Urban–rural justice

IF 2.9 1区 哲学 Q1 ETHICS Journal of Political Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-03-08 DOI:10.1111/jopp.12297
Lisa Herzog
{"title":"Urban–rural justice","authors":"Lisa Herzog","doi":"10.1111/jopp.12297","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the public discourse of Western democracies,1 the axis of “urban” versus “rural” has reappeared.2 Often discussed in the context of right-wing populism and its successes among rural voters, commentators have discussed the “Big Sort,”3 the contrast between “Anywheres” and “Somewheres,”4 and the lifeworlds of “hillbillies.”5 Scholars in the social sciences have attempted to understand what it feels like to live in rural places, using ethnographic methods,6 or how to understand the resentment against urbanites expressed in farmers' protests.7 In studies of electoral politics, the differences between urban and rural voting behavior have long been an issue.8 One political scientist, Jonathan A. Rodden, claims, with regard to the US, that “The Democrats, quite simply, have evolved into a diverse collection of urban interest groups, and the Republicans into an assemblage of exurban and rural interests.”9</p><p>In philosophical discussions about justice, in contrast, one finds hardly any mention of the urban–rural divide.10 Geography plays a role in discussions about global justice, but not in discussions about justice within societies. Several reasons might explain this gap (apart from a possible sociological explanation: namely, that philosophers tend to be urbanites). One is the assumption that all questions about these geographical differences can be subsumed under other dimensions of justice. For example, if rural populations are poorer, on average, this is a matter of distributive justice; if they do not have good schools, this is a matter of equality of opportunity, and so on. This argument is hard to reject if one operates at a high level of abstraction and discusses the formulation and justification of different principles of justice. However, political philosophy might also want to address issues that are closer to concrete real-life issues, whether one describes this as “non-ideal” theory11 or “problem-driven” political philosophy.12 For such approaches, it seems relevant to ask what considerations of justice might apply to the urban–rural divide that social scientists have diagnosed.</p><p>A focus on the concerns of rural communities is also sometimes coupled with nationalist tendencies, even within scholarship.14 It is understandable not to want to be associated with such voices.</p><p>Nonetheless, if political philosophy is interested in the matters that mar our societies, it seems at least worth asking <i>whether there might be any issues of justice at all</i> with regard to the urban–rural divide. The aim of this article is to ask what theories of justice might have to say about this topic. I take a relational-egalitarian perspective, which focuses on the relations that should hold between the citizens of a just society,15 but also discuss the applicability of some luck-egalitarian arguments.16 Overall, the article provides a survey of the various dimensions of the question: what (if anything) would a just society, whose citizens relate to each other as equals, do about the differences between urban and rural life? While the answers to concrete policy questions about the urban–rural divide have to be given within the specific contexts of different societies, or even with regard to specific regions, it is possible to identify some key issues of concern.</p><p>I first delve into the empirical literature on the urban–rural divide (Section II). Then I approach the question of justice with regard to this divide by focusing on three topics. The first concerns the distribution of educational opportunities, with a key question being how all children from rural areas can get the necessary support both for leaving and for staying (Section III). The second issue is the provision of public services and economic opportunities. Here I also discuss the luck-egalitarian objection that individuals choose the place in which they live for themselves, and are therefore themselves responsible if they have less access to certain opportunities in their region. Against this view, I argue that certain basic and civic services are owed to citizens in all regions, even if this comes at a higher cost to the public than the provision in urban areas.</p><p>The third frame concerns cultural recognition, which has some overlap with economic issues, but also raises separate questions.17 I argue that the framework of multiculturalism, which has traditionally been applied to migrant communities, can also be applied to certain differences between the lifeworlds and cultural values of urban and rural communities.18 I conclude by summarizing the policy proposals that follow from these arguments, and by briefly reflecting on the ways in which temporal and geographical considerations are intertwined when it comes to justice for individuals in “backward” regions.</p><p>Although it has recently achieved new salience in public discourse, the social realities and the imaginaries that contrast urban and rural life are anything but new. In a recent article, Charles Nathan describes how this contrast played out in ancient Athenian democracy, which encompassed not only the city of Athens, but also a rural hinterland that was “less dynamic, less commercial, less cosmopolitan and less democratic.”19 The topic of urbanites mocking their rural compatriots, who in turn fear the erosion of their way of life, already appears in ancient Greek plays.20 Visions of “the city” versus “the countryside” also played an important role in nineteenth-century nation building.21 In the 1920s and 1930s, conservative and fascist thinking had a strong anti-urban strand.22 In 1940, historian Arthur Schlesinger wrote about the growing differences in lifestyles between cities and the countryside in the US.23</p><p>As noted in the Introduction, in recent years the topic has made a comeback in public discourse and scholars have also returned to it. Reading the social scientific literature quickly makes clear, however, that one needs to beware of simple dichotomies. The size of towns and cities comes on a spectrum; even areas that are officially classified as “metropolitan” can include thinly populated regions that look and feel rather “rural.”24 The idea of “industry” having its place in urban hubs and “agriculture” in rural areas is also highly misleading. Many traditional industries have shut down their operations in Western countries; many smaller industrial companies operate in mid-size towns or in the outskirts of large metropoles; and agriculture has become industrialized and requires only small numbers of employees.25 Not all rural areas vote conservative, as the cliché would have it; in the 2016 Brexit referendum, for example, some rural areas voted “remain” even though they had a history of intense farmer protests.26 Some of the attitudes and lifestyles that one might associate with “ruralness” can also be found in post-industrial cities, with similar narratives about the loss of good jobs and a sense of being “left behind.”27</p><p>There are obviously also differences between countries. A first thing to note is the sheer difference in size, which translates into differences in distances: what counts as “far from the next city” in Belgium, for example, is far less, in kilometers or miles, than in the Mid-West of the US. Greater distances make certain problems—for example, access to educational institutions within commutable distance—more urgent. In some countries, notably the US, religious communities play a strong role in rural areas,28 whereas in Europe this holds only for specific regions. Suburbia—as the transition zone between “urban” and “rural” —is also a different phenomenon in different countries, for example with regard to access to public transport and public services, but also in its socio-economic composition. Some developments that have been particularly harmful to rural communities are specific to certain countries, such as the methamphetamine pandemic in the US.29</p><p>What, then, can one say <i>in general</i> about the urban–rural divide, that will allow one to think through considerations of justice at a level of reasonable generality? In contrast to densely populated urban areas, thinly populated rural areas typically differ with regard to three central, related areas: access to educational opportunities, the availability of (certain kinds of) economic opportunities, and, to some extent, the predominant culture or lifestyle. Of course, all these differences comes as tendencies, which take on different forms in different regions and their concrete conditions.</p><p>For young people in rural areas, <i>access to higher education</i> and to professional opportunities is often more difficult: not only are universities often in urban areas,30 informal “pathways of opportunity,” such as social networks, internships, and the cultural capital of an urban lifestyle, are also more difficult to access.31 Randall Curren argues that this threatens not only fair opportunities for rural youth with regard to professional life, but also their “civic equality” and their opportunities to develop “civic friendships” with individuals from different walks of life.32 The result can be distinctive disadvantages for children from rural areas, above and beyond other socio-economic factors, when it comes to professional success. Guilluy quotes some numbers for France: “The share of children of manual and nonmanual laborers who have become executives or middle managers varies almost by a factor of two: only 24.7 percent in Indre and Creuse, for example, but 47 percent in Paris.”33</p><p>For the US, however—where the problem is particularly urgent because of its great distances—researchers have uncovered a somewhat different picture: some small-town kids are singled out, at an early age, and are prepared by parents, teachers, and other mentors to go to college, creating high social pressure on them to leave their communities.34 These children are often from families of higher socio-economic status, or who are seen as more “deserving” than other families, and they receive far more attention and support than other children.35 Few of those who go to college (whom Maria J. Kefalas and Parick J. Carr, based on an extended ethnographic study in Iowa, describe as “achievers”)36 later return. Young people with lower grades and less support can often leave only by enlisting in the army, and their likelihood of returning is higher.37</p><p>This situation also has to do with the second factor: the <i>lack of availability of jobs,</i> especially for college-educated individuals, in many rural areas—a problem not only in the US,38 but also elsewhere. In today's economies, well-paid jobs in the tertiary sector, especially knowledge-based jobs that require high levels of formal education,39 tend to cluster in bigger cities.40 In urban areas, companies benefit from a critical mass of employees, who in turn are attracted to these urban hubs because of the opportunities in terms of jobs, but also in terms of lifestyle: the choice of restaurants, a rich cultural scene, opportunities for civic engagement, and so on. When young people from rural areas are used to an urban lifestyle, returning to their home region would mean giving up many of these economic, civic, and cultural opportunities.41 As Curren puts it with regard to the US, “For the residents of small rural towns of the ‘Heartland,’ upward mobility is now barely distinguishable from geographic mobility.”42</p><p>The resulting “brain drain” contributes to “depleting rural states of talent and tax dollars”;43 it also means a shrinking pool of people who can take on civic and political leadership roles and act as role models for local children. It has an emotional dimension, too, often leading to estrangement between family members and circles of friends. Leavers might come to see their home towns “the way outsiders do: parochial and just a little redneck.”44</p><p>This leads to a third difference, namely one of <i>culture</i> or <i>lifestyle</i>. One key dimension here is diversity, or the lack of it. More densely populated areas typically bring together more diverse individuals, whether it is in terms of ethnic background, sexual orientation, or worldviews, whereas in rural areas there is often less exposure to such diversity45 (although rural areas with seizable minority populations do also exist).46 This fact is often cited as an explanation for a pattern that is quite stable across countries, namely that rural areas—often together with post-industrial towns—show more conservative voting behaviors than metropolitan areas. The US shows a clear statistical correlation between population density and Democratic voting at various levels of the political system.47</p><p>The flipside of the lack of diversity, in many (though not all) rural areas, is what one might call a “lifestyle of familiarity,” with people knowing and supporting each other. As Kefalas and Carr put it, “Small-town people rejoice in the fact that if you get in trouble, your neighbors will close ranks and reach out with aid.”48 Wuthnow's account similarly emphasizes the self-understanding of rural communities as “moral communities” in which “people feel an obligation to one another and to uphold the local ways of being.”49 He points out that there are more voluntary associations in smaller communities than in larger ones,50 but also emphasizes that these communities are, to a large extent, “imagined.”51 The inhabitants of small towns see no need to lock their doors, and kids can roam unsupervised, because everyone knows everyone, or at least this is what it feels like.52 In addition, a strong emphasis is put on hard work and perserverance, and community members admire those among their fellow citizens who have a strong work ethic.53</p><p>Cramer shows that the claim of unfair treatment, when translated into taxation and public support for different constituencies, is incorrect, but she argues that the costs for maintaining infrastructure and public services in rural communities are often higher, which may justify the perception of disadvantage.56</p><p>It is helpful here to draw a distinction between those rural communities which, although disadvantaged in certain ways, are stable for the foreseeable future, and those that are not.57 To be sure, in terms of long-term population trends, rural areas are thinning out; for example, as Wuthnow reports, the percentage of the US population living in rural areas shifted from 95 percent in 1810, to 55 percent in 1910, to 20 percent in 2010.58 The global trend is towards urbanization, with 55 percent of the world population already living in cities in 2017.59 But population dynamics are not the same everywhere.60 Some rural areas have enough local jobs and fruitful relations with larger conglomerations to remain stable. Others, however, see jobs moving away and populations shrinking. If too many young people leave for good, fewer children are born, which can lead to the closure of local schools, a painful symbol of decline.61 In other words, for some communities, there seems to be no way to maintain civic and economic viability in the long run, and their inhabitants may feel “the almost inexpressible concern that their way of life is eroding, shifting imperceptibly under their feet, and being discredited and attacked from the outside.”62</p><p>How, then, should a society guided by an ideal of relational equality react to such differences? In the next sections, I discuss how relational egalitarians can approach the issues of access to education, availability of public services and economic opportunities, and cultural difference.</p><p>A first area of justice concerns children growing up in rural areas and their opportunities to access education. Children have not chosen to grow up in rural areas; relational egalitarians and those with luck egalitarian intuitions—to which I come back below—can agree that they should not suffer disadvantages caused by unchosen circumstances. As described above, accessing higher education typically means that these young people must leave their home regions, which carries a high cost in terms of being separated from family and friends, and having to learn new social and cultural codes that may estrange them from their previous lives.63 At the same time, it is clear that from a perspective of equal opportunity, they need to be given the chance to leave; their chances to access leadership roles in all areas of society must not be systematically lower than those of children from urban areas.64 This means that they need to have access to additional financial support—even compared to disadvantaged children in urban areas—for living away from their families in order to attend educational institutions or realize opportunities such as internships.</p><p>Importantly, the necessary formal (for example, stipends) and informal (for example, mentorship and peer mentoring) support needs to be offered to <i>all</i> children who show an interest in leaving a rural community, instead of focusing such efforts disproportionately on some high-achieving “good treasures” that a community picks based on family backgrounds.65 At the same time, those who want to stay in, or close to, their home region also need to receive adequate support, for example by matching local educational offers to local economic opportunities, in renewable energy projects, for instance. As Kefalas and Carr emphasize, local policies should not only try to get a few “achievers” to return, but should also focus on “boomerang” types who want to return or “stayers” who never leave.66</p><p>To better do justice to all children, two additional directions for educational policy are worth considering. The first is to focus not only on education for young people, but also on opportunities for (re-)training and education throughout the course of one's life. This is particularly relevant for young people in rural areas who decide to leave school and take on full-time jobs at an early age, but then realize that they are stuck at the same low wage level for years to come.67 The second—which can be related to the first—is to not think about “education” exclusively in a theoretical, “academic” sense. The experiences of countries (for example, Germany and Switzerland) with vocational tracks show that these can offer good financial prospects and fulfilling jobs in practical fields.68 This may be particularly relevant for rural areas in which there are more job opportunities for individuals with such skills. But, of course, this must not lead to a new kind of segregation in which rural children are automatically channeled towards vocational rather than academic training.</p><p>Lastly, a specifically US problem is worth briefly mentioning: the high percentage of school funding that comes from local tax revenue. This obviously creates challenges for poor school districts—in the city and the country—and can be particularly challenging for rural areas with declining populations.69 It is all the more problematic given that, as described above, the most talented and energetic children from rural areas often end up in metropoles, which benefit from their influx. From a perspective of educational justice, education should be funded on the national level, with adequate provisions to compensate for disadvantages of along various lines, including the disadvantages that come from living at great distance from institutions of higher education and other educational opportunities.</p><p>A second set of questions of justice, and ensuing policy questions, turns around the provision of public services and economic opportunities, whether in the form of individualized or collective provision. This leads to the question of <i>where</i> individuals are owed certain things: can they claim them wherever they live, or could they justifiably only be provided in certain locations, with individuals themselves being responsible for getting them there? A resource-based approach, understood in purely financial terms, can avoid this problem: from this perspective, one can simply provide financial means to individuals and leave it to themselves where they use them. When translating these resources into opportunities, it is up to individuals how they manage the geographies of their lives. If certain things are more expensive for those living in rural areas, for example because they face higher travel costs, they can decide to move elsewhere—or so this argument would go.</p><p>This line of reasoning presents a luck-egalitarian intuition that many individuals might have about the urban–rural divide, and that might amount to an objection to relational-egalitarian approaches: aren't grown-up individuals responsible for their own choices, including the choice of staying put in a rural area?70 From this perspective, one might describe the decision to live in a certain region as a matter of choosing one value—rootedness, as one might call it—over other values.71 And if this comes at a cost in terms of less access to certain public services and fewer economic opportunities, is that really a problem? If someone can enjoy stunningly beautiful nature in a remote area, they may not need a public library nearby, and they should accept a somewhat longer drive to get to a hospital. It would, after all, be extremely costly for societies to try to provide the same level of public services in remote, thinly populated areas as in metropoles—or so this argument goes.