Progressive Political Theory and Separation of Powers on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts

Eric R. Claeys
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

This article proposes a positive explanation why the Supreme Court has erratically veered from functionalism to formalism and back in its separation of powers law for almost 30 years. The explanation suggests that most members of the Court are drawing on normative ideas about separation of powers heavily influenced by Progressive political theory. The Progressives generated a theory of government the article identifies as the Progressive theory of apolitical administration. The Progressives held that politics, the formation of a national will, needed to be kept separate from administration, the rational implementation of that will. The basic distinction between politics and administration became an important staple of legal education during and shortly after the New Deal - when most of the Justices on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts went to law school. Most of the Justices on these Courts have relied on Progressive norms about independent administration in deciding separation of powers cases since the 1970s. These Justices have applied formalism and functionalism selectively to promote the Progressive theory of apolitical administration in the Court's case law. If a law transfers power to independent agency administrators, most Justices apply functionalism, cite Progressive normative values in the functionalist analysis, defer to Congress, and uphold the law. If, however, a law enables politicians, and especially members of Congress, to supervise agency administration closely, the same Justices apply formalism to justify striking it down. The article has two main lessons. First, it explains in positive terms a phenomenon that has puzzled administrative-law commentators for years. Second, it offers a useful correction to several leading retrospectives written to date about the Rehnquist Court. The Progressive/New Deal influence in the Court's separation of powers law suggests that there are strong intellectual limits on the extent to which the Rehnquist Court or a future Court may repudiate the constitutional achievements of the New Deal.
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进步政治理论与伯格和伦奎斯特法院的分权
这篇文章提出了一个积极的解释,为什么最高法院在近30年的时间里反复地从功能主义转向形式主义,并回到了权力分立法。这一解释表明,最高法院的大多数法官都在借鉴深受进步主义政治理论影响的关于三权分立的规范性观念。进步派产生了一种政府理论,本文将其称为进步的非政治管理理论。进步派认为,政治,即国家意志的形成,需要与行政,即意志的合理实施分开。在新政期间和新政结束后不久,政治和行政之间的基本区别成为法律教育的重要内容,当时伯格法院和伦奎斯特法院的大多数法官都上过法学院。自20世纪70年代以来,这些法院的大多数法官在裁决权力分立案件时都依赖于有关独立行政的进步主义规范。这些法官有选择地运用形式主义和功能主义,在最高法院的判例法中推行进步主义的非政治行政理论。如果一项法律将权力移交给独立的机构管理者,大多数法官会运用功能主义,在功能主义分析中引用进步的规范价值观,服从国会,并维护法律。然而,如果一项法律允许政治家,尤其是国会议员,密切监督机构的行政,同样的法官也会运用形式主义来证明废除这项法律是正当的。这篇文章有两个主要教训。首先,它从积极的角度解释了一个困扰行政法评论家多年的现象。其次,它为迄今为止撰写的关于伦奎斯特法院的几个主要回顾提供了有益的纠正。进步/新政对最高法院三权分立法的影响表明,伦奎斯特法院或未来的最高法院在多大程度上否定新政的宪法成就存在很强的智力限制。
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