The History of the Loyal Denominator

Q4 Social Sciences Louisiana Law Review Pub Date : 2013-08-28 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.2317471
Christopher R. Green
{"title":"The History of the Loyal Denominator","authors":"Christopher R. Green","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2317471","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The exclusion of Southern representatives from Congress from December 1865 to the summer of 1868 raises problems for the Fourteenth Amendment’s compliance with both of Article V’s requirements for constitutional amendments. Congress (a) proposed the Amendment in 1866 while excluding Southern representatives, an exclusion critical to achieving 2/3-of-each-house majorities, and (b) required Southern states in 1867 to ratify as a condition for readmission, an inducement critical to achieving a 3/4-of-the-states ratification requirement. Even if these problems do not imperil the Fourteenth Amendment as an enforceable part of the Constitution, they may give interpreters pause in enforcing it as energetically as they might enforce parts of the Constitution with less-cloudy pedigrees.Scholars like Bruce Ackerman, John Harrison, Akhil Amar, and most recently Thomas Colby have proposed a wide variety of conflicting ways to handle these problems. Ackerman explains the Amendment’s legitimacy on the basis of President Johnson’s 1868 capitulation to a non-Article-V process, confirmed by the Supreme Court in 1873. Harrison relies instead on the unreviewable finality of congressional membership decisions and pressured state ratifications, Amar on congressional power to republicanize Southern states with black suffrage, and Colby on the normative desirability of an intergenerationally-authored Fourteenth Amendment including cases like Brown and Roe. Here, however, I propose an approach that will (a) fit the text and history of the Constitution, (b) preserve Fourteenth Amendment legitimacy in a simple, appealing fashion, and (c) clarify the Fourteenth Amendment’s author and frame the Fourteenth Amendment more straightforwardly as an expression of the victorious Union’s Republican principles. The “loyal denominator” view roots both the 1866 proposal and the 1867 coercion of the South on the continuing suspension of rights that began with secession. A disloyal South whose Article I and Article V rights were suspended upon secession had no right to participate in federal lawmaking process, either in Congress or as part of the Article V denominator, until the Union’s military victory was sufficiently secure in the view of Congress. Given a loyal Article V denominator, the Fourteenth Amendment became law on February 12, 1867, with Pennsylvania’s 20th ratification out of 26 congressionally-represented states, as opposed to July 1868, when 28 of the full 37 states had ratified, including 8 ratifications squeezed out of the South. This view changes the Fourteenth Amendment’s time of adoption, but even more important is the change in the constitutional author: we should understand the text as expressions of meaning uttered by the loyal North, not as jointly uttered by the loyal North and the defeated South. Ackerman, Harrison, Colby, and especially Amar have all explored the possibility of a loyal-denominator solution to Fourteenth Amendment legitimacy and noted substantial support for the theory. Ackerman and Colby chiefly associate the view with Charles Sumner and Thaddeus Stevens’s idiosyncratic versions of the position, while Harrison rejects it on textual grounds and Amar thinks that Congress abandoned the view in the Reconstruction Act of 1867. A full canvass of historical support for a loyal denominator, however, which this article supplies for the first time, answers these objections.A great many Republicans espoused the loyal-denominator theory of Article V, from the very start of the war and continuing through 1868 and beyond. Their theories were not limited to Charles Sumner’s state-suicide theory, Thaddeus Stevens’s theory of successful secession and reconquest, or the view that Southern states were not republican