</p><p>But from a relational-egalitarian perspective, this conclusion is too quick, even if one assumes that individual choice can play <i>some</i> role in the distribution of goods and services. A first thing to note is that rootedness is, in many cases, not just an “expensive taste,” but a matter of social connections and attachments to an area that shapes people's whole lives.72 With regard to international migration, theorists have argued for a “right to stay”73 or a “right to occupancy.”74 Kieran Oberman argues that such a right is grounded in three types of arguments: freedom of movement (which must also include the freedom <i>not</i> to move), “cultural membership,” and “territorial attachment.”75 Similarly, Anna Stilz uses the notion of “located life-plans” to describe the ways in which people's fundamental projects can be tied to certain localities in which they live together with others and participate in various economic, social, and cultural practices.76</p><p>Now, these discussions concern international migration and questions of violent removal, in which the loss that individuals suffer when they are forced to leave, and also the costs of “mastering a new social organization and cultural environment,”77 are much greater. Nonetheless, the argument that rootedness can be a core commitment can also apply to different regions within a country. For example, individuals may have local family businesses—for example, farms—that they feel obliged to continue.78 Hochschild describes numerous cases of individuals who do not want to leave their communities, even though there are no good jobs and the environment suffers from massive industrial pollution that also creates health risks.79 Sometimes individuals try to leave, but realize that they feel too homesick and lonely, and therefore return.80</p><p>Thus, the importance of rootedness for many people's lives suggests that treating it as a mere “expensive taste” that would justify certain disadvantages does not do justice to the way in which it is connected to other central elements of people's lifeplans, especially the connection to certain communities. A second argument also pushes against the luck-egalitarian intuition. For individual choice to justify disadvantage, the choice needs to be made from a fairly structured set of options.81 The bundles of options that come with an “urban” and a “rural” lifestyle may have some differences (for example, anonymity versus familiarity, enjoyment of nature versus cultural diversity, and so on), but they must not diverge so much from each other that those who may end up opting for a rural lifestyle are disadvantaged by this very fact.82 Whether or not this is the case differs with regard to different rural areas, across countries, but also within them. In long-term stable rural areas with a just provision of public services—on which I say more below—it may well be justifiable that certain kinds of high-paying jobs are not locally available and that the choice of restaurants is limited. But in many declining areas, in which the provision of public services is often inadequate, the set of opportunities cannot be described as fairly structured.</p><p>What, then, are the public services that need to be provided to all rural areas? Some services are non-negotiable from a relational-egalitarian perspective, even if the costs for society are high. Just as we have a moral obligation to offer medical help to a reckless motorcyclist who has a self-inflicted accident,83 we have a moral obligation to offer medical services to fellow citizens who decide to live in very remote areas. Unless very extraordinary circumstances hold, basic life-sustaining services need to be offered, even if the costs are considerable (for example, helicopter services to take patients to hospital in health emergencies). Rurual residents also need access to regular health checks84 and help for mental health issues.85</p><p>Beyond that, from a liberal-egalitarian perspective, individuals in rural areas also require services that secure at least a minimum of civic participation. This can, for example, involve public library services, which offer not only information (books, newspapers, and so on), but also access to computers. There also need to be spaces for public gatherings with suitable facilities for, say, public debates, to ensure that the right of free assembly can be assured. As part of civic life, subsidies should also be available for certain forms of cultural expression—such as drama and music—for example towards the travel costs that such activities involve in thinly populated areas.</p><p>All these arguments, however, leave one big issue unaddressed: the availability of economic opportunities. Should public policy also try to create jobs in rural areas, to make sure that people can <i>actually</i> stay there? Interestingly, Stilz, in her discussion of occupancy rights, explicitly denies that her arguments would “extend … to a duty to subsidize others against economic and social change.”86 She bases this claim on two arguments: that “located life-plans are typically less drastically affected by economic restructuring than by territorial removal,” at least if alternative jobs are available, and that society as a whole benefits from “a market economy that affords them significant benefits—including dynamic innovation, lower consumer prices, and greater opportunities.”87</p><p>This assumption, however, seems too quick. In certain rural areas, there simply are no alternative jobs available, and it is unrealistic for people to continue to realize “located life-plans” once, say, a factory has closed down in a community. But at the same time, it is also too simple to speak of “a market economy” without asking further questions about the form that this market economy takes.88 By setting the rules of the economic game, through taxes and subsidies, but also through instruments such as anti-trust law and by providing public infrastructure (roads, railway lines, internet connections, and so on), governments can, to a certain extent, influence the character of the economic system. For example, policies can favor transnational corporations or family-owned companies, mainstream or organic farming, and so on, and this also has an impact on the kinds of jobs that are available in rural areas.89</p><p>The problem with policies of job creation—which relational egalitarians can and should endorse in principle—is more that, for one thing, it is not so clear what works, and, for another, it is hard to generalize what might work in specific regions. Attempts to “bring jobs” to rural areas through development strategies have decidedly mixed results, often incurring huge costs, yet without the desired effects.90 In some places, publicly supported tourism initiatives have offered new economic opportunities. But this is not always welcomed by locals; it means, after all, an influx of “city people” and a change in the character of the community.91 Other opportunities may come from the transition towards sustainable energy: for renewable energy projects, many investments in rural communities will be needed.92 But such policies can also introduce new inequalities between different rural communities, because some locations offer better conditions for renewable energy projects than others. Therefore, it remains a question of principle—rather than one that could conveniently be answered by finding win-win opportunities—how societies deal with those rural communities in which no new opportunities come up.</p><p>In cases in which job creation is unsuccessful, individuals will often have to rely on welfare payments. This leads to another policy question, at least for welfare regimes that make payment of public support conditional on the willingness to accept a job, as is the case in many European countries: how far do they expect individuals to commute for a job, or do they even expect them to move to a different region? Given the value of rootedness discussed above, this seems an overly harsh request. Individuals should get individualized advice and support (for example, for the costs of moving) if they <i>want</i> to leave, but if they do not, they should not be forced.</p><p>There is some hope that in the future, and after the experiences of the covid-19 lockdowns, remote work will offer new opportunities. But this is only a realistic option if there are stable and reliable high-speed internet connections. Providing these (whether through public services or by creating a market for providers and ensuring its functionality) is an important public task, not least because many forms of cultural participation rely on online formats as well, a point to which I come back below.93 At the same time, not all jobs that one can digitally access—for example, platform work—are attractive in terms of remuneration and other features (development of skills, variety of tasks, and so on).94 This is a matter of justice that society should address for many reasons, but one such reason is that these jobs might be taken on, to a great extent, by individuals in rural areas who are already disadvantaged in other respects.</p><p>A third frame for understanding the relation between citizens in urban and rural contexts concerns the mutual recognition and respect that the citizens of a country owe to each other.95 As I have described above (Section II), life in rural areas often comes with its own culture, habits, and traditions. In a context in which cities are typically seen as “progressive” and rural areas as “backward,” many commentators have called for more respect for individuals who live in the countryside. Cramer, for example, notes that “[m]any rural residents believed that city dwellers thought they were just ‘a bunch of rednecks,’”96 and emphasizes that many rural individuals feel that their voice is not being heard in the political discussions that take place in cities. Hochschild depicts the way in which public discourse and popular culture perpetuate stereotype about rural dwellers as stupid, backward, and not worthy of respect.97 Some authors explicitly exhort their readers, who they assume are mostly city-dwellers, to show more respect for fellow citizens in rural communities.98</p><p>Now, a first thing to note is that if the provision of educational opportunities, public services, and perhaps policies to create economic opportunities, as discussed above, were successfully implemented, this would probably do much to combat stereotypes and prejudices, simply because rural areas would no longer be so “backward.” The lack of respect for rural communities may have a lot to do with an assumption that individuals who live there are not economically successful, maybe combined with a meritocratic ideology that misinterprets economic success as a result of personal virtue.99 In this sense, it may not be different from misguided prejudices against other socio-economically disadvantaged groups. But perhaps it is particularly painful for members of rural communities, because, as mentioned above, hard work <i>is</i> indeed a value held by many of them, and many rural jobs do in fact require extremely hard work, but do not result in high incomes.</p><p>But even in a situation in which the <i>economic</i> dimensions of stereotypes and prejudices were absent, there might still be cultural differences; as discussed above, rural lifestyles <i>are</i> often different from urban ones and in certain regions, for example in Europe, one also finds an attachment to traditions (annual fairs, costumes in traditional styles, and so on) that is quite foreign to urbanites. Such differences, and the question of how to react to them, can be captured by applying the lens of multiculturalism.</p><p>Interestingly, respect for rural communities has, to the best of my knowledge, not been part of the debate about multiculturalism, which has long dealt with questions about mutual respect between different cultural communities.100 This is understandable from a historical perspective: rural lifestyles had once been dominant, and probably continue to be seen as a core part of the national identity in many countries (not least by rural communities themselves). It was new cultural communities of immigrants that fought for recognition. But today it seems not too far-fetched to integrate respect for rural communities into a picture of a multicultural society in which individuals with different lifestyles need to find ways of organizing their political life around a set of shared values—which John Rawls famously conceptualized as “overlapping consensus”101— all while being tolerant towards different sets of values beyond this consensus. The decision to live in a rural community (even if it is a “non-decision” in the sense that individuals stay put where their families have always lived) can, in this sense, be seen as a decision for a certain lifestyle that fellow citizens should respect. Ceteris paribus, having more rather than fewer lifestyles in a society means more choice for individuals and, as such, is to be welcomed.102</p><p>Subsuming the question of recognition and respect under a framework of multiculturalism also makes clear that serious problems of “minorities within minorities”103 can arise with regard to rural communities. What about, say, the young girl from a rural family who wants to study astrophysics rather than become a homemaker?104 What about the non-heterosexual youngster who fears being socially excluded if their sexual orientation becomes known? What about the foreign woman who follows her husband into a rural community and feels “ostracized” there?105 It seems that from a perspective of relational egalitarianism—and given the non-ideal circumstances that create these problems—these individuals are owed <i>support against their local environment</i> in order to lead an autonomous life. Here, however, one runs into a dilemma (also encountered with regard to other cultural communities): insofar as rural communities value strong social cohesion, it comes with the territory that they hold those who cannot or do not want to “fit in” in low esteem. Often, such individuals end up leaving these communities, because they can only find like-minded peers in urban areas. But this means that they are faced with a painful choice between “staying” and “leaving.”106 They might be owed special support to make this choice more bearable.</p><p>More generally speaking, the picture I am drawing here requires rural communities to accept that theirs is one lifestyle among many, not the “one and only” or “truly authentic” way of life of a society—and thus to also respect “city folk” of all backgrounds as equal fellow citizens. This may, in itself, feel like an insult to some members of rural communities, who, for example in the US, “consider their communities the heartland of America.”107 But this is nonetheless not an unfair request: it is the other side of the coin of requesting recognition for their lifestyle from urban communities, who in turn cannot claim that their lifestyle is the only one that defines the cultural character of their country. Such a mutual recognition could be understood, again, as a kind of social contract between different communities that share an “overlapping consensus” of values, but otherwise need to live with deep value disagreements.</p><p>What does this mean for policy? Like many cultural questions, it is difficult to address this issue directly through policy measures (other than reducing unequal access to education and delivering appropriate bundles of opportunities, as described above). Some measures are nonetheless possible. Public support of local and regional media can help bring the issues of rural communities into the spotlight. It can also create outlets for artistic examinations of different urban and rural lifestyles (TV series, documentaries, and so on), which can help create mutual empathy in cases in which hostile stereotypes or other epistemic blockades prevail.108</p><p>A second type of policy concerns the creation of opportunities for urban and rural communities and individuals to encounter each other and thereby to create opportunities for genuine connection and the reduction of prejudices by gaining a deeper understanding of the lifeworlds and values of others. Democratic societies might take inspiration from ancient Athens109 and think about events that can bring rural and urban communities together, for example, by offering cultural events that speak to both constituencies. It might be particularly effective to create such opportunities for young people, because it holds the potential of sowing the seeds for life-long friendships. Curren suggests that service programs for young people (including team-building, leadership training, social action projects, and so on) could be held for rural and urban youth together.110 If rural communities have good digital infrastructures, as discussed above, using online communication in order to bring individuals and communities together may be effective.111 Of course, the mere possibility of communicating on social media and other platforms does not, in itself, create empathetic discussions and mutual respect. But it can nonetheless be a tool that civic and political associations can use to integrate urban and rural members, and that can help create connections between individuals and groups that would otherwise never encounter each other.</p><p>In this survey article, I have introduced the urban–rural divide into the discussion about relation egalitarianism that asks what the citizens of a just society owe to each other. I have presented social scientific research about the differences in urban and rural lifestyles, all while emphasizing that the social reality is complex and diverse. Nonetheless, it is worth taking this geographical dimension into account in discussions about social justice, in addition to other dimensions such as race, gender, or class, with which it is intertwined in complex ways. The most important policy areas in which this dimension matters concern access to education, the provision of public services and economic opportunities, and mutual recognition of different lifestyles.</p><p>I have argued that from a relation-egalitarian perspective, great care needs to be taken to ensure that rural youth, both those who want to leave and those who want to stay, do not suffer disadvantages in terms of educational opportunities, and receive subsidies and informal support that can help compensate for the disadvantages caused by physical, but also cultural distance. With regard to public services and economic opportunities, I have discussed, but ultimately rejected, the luck-egalitarian argument that the decision to live in a rural areas is a matter of choice that could justify certain disadvantages. While urban and rural bundles of opportunities do not have to be identical, they all need to include certain basic services (for example, health care), and also opportunities for civic and cultural participation. The greatest practical challenge is that it is difficult to create jobs in certain rural areas, but this does not mean that it should not be tried. With regard to cultural recognition, policies can include support for local media, but also strategies for encouraging encounters between rural and urban communities, both online and offline.</p><p>The questions about “urban” and “rural” lifestyles, attitudes, and political behaviors have received a lot of attention because of the way in which right-wing populists have mobilized a narrative of “the people” against “the elite,” framing the latter as an urban phenomenon. But as I have shown, the problem is older and will likely remain with us in the future. There will always be more “central” and more “peripheral” communities, or more economically “progressive” and “backward” areas, even though which these are will shift over time. As long as we accept social, economic, and technological change, some areas will be faster to adapt to new developments than others, so that geographical and temporal questions will often be intertwined. Therefore, while the scope of application will change, the questions will remain. They deserve to be taken seriously as matters of justice, and to be discussed both by philosophers and by the democratic public.</p><p>I would like to thank Élise Roumas and three anonymous referees for very valuable comments and suggestions.</p><p>None relevant.</p><p>There are no potential conflicts of interest relevant to this article.</p><p>All relevant data are included in the article.</p><p>The author declares human ethics approval was not needed for this study.</p>","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"31 2","pages":"233-253"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9000,"publicationDate":"2023-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jopp.12297","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Political Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jopp.12297","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

