CONNECTED SELF-OWNERSHIP AND OUR OBLIGATIONS TO OTHERS

IF 0.3 4区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Social Philosophy & Policy Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI:10.1017/S0265052519000402
Ann Cudd
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Abstract

Abstract: This essay explores the concept of the connected self-owner, which takes account of the metaphysical significance of relations among persons for persons’ capacities to be owners. This concept of the self-owner conflicts with the traditional libertarian understanding of the self-owner as atomistic or essentially separable from all others. I argue that the atomistic self cannot be a self-owner. A self-owner is a moral person with intentions, desires, and thoughts. But in order to have intentions, desires, and thoughts a being must relate to others through language and norm-guided behavior. Individual beings require the pre-existence of norms and norm-givers to bootstrap their selves, and norms, norm-givers, and norm-takers are necessary to continue to support the self. That means, I argue, that the self who can be an owner is essentially connected. Next, I ask how humans become connected selves and whether that connection matters morally. I distinguish among those connections that support development of valuable capacities. One such capacity is the autonomous individual. I argue that the social connections that allow the development of autonomous individuals have moral value and should be fostered. On the basis of these two values, I argue that we can support at least two nonvoluntary obligations, one negative and one positive, that we can ground in our metaphysical essence as connected self-owners.
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相互关联的自我所有权和我们对他人的义务
摘要:本文探讨了关联自我所有者的概念,它考虑到人与人之间的关系对人成为所有者的能力的形而上学意义。这种自我所有者的概念与传统自由意志主义对自我所有者的理解相冲突,传统自由意志主义认为自我所有者是原子的,或者本质上与所有其他人是可分离的。我认为原子的自我不可能是一个自我所有者。自我所有者是一个有意图、欲望和思想的道德人。但是为了有意图、欲望和思想,一个人必须通过语言和规范引导的行为与他人联系。个体需要规范和规范给予者的预先存在来引导他们的自我,规范、规范给予者和规范接受者是必要的,以继续支持自我。我认为,这意味着可以成为所有者的自我本质上是相互联系的。接下来,我要问人类是如何成为相互联系的自我,以及这种联系在道德上是否重要。我区分那些支持有价值能力发展的联系。其中一种能力就是自主的个人。我认为,允许自主个体发展的社会关系具有道德价值,应该加以培养。在这两种价值观的基础上,我认为我们至少可以支持两种非自愿的义务,一种是消极的,一种是积极的,我们可以在形而上学的本质上把它们作为相互联系的自我所有者。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.60
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期刊介绍: Social Philosophy and Policy is an interdisciplinary journal with an emphasis on the philosophical underpinnings of enduring social policy debates. The issues are thematic in format, examining a specific area of concern with contributions from scholars in different disciplines, especially philosophy, economics, political science and law. While not primarily a journal of policy prescriptions, some articles in each issue will typically connect theory with practice. The 2006 issues are "Justice and Global Politics" and "Taxation, Economic Prosperity, and Distributive Justice". The 2007 issues will be "Liberalism: Old and New" and "Ancient Greek Political Theory".
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