Pub Date : 2022-03-08DOI: 10.1017/S1431927622000186
Carolina Dos S Jacob, Gabriela K Barbosa, Mariana P Rodrigues, Jurandyr Pimentel Neto, Lara C Rocha-Braga, Camilla G de Oliveira, Marucia Chacur, Adriano P Ciena
The myotendinous junction (MTJ) is a highly specialized region of the locomotor apparatus. Here, we investigated the ultrastructural and molecular effects in the MTJ region after static stretching prior to the ladder-based resistance training. Thirty-two male, 60-day old Wistar rats were divided into four groups: Sedentary, Resistance Training, Stretching, and Stretching-Resistance Training. The gastrocnemius muscle was processed for transmission electron microscopy techniques and Western blot assay. We observed that the static stretching prior to the ladder-based resistance training increased the MTJ components, the fibroblast growth factor (FGF)-2 and FGF-6 protein expression. Also, we demonstrated the lower transforming growth factor expression and no difference in the lysyl oxidase expression after combined training. The MTJ alterations in response to combined training demonstrate adaptive mechanisms which can be used for the prescription or development of methods to reduce or prevent injuries in humans and promote the myotendinous interface benefit.
肌腱连接处（MTJ）是运动器官中一个高度特化的区域。在此，我们研究了阶梯式阻力训练前静态拉伸后 MTJ 区域的超微结构和分子影响。32 只 60 天大的雄性 Wistar 大鼠被分为四组：静坐组、阻力训练组、拉伸组和拉伸-阻力训练组。对腓肠肌进行了透射电子显微镜技术和 Western 印迹分析。我们观察到，阶梯式阻力训练前的静态拉伸增加了MTJ成分、成纤维细胞生长因子（FGF）-2和FGF-6蛋白的表达。此外，我们还发现在联合训练后，转化生长因子的表达较低，而赖氨酸氧化酶的表达则无差异。MTJ对联合训练的反应变化显示了适应机制，可用于制定或开发减少或预防人体损伤的方法，并促进肌腱界面的益处。
{"title":"Ultrastructural and Molecular Development of the Myotendinous Junction Triggered by Stretching Prior to Resistance Exercise.","authors":"Carolina Dos S Jacob, Gabriela K Barbosa, Mariana P Rodrigues, Jurandyr Pimentel Neto, Lara C Rocha-Braga, Camilla G de Oliveira, Marucia Chacur, Adriano P Ciena","doi":"10.1017/S1431927622000186","DOIUrl":"10.1017/S1431927622000186","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The myotendinous junction (MTJ) is a highly specialized region of the locomotor apparatus. Here, we investigated the ultrastructural and molecular effects in the MTJ region after static stretching prior to the ladder-based resistance training. Thirty-two male, 60-day old Wistar rats were divided into four groups: Sedentary, Resistance Training, Stretching, and Stretching-Resistance Training. The gastrocnemius muscle was processed for transmission electron microscopy techniques and Western blot assay. We observed that the static stretching prior to the ladder-based resistance training increased the MTJ components, the fibroblast growth factor (FGF)-2 and FGF-6 protein expression. Also, we demonstrated the lower transforming growth factor expression and no difference in the lysyl oxidase expression after combined training. The MTJ alterations in response to combined training demonstrate adaptive mechanisms which can be used for the prescription or development of methods to reduce or prevent injuries in humans and promote the myotendinous interface benefit.</p>","PeriodicalId":48012,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Law Review","volume":"101 1","pages":"1-6"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91037666","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When agencies implement their statutes, administrative law doctrine describes what they do as interpretation. This raises the question of how much deference courts ought to give to such agency interpretations of law. This Article claims, however, that something else is usually going on when agencies implement statutory schemes. Although agencies interpret law, as they must, as an incident to enforce the law, agencies also exercise another power altogether: an interstitial lawmaking, gap-filling, policymaking power, a power that I shall call the “specification power.” This Article aims to advance existing accounts of agency activity and judicial deference by demonstrating that agencies exercise distinct powers of law-interpretation and law-specification when implementing a statutory scheme. Most significantly, it provides a constitutional account for why agencies may exercise this specification power as a formalist matter, even if they cannot have final say over the interpretation of law. If this account is correct, then calls to overturn modern judicial deference may be overblown if agencies are usually exercising their powers not of interpretation, but of specification.
