Phenomenology of the Turing test: a Levinasian perspective

Abstract

This article considers the Turing test as a problem of communication, particularly by asking how the language of artificial intelligence (AI) appears to human experience in comparison to the language of the Other. This question is approached through Levinas’ philosophy, by considering the possibility of AI as an absolute alterity, rather than reducing its alterity to the Same. This perspective diverges from traditional accounts of AI, which are more concerned with identifying structures of consciousness in the machine that are analogous to those evident in firsthand experience. This article asks how exactly AI appears to human consciousness, and whether this appearance precludes the appearance of AI as a thinking-being. In the final analysis, the author argues that AI diverges from Levinas’ understanding of alterity, which centers around the exteriority of the Other. The alterity of AI, in contrast, centers around anteriority, defined as the appearance of language's origin-in-itself.