The evolutionary game of enterprise and driver fatigue regulation in the intelligent networked environment-A case study in Jiaozuo city, China

Li Xianghong , Zheng Lanlan , Chen Jun , Niu Jiageng , Fang Xufei
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Abstract

To give full play to the role of fatigue supervision of intelligent monitoring platforms, We consider the shortage of the traditional management model of enterprises. The management game model of enterprises and drivers is built from the benefits of drivers. Taking 79 drivers of enterprise A in Jiaozuo City as an example, the number of fatigue violations of each driver in each of the six consecutive months was counted. Combined with the system clustering method, the drivers are classified according to the trend of the number of violations. Finally, different regulatory measures were proposed for different categories of drivers according to the evolution of the regulatory game system. The model evolution simulation results show that when the cost paid by the driver for violating the law (c) is greater than the additional benefit generated by the violation (d), the driver will choose not to drive fatigued to protect his benefits. The classification results show that drivers can be divided into four categories:① class no fatigue violation records; ② class fatigue violation records show a downward trend; ③ class fatigue violation records show wavy changes, indicating repeated violations; ④ class fatigue violation records show an upward trend. The number of violations varies for different categories of drivers. The d increases as the number of violations increases. Therefore, different management measures are proposed to increase c for the 4-type drivers so that the parameters of each type of driver satisfy the range of values of c>d. Thus, the driver evolves in the direction of no-fatigue driving. It can effectively regulate fatigue driving and improve driving safety.

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智能网络环境下企业与驾驶员疲劳调节的进化博弈——以焦作市为例
为了充分发挥智能监控平台的疲劳监管作用,我们考虑了传统企业管理模式的不足。企业和驾驶员的管理博弈模型是从驾驶员的利益出发构建的。以焦作市A企业79名驾驶员为例,统计了每名驾驶员连续6个月的疲劳违章次数。结合系统聚类方法,根据违章次数的趋势对驾驶员进行分类。最后,根据监管博弈体系的演变,对不同类别的驾驶员提出了不同的监管措施。模型演化模拟结果表明,当驾驶员因违法(c)而支付的成本大于违法(d)所产生的额外利益时,驾驶员将选择不疲劳驾驶以保护其利益。分类结果表明,驾驶员可分为四类:①无疲劳违章记录;②课堂疲劳违规记录呈下降趋势;③课堂疲劳违规记录呈波浪状变化,表明违规行为反复发生;④课堂疲劳违规记录呈上升趋势。不同类别的驾驶员的违规次数各不相同。d随着违规次数的增加而增加。因此,提出了不同的管理措施来增加4型驱动器的c,使得每种类型的驱动器的参数满足c>;d.因此,驾驶员朝着无疲劳驾驶的方向发展。能有效调节疲劳驾驶,提高驾驶安全性。
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