{"title":"Two Visions of Corporate Law","authors":"Todd Henderson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1328343","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In a recent paper, Professor Robert Ahdieh argues that the debate about whether corporate law federalism leads to a race to the top or the bottom is pointless because state corporate law has little to do with the quality of corporate governance. Ahdieh thinks that markets, like those for corporate control and labor, are what make corporate governance what it is, not state competition for corporate charters. This essay, which will appear in the George Washington Law Review as part of a colloquy on Ahdieh's thought-provoking paper, argues that the race debate matters because while the market for corporate control disciplines managers, it is competition among states that disciplines states from distorting the market for corporate control. After showing that the race debate matters, the essay then tries to explain the persistence and ideological valence of the debate. Why is it that the debate continues despite innumerable empirical and theoretical studies on both sides, and why is it that defenders of the federalism model are mostly conservatives and critics are mostly liberals? The answer to both questions is that the race debate is really a conflict between two visions of corporate law held by these groups. Using the framework developed by Thomas Sowell, the essay shows how the split in the academic community about the optimality of the corporate law model can be explained by one's faith in experts (what Sowell calls the \"unconstrained\" vision) or by one's faith in processes, like markets (what Sowell calls the \"constrained\" vision). The essay then offers some preliminary thoughts on the implications of this description for corporate law scholarship and some ideas on how to move the debate forward.","PeriodicalId":47068,"journal":{"name":"George Washington Law Review","volume":"77 1","pages":"708"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2009-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"34","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"George Washington Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1328343","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 34
Abstract
In a recent paper, Professor Robert Ahdieh argues that the debate about whether corporate law federalism leads to a race to the top or the bottom is pointless because state corporate law has little to do with the quality of corporate governance. Ahdieh thinks that markets, like those for corporate control and labor, are what make corporate governance what it is, not state competition for corporate charters. This essay, which will appear in the George Washington Law Review as part of a colloquy on Ahdieh's thought-provoking paper, argues that the race debate matters because while the market for corporate control disciplines managers, it is competition among states that disciplines states from distorting the market for corporate control. After showing that the race debate matters, the essay then tries to explain the persistence and ideological valence of the debate. Why is it that the debate continues despite innumerable empirical and theoretical studies on both sides, and why is it that defenders of the federalism model are mostly conservatives and critics are mostly liberals? The answer to both questions is that the race debate is really a conflict between two visions of corporate law held by these groups. Using the framework developed by Thomas Sowell, the essay shows how the split in the academic community about the optimality of the corporate law model can be explained by one's faith in experts (what Sowell calls the "unconstrained" vision) or by one's faith in processes, like markets (what Sowell calls the "constrained" vision). The essay then offers some preliminary thoughts on the implications of this description for corporate law scholarship and some ideas on how to move the debate forward.
在最近的一篇论文中,罗伯特•阿迪耶(Robert Ahdieh)教授认为,关于公司法联邦制是否会导致竞争的争论毫无意义,因为州公司法与公司治理的质量几乎没有关系。Ahdieh认为,市场,就像公司控制和劳动力市场一样,是公司治理的基础,而不是国家对公司章程的竞争。这篇文章将出现在《乔治华盛顿法律评论》(George Washington Law Review)上,作为对Ahdieh那篇发人深省的论文的讨论的一部分。文章认为,种族辩论很重要,因为虽然公司控制权的市场约束了管理者,但约束各州扭曲公司控制权市场的是各州之间的竞争。在展示了种族辩论的重要性之后,文章试图解释辩论的持久性和意识形态价值。为什么尽管双方都进行了无数的实证和理论研究,辩论仍在继续?为什么联邦主义模式的捍卫者大多是保守派,而批评者大多是自由派?这两个问题的答案是,种族辩论实际上是这些团体对公司法的两种看法之间的冲突。利用托马斯·索威尔(Thomas Sowell)提出的框架,这篇文章展示了学术界关于公司法模型最优性的分歧是如何通过对专家的信任(索威尔称之为“不受约束”的观点)或对市场等过程的信任(索威尔称之为“受约束”的观点)来解释的。然后,本文就这种描述对公司法学术的影响提供了一些初步的想法,并就如何推动辩论提出了一些想法。