Purpose—The purpose of the article is to analyze the U.S.’s foreign policy framework toward North Korea in the post–Cold War era. Design, Methodology, Approach—We employ process-tracing technique and comparative sequential method across successive administrations and find that the U.S.’s foreign policy toward North Korea is one of a self-amplifying process. Findings—We argue that the U.S.’s foreign policy toward North Korea has remained remarkably consistent over the course of three decades. Furthermore, the policy has both hardened and narrowed in its focus on denuclearization. Practical Implications—As the U.S. deepens its pursuit for denuclearization as an end, the misalignment of goals between Washington and Pyongyang persists and even grows. Originality, Value—Through our analysis, we contribute to existing work that identifies North Korea’s liability for the engagement failures and add texture to the understanding of the current deadlock in negotiations.
{"title":"Staying the course: Denuclearization and path dependence in the US's North Korea policy","authors":"Kimberly Peh, Soul Park","doi":"10.2307/NKR.17.1.57","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/NKR.17.1.57","url":null,"abstract":"Purpose—The purpose of the article is to analyze the U.S.’s foreign policy framework toward North Korea in the post–Cold War era. Design, Methodology, Approach—We employ process-tracing technique and comparative sequential method across successive administrations and find that the U.S.’s foreign policy toward North Korea is one of a self-amplifying process. Findings—We argue that the U.S.’s foreign policy toward North Korea has remained remarkably consistent over the course of three decades. Furthermore, the policy has both hardened and narrowed in its focus on denuclearization. Practical Implications—As the U.S. deepens its pursuit for denuclearization as an end, the misalignment of goals between Washington and Pyongyang persists and even grows. Originality, Value—Through our analysis, we contribute to existing work that identifies North Korea’s liability for the engagement failures and add texture to the understanding of the current deadlock in negotiations.","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42349306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dear Readers,On behalf of North Korean Review I wish you a Happy 2017. As always, it is my pleasure to bring you another edition of NKR. This issue is the first at the beginning of a new American presidency which, to be certain, has introduced a certain level of unpredictability and uncertainty to the international stage that we have not seen in quite some time. To be sure, never in recent memory has there been so much potential for a change in the U.S. policy direction all over the world, with the Korean Peninsula being no exception. In that vein, this issue of NKR includes some interesting offerings that give some advice and potential new avenues for dealing with North Korea.Blinka and Křiž attempt to uncover whether relations between the United States and North Korea are driven by reciprocal or bullying strategies by using event data analysis. They find it is possible to determine the existence of reciprocity or bullying and the over-all pattern of mutual relations in a given period. Their conclusion is that states should not expect their counterparts to respond in a reciprocal manner, especially when they strive to establish long-term cooperative relations. When dealing with North Korea, they contend that states should take a firm stance rather than offering positive stimuli, because those tend to be exploited and not reciprocated.Lee and Kim seek to address China's cooperation and limitations in sanctioning North Korea. This study goes beyond the majority of existing research which discusses North Korea's nuclear sanctions in the context of China's foreign policy or policies concerning the Korean Peninsula in the Northeast Asian order. They find that while perception and interests pose fundamental influence on state behavior, an institutional foundation is needed for China to project its actions or preferences. In short, cooperation with international sanctions was made possible with China's changing perception of the nuclear regime, increase in relevant interests, and evolution of the domestic institutional environment.Bluth develops a novel approach to understand North Korea's nuclear policy on the basis of conflict transformation theory. By conceptualizing the situation on the Korean peninsula as a protracted conflict (either between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea or North Korea and the United States), new insights into the nature of the protracted cycle of engagement and conflict with North Korea can be developed. In this context, the role and trajectory of the nuclear program can be analyzed and both the failure of and the need for arms control negotiations understood. He shows that the use of conflict transformation theory provides an analytically coherent explanation of North Korean security policy and foreign policy behavior that fits the empirical evidence more closely than alternative approaches.Patterson sets out to explore the ways in which North Korea has low efficacy in fulfilling its self-prescribed duties to ensure econom