{"title":"The Specification Power","authors":"I. Wurman","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3226964","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3226964","url":null,"abstract":"When agencies implement their statutes, administrative law doctrine describes what they do as interpretation. This raises the question of how much deference courts ought to give to such agency interpretations of law. This Article claims, however, that something else is usually going on when agencies implement statutory schemes. Although agencies interpret law, as they must, as an incident to enforce the law, agencies also exercise another power altogether: an interstitial lawmaking, gap-filling, policymaking power, a power that I shall call the “specification power.” This Article aims to advance existing accounts of agency activity and judicial deference by demonstrating that agencies exercise distinct powers of law-interpretation and law-specification when implementing a statutory scheme. Most significantly, it provides a constitutional account for why agencies may exercise this specification power as a formalist matter, even if they cannot have final say over the interpretation of law. If this account is correct, then calls to overturn modern judicial deference may be overblown if agencies are usually exercising their powers not of interpretation, but of specification.","PeriodicalId":48012,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Law Review","volume":"168 1","pages":"689-732"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2019-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48385975","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-29eCollection Date: 2019-01-01DOI: 10.23922/jarc.2017-031
Naohisa Yoshida, Yuji Naito, Yutaka Inada, Yoshito Itoh, Sang Pyo Lee, Jeong Hwan Kim, In-Kyung Sung, Hyung Seok Park, Hye Seung Han, Masayoshi Nakanishi, Mitsuo Kishimoto, Sun-Young Lee
Objectives: There are differences in each country with regards to histopathological managements of colorectal cancer (CRC), such as definition of Tis and lymphatic and venous invasion. In this study, we compared Tis and T1 CRC in Japan and Korea.
Methods: We retrospectively compared various clinical characteristics of consecutive patients who had Tis and T1 CRCs and who were newly diagnosed between 2010 and 2014 at the Kyoto Prefectural University of Medicine (Japan) and the Konkuk University (Korea).
Results: Three hundred and sixty-five cases of T1 cancer and 510 cases of Tis cancer from 726 Japanese and 149 Korean patients were included. The rate of Tis in Japan was higher than in Korea (59.8% vs. 51.0%, P = 0.047), according to the difference of definition of Tis. In the analyses of 365 T1 CRCs, median age was higher in Japan than Korea (67.8 ± 10.6 vs. 62.2 ± 10.1, P < 0.001). Right-sided lesions were more frequent in Japan than they were in Korea (38.7% vs. 22.2%, P < 0.001). The rates of venous and lymphatic invasion were higher in Japan than they were in Korea (venous: 18.6% vs. 1.4%, P < 0.001, lymphatic: 25.3% vs. 13.7%, P = 0.042), according to the different methods of immunohistochemical examinations used (Japan: E-HE and D2-40, Korea: ERG).
Conclusions: Our study of T1 CRC showed that there were differences between Japan and Korea in tumor location, elderly incidence, and histopathological lymphatic and venous invasion. Additionally, rates of Tis were different between the two countries. In this international study for CRC, it is considered that we have to pay attention regarding the difference of histopathological definition and method in each country.
