{"title":"Propensities and Possibilities","authors":"D. Mellor","doi":"10.1515/mp-2019-2002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper is a reply to a recent Metaphysica paper advocating an ‘unrestricted actualism’ which lets the actual world include unrealised possible outcomes of propensities. I argue that the actual world can accommodate propensity theories of chance without including unrealised possibilities.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":"20 1","pages":"1 - 3"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2019-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2019-2002","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2019-2002","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Abstract This paper is a reply to a recent Metaphysica paper advocating an ‘unrestricted actualism’ which lets the actual world include unrealised possible outcomes of propensities. I argue that the actual world can accommodate propensity theories of chance without including unrealised possibilities.