{"title":"Editor-in-Chief's Comments","authors":"Yongho Kim","doi":"10.1210/jcem-68-5-1004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1210/jcem-68-5-1004","url":null,"abstract":"Dear Readers,On behalf of North Korean Review I wish you a Happy 2017. As always, it is my pleasure to bring you another edition of NKR. This issue is the first at the beginning of a new American presidency which, to be certain, has introduced a certain level of unpredictability and uncertainty to the international stage that we have not seen in quite some time. To be sure, never in recent memory has there been so much potential for a change in the U.S. policy direction all over the world, with the Korean Peninsula being no exception. In that vein, this issue of NKR includes some interesting offerings that give some advice and potential new avenues for dealing with North Korea.Blinka and Křiž attempt to uncover whether relations between the United States and North Korea are driven by reciprocal or bullying strategies by using event data analysis. They find it is possible to determine the existence of reciprocity or bullying and the over-all pattern of mutual relations in a given period. Their conclusion is that states should not expect their counterparts to respond in a reciprocal manner, especially when they strive to establish long-term cooperative relations. When dealing with North Korea, they contend that states should take a firm stance rather than offering positive stimuli, because those tend to be exploited and not reciprocated.Lee and Kim seek to address China's cooperation and limitations in sanctioning North Korea. This study goes beyond the majority of existing research which discusses North Korea's nuclear sanctions in the context of China's foreign policy or policies concerning the Korean Peninsula in the Northeast Asian order. They find that while perception and interests pose fundamental influence on state behavior, an institutional foundation is needed for China to project its actions or preferences. In short, cooperation with international sanctions was made possible with China's changing perception of the nuclear regime, increase in relevant interests, and evolution of the domestic institutional environment.Bluth develops a novel approach to understand North Korea's nuclear policy on the basis of conflict transformation theory. By conceptualizing the situation on the Korean peninsula as a protracted conflict (either between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea or North Korea and the United States), new insights into the nature of the protracted cycle of engagement and conflict with North Korea can be developed. In this context, the role and trajectory of the nuclear program can be analyzed and both the failure of and the need for arms control negotiations understood. He shows that the use of conflict transformation theory provides an analytically coherent explanation of North Korean security policy and foreign policy behavior that fits the empirical evidence more closely than alternative approaches.Patterson sets out to explore the ways in which North Korea has low efficacy in fulfilling its self-prescribed duties to ensure econom","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66008880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Greetings to all our loyal readers and Happy New Year. Twenty sixteen is upon us and, as I am sure you all know, North Korea did not take long to make its impact felt on the news stories of both the solar and lunar New Years. I am sure many of you have been busy writing or doing interviews as, once again, the insight of North Korea scholars is in high demand. However, perhaps only in my own reflection, something felt different about the most recent nuclear and rocket tests. The tone in the media, while doing its best to cover the story in a way that portrayed it as an outrage, didn't seem to have the same effect as previous tests' coverage. Policy makers went through the usual motions of talking about sanctions and how dangerous North Korea is, but skepticism over the veracity and effectiveness of the reported H-bomb tests seemed to prevail. Even the rocket test seemed rather pedestrian. In my humble opinion, the dynamics of the nuclear program in terms of achieving DPRK policy objectives have changed vis-a-vis the perception of the actors involved. In light of this, NKR decided to publish two commentary essays that capture some of this shift in thinking in addition to a number of articles which question prevailing thought on North Korea.Hazel Smith challenges the longstanding common perception that nothing has changed in North Korea since the famine of the late 1990s. By using a wealth of data available from a number of aid agencies and organizations, she is able to demonstrate, again contrary to common discourse on North Korea, that nutrition and health outcomes in the DPRK have improved greatly since the famine period. She contributes to a shift in North Korean Studies from securitized, opinion-based discussions in which all North Koreans are either "victims or villains," and which very often obscure or ignore the mundane but important facts on the ground, toward careful, qualified, data-based analysis of societal change in the post-famine era of marketization in the DPRK.Kevin Gray re-examines the question of why economic integration between the two Koreas has remained so limited through moving beyond a focus on strategicmilitary tensions to examine the influence that South Korea's domestic political culture plays. He argues that anti-communism, inter-Korean tensions, and the broader context of the Cold War initially contributed toward South Korea's national development. While there was a break in this rhetoric during the Sunshine Policy but a resurgence of South Korean discourse of anti-communism continues to be a key variable in preventing progress on the North Korean question. This suggests that left over Cold War attitudes and the dominance of chaebols in the economy may play as big a role in the current impasse as North Korea's behavior itself.Henry Em then discusses security on the Korean peninsula in terms of governmentality. Instead of focusing on institutional attributes that characterize regime type, this article examines the ration
