{"title":"TAICHI: Transform Your Secret Exploits Into Mine From a Victim’s Perspective","authors":"Zhongyu Pei, Xingman Chen, Songtao Yang, Haixin Duan, Chao Zhang","doi":"10.1109/tdsc.2022.3191693","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Acquiring and analyzing exploits, which take advantage of vulnerabilities to conduct malicious actions, are crucial for victims (and defenders) when responding to system compromising incidents. However, exploits are sensitive and valuable assets that are not available to victims. The most common resource available for victims to investigate is network traffic, which covers the exploitation period. Thus reconstructing exploits from network traffic is demanded. In practice, the reconstruction process is performed manually, thus inefficient and non-scalable. In this article, we present an automated solution TAICHI to reconstruct exploits from network traffic, able to generate replica exploits and facilitate timely incident analysis. By nature, a working exploit has to satisfy (1) path constraints which ensure the program path same as the original exploit's is explored and the same vulnerability is triggered, and (2) exploit constraints which ensure the same exploitation strategy is applied, e.g., to bypass deployed defenses or to stitch multiple gadgets together. We propose a hybrid solution to this problem by integrating techniques including multi-version execution (MVE), dynamic taint analysis (DTA), and concolic execution. We have implemented a prototype of TAICHI on x86 and x86-64 Linux and tested it on the Cyber Grand Challenge (CGC) dataset, several Capture the Flag (CTF) challenges, and Metasploit exploit modules targeting real world applications. The evaluation results showed that TAICHI could reconstruct exploits efficiently with a high success rate. Moreover, it could be applied to production environments without disrupting running services, and could reconstruct exploits even if only one round of exploitation traffic is available.","PeriodicalId":13047,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":7.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/tdsc.2022.3191693","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, HARDWARE & ARCHITECTURE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Acquiring and analyzing exploits, which take advantage of vulnerabilities to conduct malicious actions, are crucial for victims (and defenders) when responding to system compromising incidents. However, exploits are sensitive and valuable assets that are not available to victims. The most common resource available for victims to investigate is network traffic, which covers the exploitation period. Thus reconstructing exploits from network traffic is demanded. In practice, the reconstruction process is performed manually, thus inefficient and non-scalable. In this article, we present an automated solution TAICHI to reconstruct exploits from network traffic, able to generate replica exploits and facilitate timely incident analysis. By nature, a working exploit has to satisfy (1) path constraints which ensure the program path same as the original exploit's is explored and the same vulnerability is triggered, and (2) exploit constraints which ensure the same exploitation strategy is applied, e.g., to bypass deployed defenses or to stitch multiple gadgets together. We propose a hybrid solution to this problem by integrating techniques including multi-version execution (MVE), dynamic taint analysis (DTA), and concolic execution. We have implemented a prototype of TAICHI on x86 and x86-64 Linux and tested it on the Cyber Grand Challenge (CGC) dataset, several Capture the Flag (CTF) challenges, and Metasploit exploit modules targeting real world applications. The evaluation results showed that TAICHI could reconstruct exploits efficiently with a high success rate. Moreover, it could be applied to production environments without disrupting running services, and could reconstruct exploits even if only one round of exploitation traffic is available.
期刊介绍:
The "IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing (TDSC)" is a prestigious journal that publishes high-quality, peer-reviewed research in the field of computer science, specifically targeting the development of dependable and secure computing systems and networks. This journal is dedicated to exploring the fundamental principles, methodologies, and mechanisms that enable the design, modeling, and evaluation of systems that meet the required levels of reliability, security, and performance.
The scope of TDSC includes research on measurement, modeling, and simulation techniques that contribute to the understanding and improvement of system performance under various constraints. It also covers the foundations necessary for the joint evaluation, verification, and design of systems that balance performance, security, and dependability.
By publishing archival research results, TDSC aims to provide a valuable resource for researchers, engineers, and practitioners working in the areas of cybersecurity, fault tolerance, and system reliability. The journal's focus on cutting-edge research ensures that it remains at the forefront of advancements in the field, promoting the development of technologies that are critical for the functioning of modern, complex systems.