{"title":"BOUNDARY PROBLEMS AND SELF-OWNERSHIP","authors":"Jessica Flanigan","doi":"10.1017/S0265052519000451","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: Self-ownership theorists argue that many of our most morally urgent and enforceable rights stem from the fact that we own ourselves. Critics of self-ownership argue that the claim that people own their bodies commits self-ownership theorists to several implausible conclusions because self-ownership theory relies on several vague moral predicates, and any precisification of the required predicates is seemingly too permissive (because it allows people to impose deadly risks on innocent bystanders for no reason) or too restrictive (because it prohibits people from polluting or even interacting with others at all). I argue that this line of criticism does not undermine the case for self-ownership theory because self-ownership theory does not require precisification of each moral concept that it is based on and, even if it did, the theory’s alleged extensional inadequacy does not undermine its justification.","PeriodicalId":46601,"journal":{"name":"Social Philosophy & Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0265052519000451","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Social Philosophy & Policy","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052519000451","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
Abstract: Self-ownership theorists argue that many of our most morally urgent and enforceable rights stem from the fact that we own ourselves. Critics of self-ownership argue that the claim that people own their bodies commits self-ownership theorists to several implausible conclusions because self-ownership theory relies on several vague moral predicates, and any precisification of the required predicates is seemingly too permissive (because it allows people to impose deadly risks on innocent bystanders for no reason) or too restrictive (because it prohibits people from polluting or even interacting with others at all). I argue that this line of criticism does not undermine the case for self-ownership theory because self-ownership theory does not require precisification of each moral concept that it is based on and, even if it did, the theory’s alleged extensional inadequacy does not undermine its justification.
期刊介绍:
Social Philosophy and Policy is an interdisciplinary journal with an emphasis on the philosophical underpinnings of enduring social policy debates. The issues are thematic in format, examining a specific area of concern with contributions from scholars in different disciplines, especially philosophy, economics, political science and law. While not primarily a journal of policy prescriptions, some articles in each issue will typically connect theory with practice. The 2006 issues are "Justice and Global Politics" and "Taxation, Economic Prosperity, and Distributive Justice". The 2007 issues will be "Liberalism: Old and New" and "Ancient Greek Political Theory".