{"title":"Managing Editor's Comments","authors":"Lonnie Edge","doi":"10.1093/besa/22.2.135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/besa/22.2.135","url":null,"abstract":"Greetings to all our loyal readers and Happy New Year. Twenty sixteen is upon us and, as I am sure you all know, North Korea did not take long to make its impact felt on the news stories of both the solar and lunar New Years. I am sure many of you have been busy writing or doing interviews as, once again, the insight of North Korea scholars is in high demand. However, perhaps only in my own reflection, something felt different about the most recent nuclear and rocket tests. The tone in the media, while doing its best to cover the story in a way that portrayed it as an outrage, didn't seem to have the same effect as previous tests' coverage. Policy makers went through the usual motions of talking about sanctions and how dangerous North Korea is, but skepticism over the veracity and effectiveness of the reported H-bomb tests seemed to prevail. Even the rocket test seemed rather pedestrian. In my humble opinion, the dynamics of the nuclear program in terms of achieving DPRK policy objectives have changed vis-a-vis the perception of the actors involved. In light of this, NKR decided to publish two commentary essays that capture some of this shift in thinking in addition to a number of articles which question prevailing thought on North Korea.Hazel Smith challenges the longstanding common perception that nothing has changed in North Korea since the famine of the late 1990s. By using a wealth of data available from a number of aid agencies and organizations, she is able to demonstrate, again contrary to common discourse on North Korea, that nutrition and health outcomes in the DPRK have improved greatly since the famine period. She contributes to a shift in North Korean Studies from securitized, opinion-based discussions in which all North Koreans are either \"victims or villains,\" and which very often obscure or ignore the mundane but important facts on the ground, toward careful, qualified, data-based analysis of societal change in the post-famine era of marketization in the DPRK.Kevin Gray re-examines the question of why economic integration between the two Koreas has remained so limited through moving beyond a focus on strategicmilitary tensions to examine the influence that South Korea's domestic political culture plays. He argues that anti-communism, inter-Korean tensions, and the broader context of the Cold War initially contributed toward South Korea's national development. While there was a break in this rhetoric during the Sunshine Policy but a resurgence of South Korean discourse of anti-communism continues to be a key variable in preventing progress on the North Korean question. This suggests that left over Cold War attitudes and the dominance of chaebols in the economy may play as big a role in the current impasse as North Korea's behavior itself.Henry Em then discusses security on the Korean peninsula in terms of governmentality. Instead of focusing on institutional attributes that characterize regime type, this article examines the ration","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/besa/22.2.135","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60754483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
North Korea and Northeast Asian Regional Security Simon Shen, ed. New York: Routledge. 2015. 175 pp. Hardcover, $160.00, ISBN 978-1- 1388-2855-1.Since the early 1990s, the North Korean nuclear issue has represented the most controversial point in the analysis of the security regime of Northeast Asia. After the end of the Cold War, scholars, analysts and politicians form all over the world started to predict the imminent and sudden collapse of North Korean regime. It was assumed that this would have been followed by the reunification of the peninsula under the auspices of the Western- style liberal democratic system that had triumphed in South Korea after the democratization process of 1987. Reality, however, proved far outside the predictions of Francis Fukuyama's "end of history."Pyongyang's regime, aiming at acquiring an adequate instrument of defence and survival, embarked on the development of a military nuclear programme, that caused serious concern, not only for South Korea and Japan, but for all the major powers involved in the security regime of Northeast Asia and/or in the struggle against global nuclear proliferation.From that moment onward, a vast amount of literature has been dedicated to analysing the so- called "North Korean nuclear issue." In particular, the scholars and pundits alike have been drawn to considerations of the consequences for the region as a whole and for relations among the major powers involved.The book, North Korea and Northeast Asian Regional Security, edited by Simon Shen, is part of a broader effort to study the consequences of the second nuclear crisis. This period started from between the end of 2002 to the beginning of 2003, following the presumed discovery of a uranium enrichment program in North Korea and Pyongyang's subsequently withdrew from the Non- Proliferation Treaty. The second stage in the crisis, from 2006 to 2009, was characterized by two underground nuclear tests and the failure of the Six- Party Talks, the multilateral solution created to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. The essays that form the volume were originally published in December 2011; obviously, for this reason, the analysis cannot take into account the recent development on the peninsula, nonetheless, many of the conclusions reached by the authors are still valid today.The main characteristic of the book, representing both a point of strength and a weakness, is the heterogeneity of the perspectives through which the North Korean nuclear issue is understood. On the one hand, this diversity creates a certain degree of confusion in the reader, on the other, it offers the reader a broader view of the issues, moving beyond traditional security approaches which monopolize the analysis of the Korean Peninsula. While reading the volume, we pass from essays that make a wide use of international relations theory to discuss relations among states in the region, to analysis of the domestic dimensions of the various actors involved. It i
