Firm Corruption in the Presence of an Auditor

IF 0.7 Q3 ECONOMICS Review of Economic Analysis Pub Date : 2010-09-01 DOI:10.15353/rea.v8i2.1511
M. Dietrich, Jolian P Mchardy, Abhijit Sharma
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

We develop a theoretical framework exploring firm corruption accounting for interactions with an auditor who provides auditing and other services. A multiplicity of equilibria can exist including stable corruption and auditor controlled corruption. Whilst fining the auditor cannot eliminate all corruption, fining the firm can, but marginal increases in this fine can also have perverse effects. Investing in corruption detection may be effective in deterring auditor corruption but ineffective in deterring firm corruption. Policy effectiveness is highly dependent upon several factors which may be hard to observe in practice making general rules about policy interventions to address corruption very difficult.
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审计人员在场时的公司腐败
我们开发了一个理论框架,探索公司腐败会计与提供审计和其他服务的审计师的互动。稳定腐败和审计员控制的腐败可以存在多重均衡。虽然对审计人员进行罚款不能消除所有腐败,但对公司进行罚款可以消除所有腐败,但罚款的边际增加也可能产生不良影响。投资于腐败侦查可能对阻止审计人员腐败有效,但对阻止公司腐败无效。政策有效性高度依赖于几个因素,这些因素在实践中可能很难观察到,因此很难制定有关解决腐败问题的政策干预的一般规则。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
10
审稿时长
26 weeks
期刊最新文献
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