Abstract

In the public discourse of Western democracies,1 the axis of “urban” versus “rural” has reappeared.2 Often discussed in the context of right-wing populism and its successes among rural voters, commentators have discussed the “Big Sort,”3 the contrast between “Anywheres” and “Somewheres,”4 and the lifeworlds of “hillbillies.”5 Scholars in the social sciences have attempted to understand what it feels like to live in rural places, using ethnographic methods,6 or how to understand the resentment against urbanites expressed in farmers' protests.7 In studies of electoral politics, the differences between urban and rural voting behavior have long been an issue.8 One political scientist, Jonathan A. Rodden, claims, with regard to the US, that “The Democrats, quite simply, have evolved into a diverse collection of urban interest groups, and the Republicans into an assemblage of exurban and rural interests.”9

In philosophical discussions about justice, in contrast, one finds hardly any mention of the urban–rural divide.10 Geography plays a role in discussions about global justice, but not in discussions about justice within societies. Several reasons might explain this gap (apart from a possible sociological explanation: namely, that philosophers tend to be urbanites). One is the assumption that all questions about these geographical differences can be subsumed under other dimensions of justice. For example, if rural populations are poorer, on average, this is a matter of distributive justice; if they do not have good schools, this is a matter of equality of opportunity, and so on. This argument is hard to reject if one operates at a high level of abstraction and discusses the formulation and justification of different principles of justice. However, political philosophy might also want to address issues that are closer to concrete real-life issues, whether one describes this as “non-ideal” theory11 or “problem-driven” political philosophy.12 For such approaches, it seems relevant to ask what considerations of justice might apply to the urban–rural divide that social scientists have diagnosed.