{"title":"North Korea and Northeast Asian Regional Security","authors":"Ceinwen Thomas","doi":"10.4324/9781315738321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315738321","url":null,"abstract":"North Korea and Northeast Asian Regional Security Simon Shen, ed. New York: Routledge. 2015. 175 pp. Hardcover, $160.00, ISBN 978-1- 1388-2855-1.Since the early 1990s, the North Korean nuclear issue has represented the most controversial point in the analysis of the security regime of Northeast Asia. After the end of the Cold War, scholars, analysts and politicians form all over the world started to predict the imminent and sudden collapse of North Korean regime. It was assumed that this would have been followed by the reunification of the peninsula under the auspices of the Western- style liberal democratic system that had triumphed in South Korea after the democratization process of 1987. Reality, however, proved far outside the predictions of Francis Fukuyama's \"end of history.\"Pyongyang's regime, aiming at acquiring an adequate instrument of defence and survival, embarked on the development of a military nuclear programme, that caused serious concern, not only for South Korea and Japan, but for all the major powers involved in the security regime of Northeast Asia and/or in the struggle against global nuclear proliferation.From that moment onward, a vast amount of literature has been dedicated to analysing the so- called \"North Korean nuclear issue.\" In particular, the scholars and pundits alike have been drawn to considerations of the consequences for the region as a whole and for relations among the major powers involved.The book, North Korea and Northeast Asian Regional Security, edited by Simon Shen, is part of a broader effort to study the consequences of the second nuclear crisis. This period started from between the end of 2002 to the beginning of 2003, following the presumed discovery of a uranium enrichment program in North Korea and Pyongyang's subsequently withdrew from the Non- Proliferation Treaty. The second stage in the crisis, from 2006 to 2009, was characterized by two underground nuclear tests and the failure of the Six- Party Talks, the multilateral solution created to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. The essays that form the volume were originally published in December 2011; obviously, for this reason, the analysis cannot take into account the recent development on the peninsula, nonetheless, many of the conclusions reached by the authors are still valid today.The main characteristic of the book, representing both a point of strength and a weakness, is the heterogeneity of the perspectives through which the North Korean nuclear issue is understood. On the one hand, this diversity creates a certain degree of confusion in the reader, on the other, it offers the reader a broader view of the issues, moving beyond traditional security approaches which monopolize the analysis of the Korean Peninsula. While reading the volume, we pass from essays that make a wide use of international relations theory to discuss relations among states in the region, to analysis of the domestic dimensions of the various actors involved. It i","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70438397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionMore than 20 years have passed since the signing of the Geneva Agreed Framework between the U.S. and the DPRK. Since the October 1994 agreement, the U.S.- DPRK relationship has at times seemed to improve and at other times rapidly deteriorated. The international community is no closer today to resolving the nuclear issue than it was during the early 1990s, and many observers believe North Korea will never completely abandon its nuclear ambitions.1Yet two decades ago, in the face of overwhelming odds, an incongruous marriage was formed between the U.S. and the DPRK. The Agreed Framework itself is remarkable, given the long-standing mutual enmity and distrust between the U.S. and the DPRK. The Korean nuclear crisis situation in the early 1990s could have developed into a military conflict on the Korean peninsula.2 However, the Agreed Framework provided a diplomatic solution, which temporarily diffused the tension between the U.S. and the DPRK and averted further escalation of the North Korean nuclear crisis. The U.S. elected to implement positive economic sanctions-a package of goods- in exchange for a promise by the DPRK to end its nuclear program. This controversial U.S. decision contradicted the prevailing U.S. foreign policy preference, which favored negative economic sanctions and/or military action when dealing with the nuclear weapons ambitions of rogue nations.Since the Agreed Framework, many scholars have tried to explain the North Korean nuclear issue.3 While many articles describe the agreement's technical aspects and procedures, most of them have not provided a theoretical basis that explains why and how the agreement was