Selection Effects in Constitutional Law

IF 2.4 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW Virginia Law Review Pub Date : 2004-03-01 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.523542
Adrian Vermeule
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引用次数: 67

Abstract

The standard consequentialist analysis of constitutional law focuses on the incentives that shape the behavior of government officials and other constitutional actors. Incentive-based accounts justify elections as a means of constraining officials to promote the public welfare, or at least the welfare of the median voter; justify the separation of powers as a means of making "ambition counteract ambition"; justify negative liberties, such as free speech and free association, as a necessary corrective to incumbent officials' incentives to suppress political opposition; and so forth. In this experimental essay I offer a preliminary sketch of a different way of looking at constitutional law generally and constitutional structure in particular: through the lens of "selection effects." Constitutional rules, on this account, should focus not only on the creation of optimal incentives for those who happen to occupy official posts at any given time, but also on the question which (potential) officials are selected to occupy those posts over time. Where an incentive analysis is short-term and static, asking only how legal rules affect the behavior of a given set of officeholders, selection analysis is long-term and dynamic, asking how legal rules themselves produce feedback effects that, over time, bring new types of government officials into power. This turn to selection-based analysis yields fresh insight into the dynamics of constitutionalism. Because constitutional rules affect the pool of potential and actual officeholders, as well as the behavior of current officeholders, focusing on selection effects shows that some constitutional rules prove "self-stabilizing": the rules tend to select a corps of officeholders who will act to uphold and stabilize the rules themselves. Other constitutional rules, by contrast, prove "self-negating": the rules tend to select a corps of officeholders who work to undermine or destabilize the rules themselves. This framework supplies insights into diverse areas of constitutional law and theory, ranging from governmental structure, campaign finance and voting rights to criminal sentencing, free speech, and affirmative action.
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宪法中的选择效应
对宪法的标准结果主义分析侧重于影响政府官员和其他宪法行为者行为的激励因素。基于激励的解释证明选举是一种约束官员促进公共福利的手段,或者至少是中间选民的福利;证明三权分立是一种使“野心抵消野心”的手段;证明言论自由和结社自由等负面自由是对现任官员压制政治反对派动机的必要纠正;等等。在这篇实验文章中,我提供了一个初步的概述,从一个不同的角度来看待宪法,特别是宪法结构:通过“选择效应”的镜头。因此,宪法规则不仅应注重为那些在任何时候碰巧担任公职的人创造最佳的奖励,而且还应注重长期挑选哪些(潜在)官员担任这些职务的问题。激励分析是短期和静态的,只询问法律规则如何影响一组特定官员的行为,而选择分析是长期和动态的,询问法律规则本身如何产生反馈效应,随着时间的推移,这种反馈效应会使新型政府官员上台。这种转向以选择为基础的分析产生了对宪政动态的新见解。由于宪法规则影响的是潜在和实际公职人员的数量,以及现任公职人员的行为,因此关注选择效应表明,一些宪法规则具有“自我稳定”的特点:规则倾向于选择一群自己维护和稳定规则的公职人员。相比之下,其他宪法规定则被证明是“自我否定”的:这些规定倾向于选择一群致力于破坏或破坏这些规定的公职人员。这个框架提供了对宪法法律和理论的不同领域的见解,从政府结构、竞选资金和投票权到刑事判决、言论自由和平权行动。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.70
自引率
3.80%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Virginia Law Review is a journal of general legal scholarship published by the students of the University of Virginia School of Law. The continuing objective of the Virginia Law Review is to publish a professional periodical devoted to legal and law-related issues that can be of use to judges, practitioners, teachers, legislators, students, and others interested in the law. First formally organized on April 23, 1913, the Virginia Law Review today remains one of the most respected and influential student legal periodicals in the country.
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