{"title":"How Not to Be Chief Justice: The Apprenticeship of William H. Rehnquist","authors":"L. Greenhouse","doi":"10.2307/40041342","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"William H. Rehnquist had an unusually long apprenticeship before he became Chief Justice in 1986. He had already served under two Chief Justices: first under Chief Justice Fred Vinson during his own Supreme Court clerkship for Justice Robert H. Jackson in 1952-1953, and then, of course, during the more than fourteen years that he spent as an Associate Justice on the Burger Court. (You will notice that Rehnquist’s Supreme Court biography happens to skip the Warren Court years—not that exposure to Earl Warren would likely have made much difference, but it is worth noting that Chief Justice Warren does not even appear in the index to Rehnquist’s book on the Supreme Court, a part-memoir and part-history that he published in 1987.) The differences between Chief Justice Burger and Chief Justice Rehnquist were manifest. One did not need to be a Court insider— and I do not present myself as one—to observe some of them. For example, during the Burger years, it was regarded as routine that an argued case or two would not be decided by the end of the Term, and instead would be, without explanation, restored to the calendar for reargument during the next Term. The reason, almost invariably, was that the Chief Justice had simply failed to exercise enough leadership to extract from his colleagues something that could pass for an opinion. Perhaps the most egregious example of this phenomenon was the Court’s failure to decide INS v. Chadha, the legislative veto case, during the 1981 Term. The case was reargued during the 1982 Term and was finally decided on June 23, 1983, by a vote of seven to two, with an opinion for the Court by Chief Justice Burger declaring the legislative veto unconstitutional. The Chadha file was one of the first I looked at when I began my work with the papers of Justice Harry Blackmun at","PeriodicalId":48012,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Law Review","volume":"154 1","pages":"1365"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5000,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/40041342","citationCount":"4","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"University of Pennsylvania Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2307/40041342","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Abstract
William H. Rehnquist had an unusually long apprenticeship before he became Chief Justice in 1986. He had already served under two Chief Justices: first under Chief Justice Fred Vinson during his own Supreme Court clerkship for Justice Robert H. Jackson in 1952-1953, and then, of course, during the more than fourteen years that he spent as an Associate Justice on the Burger Court. (You will notice that Rehnquist’s Supreme Court biography happens to skip the Warren Court years—not that exposure to Earl Warren would likely have made much difference, but it is worth noting that Chief Justice Warren does not even appear in the index to Rehnquist’s book on the Supreme Court, a part-memoir and part-history that he published in 1987.) The differences between Chief Justice Burger and Chief Justice Rehnquist were manifest. One did not need to be a Court insider— and I do not present myself as one—to observe some of them. For example, during the Burger years, it was regarded as routine that an argued case or two would not be decided by the end of the Term, and instead would be, without explanation, restored to the calendar for reargument during the next Term. The reason, almost invariably, was that the Chief Justice had simply failed to exercise enough leadership to extract from his colleagues something that could pass for an opinion. Perhaps the most egregious example of this phenomenon was the Court’s failure to decide INS v. Chadha, the legislative veto case, during the 1981 Term. The case was reargued during the 1982 Term and was finally decided on June 23, 1983, by a vote of seven to two, with an opinion for the Court by Chief Justice Burger declaring the legislative veto unconstitutional. The Chadha file was one of the first I looked at when I began my work with the papers of Justice Harry Blackmun at
威廉·h·伦奎斯特(William H. Rehnquist)在1986年成为首席大法官之前,经历了一段异常漫长的学徒期。他已经在两位首席大法官手下工作过:第一个是首席大法官弗雷德·文森的手下,1952年至1953年,他在最高法院为罗伯特·h·杰克逊大法官做助理,然后,当然,他在汉堡法院担任了14年多的大法官。(你会注意到伦奎斯特的最高法院传记恰好跳过了沃伦法院的岁月——虽然与厄尔·沃伦的接触可能会有很大的不同,但值得注意的是,首席大法官沃伦甚至没有出现在伦奎斯特1987年出版的关于最高法院的书的索引中,这本书既是回忆录又是历史。)首席大法官伯格和首席大法官伦奎斯特之间的分歧是显而易见的。一个人不需要成为法院的内部人士——我也不以内部人士自居——就能观察到其中的一些。例如,在伯格任职期间,一两个有争议的案件在学期结束前不会作出裁决,而是在没有任何解释的情况下,被恢复到日历上,以便在下一学期重新辩论,这被视为惯例。原因几乎无一例外地是,首席大法官只是没有发挥足够的领导能力,从他的同事那里获得一些可以作为意见的东西。这种现象最令人震惊的例子也许是法院在1981年任期内未能就立法否决案INS诉Chadha案作出裁决。该案在1982年任期内被重新辩论,并最终于1983年6月23日以7比2的投票结果作出裁决,首席大法官伯格宣布立法否决违宪。查达的文件是我开始研究哈里·布莱克蒙法官的文件时最先看到的文件之一