reached.4 While a few studies even define North Korea as an irrational state and its nuclear program as terror and coercive diplomacies, North Korea's pursuit of its nuclear program was a rational choice given its domestic and international conditions.5 To understand why and how the U.S. and the DPRK first reached the agreement and then failed to maintain it, research should focus on the DPRK's rational decisions given its domestic and environmental conditions.This paper attempts to provide a theoretical basis for not only the initial success, but also the ultimate failure of the Agreed Framework. The U.S. and the DPRK were bargaining during a conflict situation in the early 1990s. In a bilateral bargaining situation, the ability of one participant to achieve its goals depends, in large part, on the decisions of the other participant.6 Negotiators also had limited choices given their expectations of the other's reaction. While the U.S. could enforce economic sanctions or militarily attack North Korea, these choices could be less beneficial given the United States' expectation of North Korea's reaction. While the DPRK could ignore U.S. demands and continue its nuclear development, the choice could be less favorable given the DPRK's expectation of the United States' reaction. While the Agreed Framework was le
{"title":"Socio-Economic Change in the DPRK and Korean Security Dilemmas: The Implications for International Policy","authors":"R. Frank","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2874337","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2874337","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionMore than 20 years have passed since the signing of the Geneva Agreed Framework between the U.S. and the DPRK. Since the October 1994 agreement, the U.S.- DPRK relationship has at times seemed to improve and at other times rapidly deteriorated. The international community is no closer today to resolving the nuclear issue than it was during the early 1990s, and many observers believe North Korea will never completely abandon its nuclear ambitions.1Yet two decades ago, in the face of overwhelming odds, an incongruous marriage was formed between the U.S. and the DPRK. The Agreed Framework itself is remarkable, given the long-standing mutual enmity and distrust between the U.S. and the DPRK. The Korean nuclear crisis situation in the early 1990s could have developed into a military conflict on the Korean peninsula.2 However, the Agreed Framework provided a diplomatic solution, which temporarily diffused the tension between the U.S. and the DPRK and averted further escalation of the North Korean nuclear crisis. The U.S. elected to implement positive economic sanctions-a package of goods- in exchange for a promise by the DPRK to end its nuclear program. This controversial U.S. decision contradicted the prevailing U.S. foreign policy preference, which favored negative economic sanctions and/or military action when dealing with the nuclear weapons ambitions of rogue nations.Since the Agreed Framework, many scholars have tried to explain the North Korean nuclear issue.3 While many articles describe the agreement's technical aspects and procedures, most of them have not provided a theoretical basis that explains why and how the agreement was reached.4 While a few studies even define North Korea as an irrational state and its nuclear program as terror and coercive diplomacies, North Korea's pursuit of its nuclear program was a rational choice given its domestic and international conditions.5 To understand why and how the U.S. and the DPRK first reached the agreement and then failed to maintain it, research should focus on the DPRK's rational decisions given its domestic and environmental conditions.This paper attempts to provide a theoretical basis for not only the initial success, but also the ultimate failure of the Agreed Framework. The U.S. and the DPRK were bargaining during a conflict situation in the early 1990s. In a bilateral bargaining situation, the ability of one participant to achieve its goals depends, in large part, on the decisions of the other participant.6 Negotiators also had limited choices given their expectations of the other's reaction. While the U.S. could enforce economic sanctions or militarily attack North Korea, these choices could be less beneficial given the United States' expectation of North Korea's reaction. While the DPRK could ignore U.S. demands and continue its nuclear development, the choice could be less favorable given the DPRK's expectation of the United States' reaction. While the Agreed Framework was le","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68409019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionThe year 2013 marked the sixty-fifth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Mongolia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The relations were established within a shared ideology, at a time when both countries sought allies to strengthen their independence. Mongolia's rejection of communism and adoption of a multi-party system and market economy in 1990 were to radically change its relationship with the DPRK.However, despite their many differences and North Korea's pariah status in the international arena, Ulaanbaatar has made repeated efforts to maintain active diplomatic relations and engage North Korea. It has hosted talks in Ulaanbaatar between the DPRK and Japan, expressed interest in leasing a seaport in North Korea and, to mark the 65th diplomatic anniversary, Mongolia's head of state has visited Pyong-yang. These initiatives raise a number of questions. How have Mongolia's relations with the DPRK evolved over these sixty-five years, and can Ulaanbaatar continue