Can the New Nuclear Deal with North Korea Succeed

Q1 Arts and Humanities North Korean Review Pub Date : 2007-09-01 DOI:10.3172/NKR.3.2.24
C. Quiñones
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Can the New Nuclear Deal with North Korea Succeed?The new nuclear deal hammered out in Beijing in mid-February 2007 is a very tentative and limited first step toward ending North Korea's nuclear ambitions. Unfortunately, it creates numerous new problems without solving any fundamental issues. Prospects for its eventual success could prove worrisome.On the plus side, the accord is a step away from confrontation toward preserving peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. The Bush Administration, after four years of exchanging heated rhetoric with Pyongyang and reliance on ineffective coercive tactics like economic sanctions, has finally decided to negotiate with Pyongyang. Frankly, this has always been the only way to achieve a "peaceful diplomatic solution" to the North Korean nuclear issue. Simply put, at long last negotiations have finally just begun.But the accord's negative aspects outweigh its positive points. It is not a new "Agreed Framework." This is a tentative deal. If North Korea does not like the direction of future negotiations, it can pull out at any time and restart its nuclear reactor. The Agreed Framework was not a tentative deal. It was a package deal-all or nothing. The 1994 accord "froze" all nuclear activities and put all North Korean nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring. The new deal says that the "DPRK will discuss with other parties" the scope of nuclear activities to be covered. Also the details IAEA monitoring are to be "agreed between IAEA and DPRK." The Agreed Framework resolved such issues prior to its finalization.In other words, the new agreement reverses the process that led to the Agreed Framework. Numerous working level discussions were held in New York and elsewhere to resolve the details of implementation prior to the agreement's conclusion. Under this new deal, North Korea can control the entire process because it can threaten to unfreeze its nuclear activities anytime that it is unhappy with one or more of the working group negotiations.Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill has incorrectly claimed that the new deal is better than the old one because it is "multilateral." He simply does not know his history. The Agreed Framework was multilateral. Prior to its finalization, the United States forged an international consensus supportive of the accord by consulting daily for eighteen months with Seoul, Tokyo, Beijing and Moscow, not to mention many other governments. Also, the Agreed Framework was designed to support the multilateral IAEA, an agency of the United Nations. The Bush Administration has openly and repeatedly belittled the effectiveness of the IAEA and its director, even calling for his replacement.The new accord's shortcomings suggest that the Bush Administration was desperate to continue the Six Party Talks at any price. Over-extended militarily in the Middle East, the Bush Administration cannot afford instability on the Korean Peninsula. …
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与朝鲜的新核协议能成功吗
与朝鲜的新核协议能成功吗?2007年2月中旬在北京敲定的新核协议是朝着结束北韩核野心迈出的非常试探性和有限的第一步。不幸的是,它产生了许多新问题,却没有解决任何根本问题。其最终成功的前景可能令人担忧。从积极的一面看,这一协议是朝着维护东北亚和平与繁荣迈出的一步。布什政府在与北韩进行了4年激烈的言辞交锋,并依赖经济制裁等无效的强制手段之后,终于决定与北韩进行谈判。坦率地说,这一直是实现朝核问题“和平外交解决”的唯一途径。简单地说,谈判终于开始了。但该协议的负面影响大于其正面影响。这不是一个新的“框架协议”。这是一项暂定协议。如果朝鲜不喜欢未来谈判的方向,它可以随时退出并重启核反应堆。《框架协议》不是一项临时协议。这是一笔一揽子交易,要么全有,要么全无。1994年的协议“冻结”了所有核活动,并将朝鲜所有核设施置于国际原子能机构(IAEA)的监督之下。新协议称,“朝鲜将与其他各方讨论”将涵盖的核活动范围。此外,国际原子能机构监测的细节将“由国际原子能机构和朝鲜商定”。《商定框架》在最后定稿之前解决了这些问题。换句话说,新协议逆转了导致《框架协议》的进程。在纽约和其他地方举行了许多工作级别的讨论,以便在协定缔结之前解决执行的细节问题。根据这项新协议,朝鲜可以控制整个过程,因为它可以随时威胁要解冻其核活动,只要它对一个或多个工作组的谈判不满意。美国助理国务卿克里斯托弗·希尔错误地声称,新协议比旧协议更好,因为它是“多边的”。他根本不了解他的历史。《框架协议》是多边的。在达成协议之前,美国在18个月的时间里,与首尔、东京、北京和莫斯科等国政府进行了日常磋商,形成了支持该协议的国际共识。此外,《商定框架》的目的是支持联合国的一个机构——多边的原子能机构。布什政府一再公开贬低国际原子能机构及其总干事的有效性,甚至要求撤换他。新协议的缺点表明,布什政府不顾一切地想要不惜任何代价继续六方会谈。布什政府在中东过度投入军事力量,无法承受韩半岛的不稳定。…
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North Korean Review
North Korean Review Arts and Humanities-History
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0.70
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Staying the course: Denuclearization and path dependence in the US's North Korea policy Editor-in-Chief's Comments Managing Editor's Comments Socio-Economic Change in the DPRK and Korean Security Dilemmas: The Implications for International Policy North Korea and Northeast Asian Regional Security
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