，不需要删除。支持通过引用规范的问责标准来扩大对个人公共信息档案失真的索赔，这有助于我们解释这里的紧张局势。关于最初的报纸文章，允许它保留在互联网上，但不能通过简单的谷歌搜索Costeja的名字直接访问，这将确保任何想找到它的人都必须深入挖掘。虽然在某些受限制的情况下，这种程度的调查可能是适当的，甚至是必要的，但在许多社交环境中，用谷歌搜索某人的名字可能是正常的（例如约会或在评估某人的工作申请后决定是否邀请其面试），这是不合适的。如上所述，确保这些信息仍然可以获得，但相对难以找到，这与围绕沉默和问责公约维护社会规范是一致的。关于报道CJEU案件的报纸文章的链接被允许保留在显著位置，鉴于我提出的关于问责制的论点，我们可以注意到，有问题的信息的框架将对我们评估其在搜索排名中的相关性至关重要。从这个角度来看，重要的是，这些文章在报道谷歌西班牙案事实的背景下嵌入了有关丧失抵押品赎回权的信息。也就是说，他们明确提到，最初的止赎通知受到法院裁决的约束，在该裁决中，该通知被认为足够不相关或过时，有必要从与Costeja名字相关的搜索结果中删除。虽然这一结果仍然使有关原始止赎通知的信息能够在公共领域随时获得，但它确保了它的框架同时表明，在我们可能在谷歌上快速搜索此人姓名的许多情况下，这类信息不适合追究此人的责任。这样，这一结果也可以被解读为一种连贯的方式，通过采取措施加强或维护问责制规范，保护个人的公共信息不被扭曲。一个可能的反对意见是，虽然这些措施确实可能会向公众传达一些信息，表明信息与我们追究人们责任的内容之间的相关性，但这并不能保证人们会不追究我们对相关事情的责任。这种反对意见可能会受到那些主张从情绪反应或反应态度的角度来分析责任和指责的人的强烈反对。46即使人们认识到在特定的背景下提及一个人的特定轻罪是不合适的，然而，他们可能对他们持有相关的态度，并在这个意义上要求他们对个人性格的判断负责。当然，没有什么可以阻止他们相应地改变自己的行为，例如取消约会。当然，我们不能为他人的态度立法。正如里普斯坦在讨论反对诽谤的权利时指出的那样，名誉权并不是别人对你评价良好的权利。别人不应该决定你在别人眼中的声誉，这是一项权利。扩大我们对名誉权的看法，以考虑到随着时间的推移问责制的重要性，以及狭义的归属性问题，在什么构成他人干扰或扭曲个人名誉的问题上引入了灰色地带。然而，围绕我们公

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引用次数: 0

Is One More Powerful with Numbers on One's Side? 有数字在身边的人更强大吗？

IF 1.8 1区哲学 Q1 ETHICS

Journal of Political Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-08-02 DOI: 10.1111/jopp.12307

Sean Ingham, Niko Kolodny

Suppose that in a jurisdiction there are 2,000,001 white voters and 1,000,000 black voters, all of whom enjoy equally weighted votes. The question of white supremacy is routinely put to a majority-rule plebiscite. In each such plebiscite, all white voters vote yes for white supremacy and all black voters vote no. This has been going on as long as anyone can remember, and it will continue for as long as anyone can foresee. This is a paradigm of a persistent minority, to which, intuitively, each black voter has an objection.What is their objection? One answer is that black voters don't get their preferences satisfied. Another answer is that black voters are oppressed by the eventuating policies of white supremacy. Yet another answer considers the white majority as a group. As a group, they have greater power to determine the outcome than have the blacks as a group. Indeed, the white majority as a group is always decisive. In the last plebiscite, all the whites voted for white supremacy and it passed; and if all the whites had voted against, it would have failed. By contrast, the black minority as a group is never decisive. They voted against and it passed; and if any assemblage of them had voted yes, it would still have passed.In this article, we raise a number of doubts about Abizadeh's suggestion that the power-of-numbers thesis can vindicate the thought that members of the minority as individuals have less voting power and thereby account for their objection to belonging to a persistent minority. Perhaps the most serious doubt is that while Abizadeh correctly holds that voting power must be assessed in part by counterfactualizing on votes—by asking what would have happened if a voter had voted otherwise than he in fact did—he does not counterfactualize in the right way.We cannot vindicate the thought that members of the minority have less voting power if we assume an a priori measure of voting power that abstracts from information about the distribution of political preferences and its causes. An example is the Banzhaf (or Penrose–Banzhaf) measure of voting power, according to which a voter's power is her probability of casting a decisive vote if all other voters vote independently and with equal probability for either alternative.4 (A voter's vote in favor of (or against) a measure is decisive if the measure passes (fails), but would have failed (passed) if the voter had instead voted against (in favor).) An a priori measure of voting power will not register any differences between members of the persistent minority and anyone else, because it ignores, by construction, the facts about the distribution of preferences and its causes, in virtue of which some voters qualify as members of a persistent minority.Abizadeh therefore seeks to vindicate the power-of-numbers thesis with an a posteriori measure: power is calculated on the basis of, rather than in abstraction from, information

