Public interest vs. strategies of individual actors in urban and spatial planning

Abstract

Here a preliminary hypothesis is used, viz., that the concept of "postsocialist" public interests is disputed in each and every aspect, implicating that a new theoretical and heuristic framework is needed for urban planning. This framework ought to be developed in a way to render it acceptable as a common denominator for the majority of urban actors, on the one hand, and to help balance individual (partial) and collective interests in the preparation and implementation of planning decisions at various planning levels, on the other. Under the current conditions of transition, there are very few elements that could in advance and with certainty be ascertained of public or general interest. The quality and societal relevance of planning decisions would basically depend on the quality of planning communication and interaction, also being relevant for the developing of a public interest. In the contribution, it is particularly emphasized that, following the collapse of the former ("socialist") public interests, the very legitimacy of planning is endangered as well. We direct attention to a number of new approaches, with a view to make use of their respective rational, productive, emancipatory and modernizing potential. Here, it is almost the last "resort" for one to insist on the publicity and public control in planning decision-making, especially in terms of the role of laymen - versus the more powerful and influential stakeholders - as the key direction in developing of new modes of planning. In this context, of crucial importance is to develop a new theoretical articulation of the concept of "postsocialist" public interests, as this concept is constituent for developing democratic planning during the transition period. The key aspect here pertains to balancing a large number of emerging and legitimate individual interest vis-a-vis public (collective, common, and similar) interests. This also applies to developing new institutional and organization arrangements and support that are needed, to direct the "societal game" of individual interests to collective public purposes. Particularly, effective arrangements of the kind are needed to prevent the "game" ends in destructive outcome, in the first place for the already well established public interests that will predictably keep such status.