Corporate R&D Investments Following Competitors’ Voluntary Disclosures: Evidence from the Drug Development Process

Abstract

This paper examines the role of peer firm disclosures in shaping corporate research and development (R&D) investments. Drawing on models of two-stage R&D races, I hypothesize that a firm could be either deterred or encouraged by peer disclosure of interim R&D success, depending on peer firms’ R&D strength in the race. Using granular, project-level data on clinical trials in the drug development process, I find that a firm's R&D investments in a specific therapeutic area are deterred by disclosures of early-phase trial initiation from strong rivals in the same area but encouraged by disclosures from weak rivals. Cross-sectional analyses show that focal firm strength and disclosure relevance moderate the effects of peer firm disclosure. Overall, my evidence suggests that peer firms’ R&D disclosures can have both proprietary costs and deterrence benefits.