{"title":"The Politics of Blame Avoidance","authors":"R. Weaver","doi":"10.1017/S0143814X00004219","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Politicians are motivated primarily by the desire to avoid blame for unpopular actions rather than by seeking to claim credit for popular ones. This results from voters' ‘negativity bias’: their tendency to be more sensitive to real or potential losses than they are to gains. Incentives to avoid blame lead politicians to adopt a distinctive set of political strategies, including agenda limitation, scapegoating, ‘passing the buck’ and defection (‘jumping on the bandwagon’) that are different than those they would follow if they were primarily interested in pursuing good policy or maximizing credit-claiming opportunities. These strategies in turn lead to important policy effects, including a surrender of discretion even when it offers important credit-claiming opportunities.","PeriodicalId":47578,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Policy","volume":"6 1","pages":"371 - 398"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"1986-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0143814X00004219","citationCount":"1348","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Public Policy","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X00004219","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1348
Abstract
ABSTRACT Politicians are motivated primarily by the desire to avoid blame for unpopular actions rather than by seeking to claim credit for popular ones. This results from voters' ‘negativity bias’: their tendency to be more sensitive to real or potential losses than they are to gains. Incentives to avoid blame lead politicians to adopt a distinctive set of political strategies, including agenda limitation, scapegoating, ‘passing the buck’ and defection (‘jumping on the bandwagon’) that are different than those they would follow if they were primarily interested in pursuing good policy or maximizing credit-claiming opportunities. These strategies in turn lead to important policy effects, including a surrender of discretion even when it offers important credit-claiming opportunities.
期刊介绍：
The Journal of Public Policy applies social science theories and concepts to significant political, economic and social issues and to the ways in which public policies are made. Its articles deal with topics of concern to public policy scholars in America, Europe, Japan and other advanced industrial nations. The journal often publishes articles that cut across disciplines, such as environmental issues, international political economy, regulatory policy and European Union processes. Its peer reviewers come from up to a dozen social science disciplines and countries across three continents, thus ensuring both analytic rigour and accuracy in reference to national and policy context.
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