ECONOMISTS ON PRIVATE INCENTIVES, ECONOMIC MODELS, AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: THE CLASH BETWEEN HAPPINESS AND THE SO-CALLED PUBLIC GOOD

IF 0.3 4区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Social Philosophy & Policy Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI:10.1017/S0265052521000261
S. Peart
{"title":"ECONOMISTS ON PRIVATE INCENTIVES, ECONOMIC MODELS, AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: THE CLASH BETWEEN HAPPINESS AND THE SO-CALLED PUBLIC GOOD","authors":"S. Peart","doi":"10.1017/S0265052521000261","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This essay examines the administrative state as a ubiquitous phenomenon that results in part from the mismatch of incentives. Using two dramatic episodes in the history of economics, the essay considers two types of mismatch. It then examines how economists increasingly endorsed the “general good” as a unitary goal for society, even at the expense of private hopes and desires. More than this, their procedures and models gave them warrant to design mechanisms and advocate for legislation and regulations to “fix” the supposedly suboptimal choices of individuals in service to the overarching goal. The rise of New Welfare Economics dealt an additional blow to the sovereignty of individual motivations, notwithstanding that Hayek and Buchanan warned that this engineering approach allowed social goals to override individual preferences. Throughout, the argument is that it is important to recognize that people within or advising the administrative state are influenced by the same sorts of (private) motivations as actors throughout the economy.","PeriodicalId":46601,"journal":{"name":"Social Philosophy & Policy","volume":"15 1","pages":"152 - 169"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Social Philosophy & Policy","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052521000261","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract This essay examines the administrative state as a ubiquitous phenomenon that results in part from the mismatch of incentives. Using two dramatic episodes in the history of economics, the essay considers two types of mismatch. It then examines how economists increasingly endorsed the “general good” as a unitary goal for society, even at the expense of private hopes and desires. More than this, their procedures and models gave them warrant to design mechanisms and advocate for legislation and regulations to “fix” the supposedly suboptimal choices of individuals in service to the overarching goal. The rise of New Welfare Economics dealt an additional blow to the sovereignty of individual motivations, notwithstanding that Hayek and Buchanan warned that this engineering approach allowed social goals to override individual preferences. Throughout, the argument is that it is important to recognize that people within or advising the administrative state are influenced by the same sorts of (private) motivations as actors throughout the economy.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
私人激励、经济模式和行政国家的经济学家:幸福与所谓的公共利益之间的冲突
摘要本文将行政状态视为一种普遍存在的现象,其部分原因是激励机制的不匹配。本文以经济学史上的两个戏剧性事件为例,研究了两种类型的错配。然后,它考察了经济学家如何越来越多地支持“普遍利益”作为社会的统一目标,甚至以牺牲个人的希望和欲望为代价。不仅如此,他们的程序和模型让他们有理由设计机制,并倡导立法和法规,以“修复”服务于总体目标的个人的所谓次优选择。尽管哈耶克和布坎南警告说,这种工程方法允许社会目标凌驾于个人偏好之上,但新福利经济学的兴起给个人动机的主权带来了额外的打击。贯穿全文的论点是,重要的是要认识到,在行政国家内部或为行政国家提供建议的人,与整个经济中的行动者一样,受到同样类型的(私人)动机的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
0.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: Social Philosophy and Policy is an interdisciplinary journal with an emphasis on the philosophical underpinnings of enduring social policy debates. The issues are thematic in format, examining a specific area of concern with contributions from scholars in different disciplines, especially philosophy, economics, political science and law. While not primarily a journal of policy prescriptions, some articles in each issue will typically connect theory with practice. The 2006 issues are "Justice and Global Politics" and "Taxation, Economic Prosperity, and Distributive Justice". The 2007 issues will be "Liberalism: Old and New" and "Ancient Greek Political Theory".
期刊最新文献
A LIMITED DEFENSE OF EFFICIENCY AGAINST CHARGES OF INCOHERENCY AND BIAS WHO SHOULD TAX MULTINATIONALS? PREDISTRIBUTION AGAINST RENT-SEEKING: THE BENEFIT PRINCIPLE’S ALTERNATIVE TO REDISTRIBUTIVE TAXATION REALIZATION AND RECOGNITION UNDER THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE JUSTIFYING TAXATION
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1