{"title":"Institutional reform paths","authors":"Clemens Buchen","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12252","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper develops a dynamic population game in which agents play a simple anonymous-exchange game of cooperating or defecting. Agents switch to the strategy with a higher expected payoff. Reformers can affect the payoff structure of the stage game to maximize the number of cooperators in the population by either enacting legal reform (institutional quality of contract law) or focusing on the macro outlook of the economy. Based on the theoretical model, the paper predicts which types the reformer should enact first and under which conditions reform will not be successful.</p>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"35 3","pages":"1099-1121"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecpo.12252","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economics & Politics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecpo.12252","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
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Abstract
This paper develops a dynamic population game in which agents play a simple anonymous-exchange game of cooperating or defecting. Agents switch to the strategy with a higher expected payoff. Reformers can affect the payoff structure of the stage game to maximize the number of cooperators in the population by either enacting legal reform (institutional quality of contract law) or focusing on the macro outlook of the economy. Based on the theoretical model, the paper predicts which types the reformer should enact first and under which conditions reform will not be successful.
期刊介绍：
Economics & Politics focuses on analytical political economy, broadly defined as the study of economic and political phenomena and policy in models that include political processes, institutions and markets. The journal is the source for innovative theoretical and empirical work on the intersection of politics and economics, at both domestic and international levels, and aims to promote new approaches on how these forces interact to affect political outcomes and policy choices, economic performance and societal welfare. Economics & Politics is a vital source of information for economists, academics and students, providing: - Analytical political economics - International scholarship - Accessible & thought-provoking articles - Creative inter-disciplinary analysis
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