{"title":"Cross-national analysis about the difference of histopathological management in Tis and T1 colorectal cancer between Japan and Korea.","authors":"Naohisa Yoshida, Yuji Naito, Yutaka Inada, Yoshito Itoh, Sang Pyo Lee, Jeong Hwan Kim, In-Kyung Sung, Hyung Seok Park, Hye Seung Han, Masayoshi Nakanishi, Mitsuo Kishimoto, Sun-Young Lee","doi":"10.23922/jarc.2017-031","DOIUrl":"10.23922/jarc.2017-031","url":null,"abstract":"<p><strong>Objectives: </strong>There are differences in each country with regards to histopathological managements of colorectal cancer (CRC), such as definition of Tis and lymphatic and venous invasion. In this study, we compared Tis and T1 CRC in Japan and Korea.</p><p><strong>Methods: </strong>We retrospectively compared various clinical characteristics of consecutive patients who had Tis and T1 CRCs and who were newly diagnosed between 2010 and 2014 at the Kyoto Prefectural University of Medicine (Japan) and the Konkuk University (Korea).</p><p><strong>Results: </strong>Three hundred and sixty-five cases of T1 cancer and 510 cases of Tis cancer from 726 Japanese and 149 Korean patients were included. The rate of Tis in Japan was higher than in Korea (59.8% vs. 51.0%, <i>P</i> = 0.047), according to the difference of definition of Tis. In the analyses of 365 T1 CRCs, median age was higher in Japan than Korea (67.8 ± 10.6 vs. 62.2 ± 10.1, <i>P</i> < 0.001). Right-sided lesions were more frequent in Japan than they were in Korea (38.7% vs. 22.2%, <i>P</i> < 0.001). The rates of venous and lymphatic invasion were higher in Japan than they were in Korea (venous: 18.6% vs. 1.4%, <i>P</i> < 0.001, lymphatic: 25.3% vs. 13.7%, <i>P</i> = 0.042), according to the different methods of immunohistochemical examinations used (Japan: E-HE and D2-40, Korea: ERG).</p><p><strong>Conclusions: </strong>Our study of T1 CRC showed that there were differences between Japan and Korea in tumor location, elderly incidence, and histopathological lymphatic and venous invasion. Additionally, rates of Tis were different between the two countries. In this international study for CRC, it is considered that we have to pay attention regarding the difference of histopathological definition and method in each country.</p>","PeriodicalId":48012,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Law Review","volume":"88 1","pages":"18-26"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6752126/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91028970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR) are going to be big -- not just for gaming but for work, for social life, and for evaluating and buying real-world products. Like many big technological advances, they will in some ways challenge legal doctrine. In this Article, we will speculate about some of these upcoming challenges, asking: (1) How might the law treat “street crimes” in VR and AR -- behavior such as disturbing the peace, indecent exposure, deliberately harmful visuals (such as strobe lighting used to provoke seizures in people with epilepsy), and “virtual groping”? Two key aspects of this, we will argue, are the Bangladesh problem (which will make criminal law very hard to practically enforce) and technologically enabled self-help (which will offer an attractive alternative protection to users, but also a further excuse for real-world police departments not to get involved). (2) How might the law handle tort lawsuits, by users against users, users against VR and AR environment operators, outsiders (such as copyright owners whose works are being copied by users) against users, and outsiders against the environment operators? (3) How might the law treat users’ alteration of other users’ avatars, or creation of their own avatars that borrow someone else’s name and likeness? (4) How might privacy law deal with the likely pervasive storage of all the sensory information that VR and AR systems present to their users, and that they gather from the users in the course of presenting it? (5) How might these analyses reflect on broader debates even outside VR and AR, especially order without law and the speech-conduct distinction?