因此，如果选民的权力与投出决定性选票的概率相对应（Penrose-Banzhaf衡量标准背后的假设），那么每个选民，无论白人还是黑人，都拥有相同的权力。如果在阿比扎德之后，我们承认获胜一方的一名成员可以享有部分效力，即使他们不是决定性的，该怎么办？当每个人都投下同等权重的选票时，正如我们所有的例子一样，我们可以假设部分效力的程度是获胜联盟规模（相对于选民规模）的函数。在光谱的一端，有人和其他选民一起投票给获胜的一方；他们的投票有一定的部分效果，但不如获胜联盟的相对规模较小时那么有效。另一端是完全决定性的选民，他投票给获胜的一方，是最小决定性联盟的一部分（例如，简单多数规则下的绝对多数）。在我们的例子中，当白人选民投票给获胜联盟，支持白人至上主义时，他的投票具有一定的部分效力，即在3000001名选民中，与2000000名其他选民一起投票选出获胜的备选方案相对应的部分效力程度。如果白人选民投票反对白人至上主义，他的投票效果将为零。如果一名黑人选民投票支持获胜的联盟，支持白人至上主义，那么她的选票将具有一定的部分效力，即在3000001名选民中，与2000001名其他选民一起投票支持获胜候选人的部分效力程度。当黑人选民投票反对白人至上主义时，她的投票效果将为零。他们的部分疗效评分几乎相同。这些说法建立在一种默认的假设之上，即如果选民的投票方式与他们实际的投票方式不同，那么其他人的投票方式仍然与他们实际投票的方式相同。如果一个人想为数字的幂理论辩护，就必须拒绝这种假设。有些人可能会基于以下理由反对这种默认假设。鉴于我们对此案的规定，所有白人选民肯定会以同样的方式投票。因此，如果一个特定的白人选民投票反对白人至上主义，而不是支持，那么所有其他白人选民也会投票反对。但事实并非如此。假设A报和B报总是报道同样的事件；当丑闻爆发时，他们每个人都一定会举报。这并不是说如果A不举报丑闻，那么B也会不举报。概率依赖并不意味着反事实依赖。5如果一名选民关于如何投票的决定对其他选民的决定产生了因果影响，人们会有充分的理由拒绝默认假设。但让我们假设，没有人的投票对其他人的投票有任何因果影响。如果你愿意，假设每个人都同时秘密投票。数字理论的力量不应该取决于选民相互影响的能力。人们可能会拒绝这一假设的另一个原因是，如果人们认为投票权的衡量不仅应该反映选民的行为，还应该反映过去对选民行为以及其他选民行为产生因果影响的事件。原因可能如下。这个例子假设所有白人选民总是作为一个群体投票，所有黑人选民总是作为群体投票。这种相关性模式只有在潜在的社会结构原因的作用下才能成立，这些原因对白人选民的偏好有一个（完全决定的）影响，而对黑人选民的偏好则有相反的（完全决定）影响。如果某个白人选民投票反对拟议的投票措施，那一定是因为潜在的社会结构影响导致他和所有其他白人选民反对。因此，如果一个特定的白人选民投反对票，他们会发现自己站在获胜的一边，并会享有一些部分效力，就像他们投赞成票时享有一些部分功效一样；相比之下，如果一位黑人选民投了赞成票，她仍然会输，她的投票仍然无效，就像她实际投的反对票无效一样。因此，白人选民比黑人选民享有更大的权力。这种推理涉及“回溯”反事实：假设当一个人对白人选民的行为进行反事实化，并寻找他投反对票的最接近的世界时，应该包括在投票前具有不同历史的世界。她投票支持工会的最接近的世界可能是老板从未发出威胁，也没有人因为投票支持工会而面临失业的前景，在这种情况下，其他人也会投票支持工会，工会提案就会通过。因此，如果她投赞成工会提案的票，然后——回溯和反实现老板过去的行为——它就会通过，在这种情况下，她会和其他人一起通过提案。或者假设一位美国足球教练正在决定是在第四次落后时触地得分，还是让他的踢球者踢出一个界外球。当他做出这样的决定时，一个考虑因素是风：如果风太大，踢球者将没有力量射门，因此在这种情况下，教练决定触地得分。假设事实上风很大，所以他决定触地得分。在他们失败后，他的批评者说：“教练做出了错误的决定。踢球者确实有能力在球场上进球。在他踢球的最接近的世界里，他踢球是因为教练告诉他，教练告诉他这样做是因为风的条件很好，既然风的条件好，踢球者就进球了。”我们把周一早上的四分卫提升到了一个全新的水平。到目前为止，我们已经考虑了一个例子，在这个例子中，投票权的衡量是基于完全可以预测每个人投票行为的信息。在这种假设下，持续多数派的个人成员和持续少数派的个人会员之间的投票权差异可以忽略不计。如果人们放松这一假设，转而根据仅部分预测选票分布的信息来衡量权力，那么在某些情况下，结构性少数群体的成员比结构性多数群体的成员在预期中拥有更大的权力——同样，前提是人们不用回溯的反事实来衡量权力。选民1属于结构性少数，选民2、3、4和5属于结构性多数。对于每一次公民投票，都有一个社会结构变量S t影响所有五名选民的投票行为。S t=0 或S t=1。如果 S t=1，则选民1、2和3将支持该措施，而选民4和5将反对该措施的概率为p；选民1支持，但选民2、3、4和5反对的概率为1−p。如果 S t=0，则选民1、2和3将反对该措施，而选民4和5将支持该措施的概率为p；选民1反对，但选民2、3、4和5支持的概率为1−p。9假设0&lt；p&lt；1/2。大多数情况下（一小部分1−p&gt；1/2的时间），选民1发现自己处于少数，而选民2、3、4和5发现自己处于多数。但选民1属于结构性少数，选民5属于结构性多数。选民1占少数，而选民5占多数，分数为1-p&gt；1/2的时间，由于他们在社会结构中的地位及其对投票行为的影响。在不失普遍性的情况下，我们假设我们正在进行公民投票，1号选民支持这项措施。但如果我们假设选民1反对，我们也会得出同样的结论。因此，我们的结论并不取决于公民投票前的实际历史（特别是社会结构变量ST的实际实现）。它只依赖于这样一个假设，即公民投票是由简单多数规则决定的，并且社会结构变量S t以所描述的方式在投票行为中引起概率依赖。结果的直觉很简单。选民1比选民5更有可能成为少数派，尽管她也有更高的概率投出决定性的一票。如果后一种概率足够高（在我们的例子中，如果p＞3/23），则结论将是投票者1更强大。关键的假设是，我们评估了关于选民1行为的反事实假设，而没有反事实化她的历史特征（s t的已实现值），这些特征固定了其他选民行为的概率分布从而确定她的投票具有决定性的可能性。关于必须如何定义顽固的少数群体的说法很重要，因为Abizadeh所援引的一切都是为了避免数字力量论“荒谬地要求以民主平等为由补偿政治怪癖”的结果。这是他对为什么“如果自由意志主义者或布尔什维克的人数持续超过他们，民主平等就不需要正式的程序不平等来补偿他们。”13根据实际偏好来定义“持续的少数群体”到底有什么问题？令人担忧的

