Fallacies and Their Place in the Foundations of Science

Abstract

It has been said that there is no scholarly consensus as to why Aristotle’s logics of proof and refutation would have borne the title Analytics. But if we consulted Tarski’s (Introduction to logic and the methodology of deductive sciences, Oxford University Press, New York, 1941) graduate-level primer, we would have the perfect title for them: Introduction to logic and to the methodology of deductive sciences. There are two strings to Aristotle’s bow. The methodological string is the founding work on the epistemology of science, and the logical string sets down conditions on the proofs that bring this knowledge about. The logic of proof presents a difficulty whose solution exceeds its theoretical reach. The logic of refutation takes the problem on board, and advances a solution whose execution is framed by fallacy-avoidance at the beginning and fallacy-adoption at the end. But with a difference: the avoidance-fallacies are of Aristotle’s own conception, whereas the adoption-fallacies, so judged in the modern tradition, aren’t fallacies at all for Aristotle. The avoidance-fallacies are begging the question and ignoratio elenchi, and the adoption-fallacies, fallacies in name only, are the ad hominem and ad ignorantiam, an inductive turning in the first instance, and an abductive finish in the second.