The Political Economy of Net Neutrality Regulation

IF 0.4 Q4 ECONOMICS Economists Voice Pub Date : 2015-01-01 DOI:10.1515/ev-2015-0003
Dennis L. Weisman
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Abstract

Abstract On February 26, 2015, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) proposed sweeping new regulation for broadband providers. While regulation is typically driven by a combination of economic and political considerations, this article argues that the FCC’s initiative is long on politics and short on economics. For example, the FCC is not able to identify a non-transitory abuse of market power by broadband providers to justify its actions. There is no evidence of excessive returns being earned by broadband providers and the violations of net neutrality that the Commission can point to, including throttling and blocking of data, are conspicuously few in number. What is more, the FCC has yet to establish that the regulatory oversight it proposes would not stifle more investment than it stimulates. Broadband is an example of a two-sided market in which edge (content) providers represent one side of the market and consumers represent the other side of the market. Just as newspapers impose positive prices on both advertisers and subscribers, it is (quite generally) efficient in two-sided markets for both sides of the market to contribute to the total price. Two-sided markets are characterized by a seesaw principle in which a lower price on one side of the market tends to give rise to a higher price on the other side of the market. Hence, a ban on paid prioritization of traffic delivery over broadband networks essentially requires consumers to pay the full freight. The FCC is therefore in the unenviable position of having to justify a policy to regulate broadband that is distinguished by being both economically inefficient and socially inequitable. While the courts are disposed to give deference to expert federal agencies under the Chevron Doctrine, the lack of economic foundation to justify broadband regulation promises to make this tough sledding for the FCC. The strategy on the part of the broadband providers will be to run out the clock with litigation in the hope that the political winds shift in their favor post 2016.
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网络中立性监管的政治经济学
2015年2月26日,美国联邦通信委员会(FCC)提出了针对宽带提供商的全面新规。虽然监管通常是由经济和政治因素共同驱动的,但本文认为,联邦通信委员会的倡议在政治上很长,在经济上很短。例如,FCC无法确定宽带提供商对市场力量的非暂时性滥用,以证明其行动的合理性。没有证据表明宽带提供商获得了过高的回报,委员会可以指出的违反网络中立性的行为,包括限制和阻止数据,数量明显很少。更重要的是,联邦通信委员会尚未确定其提议的监管监督不会扼杀更多的投资,而不是刺激更多的投资。宽带是一个双边市场的例子,其中边缘(内容)提供商代表市场的一边,消费者代表市场的另一边。正如报纸对广告主和订户都施加正价格一样,在双边市场中,市场双方对总价格的贡献是(相当普遍的)有效的。双边市场的特点是跷跷板原则,即市场一侧的较低价格往往会引起市场另一侧的较高价格。因此,禁止在宽带网络上按优先顺序付费传输流量,本质上要求消费者支付全部费用。因此,联邦通信委员会处于一种不令人羡慕的境地,必须为一项既经济效率低下又社会不公平的宽带监管政策辩护。虽然法院倾向于在雪佛龙原则下尊重联邦专家机构,但缺乏证明宽带监管合理性的经济基础,将使联邦通信委员会面临艰难的考验。宽带提供商的策略将是通过诉讼来消磨时间,希望2016年后政治风向对他们有利。
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来源期刊
Economists Voice
Economists Voice ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
25.00%
发文量
9
期刊介绍: This journal is a non-partisan forum for economists to present innovative policy ideas or engaging commentary on the issues of the day. Readers include professional economists, lawyers, policy analysts, policymakers, and students of economics. Articles are short, 600-2000 words, and are intended to contain deeper analysis than is found on the Op-Ed page of the Wall Street Journal or New York Times, but to be of comparable general interest. We welcome submitted Columns from any professional economist. Letters to the editor are encouraged and may comment on any Column or Letter. Letters must be less than 300 words.
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