A symmetric capacity-constrained differentiated oligopoly model for the United States pediatric vaccine market with linear demand

Banafsheh Behzad, S. Jacobson, M. Robbins
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引用次数: 9

Abstract

The United States pediatric vaccine market is examined using Bertrand–Edgeworth–Chamberlin price competition. The proposed game captures interactions between symmetric, capacity-constrained manufacturers in a differentiated, single-product market with linear demand. Results indicate that a unique pure strategy equilibrium exists in the case where the capacities of the manufacturers are at their extreme. For the capacity region where no pure strategy equilibrium exists, there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium where the distribution function, its support, and the expected profit of the manufacturers are characterized. Three game instances are introduced to model the United States pediatric vaccine market. In each instance, the manufacturers are assumed to have equal capacity in producing vaccines. Vaccines are differentiated based upon the number of reported adverse medical events for that vaccine. Using a game-theoretic model, equilibrium prices are computed for each monovalent vaccine. Results indicate that the equilibrium prices for monovalent vaccines are lower than the federal contract prices. The numerical results provide both a lower and upper bound for the vaccine equilibrium prices in the public sector, based on the capacity of the vaccine manufacturers. Results illustrate the importance of several model parameters such as market demand and vaccine adverse events on the equilibrium prices. Supplementary materials are available for this article. Go to the publisher’s online edition of IIE Transactions for datasets, additional tables, detailed proofs, etc.
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具有线性需求的美国儿童疫苗市场的对称容量约束差异化寡头垄断模型
使用Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin价格竞争对美国儿科疫苗市场进行了检查。所提出的博弈捕获了在一个具有线性需求的差异化单一产品市场中对称的、产能受限的制造商之间的相互作用。结果表明,当制造商的生产能力达到极限时,存在唯一的纯战略均衡。对于不存在纯战略均衡的产能区域,存在一个混合战略均衡,该混合战略均衡具有分布函数及其支持度和制造商期望利润的特征。介绍了三个游戏实例来模拟美国儿科疫苗市场。在每种情况下,假定制造商具有同等的疫苗生产能力。根据疫苗所报告的不良医疗事件的数量对疫苗进行区分。利用博弈论模型,计算了每种单价疫苗的均衡价格。结果表明,单价疫苗的均衡价格低于联邦合同价格。数值结果根据疫苗制造商的能力,提供了公共部门疫苗均衡价格的下限和上限。结果说明了市场需求和疫苗不良事件等模型参数对均衡价格的重要性。本文有补充材料。请访问出版商的在线版IIE Transactions获取数据集、附加表、详细证明等。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
IIE Transactions
IIE Transactions 工程技术-工程:工业
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审稿时长
4.5 months
期刊最新文献
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