With unamet in East Timor: A historian's personal view

Abstract

Abstract Written by a historian who served with the UN's Political Affairs Office in East Timor during the turbulent months in mid 1999, this article provides an insider's view on the terror of the militia violence but goes beyond that to explain why many of those who worked with the UN mission were less worried about the militia than about being party to a failed and perhaps shameful process—failed for the people of East Timor and shameful for the United Nations. The article offers intimate details on the internal decision-making process at the United Nations concerning the “popular consultation” and the introduction of a peacekeeping force, and then about whether or not to evacuate UN personnel and their East Timorese associates as the violence escalated. The author concludes that the UN effort was not the “fiasco” that some feared it would be. On the contrary, the Unamet mission managed to avoid the pitfalls of other UN interventions (in Rwanda, for example) and go on to establish some important precedents that will allow the United Nations to work more effectively in the years ahead.