Money Can't Buy You Love: Partisan Responses to Vote-Buying Offers

Abstract

Current theory on vote-buying treats benefits instrumentally as income replacement that always increase utility for the machine. But many recipients react negatively. I argue that responses to selective benefits spring from partisan bias, with opponents motivated to reject a machine that attempts to buy their vote. This new partisan response model helps explain why machines target many supporters, why many opponents remain unpersuaded by selective benefits, and why the electoral return from vote-buying is often lower than assumed. Tests using conjoint survey experiments in Mexico show that initial supporters are 14.5 percentage points more likely to vote for the machine, whereas initial opponents are 8.5 percentage points less likely to vote for it, holding benefits constant. Mediation analysis reveals that initial supporters demonstrate gratitude for selective benefits and view the machine's actions as legitimate, whereas initial opponents take offense and see machine politics as illegitimate.