Unforeseen Consequences: The Constitutionality of Unilateral Executive R2P Deployments and the Need for Congressional and Judicial Involvement

Matthew E. Vigeant
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

The role that the Responsibility to Protect ("R2P") played in the United States' decision to intervene in Libya in 2011 received wide coverage in academic and policy circles. While the Executive Branch's legal justification for taking action in Libya without Congressional authorization was not premised solely on humanitarian grounds, R2P is a key plank in President Obama's foreign policy. Other commentators have discussed the role of R2P in international law, but a major domestic legal question remains: does the President have the power to unilaterally deploy military forces on R2P missions with no direct U.S. national security interests at stake? This Note argues that though past unilateral Executive deployments of military force were justified primarily on U.S. national security interests, due to (1) the evolution of the President's national security powers, and (2) the President's ability to define "the national interest," the Executive has the constitutional power to send U.S. military forces into harm's way on purely humanitarian missions without the consent of Congress. Yet unilateral deployments may produce unintended consequences, as seen in Africa and Syria after the Libyan intervention. In light of these events, this Note lays out a proposed solution to constrain the President's ability to conduct such unilateral missions: Congress must pass legislation to check the Executive's ability to conduct R2P deployments, and the judiciary must be willing to enforce such legislation.I. IntroductionIn 2011, President Barack Obama ordered the U.S. military to provide logistical and combat support for NATO forces to conduct a series of strikes against Colonel Muammar Quaddafi's regime in Libya without Congressional authorization.1 According to the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") and State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh, the President possessed the power to order the involvement of U.S. military forces in combat situations in Libya without Congressional approval because (1) important national security interests were at stake; and (2) this intervention did not rise to the threshold of a "war" for Constitutional purposes.2 The two important national security interests Koh cited were (a) maintaining the credibility of the United Nations ("U.N.") Security Council, and (b) preserving regional stability.3 While discussing what "preserving regional stability" meant, the President stated that a humanitarian crisis would ensue without U.S. intervention.4Keying in on the role that humanitarian purposes played in the U.S. decision to intervene in Libya and subsequent U.N. Security Council debates over the situation in Libya, scholars hailed or decried the Libyan intervention as the fruition of the Obama Administration's effort to promote the Responsibility to Protect (commonly, "R2P") Principle.5 R2P is shorthand for the emerging international consensus in favor of supporting humanitarian intervention when a state fails to protect its own people, thereby forfeiting its sovereign rights.6 While the exact role R2P played in decision-making around Libya is unknown to anyone outside of the Executive branch, the President's 2010 National Security Strategy is seen in the international community as an American endorsement of R2P.7Although Presidential War Powers have expanded since the framing of the Constitution, the adoption of the extra-territorial principle of the Responsibility to Protect by a U.S. President presents a new question of whether the Executive has the inherent constitutional authority to unilaterally deploy U.S. military forces in any role - e.g., logistical, advisory, combat, etc. - into a foreign conflict which poses no direct security risk to the United States, motivated by purely humanitarian grounds, and without Congressional authorization. The legitimacy of taking such an action is not uniformly accepted, and some U.S. Senators have publicly indicated that they do not believe the President has such power. …
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不可预见的后果:单方面行政R2P部署的合宪性以及国会和司法介入的必要性
保护责任(R2P)在美国2011年干预利比亚的决定中所起的作用在学术界和政策圈得到了广泛的报道。虽然行政部门在没有国会授权的情况下对利比亚采取行动的法律理由并不仅仅以人道主义为前提,但R2P是奥巴马总统外交政策的一个关键支柱。其他评论员已经讨论了R2P在国际法中的作用,但一个主要的国内法律问题仍然存在:总统是否有权单方面部署军事力量执行R2P任务,而不危及美国的直接国家安全利益?本文认为,尽管过去行政部门单方面部署军事力量主要是出于美国国家安全利益的考虑,但由于:(1)总统国家安全权力的演变,以及(2)总统定义“国家利益”的能力,行政部门拥有宪法赋予的权力,可以在未经国会同意的情况下派遣美国军队从事纯粹的人道主义任务。然而,单边部署可能会产生意想不到的后果,就像干预利比亚后在非洲和叙利亚看到的那样。鉴于这些事件,本报告提出了一个限制总统执行此类单方面任务能力的建议解决方案:国会必须通过立法来检查行政部门进行R2P部署的能力,司法部门必须愿意执行此类立法。2011年,奥巴马总统命令美国军方在没有国会授权的情况下,为北约部队提供后勤和战斗支持,以对利比亚穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲上校政权进行一系列打击根据司法部法律顾问办公室(“OLC”)和国务院法律顾问Harold Koh的说法,总统有权在没有国会批准的情况下命令美国军队参与利比亚的战斗情况,因为(1)重要的国家安全利益受到威胁;(2)这种干预没有上升到宪法目的的“战争”的门槛Koh提到的两个重要的国家安全利益是(a)维护联合国安理会的信誉,(b)维护地区稳定在讨论“维护地区稳定”的含义时,总统表示,如果没有美国的干预,人道主义危机将随之而来。关注人道主义目的在美国决定干预利比亚以及随后联合国安理会对利比亚局势的辩论中所起的作用,学者们对利比亚的干预表示赞赏或谴责,认为这是奥巴马政府努力促进“保护责任”的成果。(R2P原则(R2P是新兴的国际共识的简称,即当一个国家不能保护自己的人民,从而丧失其主权权利时,支持人道主义干预虽然除了行政部门之外,任何人都不知道R2P在利比亚的决策中所起的确切作用,但国际社会认为总统的2010年国家安全战略是美国对R2P的认可。7 .尽管自宪法制定以来,总统的战争权力已经扩大,但美国总统对“保护责任”的域外原则的采用提出了一个新的问题,即行政部门是否具有内在的宪法权力,可以单方面将美国军队部署在任何角色中——例如,后勤、咨询、战斗等——进入对美国不构成直接安全风险的外国冲突中。纯粹出于人道主义考虑,而且没有国会授权。采取这种行动的合法性并没有得到一致的认可,一些美国参议员公开表示,他们不相信总统有这样的权力。…
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