La teoría consensual de la pena en la encrucijada

Abstract

espanolTanto el concepto tipicamente utilitarista de proteccion social como el concepto tipicamente kantiano de consentimiento ocupan un lugar central en la estrategia que ensaya C. S. Nino para justificar la institucion del castigo. Sin embargo, en este trabajo intentare demostrar que ambos conceptos son irreconciliables. La encrucijada, en cualquier caso, es la siguiente: mientras el primer concepto, interpretado a la luz de la teoria etica del autor, parece tornar innecesaria la apelacion al segundo concepto, una interpretacion alternativa del primer concepto tampoco nos situaria ante un mejor panorama filosofico. EnglishIn the present article I aim to show that the meaning of the first concept (social protection), as well as the Kantian concept (consent) becomes truly intelligible only when we manage to read Nino’s penal theory in the light of his own ethical theory. Thus, on the hypothesis that this is indeed the best possible reading, the strategy tried out by Nino will have to face a difficult crossroads: either adopt a concept of social protection that will definitely displace the notion of consent from the justifying plane where the theory operates; or embrace a broader idea of protection where the notion of consent finds a less uncomfortable place. As will be argued, none of the alternatives is without its problems.