in form. The key for most advocates of the view was instead reliable loyalty in the face of secession. While some important Republicans, like President Lincoln in speaking of the Thirteenth Amendment, were agnostic on the issue, virtually no Republicans voiced full-throated criticisms of the loyal denominator. A loyal denominator was also adopted by many early scholars who considered the issue. This Article explains the loyal-denominator view and focuses on its prevalence during and after the Civil War and Reconstruction. Sequels will defend loyal denominatorism under the meaning expressed by the relevant constitutional language at the original Founding and investigate the implications of a Northern-authored Fourteenth Amendment both for interpretation of the amendment and for democratic theory.","PeriodicalId":39678,"journal":{"name":"Louisiana Law Review","volume":"79 1","pages":"7"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.2317471","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Louisiana Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2317471","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

The exclusion of Southern representatives from Congress from December 1865 to the summer of 1868 raises problems for the Fourteenth Amendment’s compliance with both of Article V’s requirements for constitutional amendments. Congress (a) proposed the Amendment in 1866 while excluding Southern representatives, an exclusion critical to achieving 2/3-of-each-house majorities, and (b) required Southern states in 1867 to ratify as a condition for readmission, an inducement critical to achieving a 3/4-of-the-states ratification requirement. Even if these problems do not imperil the Fourteenth Amendment as an enforceable part of the Constitution, they may give interpreters pause in enforcing it as energetically as they might enforce parts of the Constitution with less-cloudy pedigrees.Scholars like Bruce Ackerman, John Harrison, Akhil Amar, and most recently Thomas Colby have proposed a wide variety of conflicting ways to handle these problems. Ackerman explains the Amendment’s legitimacy on the basis of President Johnson’s 1868 capitulation to a non-Article-V process, confirmed by the Supreme Court in 1873. Harrison relies instead on the unreviewable finality of congressional membership decisions and pressured state ratifications, Amar on congressional power to republicanize Southern states with black suffrage, and Colby on the normative desirability of an intergenerationally-authored Fourteenth Amendment including cases like Brown and Roe. Here, however, I propose an approach that will (a) fit the text and history of the Constitution, (b) preserve Fourteenth Amendment legitimacy in a simple, appealing fashion, and (c) clarify the Fourteenth Amendment’s author and frame the Fourteenth Amendment more straightforwardly as an expression of the victorious Union’s Republican principles. The “loyal denominator” view roots both the 1866 proposal and the 1867 coercion of the South on the continuing suspension of rights that began with secession. A disloyal South whose Article I and Article V rights were suspended upon secession had no right to participate in federal lawmaking process, either in Congress or as part of the Article V denominator, until the Union’s military victory was sufficiently secure in the view of Congress. Given a loyal Article V denominator, the Fourteenth Amendment became law on February 12, 1867, with Pennsylvania’s 20th ratification out of 26 congressionally-represented states, as opposed to July 1868, when 28 of the full 37 states had ratified, including 8 ratifications squeezed out of the South. This view changes the Fourteenth Amendment’s time of adoption, but even more important is the change in the constitutional author: we should understand the text as expressions of meaning uttered by the loyal North, not as jointly uttered by the loyal North and the defeated South. Ackerman, Harrison, Colby, and especially Amar have all explored the possibility of a loyal-denominator solution to Fourteenth Amendment legitimacy and noted substantial support