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引用次数: 0

Rethinking moral claim rights 对道德请求权的再思考

IF 1.8 1区哲学 Q1 ETHICS

Journal of Political Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-06-22 DOI: 10.1111/jopp.12306

Laura Valentini

The notion of rights is ubiquitous in philosophical discourse. As Allen Buchanan put it over thirty years ago, ‘Future historians of moral and political philosophy may well label our period the Age of Rights’.1 This notion is not only popular, but also complex. As the legal scholar W. N. Hohfeld famously suggested, rights are susceptible to multiple interpretations: they can be claims, liberties, powers, or immunities.2 Despite this variation, the consensus view is that the core instance of a right is a claim right.3

In the moral domain, claim rights designate a binary relation between a right-holder and a duty-bearer, where the former stands in a distinctive moral position vis-à-vis the latter.4 While there is controversy as to what, precisely, this distinctive moral position amounts to, the idea that claim rights capture it is seldom put into question.

In this article, I challenge this way of thinking. I argue that the language of claim rights is ill suited for the purpose of picking out a distinctive moral position.5 I show that the notion of a claim right is susceptible to several disambiguations, just as the notion of a right itself is. From this, I conclude that we should either no longer appeal to the concept of a claim right in moral theorizing or rethink its purpose.

The article proceeds as follows. In Section II, I set out two desiderata that a plausible definition of moral claim rights should satisfy. The definition should: (a) capture a distinctive moral position and (b) account for paradigmatic instances of claim rights in our ordinary language. In Section III, I show that the two most prominent accounts of claim rights fail to meet desideratum (b). Of course, the fact that prominent accounts are unsatisfactory does not mean that no satisfactory account could be developed. To support this stronger claim, in Section IV, I offer a systematization of our language of claim rights. I suggest that the greatest common denominator of such language is the idea of empowerment, and show that paradigmatic statements about claim rights track either the justification for certain forms of empowerment (justification rights statements) or empowerment itself and the particular status it confers on individuals (status rights statements).

As I explain in Section V, this twofold connection between claim rights and empowerment reveals that, for structural reasons, our desiderata cannot be jointly satisfied. No notion of claim rights can both capture justification as well as status rights statements and pick out a distinctive moral position. In Section VI, I consider three possible implications of this conclusion. One is that we should abandon the notion of claim rights in moral theorizing. Another, less drastic possibility is that, in light of its disjunctive structure, the notion of claim rights should be given a different purpose. A third possibility, for those not persua

