“Truth that one produces” or the history of philosophy by Elizabeth Anscombe

IF 0.1 0 PHILOSOPHY Filosofskii Zhurnal Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI:10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-2-80-93
A. Sanzhenakov
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Abstract

The article deals with the specifics of Elizabeth Anscombe’s approach to the history of philosophy. First, the author presents various approaches to the history of philosophy, and then gives a brief introduction of Anscombe as a philosopher and as a historian of philos­ophy. Her articles “Causality and Determinism” and “Practical Truth” are discussed as paradigmatic examples of Anscombe’s works on the history of philosophy. These exam­ples show that Anscombe’s appeal to the philosophy of the past, and especially to the legacy of Aristotle, was not episodic. The reason for her turning to the history of phi­losophy were always caused by theoretical difficulties in the contemporary philosophical context. For instance, the article “Causality and Determinism” appeals to a wide range of sources (Aristotle, Spinoza, Kant, Hume, Mill) in order to show the history of the forma­tion of the concept of causality as a necessary connection of events, but Anscombe looks for a solution to the problem in the works of her older contemporary B. Russell. Espe­cially often, Anscombe turns to Aristotle’s practical philosophy, with the help of which she attacks contemporary concepts. In particular, she criticizes the concept of “moral obligation”, points at an incorrect understanding of the “practical syllogism”, reveals the shortcomings of the Anglo-American concept of desire. In the end, the author of the article offers a brief retelling of the analysis of the Aristotelian concept of “practical truth”, which Anscombe proposes to understand as “the truth that one produces in acting according to choice and decision”. In proposing such an interpretation, Anscombe relies less on a philological or contextual analysis, but rather is guided by her own intuitions.
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"一个人产生的真理"或伊丽莎白·安斯科姆的哲学史
这篇文章论述了伊丽莎白·安斯库姆研究哲学史的具体方法。首先,作者介绍了哲学史的各种研究方法,然后简要介绍了安斯科姆作为哲学家和哲学史家的情况。她的文章《因果性与决定论》和《实践真理》作为安斯库姆哲学史著作的范例被讨论。这些例子表明,安斯科姆对过去的哲学,特别是对亚里士多德遗产的呼吁,并不是偶然的。她之所以转向哲学史,往往是由于当代哲学语境中的理论困境。例如,文章“因果关系和决定论”呼吁广泛的来源(亚里士多德,斯宾诺莎,康德,休谟,穆勒),以显示因果关系概念的形成历史,作为事件的必要联系,但安斯科姆在她的老同代人B.罗素的作品中寻找解决这个问题的方法。尤其经常,安斯科姆求助于亚里士多德的实践哲学,在其帮助下,她攻击当代概念。特别是,她批判了“道德义务”的概念,指出了对“实践三段论”的错误理解,揭示了英美欲望概念的缺陷。最后,作者简要复述了对亚里士多德“实践真理”概念的分析,安斯科姆建议将其理解为“人们根据选择和决定采取行动时产生的真理”。在提出这样的解释时,安斯库姆较少依赖于语言学或语境分析,而是以她自己的直觉为指导。
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来源期刊
Filosofskii Zhurnal
Filosofskii Zhurnal PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
50.00%
发文量
25
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