A focus on the concerns of rural communities is also sometimes coupled with nationalist tendencies, even within scholarship.14 It is understandable not to want to be associated with such voices.

Nonetheless, if political philosophy is interested in the matters that mar our societies, it seems at least worth asking whether there might be any issues of justice at all with regard to the urban–rural divide. The aim of this article is to ask what theories of justice might have to say about this topic. I take a relational-egalitarian perspective, which focuses on the relations that should hold between the citizens of a just society,15 but also discuss the applicability of some luck-egalitarian arguments.16 Overall, the article provides a survey of the various dimensions of the question: what (if anything) would a just society, whose citizens relate to each other as equals, do about the differences between urban and rural life? While the answers to concrete policy questions about the urban–rural divide have to be given within the specific contexts of different societies, or even with regard to specific regions, it is possible to identify some key issues of concern.

I first delve into the empirical literature on the urban–rural divide (Section II). Then I approach the question of justice with regard to this divide by focusing on three topics. The first concerns the distribution of educational opportunities, with a key question being how all children from rural areas can get the necessary support both for leaving and for staying (Section III). The second issue is the provision of public services and economic opportunities. Here I also discuss the luck-egalitarian objection that individuals choose the place in which they live for themselves, and are therefore themselves responsible if they have less access to certain opportunities in their region. Against this view, I argue that certain basic and civic services are owed to citizens in all regions, even if this comes at a higher cost to the public than the provision in urban areas.

The third frame concerns cultural recognition, which has some overlap with economic issues, but also raises separate questions.17 I argue that the framework of multiculturalism, which has traditionally been applied to migrant communities, can also be applied to certain differences between the lifeworlds and cultural values of urban and rural communities.18 I conclude by summarizing the policy proposals that follow from these arguments, and by briefly reflecting on the ways in which temporal and geographical considerations are intertwined when it comes to justice for individuals in “backward” regions.

Although it has recently achieved new salience in public discourse, the social realities and the imaginaries that contrast urban and rural life are anything but new. In a recent article, Charles Nathan describes how this contrast played out in ancient Athenian democracy, which encompassed not only the city of Athens, but also a rural hinterland that was “less dynamic, less commercial, less cosmopolitan and less democratic.”19 The topic of urbanites mocking their rural compatriots, who in turn fear the erosion of their way of life, already appears in ancient Greek plays.20 Visions of “the city” versus “the countryside” also played an important role in nineteenth-century nation building.21 In the 1920s and 1930s, conservative and fascist thinking had a strong anti-urban strand.22 In 1940, historian Arthur Schlesinger wrote about the growing differences in lifestyles between cities and the countryside in the US.23

As noted in the Introduction, in recent years the topic has made a comeback in public discourse and scholars have also returned to it. Reading the social scientific literature quickly makes clear, however, that one needs to beware of simple dichotomies. The size of towns and cities comes on a spectrum; even areas that are officially classified as “metropolitan” can include thinly populated regions that look and feel rather “rural.”24 The idea of “industry” having its place in urban hubs and “agriculture” in rural areas is also highly misleading. Many traditional industries have shut down their operations in Western countries; many smaller industrial companies operate in mid-size towns or in the outskirts of large metropoles; and agriculture has become industrialized and requires only small numbers of employees.25 Not all rural areas vote conservative, as the cliché would have it; in the 2016 Brexit referendum, for example, some rural areas voted “remain” even though they had a history of intense farmer protests.26 Some of the attitudes and lifestyles that one might associate with “ruralness” can also be found in post-industrial cities, with similar narratives about the loss of good jobs and a sense of being “left behind.”27

There are obviously also differences between countries. A first thing to note is the sheer difference in size, which translates into differences in distances: what counts as “far from the next city” in Belgium, for example, is far less, in kilometers or miles, than in the Mid-West of the US. Greater distances make certain problems—for example, access to educational institutions within commutable distance—more urgent. In some countries, notably the US, religious communities play a strong role in rural areas,28 whereas in Europe this holds only for specific regions. Suburbia—as the transition zone between “urban” and “rural” —is also a different phenomenon in different countries, for example with regard to access to public transport and public services, but also in its socio-economic composition. Some developments that have been particularly harmful to rural communities are specific to certain countries, such as the methamphetamine pandemic in the US.29

What, then, can one say in general about the urban–rural divide, that will allow one to think through considerations of justice at a level of reasonable generality? In contrast to densely populated urban areas, thinly populated rural areas typically differ with regard to three central, related areas: access to educational opportunities, the availability of (certain kinds of) economic opportunities, and, to some extent, the predominant culture or lifestyle. Of course, all these differences comes as tendencies, which take on different forms in different regions and their concrete conditions.

For young people in rural areas, access to higher education and to professional opportunities is often more difficult: not only are universities often in urban areas,30 informal “pathways of opportunity,” such as social networks, internships, and the cultural capital of an urban lifestyle, are also more difficult to access.31 Randall Curren argues that this threatens not only fair opportunities for rural youth with regard to professional life, but also their “civic equality” and their opportunities to develop “civic friendships” with individuals from different walks of life.32 The result can be distinctive disadvantages for children from rural areas, above and beyond other socio-economic factors, when it comes to professional success. Guilluy quotes some numbers for France: “The share of children of manual and nonmanual laborers who have become executives or middle managers varies almost by a factor of two: only 24.7 percent in Indre and Creuse, for example, but 47 percent in Paris.”33

For the US, however—where the problem is particularly urgent because of its great distances—researchers have uncovered a somewhat different picture: some small-town kids are singled out, at an early age, and are prepared by parents, teachers, and other mentors to go to college, creating high social pressure on them to leave their communities.34 These children are often from families of higher socio-economic status, or who are seen as more “deserving” than other families, and they receive far more attention and support than other children.35 Few of those who go to college (whom Maria J. Kefalas and Parick J. Carr, based on an extended ethnographic study in Iowa, describe as “achievers”)36 later return. Young people with lower grades and less support can often leave only by enlisting in the army, and their likelihood of returning is higher.37

This situation also has to do with the second factor: the lack of availability of jobs, especially for college-educated individuals, in many rural areas—a problem not only in the US,38 but also elsewhere. In today's economies, well-paid jobs in the tertiary sector, especially knowledge-based jobs that require high levels of formal education,39 tend to cluster in bigger cities.40 In urban areas, companies benefit from a critical mass of employees, who in turn are attracted to these urban hubs because of the opportunities in terms of jobs, but also in terms of lifestyle: the choice of restaurants, a rich cultural scene, opportunities for civic engagement, and so on. When young people from rural areas are used to an urban lifestyle, returning to their home region would mean giving up many of these economic, civic, and cultural opportunities.41 As Curren puts it with regard to the US, “For the residents of small rural towns of the ‘Heartland,’ upward mobility is now barely distinguishable from geographic mobility.”42

The resulting “brain drain” contributes to “depleting rural states of talent and tax dollars”;43 it also means a shrinking pool of people who can take on civic and political leadership roles and act as role models for local children. It has an emotional dimension, too, often leading to estrangement between family members and circles of friends. Leavers might come to see their home towns “the way outsiders do: parochial and just a little redneck.”44

This leads to a third difference, namely one of culture or lifestyle. One key dimension here is diversity, or the lack of it. More densely populated areas typically bring together more diverse individuals, whether it is in terms of ethnic background, sexual orientation, or worldviews, whereas in rural areas there is often less exposure to such diversity45 (although rural areas with seizable minority populations do also exist).46 This fact is often cited as an explanation for a pattern that is quite stable across countries, namely that rural areas—often together with post-industrial towns—show more conservative voting behaviors than metropolitan areas. The US shows a clear statistical correlation between population density and Democratic voting at various levels of the political system.47

The flipside of the lack of diversity, in many (though not all) rural areas, is what one might call a “lifestyle of familiarity,” with people knowing and supporting each other. As Kefalas and Carr put it, “Small-town people rejoice in the fact that if you get in trouble, your neighbors will close ranks and reach out with aid.”48 Wuthnow's account similarly emphasizes the self-understanding of rural communities as “moral communities” in which “people feel an obligation to one another and to uphold the local ways of being.”49 He points out that there are more voluntary associations in smaller communities than in larger ones,50 but also emphasizes that these communities are, to a large extent, “imagined.”51 The inhabitants of small towns see no need to lock their doors, and kids can roam unsupervised, because everyone knows everyone, or at least this is what it feels like.52 In addition, a strong emphasis is put on hard work and perserverance, and community members admire those among their fellow citizens who have a strong work ethic.53

Cramer shows that the claim of unfair treatment, when translated into taxation and public support for different constituencies, is incorrect, but she argues that the costs for maintaining infrastructure and public services in rural communities are often higher, which may justify the perception of disadvantage.56

It is helpful here to draw a distinction between those rural communities which, although disadvantaged in certain ways, are stable for the foreseeable future, and those that are not.57 To be sure, in terms of long-term population trends, rural areas are thinning out; for example, as Wuthnow reports, the percentage of the US population living in rural areas shifted from 95 percent in 1810, to 55 percent in 1910, to 20 percent in 2010.58 The global trend is towards urbanization, with 55 percent of the world population already living in cities in 2017.59 But population dynamics are not the same everywhere.60 Some rural areas have enough local jobs and fruitful relations with larger conglomerations to remain stable. Others, however, see jobs moving away and populations shrinking. If too many young people leave for good, fewer children are born, which can lead to the closure of local schools, a painful symbol of decline.61 In other words, for some communities, there seems to be no way to maintain civic and economic viability in the long run, and their inhabitants may feel “the almost inexpressible concern that their way of life is eroding, shifting imperceptibly under their feet, and being discredited and attacked from the outside.”62

How, then, should a society guided by an ideal of relational equality react to such differences? In the next sections, I discuss how relational egalitarians can approach the issues of access to education, availability of public services and economic opportunities, and cultural difference.