权利的概念在哲学话语中无处不在。正如Allen Buchanan在30多年前所说，“未来的道德和政治哲学历史学家很可能会把我们的时代称为权利时代”。1这个概念不仅流行，而且复杂。正如法律学者W.N.Hohfeld著名的建议，权利容易受到多种解释的影响：它们可以是主张、自由、权力或豁免。2尽管有这种变化，但一致的观点是，权利的核心实例是主张权。3在道德领域，主张权指定了权利持有人和义务持有人之间的二元关系，与后者相比，前者处于独特的道德地位。4虽然这种独特的道德立场究竟意味着什么存在争议，但主张权利涵盖这一点的想法很少受到质疑。在这篇文章中，我对这种思维方式提出了挑战。我认为，索赔权的语言不适合选择一个独特的道德立场。5我表明，索赔权概念容易受到几个歧义的影响，就像权利本身的概念一样。由此，我得出结论，我们要么在道德理论中不再诉诸索赔权概念，要么重新思考其目的。本条内容如下。在第二节中，我提出了道德请求权的合理定义应该满足的两个需求。该定义应：（a）体现一种独特的道德立场，（b）在我们的普通语言中解释索赔权的典型例子。在第三节中，我指出，关于索赔权的两个最突出的描述都不符合要求（b）。当然，突出账户不令人满意并不意味着无法开发出令人满意的账户。为了支持这一更有力的主张，在第四节中，我对我们的主张权利语言进行了系统化。我认为，这种语言的最大公约数是赋权的概念，并表明关于索赔权的范式陈述要么跟踪某些形式的赋权的正当性（正当性权利陈述），要么跟踪赋权本身及其赋予个人的特定地位（地位权利陈述）。正如我在第五节中解释的那样，索赔权和授权之间的这种双重联系表明，由于结构性原因，我们的需求无法得到共同满足。索赔权利的概念既不能反映正当性，也不能反映地位权利的陈述，也不能体现独特的道德立场。在第六节中，我考虑了这一结论可能产生的三个影响。一是我们应该在道德理论化中摒弃权利主张的概念。另一种不那么激烈的可能性是，鉴于其分离结构，索赔权的概念应该有不同的目的。对于那些不被我的论点说服的人来说，第三种可能性是，将我的讨论视为提出了一个挑战，任何令人满意的道德主张权利的描述都应该遇到这个挑战。第七节结束。在我开始发言之前，请允许我作一些澄清。我的讨论重点是道德理论中的权利主张，特别是在道德理论中，这个概念被认为占据了独特的道德地位。正如我将在文章末尾解释的那样，模糊性使索赔权的概念不适合道德理论中的这一目的，也使其成为政治宣传的有力工具。我对索赔权是否适用于法律推理的技术目的保持沉默。由于这些似乎与道德哲学的目的不同，本文提出的担忧不必延伸到法律领域。最后，请注意我的术语。在以下内容中，我将把“索赔权利”、“定向义务”（侵犯特定他人的行为）和“对他人的义务”视为同等义务。这一术语选择符合文献中的标准用法。6对索赔权的评估以我们希望这一概念在道德理论中所做的工作为前提。如果找不到可行的定义来完成这项工作，我们将有理由怀疑这个概念的有用性，至少就最初的预期目的而言。作为一个类比，考虑一个与我们不同的概念体系的社会，在这个社会中只有两种类型的餐具：叉子和尖嘴。叉子以人们熟悉的方式被定义为拾取固体食物的工具。spife的概念是不连贯的：它要么指向舀液体食物的工具，要么指向切割固体食物的工具。我们希望这些概念能帮助我们有效地选择不同的“吃饭工具”。碰巧，有两种物体属于“spives”类别：我们（在我们的世界里）称之为勺子和刀。在这个平行的社会里，当人们要求喝水时，可能会想到我们称之为勺子或刀的东西。毕竟，如果你的义务是对我的，那么它的履行在某种意义上是“我的”，当某件事是我的时，我对它有规范的控制。意志理论不仅具有独立的吸引力，而且符合需求。