for the theory. Ackerman and Colby chiefly associate the view with Charles Sumner and Thaddeus Stevens’s idiosyncratic versions of the position, while Harrison rejects it on textual grounds and Amar thinks that Congress abandoned the view in the Reconstruction Act of 1867. A full canvass of historical support for a loyal denominator, however, which this article supplies for the first time, answers these objections.A great many Republicans espoused the loyal-denominator theory of Article V, from the very start of the war and continuing through 1868 and beyond. Their theories were not limited to Charles Sumner’s state-suicide theory, Thaddeus Stevens’s theory of successful secession and reconquest, or the view that Southern states were not republican in form. The key for most advocates of the view was instead reliable loyalty in the face of secession. While some important Republicans, like President Lincoln in speaking of the Thirteenth Amendment, were agnostic on the issue, virtually no Republicans voiced full-throated criticisms of the loyal denominator. A loyal denominator was also adopted by many early scholars who considered the issue. This Article explains the loyal-denominator view and focuses on its prevalence during and after the Civil War and Reconstruction. Sequels will defend loyal denominatorism under the meaning expressed by the relevant constitutional language at the original Founding and investigate the implications of a Northern-authored Fourteenth Amendment both for interpretation of the amendment and for democratic theory.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
忠诚分母的历史
从1865年12月到1868年夏天,南方代表被排除在国会之外,这给第十四条修正案是否符合第五条对宪法修正案的两项要求提出了问题。国会(a)在1866年提出了修正案,但排除了南方代表,这是达到两院2/3多数的关键;(b)在1867年要求南方各州批准作为重新接纳的条件,这是达到3/4州批准要求的关键诱因。即使这些问题不会危及第十四修正案作为宪法可执行部分的地位,它们也可能会让解释者在执行它时踌躇不前,就像他们执行宪法中血统不那么模糊的部分一样。像Bruce Ackerman、John Harrison、Akhil Amar和最近的Thomas Colby这样的学者提出了各种各样相互矛盾的方法来处理这些问题。阿克曼解释修正案的合法性的基础是,约翰逊总统在1868年向非宪法第五条程序投降,并于1873年得到最高法院的确认。相反,哈里森依靠的是国会成员决定的不可审查的最终结果和施加压力的州批准,阿马尔依靠的是国会赋予南方各州黑人选举权的共和权力,科尔比依靠的是包括布朗和罗伊案在内的跨代起草的第十四条修正案的规范性可取性。然而,在这里,我提出了一种方法,它将(a)符合宪法的文本和历史,(b)以一种简单、有吸引力的方式保持第十四条修正案的合法性,(c)澄清第十四条修正案的作者,并更直接地将第十四条修正案框定为胜利联盟共和原则的表达。“忠诚分母”观点的根源在于1866年的提案和1867年南方的胁迫,即继续暂停从分裂开始的权利。一个不忠诚的南方,其第一条和第五条的权利在脱离联邦后被暂停,在国会或作为第五条的一部分,没有权利参与联邦立法过程,直到国会认为联邦的军事胜利是足够安全的。由于忠实于第五条款,第十四修正案于1867年2月12日成为法律,宾夕法尼亚州在26个国会代表州中获得第20个批准,而1868年7月,37个州中有28个批准,其中包括南方的8个批准。这种观点改变了第十四修正案的通过时间,但更重要的是宪法作者的改变:我们应该把文本理解为忠诚的北方所表达的意思,而不是忠诚的北方和战败的南方共同表达的意思。阿克曼、哈里森、科尔比,尤其是阿玛尔,都探索了用忠诚分母解决第十四条修正案合法性的可能性,并指出了对该理论的大量支持。阿克曼和科尔比主要将这一观点与查尔斯·萨姆纳(Charles Sumner)和撒迪厄斯·史蒂文斯(Thaddeus Stevens)的独特观点联系在一起,而哈里森则以文本为依据反对这一观点,阿马尔认为国会在1867年的《重建法案》中放弃了这一观点。然而,本文首次对忠诚分母的历史支持进行了全面调查,回答了这些反对意见。从战争一开始,一直到1868年及以后,许多共和党人都支持宪法第五条的忠诚分母理论。他们的理论并不局限于查尔斯·萨姆纳(Charles Sumner)的州自杀理论、塞迪厄斯·史蒂文斯(Thaddeus Stevens)的成功脱离和重新征服的理论,也不局限于南方各州在形式上并不共和的观点。对大多数持这种观点的人来说,关键是面对分裂时可靠的忠诚。虽然一些重要的共和党人,比如林肯总统在谈到第13修正案时,对这个问题持不可知论态度,但实际上没有共和党人对忠诚的公约数发出大声的批评。许多研究这个问题的早期学者也采用了忠诚分母。本文解释了忠诚分母观,并重点介绍了它在南北战争和重建期间及其后的流行情况。续篇将在最初建国时相关宪法语言所表达的意义下捍卫忠诚的教派主义,并调查北方起草的第十四修正案对修正案的解释和民主理论的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
Louisiana Law Review
Louisiana Law Review Social Sciences-Law
CiteScore
0.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The first issue of the Louisiana Law Review went into print in November of 1938. Since then the Review has served as Louisiana"s flagship legal journal and has become a vibrant forum for scholarship in comparative and civil law topics. The article below is taken from the first issue of the Law Review. The piece was meant to commemorate the founding of the Law Review and to foreshadow the lasting impact that the Louisiana Law Review would have on state jurisprudence and legislation and on the legal landscape of Louisiana for years to come.
期刊最新文献
Towards a New Archimedean Point for Maternal vs. Fetal Rights? A Louisiana Theory of Juridical Acts States’ Rights to Protect Gun-Owning Patients from Politicized Physician Speech Custom as a Source of Law in Louisiana A Tribute to Thanassi: The Influence of Justinian on American Common Law Property
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1