to engage North Korea now that Mongolia is a democracy, has embraced a market economy, and subscribes to vastly different values and principles? Can Mongolia convince the DPRK to take part in a dialogue on regional security, as Mongolia's head of state suggested at the time of his 2013 visit to Pyongyang?Sources regarding Mongolia's relations with the DPRK remain limited and difficult to access. This article draws on literature, media reports, official Mongolian press releases and statements, and, finally, a number of informal interviews and discussions with Mongolian policy makers and politicians.1 As such, this article approaches Mongolia's relations with the DPRK through Mongolia's DPRK policy, rather than analyzing Pyongyang's attitude towards Ulaanbaatar.Establishment of Diplomatic Relations: 19482The establishment of diplomatic relations in 1948 served Mongolia and the DPRK well. Both Mongolia and North Korea only maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Though de facto following Soviet priorities, the DPRK relations provided an opportunity for Mongolia to reaffirm its independence, particularly towards its southern neighbor China. In the 17th and 18th century, the territory of Mongolia had been administered as the Chinese province of Outer Mongolia. In 1911, with the collapse of the Manchu Qing dynasty, Mongolia proclaimed its independence yet entered a decade of disarray. The country adopted its first constitution in 1924 and proclaimed, under Russian protection, the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR). Following Russia, Mongolia became the second country to adopt communism. Mongolia's independence, however, remained fragile, and it would take two decades-and some Soviet pressure-for China's Chiang Kai-shek to reluctantly recognize the MPR (Chiang's recognition, however, was short-lived, and Mongolia-Taiwan relations remain ambiguous to this date).On October 15, 1948, barely a month after the DPRK had been pr
{"title":"Mongolia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at Sixty-five: Ulaanbaatar’s changing relations with Pyongyang","authors":"T. Halbertsma","doi":"10.3172/NKR.10.2.23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.10.2.23","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionThe year 2013 marked the sixty-fifth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Mongolia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The relations were established within a shared ideology, at a time when both countries sought allies to strengthen their independence. Mongolia's rejection of communism and adoption of a multi-party system and market economy in 1990 were to radically change its relationship with the DPRK.However, despite their many differences and North Korea's pariah status in the international arena, Ulaanbaatar has made repeated efforts to maintain active diplomatic relations and engage North Korea. It has hosted talks in Ulaanbaatar between the DPRK and Japan, expressed interest in leasing a seaport in North Korea and, to mark the 65th diplomatic anniversary, Mongolia's head of state has visited Pyong-yang. These initiatives raise a number of questions. How have Mongolia's relations with the DPRK evolved over these sixty-five years, and can Ulaanbaatar continue to engage North Korea now that Mongolia is a democracy, has embraced a market economy, and subscribes to vastly different values and principles? Can Mongolia convince the DPRK to take part in a dialogue on regional security, as Mongolia's head of state suggested at the time of his 2013 visit to Pyongyang?Sources regarding Mongolia's relations with the DPRK remain limited and difficult to access. This article draws on literature, media reports, official Mongolian press releases and statements, and, finally, a number of informal interviews and discussions with Mongolian policy makers and politicians.1 As such, this article approaches Mongolia's relations with the DPRK through Mongolia's DPRK policy, rather than analyzing Pyongyang's attitude towards Ulaanbaatar.Establishment of Diplomatic Relations: 19482The establishment of diplomatic relations in 1948 served Mongolia and the DPRK well. Both Mongolia and North Korea only maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Though de facto following Soviet priorities, the DPRK relations provided an opportunity for Mongolia to reaffirm its independence, particularly towards its southern neighbor China. In the 17th and 18th century, the territory of Mongolia had been administered as the Chinese province of Outer Mongolia. In 1911, with the collapse of the Manchu Qing dynasty, Mongolia proclaimed its independence yet entered a decade of disarray. The country adopted its first constitution in 1924 and proclaimed, under Russian protection, the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR). Following Russia, Mongolia became the second country to adopt communism. Mongolia's independence, however, remained fragile, and it would take two decades-and some Soviet pressure-for China's Chiang Kai-shek to reluctantly recognize the MPR (Chiang's recognition, however, was short-lived, and Mongolia-Taiwan relations remain ambiguous to this date).On October 15, 1948, barely a month after the DPRK had been pr","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69760558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