它赋予索赔权利人一个独特的道德地位，即控制他人义务的权力。但是desideratum（b）呢？正如评论家们著名地指出的那样，在这里，该理论遇到了一些困难，因为它没有充分产生权利。17在意志理论中，选择的能力——因此是对他人义务的规范控制——是拥有权利的必要条件。因此，该理论无法解释缺乏这种能力的实体的权利，如儿童、严重精神残疾者和非人类动物。18此外，该理论没有所谓不可剥夺的权利的空间。由于对意志理论家来说，拥有权利就是拥有控制义务的权力，包括放弃义务的权力。因此，不可剥夺的权利——即不能放弃的权利——在概念上是不可能的。19总之，意志理论满足欲望（a），但与欲望（b）作斗争。现在让我谈谈它的主要竞争对手。根据Joseph Raz等人突出捍卫的利益理论，拥有权利就是拥有足以证明他人义务正当的利益。20利益理论也有很多直观的吸引力。当我的利益是解释其存在的关键时，很自然地会认为我有义务。许多权利——生命权、身体完整权、食物权等等——似乎都符合利益理论的基本原理。此外，“作为证明义务正当的利益持有人”可以恰当地描述为一种独特的道德立场。无论谁拥有它，都与责任人有着特殊的规范关系。因此，利益理论满足需求（a）。但是，就像意志理论一样，它也很难满足需求。如果我有独特的能力帮助她，并且可以以很少的个人成本来帮助她，我就应该这样做。然而，大多数人都会否认这位女士有权得到我的帮助，就像我的面包师有权要求我为今天早上从他那里买的面包卷买单一样。我的义务看起来像是一个受益人的问题，尽管本案中的受益人是明确的，但这似乎不足以产生权利。22其次，正如我之前的其他人也指出的那样，由于在某些情况下，某人对X的权利不能通过上诉来证明其对X的利益是合理的，因此该理论低估了权利的产生。举个例子，考虑一下我对一个堂兄送给我的廉价装饰品的产权。我对拥有这个装饰品没有什么兴趣。几年前，我发现它很难看，就把它放在壁橱的底部，从此就忘记了它。根据任何合理的解释，我对拥有这件装饰品的兴趣都不足以让其他人承担不偷它的强烈义务，但作为一个决定如何处理它的人：这是对自由的更广泛兴趣。但是，正如拉兹自己承认的那样，在一些可以想象的情况下，“我不介意，也没有理由介意你未经允许服用”。24也就是说，这与自由利益无关。在这种情况下，利益理论家似乎必须得出结论，认为我没有权利。拉兹摆脱这一困境的方法包括暗示，虽然我可能对拥有这个特定的物体没有什么兴趣，但我和社会上的其他人一样，对建立一个运转良好的财产体系感兴趣。这一制度的理由不是为了迎合特定个人的利益，而是为了每个人的利益：为了共同利益。这种常见的好案例是权利持有人的利益和公众利益“和谐交织”的案例：也就是说，“使他受益是使他们受益的一种方式，并且……通过使他们受益，权利持有人的权益得到了服务”。25在这种情况下，我的个人利益的权重被其他人的利益“增加”，从而证明我的（财产）权利是合理的。虽然这种回应可能会使利益理论避免产生不足的费用，但它这样做的代价是使其无法满足需求（a）。26因为，如果从利益理论的角度来看，解释他人不盗窃我的财产的义务不是我的利益，而是我和其他人的利益（即共同利益），再也不能说我在这些职责方面处于独特的道德地位了。当涉及到履行这些职责时，我的利益并不比其他人的利益更重要。这一点可以通过回顾正当性和地位权利声明将权利作为一个道德类别定位在不同的地方来最有效地表达。正当性陈述将其定位于利益证明授权正当性的个人，在任何特定情况下，哪种形式的授权最合适是一个悬而未决的问题。相

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