{"title":"How do impeachments influence foreign policies? Lessons from South America","authors":"I. Sposito","doi":"10.1590/0034-7329202300102","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Although we have a vast understanding of the causes and institutional impacts of impeachments, we know little about their policy outcomes. As such events occur during crises, new incumbents are expected to promote policy reforms. To identify how they influence foreign policy, I applied a most-different-system design to compare the cases of Lugo in Paraguay (2012) and Rousseff in Brazil (2016). Internally, impeachments politicize foreign policy, linking the external agenda to domestic politics. Externally, they may restrict foreign policy alternatives, depending on political actors’ perceptions of process legitimacy, ideological proximity, and state resources. I found that politicization after impeachments does not necessarily bring decision-making decentralization. Instead, actors capture the foreign policy agenda for political purposes","PeriodicalId":45317,"journal":{"name":"Revista Brasileira De Politica Internacional","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Revista Brasileira De Politica Internacional","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329202300102","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Although we have a vast understanding of the causes and institutional impacts of impeachments, we know little about their policy outcomes. As such events occur during crises, new incumbents are expected to promote policy reforms. To identify how they influence foreign policy, I applied a most-different-system design to compare the cases of Lugo in Paraguay (2012) and Rousseff in Brazil (2016). Internally, impeachments politicize foreign policy, linking the external agenda to domestic politics. Externally, they may restrict foreign policy alternatives, depending on political actors’ perceptions of process legitimacy, ideological proximity, and state resources. I found that politicization after impeachments does not necessarily bring decision-making decentralization. Instead, actors capture the foreign policy agenda for political purposes