A rationalist explanation of Russian risk-taking

IF 1.1 Q3 ECONOMICS Economics of Peace and Security Journal Pub Date : 2016-04-01 DOI:10.15355/EPSJ.11.1.5
F. Lehrbass, Valentin Weinhold
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

Three seemingly unrelated topics of Russian politics are investigated. It is shown that under expected utility maximization the assumptions of an unbiased oil forward market and a risk-acceptant attitude (strictly convex utility function) are sufficient to explain Russia’s open position in oil and the bailout of Rosneft. The risk-acceptant attitude of the Russian leader also causes a shrunken bargaining range for the conflict in Ukraine, which can be enlarged by sanctions but not necessarily by the proliferation of weapons. This gives sanctions a clear edge over the proliferation of weapons.
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这是对俄罗斯冒险行为的理性解释
调查了三个看似无关的俄罗斯政治话题。研究表明,在期望效用最大化条件下,无偏石油远期市场和风险接受态度(严格凸效用函数)的假设足以解释俄罗斯在石油领域的开放立场和对俄罗斯石油公司的救助。俄罗斯领导人接受风险的态度也导致乌克兰冲突的谈判范围缩小,制裁可以扩大谈判范围,但武器扩散不一定能扩大谈判范围。这使得制裁在武器扩散方面具有明显优势。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
7
期刊最新文献
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