A first area of justice concerns children growing up in rural areas and their opportunities to access education. Children have not chosen to grow up in rural areas; relational egalitarians and those with luck egalitarian intuitions—to which I come back below—can agree that they should not suffer disadvantages caused by unchosen circumstances. As described above, accessing higher education typically means that these young people must leave their home regions, which carries a high cost in terms of being separated from family and friends, and having to learn new social and cultural codes that may estrange them from their previous lives.63 At the same time, it is clear that from a perspective of equal opportunity, they need to be given the chance to leave; their chances to access leadership roles in all areas of society must not be systematically lower than those of children from urban areas.64 This means that they need to have access to additional financial support—even compared to disadvantaged children in urban areas—for living away from their families in order to attend educational institutions or realize opportunities such as internships.

Importantly, the necessary formal (for example, stipends) and informal (for example, mentorship and peer mentoring) support needs to be offered to all children who show an interest in leaving a rural community, instead of focusing such efforts disproportionately on some high-achieving “good treasures” that a community picks based on family backgrounds.65 At the same time, those who want to stay in, or close to, their home region also need to receive adequate support, for example by matching local educational offers to local economic opportunities, in renewable energy projects, for instance. As Kefalas and Carr emphasize, local policies should not only try to get a few “achievers” to return, but should also focus on “boomerang” types who want to return or “stayers” who never leave.66

To better do justice to all children, two additional directions for educational policy are worth considering. The first is to focus not only on education for young people, but also on opportunities for (re-)training and education throughout the course of one's life. This is particularly relevant for young people in rural areas who decide to leave school and take on full-time jobs at an early age, but then realize that they are stuck at the same low wage level for years to come.67 The second—which can be related to the first—is to not think about “education” exclusively in a theoretical, “academic” sense. The experiences of countries (for example, Germany and Switzerland) with vocational tracks show that these can offer good financial prospects and fulfilling jobs in practical fields.68 This may be particularly relevant for rural areas in which there are more job opportunities for individuals with such skills. But, of course, this must not lead to a new kind of segregation in which rural children are automatically channeled towards vocational rather than academic training.

Lastly, a specifically US problem is worth briefly mentioning: the high percentage of school funding that comes from local tax revenue. This obviously creates challenges for poor school districts—in the city and the country—and can be particularly challenging for rural areas with declining populations.69 It is all the more problematic given that, as described above, the most talented and energetic children from rural areas often end up in metropoles, which benefit from their influx. From a perspective of educational justice, education should be funded on the national level, with adequate provisions to compensate for disadvantages of along various lines, including the disadvantages that come from living at great distance from institutions of higher education and other educational opportunities.

A second set of questions of justice, and ensuing policy questions, turns around the provision of public services and economic opportunities, whether in the form of individualized or collective provision. This leads to the question of where individuals are owed certain things: can they claim them wherever they live, or could they justifiably only be provided in certain locations, with individuals themselves being responsible for getting them there? A resource-based approach, understood in purely financial terms, can avoid this problem: from this perspective, one can simply provide financial means to individuals and leave it to themselves where they use them. When translating these resources into opportunities, it is up to individuals how they manage the geographies of their lives. If certain things are more expensive for those living in rural areas, for example because they face higher travel costs, they can decide to move elsewhere—or so this argument would go.

This line of reasoning presents a luck-egalitarian intuition that many individuals might have about the urban–rural divide, and that might amount to an objection to relational-egalitarian approaches: aren't grown-up individuals responsible for their own choices, including the choice of staying put in a rural area?70 From this perspective, one might describe the decision to live in a certain region as a matter of choosing one value—rootedness, as one might call it—over other values.71 And if this comes at a cost in terms of less access to certain public services and fewer economic opportunities, is that really a problem? If someone can enjoy stunningly beautiful nature in a remote area, they may not need a public library nearby, and they should accept a somewhat longer drive to get to a hospital. It would, after all, be extremely costly for societies to try to provide the same level of public services in remote, thinly populated areas as in metropoles—or so this argument goes.

But from a relational-egalitarian perspective, this conclusion is too quick, even if one assumes that individual choice can play some role in the distribution of goods and services. A first thing to note is that rootedness is, in many cases, not just an “expensive taste,” but a matter of social connections and attachments to an area that shapes people's whole lives.72 With regard to international migration, theorists have argued for a “right to stay”73 or a “right to occupancy.”74 Kieran Oberman argues that such a right is grounded in three types of arguments: freedom of movement (which must also include the freedom not to move), “cultural membership,” and “territorial attachment.”75 Similarly, Anna Stilz uses the notion of “located life-plans” to describe the ways in which people's fundamental projects can be tied to certain localities in which they live together with others and participate in various economic, social, and cultural practices.76

Now, these discussions concern international migration and questions of violent removal, in which the loss that individuals suffer when they are forced to leave, and also the costs of “mastering a new social organization and cultural environment,”77 are much greater. Nonetheless, the argument that rootedness can be a core commitment can also apply to different regions within a country. For example, individuals may have local family businesses—for example, farms—that they feel obliged to continue.78 Hochschild describes numerous cases of individuals who do not want to leave their communities, even though there are no good jobs and the environment suffers from massive industrial pollution that also creates health risks.79 Sometimes individuals try to leave, but realize that they feel too homesick and lonely, and therefore return.80

Thus, the importance of rootedness for many people's lives suggests that treating it as a mere “expensive taste” that would justify certain disadvantages does not do justice to the way in which it is connected to other central elements of people's lifeplans, especially the connection to certain communities. A second argument also pushes against the luck-egalitarian intuition. For individual choice to justify disadvantage, the choice needs to be made from a fairly structured set of options.81 The bundles of options that come with an “urban” and a “rural” lifestyle may have some differences (for example, anonymity versus familiarity, enjoyment of nature versus cultural diversity, and so on), but they must not diverge so much from each other that those who may end up opting for a rural lifestyle are disadvantaged by this very fact.82 Whether or not this is the case differs with regard to different rural areas, across countries, but also within them. In long-term stable rural areas with a just provision of public services—on which I say more below—it may well be justifiable that certain kinds of high-paying jobs are not locally available and that the choice of restaurants is limited. But in many declining areas, in which the provision of public services is often inadequate, the set of opportunities cannot be described as fairly structured.

What, then, are the public services that need to be provided to all rural areas? Some services are non-negotiable from a relational-egalitarian perspective, even if the costs for society are high. Just as we have a moral obligation to offer medical help to a reckless motorcyclist who has a self-inflicted accident,83 we have a moral obligation to offer medical services to fellow citizens who decide to live in very remote areas. Unless very extraordinary circumstances hold, basic life-sustaining services need to be offered, even if the costs are considerable (for example, helicopter services to take patients to hospital in health emergencies). Rurual residents also need access to regular health checks84 and help for mental health issues.85

Beyond that, from a liberal-egalitarian perspective, individuals in rural areas also require services that secure at least a minimum of civic participation. This can, for example, involve public library services, which offer not only information (books, newspapers, and so on), but also access to computers. There also need to be spaces for public gatherings with suitable facilities for, say, public debates, to ensure that the right of free assembly can be assured. As part of civic life, subsidies should also be available for certain forms of cultural expression—such as drama and music—for example towards the travel costs that such activities involve in thinly populated areas.

All these arguments, however, leave one big issue unaddressed: the availability of economic opportunities. Should public policy also try to create jobs in rural areas, to make sure that people can actually stay there? Interestingly, Stilz, in her discussion of occupancy rights, explicitly denies that her arguments would “extend … to a duty to subsidize others against economic and social change.”86 She bases this claim on two arguments: that “located life-plans are typically less drastically affected by economic restructuring than by territorial removal,” at least if alternative jobs are available, and that society as a whole benefits from “a market economy that affords them significant benefits—including dynamic innovation, lower consumer prices, and greater opportunities.”87

This assumption, however, seems too quick. In certain rural areas, there simply are no alternative jobs available, and it is unrealistic for people to continue to realize “located life-plans” once, say, a factory has closed down in a community. But at the same time, it is also too simple to speak of “a market economy” without asking further questions about the form that this market economy takes.88 By setting the rules of the economic game, through taxes and subsidies, but also through instruments such as anti-trust law and by providing public infrastructure (roads, railway lines, internet connections, and so on), governments can, to a certain extent, influence the character of the economic system. For example, policies can favor transnational corporations or family-owned companies, mainstream or organic farming, and so on, and this also has an impact on the kinds of jobs that are available in rural areas.89

The problem with policies of job creation—which relational egalitarians can and should endorse in principle—is more that, for one thing, it is not so clear what works, and, for another, it is hard to generalize what might work in specific regions. Attempts to “bring jobs” to rural areas through development strategies have decidedly mixed results, often incurring huge costs, yet without the desired effects.90 In some places, publicly supported tourism initiatives have offered new economic opportunities. But this is not always welcomed by locals; it means, after all, an influx of “city people” and a change in the character of the community.91 Other opportunities may come from the transition towards sustainable energy: for renewable energy projects, many investments in rural communities will be needed.92 But such policies can also introduce new inequalities between different rural communities, because some locations offer better conditions for renewable energy projects than others. Therefore, it remains a question of principle—rather than one that could conveniently be answered by finding win-win opportunities—how societies deal with those rural communities in which no new opportunities come up.

In cases in which job creation is unsuccessful, individuals will often have to rely on welfare payments. This leads to another policy question, at least for welfare regimes that make payment of public support conditional on the willingness to accept a job, as is the case in many European countries: how far do they expect individuals to commute for a job, or do they even expect them to move to a different region? Given the value of rootedness discussed above, this seems an overly harsh request. Individuals should get individualized advice and support (for example, for the costs of moving) if they want to leave, but if they do not, they should not be forced.

There is some hope that in the future, and after the experiences of the covid-19 lockdowns, remote work will offer new opportunities. But this is only a realistic option if there are stable and reliable high-speed internet connections. Providing these (whether through public services or by creating a market for providers and ensuring its functionality) is an important public task, not least because many forms of cultural participation rely on online formats as well, a point to which I come back below.93 At the same time, not all jobs that one can digitally access—for example, platform work—are attractive in terms of remuneration and other features (development of skills, variety of tasks, and so on).94 This is a matter of justice that society should address for many reasons, but one such reason is that these jobs might be taken on, to a great extent, by individuals in rural areas who are already disadvantaged in other respects.

