Risky Arguments in Social - Justice Litigation: The Case of Sex Discrimination and Marriage Equality

IF 3.4 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW Columbia Law Review Pub Date : 2014-12-01 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.2199964
Suzanne B. Goldberg
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

This Essay takes up the puzzle of the risky argument or, more precisely, the puzzle of why certain arguments do not get much traction in advocacy and adjudication even when some judges find them to be utterly convincing. Through a close examination of the sex discrimination argument’s evanescence in contemporary marriage litigation, I draw lessons about how and why arguments become risky in social justice cases and whether they should be made nonetheless. This context is particularly fruitful because some judges, advocates and scholars find it “obviously correct” that laws excluding same-sex couples from marriage discriminate facially based on sex or impose sex stereotypes. Yet advocates have tended to minimize these arguments and most judges either sidestep or go out of their way to reject them.Certain kinds of arguments, including the sex discrimination argument in marriage cases, turn out to pose greater risks than others because they ask decisionmakers to confront long-settled social hierarchies and norms, such as those associated with gender roles. As a result, they risk inciting Burkean anxieties about the dangers of non-incremental change. Arguments that ask less of decisionmakers, such as those about animus associated with a particular enactment – or that have a more limited reach, such as heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation at a time when few explicitly antigay laws remain – are less likely to provoke that discomfort. Moreover, a win on these narrower arguments can effectively erode stereotypes and norms underlying a challenged law or social policy. In marriage cases, for example, a pro-equality ruling helps call longstanding marital gender roles into question even if the court’s decision never mentions sex discrimination. Still, risky arguments add value within litigation by powerfully calling attention to deep problems that underlie a challenged law. Through close study of these costs and benefits, the risky argument frame advanced here aims to illuminate the complex dynamics of argumentation in the litigation and adjudication of social justice cases.
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社会正义诉讼中的风险论点:性别歧视与婚姻平等案例
本文探讨了风险论证的谜题,或者更准确地说,是为什么某些论证在辩护和裁决中得不到多少关注,即使有些法官认为它们完全令人信服。通过对当代婚姻诉讼中性别歧视论点的消失的仔细研究,我得出了关于在社会正义案件中论点是如何以及为什么变得有风险的教训,以及它们是否应该被提出。这一背景尤其富有成效,因为一些法官、维权人士和学者认为,将同性伴侣排除在婚姻之外的法律基于性别或强加性别刻板印象是“明显正确的”。然而,辩护人倾向于尽量减少这些论点,大多数法官要么回避,要么不顾一切地拒绝他们。事实证明,某些类型的论点,包括婚姻案件中的性别歧视论点,比其他论点带来的风险更大,因为它们要求决策者面对长期存在的社会等级和规范,比如与性别角色相关的社会等级和规范。因此,它们有可能激起伯克式的对非增量变化危险的焦虑。对决策者要求较少的争论,比如那些与某一特定法规相关的关于敌意的争论,或者那些影响范围更有限的争论,比如在明确反对同性恋的法律很少的时候加强对性取向的审查,不太可能引起这种不适。此外,在这些狭隘的争论中获胜,可以有效地侵蚀受到挑战的法律或社会政策背后的刻板印象和规范。例如,在婚姻案件中,支持平等的裁决有助于质疑长期存在的婚姻性别角色,即使法院的裁决从未提及性别歧视。尽管如此,有风险的论点在诉讼中增加了价值,因为它有力地引起了人们对受到挑战的法律背后的深层问题的关注。通过对这些成本和收益的深入研究,本文提出的风险论证框架旨在阐明在社会正义案件的诉讼和裁决中论证的复杂动态。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.00
自引率
6.90%
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0
期刊介绍: The Columbia Law Review is one of the world"s leading publications of legal scholarship. Founded in 1901, the Review is an independent nonprofit corporation that produces a law journal edited and published entirely by students at Columbia Law School. It is one of a handful of student-edited law journals in the nation that publish eight issues a year. The Review is the third most widely distributed and cited law review in the country. It receives about 2,000 submissions per year and selects approximately 20-25 manuscripts for publication annually, in addition to student Notes. In 2008, the Review expanded its audience with the launch of Sidebar, an online supplement to the Review.
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