Sequential tariffs with increasing marginal costs

Abstract

This study examines the superiority of the discriminatory and uniform tariff regimes under both simultaneous and sequential arrangements in terms of social and global welfare by considering asymmetrically increasing marginal costs among exporters. Under Cournot competition, the importing country has an incentive to manipulate the tariff structure using a sequential tariff arrangement, which implies that it prefers to impose tariff on a low-cost exporter first and a high-cost exporter later. Sequential discriminatory (uniform) tariffs can achieve Pareto superiority from the perspective of consumer surplus, and social and global welfare if product differentiation is low (high). It is mainly because high-cost (low-cost) exporters are handicapped (subsidized) under alternative tariff regimes. In contrast to previous research, our analysis suggests the possibility that preferences for tariff regimes will change in the same direction for consumer surplus, social welfare, and global welfare.