Argumentation最新文献

The main goal of the paper is to provide the theoretical model for the a fortiori argument. After a brief history of a fortiori argument (especially in the works of Aristotle, Alexander, Cicero, and Boethius) we propose its general concept, components, and argumentation schemes, its classification, and finally, criteria for assessment. The main reason for this research is that this type of argument receives little attention in contemporary argumentation theory, and consequently critical thinking students have little knowledge of it, and yet, a fortiori arguments (or “arguments from the stronger”) are prevalent in both, academic and public, discourse. Therefore, the need to incorporate the concept of a fortiori argument into argumentation theory seems even more crucial. Additionally, we develop the diagrammatic method of assessing the inference in such arguments to finally present four critical questions needed for a critical evaluation of a fortiori argument.

The paper substantiates the prospects of normativism in law, namely the possibility of using purely logical means to make a judgment as a logical conclusion. The main criticism of normativism is based on the possibility of conflicts of judicial decisions and especially on conflicts of the norms themselves, when a court under similar circumstances can make opposing decisions which are formally valid. Critics of normativism argue that logic is helpless in resolving the conflicts and that higher justice must be guided by the discretion of judges who share common values or a common ideology, especially in the case of totalitarian societies. However, we show that there are two types of logical argumentation in the elimination of these conflicts: (a) Aristotelian, when a more general basis is sought, from which only one of the contradictions follows; (b) non-Aristotelian, when a compromise is reached between two contrary statements. In the second case, this technique is used mainly for civil cases. Moreover, this technique is quite formal and does not require an appeal to paraconsistent or other non-classical logics for eliminating the conflict. Using two recent court cases, we demonstrate how the proposed two types of logical argumentation work.

In pragma-dialectics, a study of legal reasoning analyses judicial judgements’ dialectical and rhetorical aspects. Most analytical studies of legal reasoning focus on the role of judges and their decision-making mechanisms. In our study, we focus on the strategic manoeuvring of the opposing parties. Depending on the context, parties may have to justify their decision to litigants, a professional audience, and the public in rhetorically and dialectically different ways. What makes strategic manoeuvring special in judicial trials is that rhetorical aims (winning the debate) and dialectical aims (convincing the jury), in contrast with debates where parties dialectically aim at resolving a dispute by reaching consensus, are not in conflict. We analyse the Depp ctr. Heard trial 2022, focusing on the parties’ dialectical potential in cases when rhetorical aspects play an important role in addition to objective evidence required by the legal framework. Depp’s party started the trial with a strategic movement we shall call as a ‘topical shift’, doubling their starting position, aiming at dual dialectical goals, and hence also beginning a new debate parallel with the apparently only one by introducing a not directly relevant factor into the debate. Although other factors also played a role in Depp’s victory, setting up his position in the confrontation stage this way was decisive for the trial’s outcome: Heard’s party, following a traditional route, joined actively in one of the dual debates only, effectively giving up the extra debate started by Depp. This way, analysing the trial offers wider consequences to how to understand strategic manoeuvring in judicial trials, and in general as well.

This essay explores what it is to be a principle of charity in philosophical argumentation. In it, I explore some principles of charity found in classic and contemporary literature and textbooks on logic and philosophy. I distinguish between what I will maximal and sub-maximal principles of charity. With this distinction, I taxonomize current principles of charity on offer according to their dialectical function as rules for argument interpretation and reconstruction in philosophical argumentation. Principles of charity, I argue, are best construed as pragmatic rules for argument interpretation in philosophical argumentation, not merely moral or ratio-epistemic rules. I defend this claim against some objections.

The central question of this contribution is: Why argumentation theory? Its points of departure are: (1) argumentative discourse is aimed at resolving a difference of opinion based on the merits of the argumentative moves that are made (“effectiveness through reasonableness”); (2) argumentation theory concentrates on the problems involved in the production, analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse. The comprehensive research program that needs to be carried out to tackle these problems includes philosophical, theoretical, empirical, analytical, and practical research. It is illuminating to see to what extent these five components are given their due in the versions of the research program of the currently most prominent approaches: (1) the formal logical, (2) rhetorical/pragmalinguistic, (3) informal logical, and (4) pragmadialectical paradigm. Based on the research results, the discipline should serve several practical objectives: (1) providing a profound understanding of the concept of argumentation and a sound body of knowledge about the ways in which argumentation manifests itself; (2) assisting people in getting a better grip on the argumentative discourses they encounter in public life; (3) supplying tools for improving the quality of argumentative practices. The different versions of the research program implemented in the four approaches are not equally strongly designed to serve these practical objectives. Three basic problems complicate the treatment of argumentative discourse: (1) the natural communication predicament; (2) the varying institutional constraints on argumentative discourse in different macro-contexts; (3) the higher order conditions for resolving a difference that are prerequisites for reasonable argumentative discourse.

According to what we call the neutral view of poisoning the well, poisoning the well is an argumentative move that appeals to an opponent’s social identity as an attempt to diminish their credibility. This view holds that poisoning the well is a very special and dangerous fallacy, because it silences the recipient on the basis of their social identity, and therefore never counts as a legitimate move in a debate. In this paper, we take issue with this view. First, we show that this account is committed to the ideal of neutrality, which is highly problematic. Second, we argue that after abandoning the ideal of neutrality, it’s clear that not all cases of poisoning the well constitute silencing. Finally, we reflect on the phenomenon of poisoning the well from a non-neutral approach, and explore further situations that could count as instances of it. Poisoning the well is, many times, a virtuous move.

This paper tries to reconcile the clash between argumentation theory and formal logic regarding circular arguments, which are regarded as the fallacy of begging the question by the former, and a benign and useful inference pattern by the latter. This paper provides a formal system which can represent circular arguments found in the literature. The formal system makes it possible to distinguish two ways in which arguments can be circular. The first type of circularity, which is vicious, is when an argument is based on an inference step which is (indirectly) supported by that inference step itself. The second kind of circularity, which is benign, occurs when one of the premises is the same proposition as the conclusion. The first type of circularity implies the second type of circularity, but not the other way round. This distinction is in line with other approaches to circular arguments. Analyzing selected examples from the literature shows the value of the formal system.

According to a dialectical approach to argumentation, a single argument can be seen as a dialogical "Why? Because!" sequence. Does this also apply to multimodal arguments? This paper focuses on multimodal arguments with a predominantly visual character and shows that dialogues are helpful for identifying and reconstructing arguments in multimodal communication. To include nonverbal arguments in dialectical argumentation theory, it is proposed to regard dialogue as mode-fluid. The account of multimodal argument as dialogue will be compared with Champagne and Pietarinen’s account of visual argument as movement.

Debates have long been an effective educational method in various fields, including argumentation education. In debates in which participants are divided into affirmative and negative sides, engagement in argumentation is heightened. Numerous studies have attempted to demonstrate this, but the question of whether participation in debates leads to increased argumentativeness, or whether individuals who engage in debates inherently have a higher orientation towards argumentation, remains unresolved. In the present study, debates were conducted for 15 weeks, and argumentativeness was measured using pre-and post-tests. The results confirmed that debate participation increases argumentativeness. Furthermore, while previous research has mostly focused on argumentativeness in the first language, the present study deepens the relationship between argumentativeness in both first and second languages. Specifically, focusing on Japan, where the first language (Japanese) is high-context and the second language (English) is low-context, this research clarifies the relationship between argumentativeness in the first and second languages, as well as the impact of debate.