{"title":"Law, Virtual Reality, and Augmented Reality","authors":"Mark A. Lemley, E. Volokh","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2933867","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2933867","url":null,"abstract":"Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR) are going to be big -- not just for gaming but for work, for social life, and for evaluating and buying real-world products. Like many big technological advances, they will in some ways challenge legal doctrine. In this Article, we will speculate about some of these upcoming challenges, asking: \u0000 \u0000(1) How might the law treat “street crimes” in VR and AR -- behavior such as disturbing the peace, indecent exposure, deliberately harmful visuals (such as strobe lighting used to provoke seizures in people with epilepsy), and “virtual groping”? Two key aspects of this, we will argue, are the Bangladesh problem (which will make criminal law very hard to practically enforce) and technologically enabled self-help (which will offer an attractive alternative protection to users, but also a further excuse for real-world police departments not to get involved). \u0000 \u0000(2) How might the law handle tort lawsuits, by users against users, users against VR and AR environment operators, outsiders (such as copyright owners whose works are being copied by users) against users, and outsiders against the environment operators? \u0000 \u0000(3) How might the law treat users’ alteration of other users’ avatars, or creation of their own avatars that borrow someone else’s name and likeness? \u0000 \u0000(4) How might privacy law deal with the likely pervasive storage of all the sensory information that VR and AR systems present to their users, and that they gather from the users in the course of presenting it? \u0000 \u0000(5) How might these analyses reflect on broader debates even outside VR and AR, especially order without law and the speech-conduct distinction?","PeriodicalId":48012,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Law Review","volume":"166 1","pages":"1051-1138"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2018-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.2933867","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47118897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The threshold question for all originalist methodologies concerns the original communicative content of the words of the Constitution. For too long this inquiry has been pursued through tools that are ill-suited to the task. Dictionaries generally just define individual words; they don’t typically define phrases or allow for the consideration of broader linguistic context. And while dictionaries can provide a list of possible senses, they can’t tell us which sense is the most ordinary (or common). Founding-era dictionaries, moreover, were generally the work of one individual, tended to plagiarize each other, and relied on famous, often dated examples of English usage (from Shakespeare or the King James Bible). Originalists have also turned to examples of usage in founding-era documents. This approach can address some of the shortcomings of dictionaries; a careful inquiry into sample sentences from founding-era literature can consider a wide range of semantic context. Yet even here the standard inquiry falls short. Originalists tend to turn only to certain sources, such as the Federalist Papers or the records of the state constitutional conventions, and those sources may not fully reflect how ordinary users of English of the day would have understood the Constitution (or at least have used language). Second, the number of founding-era documents relied on is often rather small, especially for generalizing about an entire country (or profession, in the case of lawyers). This opens originalists up to criticisms of cherry-picking, and even if that is not the case, sample sizes are just too small to confidently answer originalist questions. But all is not lost. Big data, and the tools of linguists, have the potential to bring greater rigor and transparency to the practice of originalism. This article will explore the application of corpus linguistic methodology to aid originalism’s inquiry into the original communicative content of the Constitution. We propose to improve this inquiry by use of a newly released corpus (or database) of founding-era texts: the beta version of the Corpus of Founding-Era American English. The initial beta version will contain approximately 150 million words, derived from the Evans Early American Imprint Series (books, pamphlets and broadsides by all types of Americans on all types of subjects), the National Archives Founders Online Project (the papers of Washington, Franklin, Adams, Jefferson, Madison, and Hamilton, including correspondence to them), and Hein Online’s Legal Database (cases, statutes, legislative debates, etc.). The paper will showcase how typical tools of a corpus—concordance lines, collocation, clusters (or n-grams), and frequency data—can aid in the search for original communicative content. We will also show how corpus data can help determine whether a word or phrase in question is best thought of as an ordinary one or a legal term of art. To showcase corpus linguistic methodology, the paper wil