North Korea's Foreign Policy Under Kim Jong IlTae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo eds., Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2009. Hardcover. 273 pp. U.S. $113.95. ISBN: 978-0-7546-7739-0This volume of essays fills a gap in Western literature on North Korea. First published in 2009, North Korea's Foreign Policy Under Kim Jong Il brings together the work of thirteen field specialists who attempt to view North Korean foreign relations from the DPRK's perspective. While they fully acknowledge the paucity of hard data on Kim's regime and the murkiness of many of the available sources, the editors nevertheless offer a broad range of views covering almost the entirety of North Korean foreign relations.The six-party denuclearization talks between North Korea and the five other regional powers serve as the unifying thread of many of the essays. Most experts agree on the broad outlines of the DPRK's objectives in these talks, and for Kim's nuclear program in general: to guarantee national security (which necessarily entails the survival of the regime), while simultaneously normalizing relations with the West and continuing domestic economic development. However, the exact weight given to each of these objectives is difficult to determine, as are the internal political factors which influence North Korean actions. For instance, how much do Seongun Jeonchi ("military first") and Juche ("self-reliance"), the official state ideologies, affect the decision-making process? What is their relationship to Kim's goal of achieving Gangseong Daeguk ("strong and prosperous great power") status, and are nuclear weapons essential for any or all of them?The essayists in this volume differ widely in their approaches to these and other questions. C. Kenneth Quinones, for instance, argues that a fundamental misunderstanding of Juche distorts most Western analyses of North Korean foreign policy. He notes that "selfreliance," the most commonly accepted translation of the term, fails to capture certain critical nuances. He prefers "essence of self-determination," which, coupled with the related notion of Jajuseong ("self-determination character"), anchors Kim's version of Marxism-Leninism in the specific character of the Korean people-under Juche, "the main motive of man's political activities is his struggle to liberate his Jajuseong ... not greed or a hunger for material gain, as Marx argued" (20). Viewed through this lens, "Pyongyang's strategic goals [have] impressive consistency and continuity" (15).This is consistent with Scott Snyder's assessment of North Korea's intentions and motivations, presented in chapter three. Noting the grave threat globalization poses to a command economy, Snyder concludes that the DPRK leadership as a whole has marginalized a nascent "internationalist coalition" within its ranks, preferring to "maximize resource extraction" domestically rather than risk "integration ... with the international economy." He concludes that "a failure of the existing leadersh
《金正日时期的朝鲜外交政策》郭泰焕、周承浩著。，法纳姆:阿什盖特出版社，2009。精装版，273页，113.95美元。这本文集填补了西方关于朝鲜的文献的空白。《金正日治下的朝鲜外交政策》于2009年首次出版，汇集了13位实地专家的工作成果，他们试图从朝鲜的角度看待朝鲜的外交关系。虽然他们完全承认关于金正日政权的硬数据的缺乏和许多可用来源的不透明，但编辑们仍然提供了广泛的观点，几乎涵盖了朝鲜外交关系的全部内容。朝鲜与其他五个地区大国之间的六方无核化谈判是许多文章的统一线索。大多数专家都同意朝鲜在这些会谈中的总体目标，以及金正日核计划的总体目标:保证国家安全(这必然需要政权的生存)，同时实现与西方关系正常化并继续国内经济发展。然而，这些目标的确切权重难以确定，影响朝鲜行动的内部政治因素也难以确定。例如，国家官方意识形态“先军”和“主体”对决策过程的影响有多大?它们与金正恩的“江城大国”(“强大而繁荣的大国”)目标之间的关系是什么?核武器对它们中的任何一个或所有国家来说都是必不可少的吗?散文家在这卷不同在他们的方法，这些和其他问题。例如，c·肯尼斯·奎诺内斯(C. Kenneth Quinones)认为，对主体思想的根本误解扭曲了大多数西方对朝鲜外交政策的分析。他指出，“自力更生”，这个术语最普遍接受的翻译，未能捕捉到某些关键的细微差别。他更喜欢“自决的本质”，这与相关的“自决权”(“自决性质”)的概念相结合，将金的马克思列宁主义版本锚定在主体下的朝鲜人民的特定性质上，“人类政治活动的主要动机是他为解放自己的自决权而斗争……而不是像马克思所说的那样，对物质利益的贪婪或渴望”。从这个角度来看，“平壤的战略目标具有令人印象深刻的一致性和连续性”(15)。这与斯科特·斯奈德在第三章中对朝鲜意图和动机的评估是一致的。注意到全球化对计划经济构成的严重威胁，斯奈德总结说，朝鲜领导层作为一个整体已经边缘化了其队伍中新生的“国际主义联盟”，他们更愿意在国内“最大化资源开采”，而不是冒着“一体化”的风险。随着国际经济的发展。”他的结论是，“现有领导层的失败和新领导层的替代”是最有可能实现有意义的经济改革的途径，但他没有推测这种失败对国际安全的影响(53)。相比之下，柯蒂斯·h·马丁(Curtis H. Martin)和伊尔苏·金(Ilsu Kim)则探讨了朝鲜领导层的动态和金正日的心理。在第四章中，马丁认为，“朝鲜一直坚持对西方的一系列核心要求”，这些要求在1993-4年的危机期间首次提出，并导致了无核化框架协议的发展(57)。…
{"title":"North Korea's Foreign Policy under Kim Jong Il","authors":"Brian Donovan","doi":"10.4324/9781315247861","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315247861","url":null,"abstract":"North Korea's Foreign Policy Under Kim Jong IlTae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo eds., Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2009. Hardcover. 273 pp. U.S. $113.95. ISBN: 978-0-7546-7739-0This volume of essays fills a gap in Western literature on North Korea. First published in 2009, North Korea's Foreign Policy Under Kim Jong Il brings together the work of thirteen field specialists who attempt to view North Korean foreign relations from the DPRK's perspective. While they fully acknowledge the paucity of hard data on Kim's regime and the murkiness of many of the available sources, the editors nevertheless offer a broad range of views covering almost the entirety of North Korean foreign relations.The six-party denuclearization talks between North Korea and the five other regional powers serve as the unifying thread of many of the essays. Most experts agree on the broad outlines of the DPRK's objectives in these talks, and for Kim's nuclear program in general: to guarantee national security (which necessarily entails the survival of the regime), while simultaneously normalizing relations with the West and continuing domestic economic development. However, the exact weight given to each of these objectives is difficult to determine, as are the internal political factors which influence North Korean actions. For instance, how much do Seongun Jeonchi (\"military first\") and Juche (\"self-reliance\"), the official state ideologies, affect the decision-making process? What is their relationship to Kim's goal of achieving Gangseong Daeguk (\"strong and prosperous great power\") status, and are nuclear weapons essential for any or all of them?The essayists in this volume differ widely in their approaches to these and other questions. C. Kenneth