A third frame for understanding the relation between citizens in urban and rural contexts concerns the mutual recognition and respect that the citizens of a country owe to each other.95 As I have described above (Section II), life in rural areas often comes with its own culture, habits, and traditions. In a context in which cities are typically seen as “progressive” and rural areas as “backward,” many commentators have called for more respect for individuals who live in the countryside. Cramer, for example, notes that “[m]any rural residents believed that city dwellers thought they were just ‘a bunch of rednecks,’”96 and emphasizes that many rural individuals feel that their voice is not being heard in the political discussions that take place in cities. Hochschild depicts the way in which public discourse and popular culture perpetuate stereotype about rural dwellers as stupid, backward, and not worthy of respect.97 Some authors explicitly exhort their readers, who they assume are mostly city-dwellers, to show more respect for fellow citizens in rural communities.98

Now, a first thing to note is that if the provision of educational opportunities, public services, and perhaps policies to create economic opportunities, as discussed above, were successfully implemented, this would probably do much to combat stereotypes and prejudices, simply because rural areas would no longer be so “backward.” The lack of respect for rural communities may have a lot to do with an assumption that individuals who live there are not economically successful, maybe combined with a meritocratic ideology that misinterprets economic success as a result of personal virtue.99 In this sense, it may not be different from misguided prejudices against other socio-economically disadvantaged groups. But perhaps it is particularly painful for members of rural communities, because, as mentioned above, hard work is indeed a value held by many of them, and many rural jobs do in fact require extremely hard work, but do not result in high incomes.

But even in a situation in which the economic dimensions of stereotypes and prejudices were absent, there might still be cultural differences; as discussed above, rural lifestyles are often different from urban ones and in certain regions, for example in Europe, one also finds an attachment to traditions (annual fairs, costumes in traditional styles, and so on) that is quite foreign to urbanites. Such differences, and the question of how to react to them, can be captured by applying the lens of multiculturalism.

Interestingly, respect for rural communities has, to the best of my knowledge, not been part of the debate about multiculturalism, which has long dealt with questions about mutual respect between different cultural communities.100 This is understandable from a historical perspective: rural lifestyles had once been dominant, and probably continue to be seen as a core part of the national identity in many countries (not least by rural communities themselves). It was new cultural communities of immigrants that fought for recognition. But today it seems not too far-fetched to integrate respect for rural communities into a picture of a multicultural society in which individuals with different lifestyles need to find ways of organizing their political life around a set of shared values—which John Rawls famously conceptualized as “overlapping consensus”101— all while being tolerant towards different sets of values beyond this consensus. The decision to live in a rural community (even if it is a “non-decision” in the sense that individuals stay put where their families have always lived) can, in this sense, be seen as a decision for a certain lifestyle that fellow citizens should respect. Ceteris paribus, having more rather than fewer lifestyles in a society means more choice for individuals and, as such, is to be welcomed.102

Subsuming the question of recognition and respect under a framework of multiculturalism also makes clear that serious problems of “minorities within minorities”103 can arise with regard to rural communities. What about, say, the young girl from a rural family who wants to study astrophysics rather than become a homemaker?104 What about the non-heterosexual youngster who fears being socially excluded if their sexual orientation becomes known? What about the foreign woman who follows her husband into a rural community and feels “ostracized” there?105 It seems that from a perspective of relational egalitarianism—and given the non-ideal circumstances that create these problems—these individuals are owed support against their local environment in order to lead an autonomous life. Here, however, one runs into a dilemma (also encountered with regard to other cultural communities): insofar as rural communities value strong social cohesion, it comes with the territory that they hold those who cannot or do not want to “fit in” in low esteem. Often, such individuals end up leaving these communities, because they can only find like-minded peers in urban areas. But this means that they are faced with a painful choice between “staying” and “leaving.”106 They might be owed special support to make this choice more bearable.

More generally speaking, the picture I am drawing here requires rural communities to accept that theirs is one lifestyle among many, not the “one and only” or “truly authentic” way of life of a society—and thus to also respect “city folk” of all backgrounds as equal fellow citizens. This may, in itself, feel like an insult to some members of rural communities, who, for example in the US, “consider their communities the heartland of America.”107 But this is nonetheless not an unfair request: it is the other side of the coin of requesting recognition for their lifestyle from urban communities, who in turn cannot claim that their lifestyle is the only one that defines the cultural character of their country. Such a mutual recognition could be understood, again, as a kind of social contract between different communities that share an “overlapping consensus” of values, but otherwise need to live with deep value disagreements.

What does this mean for policy? Like many cultural questions, it is difficult to address this issue directly through policy measures (other than reducing unequal access to education and delivering appropriate bundles of opportunities, as described above). Some measures are nonetheless possible. Public support of local and regional media can help bring the issues of rural communities into the spotlight. It can also create outlets for artistic examinations of different urban and rural lifestyles (TV series, documentaries, and so on), which can help create mutual empathy in cases in which hostile stereotypes or other epistemic blockades prevail.108

A second type of policy concerns the creation of opportunities for urban and rural communities and individuals to encounter each other and thereby to create opportunities for genuine connection and the reduction of prejudices by gaining a deeper understanding of the lifeworlds and values of others. Democratic societies might take inspiration from ancient Athens109 and think about events that can bring rural and urban communities together, for example, by offering cultural events that speak to both constituencies. It might be particularly effective to create such opportunities for young people, because it holds the potential of sowing the seeds for life-long friendships. Curren suggests that service programs for young people (including team-building, leadership training, social action projects, and so on) could be held for rural and urban youth together.110 If rural communities have good digital infrastructures, as discussed above, using online communication in order to bring individuals and communities together may be effective.111 Of course, the mere possibility of communicating on social media and other platforms does not, in itself, create empathetic discussions and mutual respect. But it can nonetheless be a tool that civic and political associations can use to integrate urban and rural members, and that can help create connections between individuals and groups that would otherwise never encounter each other.

In this survey article, I have introduced the urban–rural divide into the discussion about relation egalitarianism that asks what the citizens of a just society owe to each other. I have presented social scientific research about the differences in urban and rural lifestyles, all while emphasizing that the social reality is complex and diverse. Nonetheless, it is worth taking this geographical dimension into account in discussions about social justice, in addition to other dimensions such as race, gender, or class, with which it is intertwined in complex ways. The most important policy areas in which this dimension matters concern access to education, the provision of public services and economic opportunities, and mutual recognition of different lifestyles.

I have argued that from a relation-egalitarian perspective, great care needs to be taken to ensure that rural youth, both those who want to leave and those who want to stay, do not suffer disadvantages in terms of educational opportunities, and receive subsidies and informal support that can help compensate for the disadvantages caused by physical, but also cultural distance. With regard to public services and economic opportunities, I have discussed, but ultimately rejected, the luck-egalitarian argument that the decision to live in a rural areas is a matter of choice that could justify certain disadvantages. While urban and rural bundles of opportunities do not have to be identical, they all need to include certain basic services (for example, health care), and also opportunities for civic and cultural participation. The greatest practical challenge is that it is difficult to create jobs in certain rural areas, but this does not mean that it should not be tried. With regard to cultural recognition, policies can include support for local media, but also strategies for encouraging encounters between rural and urban communities, both online and offline.

The questions about “urban” and “rural” lifestyles, attitudes, and political behaviors have received a lot of attention because of the way in which right-wing populists have mobilized a narrative of “the people” against “the elite,” framing the latter as an urban phenomenon. But as I have shown, the problem is older and will likely remain with us in the future. There will always be more “central” and more “peripheral” communities, or more economically “progressive” and “backward” areas, even though which these are will shift over time. As long as we accept social, economic, and technological change, some areas will be faster to adapt to new developments than others, so that geographical and temporal questions will often be intertwined. Therefore, while the scope of application will change, the questions will remain. They deserve to be taken seriously as matters of justice, and to be discussed both by philosophers and by the democratic public.

I would like to thank Élise Roumas and three anonymous referees for very valuable comments and suggestions.

None relevant.

There are no potential conflicts of interest relevant to this article.

All relevant data are included in the article.

The author declares human ethics approval was not needed for this study.