{"title":"Data-Driven Originalism","authors":"Thomas R. Lee, J. Phillips","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3036206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3036206","url":null,"abstract":"The threshold question for all originalist methodologies concerns the original communicative content of the words of the Constitution. For too long this inquiry has been pursued through tools that are ill-suited to the task. Dictionaries generally just define individual words; they don’t typically define phrases or allow for the consideration of broader linguistic context. And while dictionaries can provide a list of possible senses, they can’t tell us which sense is the most ordinary (or common). Founding-era dictionaries, moreover, were generally the work of one individual, tended to plagiarize each other, and relied on famous, often dated examples of English usage (from Shakespeare or the King James Bible). \u0000 \u0000Originalists have also turned to examples of usage in founding-era documents. This approach can address some of the shortcomings of dictionaries; a careful inquiry into sample sentences from founding-era literature can consider a wide range of semantic context. Yet even here the standard inquiry falls short. Originalists tend to turn only to certain sources, such as the Federalist Papers or the records of the state constitutional conventions, and those sources may not fully reflect how ordinary users of English of the day would have understood the Constitution (or at least have used language). Second, the number of founding-era documents relied on is often rather small, especially for generalizing about an entire country (or profession, in the case of lawyers). This opens originalists up to criticisms of cherry-picking, and even if that is not the case, sample sizes are just too small to confidently answer originalist questions. \u0000 \u0000But all is not lost. Big data, and the tools of linguists, have the potential to bring greater rigor and transparency to the practice of originalism. This article will explore the application of corpus linguistic methodology to aid originalism’s inquiry into the original communicative content of the Constitution. We propose to improve this inquiry by use of a newly released corpus (or database) of founding-era texts: the beta version of the Corpus of Founding-Era American English. The initial beta version will contain approximately 150 million words, derived from the Evans Early American Imprint Series (books, pamphlets and broadsides by all types of Americans on all types of subjects), the National Archives Founders Online Project (the papers of Washington, Franklin, Adams, Jefferson, Madison, and Hamilton, including correspondence to them), and Hein Online’s Legal Database (cases, statutes, legislative debates, etc.). \u0000 \u0000The paper will showcase how typical tools of a corpus—concordance lines, collocation, clusters (or n-grams), and frequency data—can aid in the search for original communicative content. We will also show how corpus data can help determine whether a word or phrase in question is best thought of as an ordinary one or a legal term of art. To showcase corpus linguistic methodology, the paper wil","PeriodicalId":48012,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Law Review","volume":"167 1","pages":"261"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2018-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46855696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Suppose that one of us contends, and the other denies, that transgender persons have constitutional rights to be treated in accord with their gender identity. It appears that we are disagreeing about “what the law is.” And, most probably, we disagree about what the law is on this matter because we disagree about what generally makes it the case that our constitutional law is this rather than that. Constitutional theory should provide guidance. It should endeavor to explain what gives our constitutional rules the contents that they have, or what makes true constitutional propositions true. Call any such account a “constitutive theory” of constitutional law. It is obvious that we do not all share a constitutive theory. It is less obvious, and strikingly underappreciated, that we have precious few candidates to choose from. We have many “prescriptive theories” regarding how judges should exercise the power of judicial review, but few of them have clear, let alone complete, constitutive implications. This Article presents an original constitutive theory of American constitutional law. It starts by distinguishing two types of constitutional norms: “constitutional principles” and “constitutional rules.” It then argues: first, that rules are determined by the interaction of principles, which combine to produce rules on the model of force addition; and second, that the principles are “grounded” in mental states, speech-acts, and behaviors of persons who make up the constitutional community, much as rules of fashion or of card games are grounded in behaviors of persons who make up their normative communities. In short: social facts determine constitutional principles, and constitutional principles determine constitutional rules. I call the account “principled positivism.” It is positivist, pluralist, and inescapably dynamic. If principled positivism is correct, then we come to know our constitutional rules by discerning the contents, contours, and weights of the constitutional principles currently in force. Accordingly, the Article offers a preliminary and partial inventory of our constitutional principles—principles concerning the legal significance of what the enacted text says and about what its authors intended; principles about the force of judicial precedents and of extra-judicial practices; principles about the locus of sovereignty, the distribution of governing power, and the demands of liberty and equality. It then puts the principles to work, illustrating their operation in a handful of actual constitutional controversies, ranging from same-sex marriage to the scope of Congress’s commerce power.
