Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial Process

Joseph Isenbergh
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引用次数: 107

Abstract

The Lewinsky affair played out under ground rules shaped in the Watergate affair, an earlier episode involving misconduct by a President. A predicate of the impeachment of President Clinton was the President's involvement in a private civil lawsuit. A sitting President's exposure to compulsory judicial process has been accepted almost without demur among academic commentators since the 1974 case of United States v. Nixon. As for impeachment, the academic consensus is that the Constitution defines impeachable offenses as "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors," the latter terms describing an imprecisely bounded category of serious offenses. This paper contends that both of these views are misconceived. The prevailing view of impeachment and presidential immunity slights both the terms of the Constitution and history. The scope of impeachment, based on a straightforward reading of the constitutional provisions concerning it, is demonstrably different from the academic consensus. The text of the Constitution and relevant history reveal that 1) impeachable offenses are not defined in the Constitution; 2) "high crimes and misdemeanors" are an historically well-defined category of offenses aimed specifically against the state, for which removal from office is mandatory upon conviction by the Senate; 3) Congress has the power to impeach and remove civil officers for a range of offenses other than high crimes and misdemeanors; and 4) the Senate can impose sanctions less severe than removal from office--censure, for example--on civil officers convicted of such other offenses. The textual and historical support for these propositions is powerful, if not overwhelming. When impeachment is correctly understood, the question of the President's immunity from judicial process takes on a different light. There is neither a constitutional basis nor a sound footing in policy for any official action against a sitting President other than impeachment.
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弹劾和总统司法程序豁免
莱温斯基事件是在水门事件中形成的基本规则下进行的,水门事件涉及一位总统的不当行为。弹劾克林顿总统的一个先决条件是总统卷入一桩私人民事诉讼。自1974年美国诉尼克松案(United States v. Nixon)以来,学术界评论员几乎毫无异议地接受了现任总统面临强制司法程序的事实。至于弹劾,学术界的共识是,宪法将可弹劾的罪行定义为“叛国、贿赂或其他重罪和轻罪”,后者描述的是一类界限不明确的严重罪行。本文认为这两种观点都是错误的。弹劾和总统豁免权的主流观点忽视了宪法条款和历史。根据对宪法条款的直接解读,弹劾的范围显然与学术界的共识不同。宪法文本和相关历史表明:1)宪法中没有对可弹劾罪的定义;2) “重罪和轻罪”是历史上定义明确的一类专门针对国家的罪行,在参议院定罪后,必须将其免职;3)国会有权弹劾和罢免除重罪和轻罪以外的一系列罪行的文职官员;4)参议院可以对犯有这类其他罪行的文职官员施加比免职更轻的制裁——例如谴责。这些命题的文本和历史支持即使不是压倒性的,也是强有力的。当弹劾被正确理解时,总统免于司法程序的问题就有了不同的看法。除了弹劾之外,对现任总统采取任何官方行动,既没有宪法依据,也没有坚实的政策基础。
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