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城乡司法
在西方民主国家的公共话语中,1“城市”与“农村”的轴心再次出现。2评论员经常在右翼民粹主义及其在农村选民中的成功的背景下讨论,他们讨论了“大类”,3“任何地方”与“有点地方”之间的对比,4以及“乡巴佬”的生活世界。“5社会科学学者试图通过民族志方法来理解生活在农村的感觉,6或者如何理解农民抗议活动中表达的对城市居民的不满。7在选举政治研究中,城市和农村投票行为之间的差异长期以来一直是一个问题。8一位政治学家Jonathan A.Rodden声称,关于美国,“很简单,民主党已经演变成了城市利益集团的多元化集合,而共和党则演变成了远郊和农村利益的集合。”9相比之下,在关于正义的哲学讨论中,人们几乎没有提到城市和农村的分歧。10地理在关于全球正义的讨论中发挥着作用,但在社会内部关于正义的讨论中却没有。有几个原因可以解释这种差距(除了一个可能的社会学解释:即哲学家往往是城市人)。一种假设是,所有关于这些地理差异的问题都可以纳入正义的其他层面。例如,如果农村人口平均更穷,这是一个分配公平的问题;如果他们没有好的学校,这是一个机会平等的问题,等等。如果一个人在高度抽象的层面上运作,并讨论不同正义原则的制定和理由,这种论点很难被拒绝。然而,政治哲学也可能希望解决更接近具体现实问题的问题,无论是将其描述为“非理想”理论11还是“问题驱动”的政治哲学。12对于这种方法,似乎有必要问一问社会科学家诊断出的城乡分歧可能适用于什么样的正义考虑。关注农村社区的关切有时也会伴随着民族主义倾向,即使在学校内部也是如此。14不想与这种声音联系在一起是可以理解的。尽管如此,如果政治哲学对破坏我们社会的问题感兴趣,那么至少值得一问的是,在城乡鸿沟方面是否存在任何正义问题。本文的目的是询问正义理论对这个话题可能有什么看法。我从关系平等主义的角度出发,重点关注一个公正社会的公民之间应该保持的关系,15但也讨论了一些运气平等主义论点的适用性。16总的来说,这篇文章对这个问题的各个方面进行了调查:一个公正的社会(如果有的话)会是什么,城市和农村生活之间的差异怎么办?虽然必须在不同社会的具体背景下,甚至在特定地区,对有关城乡差距的具体政策问题给出答案,但有可能确定一些令人关切的关键问题。我首先深入研究了关于城乡差距的实证文献(第二节)。然后,我通过集中讨论三个主题来处理关于这一分歧的正义问题。第一个问题涉及教育机会的分配,一个关键问题是所有来自农村地区的儿童如何在离开和留下时都能获得必要的支持(第三节)。第二个问题是提供公共服务和经济机会。在这里,我还讨论了运气平等主义者的反对意见,即个人为自己选择生活的地方,因此,如果他们在自己的地区获得某些机会的机会较少,他们自己也要负责。我反对这种观点,认为所有地区的公民都应获得某些基本和公民服务,即使这对公众的成本高于城市地区的成本。第三个框架涉及文化承认,这与经济问题有一些重叠,但也提出了不同的问题。17我认为,传统上适用于移民社区的多元文化主义框架,18最后,我总结了这些论点提出的政策建议,并简要反思了在为“落后”地区的个人伸张正义时,时间和地理因素是如何交织在一起的。尽管它最近在公共话语中获得了新的突出地位,但对比城市和农村生活的社会现实和想象绝非新鲜事。 34这些孩子通常来自社会经济地位较高的家庭,或者被认为比其他家庭更“值得”,他们比其他孩子得到更多的关注和支持。35上大学的人中很少有人(Maria J.Kefalas和Parick J.Carr根据爱荷华州的一项扩展民族志研究,将他们描述为“成功者”)36后来回来。成绩较低、支持较少的年轻人通常只能参军才能离开,而且他们回国的可能性更高。37这种情况还与第二个因素有关:在许多农村地区,缺乏工作,尤其是受过大学教育的人,这不仅在美国是一个问题,38在其他地方也是一个问题。在当今的经济体中,第三产业的高薪工作,特别是需要高水平正规教育的知识型工作,39往往集中在更大的城市,丰富的文化场景、公民参与的机会等等。当来自农村地区的年轻人习惯了城市生活方式时,回到家乡意味着放弃许多经济、公民和文化机会。41正如Curren在谈到美国时所说,“对于‘心脏地带’农村小镇的居民来说,向上流动性现在几乎无法与地理流动性区分开来。”42由此产生的“人才外流”导致了“农村人才和税收的枯竭”;43这也意味着能够承担公民和政治领导角色并成为当地儿童榜样的人数正在减少。它也有情感层面,经常导致家庭成员和朋友圈之间的隔阂。离职者可能会“像外人一样看待自己的家乡:狭隘而有点乡巴佬。”44这导致了第三种差异,即文化或生活方式的差异。这里的一个关键方面是多样性,或者说缺乏多样性。人口更稠密的地区通常会聚集更多不同的个人,无论是种族背景、性取向还是世界观,而在农村地区,这种多样性的暴露往往较少45(尽管也存在少数民族人口可被占领的农村地区)。46这一事实经常被用来解释一种在各国都相当稳定的模式,即农村地区——通常与后工业城镇一起——比大都市地区表现出更保守的投票行为。美国显示,人口密度与政治体系各个层面的民主党投票之间存在明显的统计相关性。47在许多(尽管不是所有)农村地区,缺乏多样性的另一面是人们可以称之为“熟悉的生活方式”,人们相互了解和支持。正如Kefalas和Carr所说,“如果你遇到麻烦,你的邻居会团结起来并伸出援助之手,小镇上的人们会为此感到高兴。”48 Wuthnow的描述同样强调了农村社区作为“道德社区”的自我理解,在这种社区中,“人们感到有义务相互帮助,维护当地的生活方式。”。“49他指出,小社区的自愿协会比大社区多,50但他也强调,这些社区在很大程度上是“想象中的”。51小城镇的居民认为没有必要锁门,孩子们可以在无人监督的情况下漫游,因为每个人都认识每个人,或者至少这是感觉。52此外,强烈强调努力工作和毅力,社区成员钦佩那些有强烈工作道德的同胞。53框架表明,不公平待遇的说法,当转化为税收和公众对不同选区的支持时,是不正确的,但她认为,维护农村社区基础设施和公共服务的成本往往更高,这可能证明了人们对不利的看法是合理的。56在这里,区分那些尽管在某些方面处于不利地位,但在可预见的未来是稳定的农村社区和那些不处于不利地位的农村社区是有帮助的,就长期人口趋势而言,农村地区人口正在减少;例如,正如Wuthnow报道的那样,美国农村人口的比例从1810年的95%,到1910年的55%,再到2010年的20%。58全球趋势是城市化,2017年,世界55%的人口已经生活在城市中。59但并非每个地方的人口动态都是一样的。60一些农村地区有足够的当地就业机会,与更大的集团有着富有成效的关系,可以保持稳定。然而,其他人则认为工作岗位在流失,人口在减少。 如果太多的年轻人永远离开,出生的孩子就会减少,这可能导致当地学校关闭,这是衰落的痛苦象征。61换句话说,对一些社区来说,从长远来看,似乎没有办法保持公民和经济的生存能力,他们的居民可能会感到“几乎无法表达的担忧,即他们的生活方式正在被侵蚀,在他们脚下不知不觉地发生变化,并受到外界的诋毁和攻击。”62那么,一个以关系平等理想为指导的社会应该如何应对这种差异呢?在接下来的章节中,我将讨论关系平等主义者如何处理教育机会、公共服务和经济机会的可用性以及文化差异等问题。司法的第一个领域涉及在农村地区长大的儿童及其接受教育的机会。儿童没有选择在农村地区长大;关系平等主义者和那些有运气的平等主义直觉的人——我在下面回到这一点——可以同意他们不应该因为未经选择的环境而遭受不利。如上所述,接受高等教育通常意味着这些年轻人必须离开自己的家乡,这会带来与家人和朋友分离的高昂成本,并且必须学习新的社会和文化准则,这可能会使他们与以前的生活产生隔阂。63同时,很明显,从机会平等的角度来看,他们需要有机会离开;他们在社会各个领域发挥领导作用的机会决不能系统地低于城市地区的儿童。64这意味着,他们需要获得额外的经济支持——即使与城市地区的弱势儿童相比也是如此——远离家人生活,以便上学或获得实习等机会。重要的是,需要向所有有兴趣离开农村社区的儿童提供必要的正式(例如津贴)和非正式(例如导师制和同伴辅导)支持,而不是将这些努力过度集中在社区根据家庭背景挑选的一些高成就的“好宝贝”上。65与此同时,那些想留在或靠近家乡的人也需要得到足够的支持,例如,在可再生能源项目中,通过将当地的教育机会与当地的经济机会相匹配。正如Kefalas和Carr强调的那样,地方政策不仅应该努力让少数“成功者”回归,还应该关注那些想要回归的“回旋镖”类型或从未离开的“留守者”。66为了更好地公平对待所有儿童,教育政策的两个额外方向值得考虑。第一,不仅要关注年轻人的教育,还要关注一个人一生中接受(再)培训和教育的机会。这对农村地区的年轻人来说尤其重要,他们在很小的时候就决定离开学校,从事全职工作,但后来意识到自己在未来几年里一直处于同样的低工资水平。拥有职业轨道的国家(例如德国和瑞士)的经验表明,这些国家可以在实际领域提供良好的财务前景和令人满意的工作。但是,当然,这决不能导致一种新的隔离,即农村儿童自动接受职业培训,而不是学术培训。最后,一个特别值得一提的美国问题是:学校资金中来自地方税收的比例很高。这显然给城市和国家的贫困学区带来了挑战,对人口下降的农村地区尤其具有挑战性。从教育公正的角度来看,教育应该在国家一级得到资助,并有足够的资金来弥补各种不利因素,包括生活在远离高等教育机构和其他教育机会的地方所带来的不利因素。第二组正义问题,以及随之而来的政策问题,围绕着公共服务和经济机会的提供,无论是以个人提供还是集体提供的形式。 这就引出了一个问题,即个人在哪里应该得到某些东西:他们能在自己居住的任何地方领取这些东西吗?或者他们只能在某些地方得到这些东西,个人自己负责把它们送到那里吗?纯粹从财务角度理解的基于资源的方法可以避免这个问题:从这个角度来看,人们可以简单地向个人提供财务手段,并将其留给他们自己使用。当将这些资源转化为机会时,取决于个人如何管理他们生活中的地理位置。如果某些东西对生活在农村地区的人来说更贵,例如因为他们面临更高的旅行成本,他们可以决定搬到其他地方——或者这种说法会成立。这条推理线呈现了一种幸运的平等主义直觉,许多人可能对城市和农村的鸿沟有这种直觉,这可能相当于对关系平等主义方法的反对:成年的个人难道不对自己的选择负责吗,包括留在农村地区的选择吗?70从这个角度来看,人们可以将居住在某个地区的决定描述为选择一种价值观——人们可以称之为扎根性——而不是其他价值观。71如果这是以获得某些公共服务的机会减少和经济机会减少为代价的,那真的是个问题吗?如果有人能在偏远地区享受令人惊叹的美丽自然,他们可能不需要附近的公共图书馆,他们应该接受更长的车程去医院。毕竟,对于社会来说,试图在偏远、人口稀少的地区提供与大都市相同水平的公共服务将是极其昂贵的——或者这一论点是如此。但从关系平等主义的角度来看,这个结论太快了,即使人们认为个人选择可以在商品和服务的分配中发挥一定作用。首先需要注意的是,在许多情况下,扎根不仅仅是一种“昂贵的品味”,而是一种社会联系和对一个影响人们整个生活的领域的依恋。72关于国际移民,理论家们主张“居留权”73或“居住权”。“74 Kieran Oberman认为,这种权利基于三种类型的论点:迁徙自由(也必须包括不迁徙的自由)、“文化成员资格”和“领土依恋”。75同样,Anna Stilz使用“定位生活计划”的概念来描述人们的基本项目如何与他们与他人共同生活并参与各种经济、社会和文化实践的某些地方联系在一起。76现在,这些讨论涉及国际移民和暴力迁移问题,其中,个人被迫离开时所遭受的损失,以及“掌握新的社会组织和文化环境”的成本,77要大得多。尽管如此,扎根可以成为核心承诺的论点也适用于一个国家的不同地区。例如,个人可能有当地的家族企业,例如农场,他们觉得有义务继续经营下去。78霍克希尔德描述了许多个人不想离开自己的社区的案例,尽管没有好的工作,环境也受到巨大的工业污染,这也会造成健康风险。79有时个人试图离开,但要意识到他们感到太想家和孤独,因此又回来了。80因此,扎根对许多人生活的重要性表明,将其视为一种纯粹的“昂贵的品味”来证明某些缺点是合理的,这与它与人们生活计划的其他核心元素的联系方式,尤其是与某些社区的联系方式并不公平。第二个论点也反对运气平等主义的直觉。