{"title":"Our Principled Constitution","authors":"Mitchell N. Berman","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2935085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2935085","url":null,"abstract":"Suppose that one of us contends, and the other denies, that transgender persons have constitutional rights to be treated in accord with their gender identity. It appears that we are disagreeing about “what the law is.” And, most probably, we disagree about what the law is on this matter because we disagree about what generally makes it the case that our constitutional law is this rather than that. Constitutional theory should provide guidance. It should endeavor to explain what gives our constitutional rules the contents that they have, or what makes true constitutional propositions true. Call any such account a “constitutive theory” of constitutional law. It is obvious that we do not all share a constitutive theory. It is less obvious, and strikingly underappreciated, that we have precious few candidates to choose from. We have many “prescriptive theories” regarding how judges should exercise the power of judicial review, but few of them have clear, let alone complete, constitutive implications. This Article presents an original constitutive theory of American constitutional law. It starts by distinguishing two types of constitutional norms: “constitutional principles” and “constitutional rules.” It then argues: first, that rules are determined by the interaction of principles, which combine to produce rules on the model of force addition; and second, that the principles are “grounded” in mental states, speech-acts, and behaviors of persons who make up the constitutional community, much as rules of fashion or of card games are grounded in behaviors of persons who make up their normative communities. In short: social facts determine constitutional principles, and constitutional principles determine constitutional rules. I call the account “principled positivism.” It is positivist, pluralist, and inescapably dynamic. If principled positivism is correct, then we come to know our constitutional rules by discerning the contents, contours, and weights of the constitutional principles currently in force. Accordingly, the Article offers a preliminary and partial inventory of our constitutional principles—principles concerning the legal significance of what the enacted text says and about what its authors intended; principles about the force of judicial precedents and of extra-judicial practices; principles about the locus of sovereignty, the distribution of governing power, and the demands of liberty and equality. It then puts the principles to work, illustrating their operation in a handful of actual constitutional controversies, ranging from same-sex marriage to the scope of Congress’s commerce power.","PeriodicalId":48012,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Law Review","volume":"166 1","pages":"1325"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2018-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45462308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Courts and legal observers have long been concerned by the scope of authority delegated to administrative agencies. The dominant explanation of delegated authority is that it is necessary to take advantage of administrative agencies’ expertise and expansive rulemaking capacity. Though this explanation makes sense in many settings, it falters in many areas and has given rise to a number of longstanding puzzles, such as why Congress does not invest in its own institutional capacity. Unrecognized in this debate over the puzzles of delegation is that Congress may delegate to take advantage of another distinctive attribute of administrative decisionmaking: the credible rationality and transparency afforded by administrative procedures. Drawing on positive political theory, this Article shows that Congress may delegate, not for expertise, but for public trust, which the legislature itself (appropriately) lacks due to concerns over the influence of special interest lucre, among other reasons. The procedural constraints that bind administrative agencies, as made credible by judicial review, encourage fairness and rationality and discourage the most egregious abuses of lawmaking authority. In delegating, Congress takes advantage of these credible constraints, which the institution cannot easily develop internally; and in relieving Members of Congress from public suspicion, it also advances their parochial electoral objectives.
{"title":"Delegating for Trust","authors":"Edward H. Stiglitz","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/x8k2c","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/x8k2c","url":null,"abstract":"Courts and legal observers have long been concerned by the scope of authority delegated to administrative agencies. The dominant explanation of delegated authority is that it is necessary to take advantage of administrative agencies’ expertise and expansive rulemaking capacity. Though this explanation makes sense in many settings, it falters in many areas and has given rise to a number of longstanding puzzles, such as why Congress does not invest in its own institutional capacity. Unrecognized in this debate over the puzzles of delegation is that Congress may delegate to take advantage of another distinctive attribute of administrative decisionmaking: the credible rationality and transparency afforded by administrative procedures. Drawing on positive political theory, this Article shows that Congress may delegate, not for expertise, but for public trust, which the legislature itself (appropriately) lacks due to concerns over the influence of special interest lucre, among other reasons. The procedural constraints that bind administrative agencies, as made credible by judicial review, encourage fairness and rationality and discourage the most egregious abuses of lawmaking authority. In delegating, Congress takes advantage of these credible constraints, which the institution cannot easily develop internally; and in relieving Members of Congress from public suspicion, it also advances their parochial electoral objectives.","PeriodicalId":48012,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Law Review","volume":"166 1","pages":"633"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69640988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Credibility is central to the legal treatment of sexual violence, as epitomized by the iconic “he said/she said” contest. Over time, the resolution of competing factual accounts has evidenced a deeply skeptical orientation toward rape accusers. This incredulous stance remains firmly lodged, having migrated from formal legal rules to informal practices, with much the same result — an enduring system of disbelief. Introducing the concept of “credibility discounting” helps to explain the dominant feature of our legal response to rape. Although false reports of rape are uncommon, law enforcement officers tend to default to doubt when women allege sexual assault, resulting in curtailed investigations along with infrequent arrests and prosecutions. Credibility discounts, which are meted out at every stage of the criminal process, involve downgrades both to trustworthiness (corresponding to testimonial injustice) and to plausibility (corresponding to hermeneutical injustice). By conceptualizing prejudiced disbelief as a distinct failure of justice, one deserving of separate consideration, we may begin to grasp the full implications of credibility discounting, beyond faulty criminal justice outcomes. Attending to this failure of epistemic justice on its own terms advances a conversation about how best to reform institutions so that credibility judgments do not perpetuate inequality. To this end, credibility discounting should count as actionable discrimination. Under certain conditions, moreover, this recognition raises constitutional concerns. When rape victims confront a law enforcement regime predisposed to dismiss their complaints, they are effectively denied the protective resources of the state.
