{"title":"Optimal verification strategies in multi‐firm projects","authors":"Aditya U. Kulkarni, A. Salado, Christian Wernz","doi":"10.1002/sys.21615","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Verification activities are intended to reduce the costs of system development by identifying design errors before deploying the system. However, subcontractors in multifirm projects are motivated to implement locally cost‐effective verification strategies over verification strategies that benefit the main contractor. Incentivizing verification activities is one mechanism by which the contractor can motivate subcontractors to implement verification strategies desirable to the contractor. Prior work on mathematical models of verification in systems engineering has neither explored optimal verification strategies nor incentives in multi‐firm projects. In this paper, we present a modeling concept for determining optimal verification strategies in multi‐firm projects. Our models are belief‐based, which means that contractors and subcontractors incorporate their at times limited knowledge about true verification state through a probabilistic assessment of possible states. We develop an initial two‐level model, where one contractor directly works with multiple subcontractors at the next lower level. This model is then extended to a general network model with multiple, multilevel contractor‐subcontractor relationship. We derive solution algorithms that characterize the optimal verification strategies and incentives for each of the firms. Our work contributes to the systems engineering literature by laying the foundation for the study of incentives as a mechanism to align verification activities in multi‐firm systems engineering projects.","PeriodicalId":54439,"journal":{"name":"Systems Engineering","volume":"25 1","pages":"254 - 270"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2022-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Systems Engineering","FirstCategoryId":"5","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1002/sys.21615","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Verification activities are intended to reduce the costs of system development by identifying design errors before deploying the system. However, subcontractors in multifirm projects are motivated to implement locally cost‐effective verification strategies over verification strategies that benefit the main contractor. Incentivizing verification activities is one mechanism by which the contractor can motivate subcontractors to implement verification strategies desirable to the contractor. Prior work on mathematical models of verification in systems engineering has neither explored optimal verification strategies nor incentives in multi‐firm projects. In this paper, we present a modeling concept for determining optimal verification strategies in multi‐firm projects. Our models are belief‐based, which means that contractors and subcontractors incorporate their at times limited knowledge about true verification state through a probabilistic assessment of possible states. We develop an initial two‐level model, where one contractor directly works with multiple subcontractors at the next lower level. This model is then extended to a general network model with multiple, multilevel contractor‐subcontractor relationship. We derive solution algorithms that characterize the optimal verification strategies and incentives for each of the firms. Our work contributes to the systems engineering literature by laying the foundation for the study of incentives as a mechanism to align verification activities in multi‐firm systems engineering projects.
期刊介绍：
Systems Engineering is a discipline whose responsibility it is to create and operate technologically enabled systems that satisfy stakeholder needs throughout their life cycle. Systems engineers reduce ambiguity by clearly defining stakeholder needs and customer requirements, they focus creativity by developing a system’s architecture and design and they manage the system’s complexity over time. Considerations taken into account by systems engineers include, among others, quality, cost and schedule, risk and opportunity under uncertainty, manufacturing and realization, performance and safety during operations, training and support, as well as disposal and recycling at the end of life. The journal welcomes original submissions in the field of Systems Engineering as defined above, but also encourages contributions that take an even broader perspective including the design and operation of systems-of-systems, the application of Systems Engineering to enterprises and complex socio-technical systems, the identification, selection and development of systems engineers as well as the evolution of systems and systems-of-systems over their entire lifecycle.
Systems Engineering integrates all the disciplines and specialty groups into a coordinated team effort forming a structured development process that proceeds from concept to realization to operation. Increasingly important topics in Systems Engineering include the role of executable languages and models of systems, the concurrent use of physical and virtual prototyping, as well as the deployment of agile processes. Systems Engineering considers both the business and the technical needs of all stakeholders with the goal of providing a quality product that meets the user needs. Systems Engineering may be applied not only to products and services in the private sector but also to public infrastructures and socio-technical systems whose precise boundaries are often challenging to define.
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