对于证明劣势的个人选择,需要从一组结构合理的选项中做出选择。81“城市”和“农村”生活方式带来的一系列选项可能存在一些差异(例如,匿名与熟悉、享受自然与文化多样性等),但他们之间的分歧不能太大,以至于那些最终可能选择农村生活方式的人因这一事实而处于不利地位。在长期稳定、公共服务公正的农村地区——我将在下文中对此进行详细介绍——当地没有某些高薪工作,餐馆的选择也很有限,这可能是合理的。但在许多公共服务提供往往不足的衰退地区,这一系列机会不能被描述为结构合理。 那么,需要向所有农村地区提供哪些公共服务?从关系平等主义的角度来看,有些服务是不可谈判的,即使社会成本很高。正如我们有道德义务为一名鲁莽的摩托车手提供医疗帮助一样,83我们也有道德义务向决定生活在偏远地区的同胞提供医疗服务。除非出现非常特殊的情况,否则需要提供基本的维持生命的服务,即使费用很高(例如,在卫生紧急情况下用直升机将患者送往医院)。农村居民还需要定期进行健康检查84,并在心理健康问题上提供帮助。85除此之外,从自由平等主义的角度来看,农村地区的个人还需要至少确保公民参与的服务。例如,这可能涉及公共图书馆服务,这些服务不仅提供信息(书籍、报纸等),还提供计算机访问。还需要为公众集会提供空间,并提供适当的公共辩论设施,以确保自由集会的权利得到保障。作为公民生活的一部分,还应为某些形式的文化表达提供补贴,如戏剧和音乐,例如在人口稀少的地区进行此类活动所需的旅行费用。然而,所有这些争论都留下了一个悬而未决的大问题:经济机会的可用性。公共政策是否也应该努力在农村地区创造就业机会,以确保人们能够真正留在那里?有趣的是,Stilz在讨论居住权时明确否认她的论点会“延伸到……补贴他人应对经济和社会变革的义务。”,社会作为一个整体受益于“市场经济为他们提供了巨大的利益——包括动态创新、更低的消费价格和更大的机会。”87然而,这种假设似乎太快了。在某些农村地区,根本没有其他工作可供选择,一旦一个社区的工厂倒闭,人们继续实现“定位生活计划”是不现实的。但与此同时,如果不进一步询问市场经济的形式,就谈论“市场经济”也太简单了。88通过制定经济游戏规则,通过税收和补贴,也通过反托拉斯法等工具,通过提供公共基础设施(道路、铁路线、互联网连接等),政府可以,在一定程度上影响着经济体系的性质。例如,政策可能有利于跨国公司或家族企业、主流农业或有机农业等,这也会影响农村地区的就业类型。89创造就业政策的问题——关系平等主义者原则上可以也应该支持——更多的是,一方面,什么有效还不太清楚,另一方面,很难概括出在特定地区可行的方法。通过发展战略为农村地区“带来就业机会”的尝试显然喜忧参半,往往会产生巨大的成本,但却没有达到预期的效果。90在一些地方,公共支持的旅游业举措提供了新的经济机会。但这并不总是受到当地人的欢迎;这意味着,毕竟,“城市人”的涌入和社区性质的改变。91其他机会可能来自向可持续能源的过渡:对于可再生能源项目,需要对农村社区进行许多投资。92但这些政策也可能在不同的农村社区之间引入新的不平等,因为有些地方为可再生能源项目提供了比其他地方更好的条件。因此,社会如何应对那些没有新机会出现的农村社区,仍然是一个原则问题,而不是一个可以通过寻找双赢机会来方便回答的问题。在创造就业机会不成功的情况下,个人往往不得不依靠福利金。这就引出了另一个政策问题,至少对于像许多欧洲国家那样,以接受工作的意愿为条件支付公共支持的福利制度来说是这样:他们希望个人通勤多远,或者他们甚至希望他们搬到另一个地区?考虑到上面讨论的扎根的价值,这似乎是一个过于苛刻的要求。 如果个人想离开,应该得到个性化的建议和支持(例如,搬家费用),但如果他们不想离开,就不应该强迫他们离开。有人希望,在经历了新冠肺炎封锁之后,远程工作将在未来提供新的机会。但只有在有稳定可靠的高速互联网连接的情况下,这才是一个现实的选择。提供这些服务(无论是通过公共服务,还是通过为提供者创造市场并确保其功能)是一项重要的公共任务,尤其是因为许多形式的文化参与也依赖于在线形式,我将在下面回到这一点。93同时,并不是所有人都能以数字方式获得的工作——例如,平台工作——在报酬和其他特征(技能发展、各种任务等)方面具有吸引力。94这是一个社会应该解决的正义问题,原因有很多,但其中一个原因是,这些工作可能在很大程度上由农村地区在其他方面已经处于不利地位的个人承担。理解城市和农村公民之间关系的第三个框架涉及一个国家的公民对彼此的相互承认和尊重。95正如我上文所述(第二节),农村地区的生活往往伴随着自己的文化、习惯和传统。在城市通常被视为“进步”,农村地区通常被视是“落后”的背景下,许多评论家呼吁更多地尊重生活在农村的个人。例如,克雷默指出,“任何农村居民都认为城市居民认为他们只是‘一群乡下人’,”96并强调,许多农村人觉得,在城市进行的政治讨论中,他们的声音没有被听到。霍克希尔德描述了公共话语和流行文化如何使人们对农村居民的刻板印象永久化,认为他们愚蠢、落后、不值得尊重。97一些作者明确告诫他们的读者,他们认为他们大多是城市居民,要对农村社区的同胞表现出更多的尊重,公共服务,也许还有创造经济机会的政策,如上所述,如果得到成功实施,这可能会大大打击陈规定型观念和偏见,因为农村地区将不再那么“落后”。“对农村社区缺乏尊重可能与这样一种假设有很大关系,即生活在那里的个人在经济上并不成功,可能与精英主义意识形态相结合,这种意识形态将经济成功误解为个人美德的结果。99从这个意义上说,这可能与对其他社会经济弱势群体的误导性偏见没有什么不同。但也许这对农村社区的成员来说尤其痛苦,因为如上所述,辛勤工作确实是他们中许多人的价值观,许多农村工作实际上需要极其艰苦的工作,但并不能带来高收入。但是,即使在没有陈规定型观念和偏见的经济层面的情况下,也可能存在文化差异;如上所述,农村的生活方式往往与城市不同,在某些地区,例如在欧洲,人们还发现对传统的依恋(年度集市、传统风格的服装等)对城市人来说是非常陌生的。这种差异,以及如何应对这些差异的问题,可以通过多元文化的视角来捕捉。有趣的是,据我所知,对农村社区的尊重并不是关于多元文化主义的辩论的一部分,多元文化主义长期以来一直在处理不同文化社区之间相互尊重的问题。100从历史的角度来看,这是可以理解的:农村生活方式曾经占主导地位,并且可能在许多国家继续被视为国家认同的核心部分(尤其是农村社区本身)。争取承认的是移民的新文化社区。但今天,将对农村社区的尊重融入一个多元文化社会的图景似乎并不牵强,在这个社会中,不同生活方式的人需要找到围绕一套共同价值观组织政治生活的方法——约翰·罗尔斯将其著名地概念化为“重叠共识”101——同时对超越传统的不同价值观保持宽容这一共识。从这个意义上说,决定住在农村社区(即使这是一个“非决定”,因为个人留在家人一直居住的地方)可以被视为对某种生活方式的决定,同胞们应该尊重这种生活方式。 尽管如此,在讨论社会正义时,除了种族、性别或阶级等以复杂方式交织在一起的其他层面外,还值得考虑这一地理层面。这一层面最重要的政策领域涉及受教育的机会、提供公共服务和经济机会以及相互承认不同的生活方式。我认为,从关系平等主义的角度来看,需要非常小心地确保农村青年,无论是想离开的还是想留下的,在教育机会方面不会受到不利影响,并获得补贴和非正式支持,这有助于弥补身体和文化距离造成的不利影响。关于公共服务和经济机会,我讨论过,但最终拒绝了运气平等主义的论点,即生活在农村地区的决定是一个选择问题,可以证明某些不利因素是合理的。虽然城市和农村的机会不一定是相同的,但它们都需要包括某些基本服务(例如医疗保健),以及公民和文化参与的机会。最大的实际挑战是在某些农村地区很难创造就业机会,但这并不意味着不应该尝试。关于文化认同,政策可以包括支持当地媒体,也可以包括鼓励农村和城市社区在线上和线下接触的战略。关于“城市”和“农村”的生活方式、态度和政治行为的问题受到了很多关注,因为右翼民粹主义者动员了一种“人民”对抗“精英”的叙事,将后者视为一种城市现象。但正如我所表明的那样,这个问题更为古老,未来可能会一直伴随着我们。总会有更多的“中心”和“外围”社区,或者经济上更“进步”和“落后”的地区,尽管这些地区会随着时间的推移而变化。只要我们接受社会、经济和技术变革,一些地区就会比其他地区更快地适应新的发展,因此地理和时间问题往往会交织在一起。因此,虽然适用范围将发生变化,但问题仍然存在。它们值得作为正义问题认真对待,哲学家和民主公众都应该讨论。我要感谢Élise Roumas和三位匿名裁判的宝贵意见和建议。无相关。本条不存在潜在的利益冲突。所有相关数据均包含在文章中。作者宣称这项研究不需要人类伦理的批准。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.10
自引率
5.60%
发文量
17
期刊介绍: The Journal of Political Philosophy is an international journal devoted to the study of theoretical issues arising out of moral, legal and political life. It welcomes, and hopes to foster, work cutting across a variety of disciplinary concerns, among them philosophy, sociology, history, economics and political science. The journal encourages new approaches, including (but not limited to): feminism; environmentalism; critical theory, post-modernism and analytical Marxism; social and public choice theory; law and economics, critical legal studies and critical race studies; and game theoretic, socio-biological and anthropological approaches to politics. It also welcomes work in the history of political thought which builds to a larger philosophical point and work in the philosophy of the social sciences and applied ethics with broader political implications. Featuring a distinguished editorial board from major centres of thought from around the globe, the journal draws equally upon the work of non-philosophers and philosophers and provides a forum of debate between disparate factions who usually keep to their own separate journals.
期刊最新文献
Evaluating International Agreements: The Voluntarist Reply and Its Limits Issue Information The Journal of Political Philosophy Index, Volume 31 (2023) The challenge of policing minorities in a liberal society Noncompliance and the Demands of Public Reason
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