{"title":"Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the Credibility Discount","authors":"Deborah Tuerkheimer","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2919865","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2919865","url":null,"abstract":"Credibility is central to the legal treatment of sexual violence, as epitomized by the iconic “he said/she said” contest. Over time, the resolution of competing factual accounts has evidenced a deeply skeptical orientation toward rape accusers. This incredulous stance remains firmly lodged, having migrated from formal legal rules to informal practices, with much the same result — an enduring system of disbelief. Introducing the concept of “credibility discounting” helps to explain the dominant feature of our legal response to rape. Although false reports of rape are uncommon, law enforcement officers tend to default to doubt when women allege sexual assault, resulting in curtailed investigations along with infrequent arrests and prosecutions. Credibility discounts, which are meted out at every stage of the criminal process, involve downgrades both to trustworthiness (corresponding to testimonial injustice) and to plausibility (corresponding to hermeneutical injustice). By conceptualizing prejudiced disbelief as a distinct failure of justice, one deserving of separate consideration, we may begin to grasp the full implications of credibility discounting, beyond faulty criminal justice outcomes. Attending to this failure of epistemic justice on its own terms advances a conversation about how best to reform institutions so that credibility judgments do not perpetuate inequality. To this end, credibility discounting should count as actionable discrimination. Under certain conditions, moreover, this recognition raises constitutional concerns. When rape victims confront a law enforcement regime predisposed to dismiss their complaints, they are effectively denied the protective resources of the state.","PeriodicalId":48012,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Law Review","volume":"166 1","pages":"1-58"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2017-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.2919865","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41779864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The first area rate proceeding conducted by the Federal Power Commission is now pending before the United States Supreme Court.' In this proceeding, the Federal Power Commission established ceiling prices for natural gas produced in the Permian Basin area of Texas and New Mexico and sold to interstate pipelines. In additional proceedings, now at various stages of prosecution, the Commission will establish ceiling prices for the other gas producing areas of the United States.2 The Permian Basin decision raises a fundamental question about price regulation in an era freed from the constraints of substantive due process: What legal standards govern price regulation under traditional American regulatory statutes providing for "just and reasonable" rates? In the Permian Basin decision the Federal Power Commission established a ceiling price of 16.5 cents per thousand cubic feet (known
{"title":"Law Review THE PERMIAN BASIN AREA RATE CASES AND THE REGULATORY DETERMINATION OF PRICE *","authors":"W. Edmund, KITOt","doi":"10.2307/3311041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3311041","url":null,"abstract":"The first area rate proceeding conducted by the Federal Power Commission is now pending before the United States Supreme Court.' In this proceeding, the Federal Power Commission established ceiling prices for natural gas produced in the Permian Basin area of Texas and New Mexico and sold to interstate pipelines. In additional proceedings, now at various stages of prosecution, the Commission will establish ceiling prices for the other gas producing areas of the United States.2 The Permian Basin decision raises a fundamental question about price regulation in an era freed from the constraints of substantive due process: What legal standards govern price regulation under traditional American regulatory statutes providing for \"just and reasonable\" rates? In the Permian Basin decision the Federal Power Commission established a ceiling price of 16.5 cents per thousand cubic feet (known","PeriodicalId":48012,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Law Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/3311041","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69060597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Supreme Court invokes Article II’s Take Care Clause often and for many purposes. First, the Court has relied on the President’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” to establish the power to remove officers who do not follow the President’s directives. Second, the Court has used the Take Care Clause to define the limits of Article III standing, holding that the constitutional requirements of injury, causation, and redressability help to ensure that the President rather than the federal judiciary retains primary responsibility for the legality of executive decisions. Third, the Court has treated the Take Care Clause as the source of the President’s prosecutorial discretion — a power that may give the President room to reshape the effective reach of laws enacted by Congress. Fourth, the Court has identified the Take Care Clause as the direct source of the President’s constitutional obligation to respect legislative supremacy. Indeed, the Court has read the clause as a negation of any presidential power to dispense with or suspend federal law. Fifth, the Court has read the Take Care Clause as the source of inherent presidential authority to take acts necessary to protect the operations of the federal government, even in cases in which no statute provides explicit authority to do so. The Court’s reliance on the Take Care Clause to serve so many ends simultaneously is striking. The Court’s decisions rely heavily on the Take Care Clause but almost never interpret it, at least not in the conventional way one thinks of the Court’s interpreting the Constitution. With rare exception, the Court has not parsed the text of the clause or examined its historical provenance (except insofar as the clause was invoked in the First Congress to justify the removal power). In addition, at least some of the ways in which the Court has used the clause are in tension with one another. The instantiation of strong prosecutorial discretion, for example, may run into the scruple against dispensation that the Court also ascribes to the clause. Such tensions, moreover, require line-drawing that raises unacknowledged questions about the availability of judicially manageable standards. Without attempting to resolve the meaning of the Take Care Clause, this Article examines its many uses in the case law and asks whether the Court has legitimately treated the clause as a proxy a freestanding separation-of-powers principles.
{"title":"The Protean Take Care Clause","authors":"J. Goldsmith, J. Manning","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2852106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2852106","url":null,"abstract":"The Supreme Court invokes Article II’s Take Care Clause often and for many purposes. First, the Court has relied on the President’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” to establish the power to remove officers who do not follow the President’s directives. Second, the Court has used the Take Care Clause to define the limits of Article III standing, holding that the constitutional requirements of injury, causation, and redressability help to ensure that the President rather than the federal judiciary retains primary responsibility for the legality of executive decisions. Third, the Court has treated the Take Care Clause as the source of the President’s prosecutorial discretion — a power that may give the President room to reshape the effective reach of laws enacted by Congress. Fourth, the Court has identified the Take Care Clause as the direct source of the President’s constitutional obligation to respect legislative supremacy. Indeed, the Court has read the clause as a negation of any presidential power to dispense with or suspend federal law. Fifth, the Court has read the Take Care Clause as the source of inherent presidential authority to take acts necessary to protect the operations of the federal government, even in cases in which no statute provides explicit authority to do so. The Court’s reliance on the Take Care Clause to serve so many ends simultaneously is striking. The Court’s decisions rely heavily on the Take Care Clause but almost never interpret it, at least not in the conventional way one thinks of the Court’s interpreting the Constitution. With rare exception, the Court has not parsed the text of the clause or examined its historical provenance (except insofar as the clause was invoked in the First Congress to justify the removal power). In addition, at least some of the ways in which the Court has used the clause are in tension with one another. The instantiation of strong prosecutorial discretion, for example, may run into the scruple against dispensation that the Court also ascribes to the clause. Such tensions, moreover, require line-drawing that raises unacknowledged questions about the availability of judicially manageable standards. Without attempting to resolve the meaning of the Take Care Clause, this Article examines its many uses in the case law and asks whether the Court has legitimately treated the clause as a proxy a freestanding separation-of-powers principles.","PeriodicalId":48012,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Law Review","volume":"164 1","pages":"1835"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2016-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68389881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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