Quinones, for instance, argues that a fundamental misunderstanding of Juche distorts most Western analyses of North Korean foreign policy. He notes that \"selfreliance,\" the most commonly accepted translation of the term, fails to capture certain critical nuances. He prefers \"essence of self-determination,\" which, coupled with the related notion of Jajuseong (\"self-determination character\"), anchors Kim's version of Marxism-Leninism in the specific character of the Korean people-under Juche, \"the main motive of man's political activities is his struggle to liberate his Jajuseong ... not greed or a hunger for material gain, as Marx argued\" (20). Viewed through this lens, \"Pyongyang's strategic goals [have] impressive consistency and continuity\" (15).This is consistent with Scott Snyder's assessment of North Korea's intentions and motivations, presented in chapter three. Noting the grave threat globalization poses to a command economy, Snyder concludes that the DPRK leadership as a whole has marginalized a nascent \"internationalist coalition\" within its ranks, preferring to \"maximize resource extraction\" domestically rather than risk \"integration ... with the international economy.\" He concludes that \"a failure of the existing leadersh","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70639864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionIn the past, because of political tensions and environmental reasons, the border region of Russia, China, and North Korea did not receive much attention, especially in terms of economic growth potential, even though specialists had designated the area "natural economic territories" in the early 1990s.1 The border region, however, is now increasingly reattracting attention from Northeast Asia experts because of its potential as a treasure trove of natural resources and a global logistics hub. Although, in the political point of view, conflicts of interests between North Korea/South Korea, China/Russia, Russia/Japan, and Japan/China are still unresolved, regional cooperation for the mutual benefit of all parties-especially in trade, investment, and energy supply-is being increasingly reassessed.In this region, Russia has planned to diversify its natural resource exports, balance regional development within the country, and expand its regional political influence. China has accelerated its efforts to develop its three northeast provinces (Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning), secure its way out to the East Sea (Sea of Japan), and improve accessibility to natural resources, such as oil and gas buried in Russian Siberia.2 North Korea spurs development of its Rason Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in order to overcome prolonged economic difficulties.3 South Korea searches for ways to secure energy resources along with its efforts to develop logistics routes connected throughout the Eurasian continent, which was highlighted in 2013 in the "Eurasia Initiative" of the Park Geun-hye government.4 Japan places top priority on ensuring resources near the Tumen River estuary as well. The "northern region," frequently called as such by South Koreans since the late 1980s-and which includes the border areas between Russia, China, and North Korea, part of the Russian Far East and Siberia, and part of Northeast China-has reemerged as a crucial juncture because of the mutual interests of all parties interlinked in the economic and the political spheres.5In addition, because of climate change and the progress of global warming, the availability of a potential route to the Arctic Ocean is emerging. Moreover, this situation increases the availability of Russian Far East ports and natural resources development in the northern region. Logistics infrastructures and their operating systems to access the resources therein are still vulnerable. The closed customs system between China and Russia could be a constraining factor for building a seamless cross-border logistics system. The most critical barrier to growth, however, would be the disconnected maritime and/or inland logistics network to North Korea, under the influence of political factors. As a way to solve political tensions with isolated North Korea, economic cooperation in the northern logistics market (including the Korean Peninsula, China, and Russia) presents itself as a necessary task to accomplish. To ach
{"title":"International Cooperation and the Logistics Market in Northeast Asia: Problems and Prospects for North Korea","authors":"Seong-gul Hong, Sung woo Lee, Sung jun Park","doi":"10.3172/NKR.10.2.39","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.10.2.39","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionIn the past, because of political tensions and environmental reasons, the border region of Russia, China, and North Korea did not receive much attention, especially in terms of economic growth potential, even though specialists had designated the area \"natural economic territories\" in the early 1990s.1 The border region, however, is now increasingly reattracting attention from Northeast Asia experts because of its potential as a treasure trove of natural resources and a global logistics hub. Although, in the political point of view, conflicts of interests between North Korea/South Korea, China/Russia, Russia/Japan, and Japan/China are still unresolved, regional cooperation for the mutual benefit of all parties-especially in trade, investment, and energy supply-is being increasingly reassessed.In this region, Russia has planned to diversify its natural resource exports, balance regional development within the country, and expand its regional political influence. China has accelerated its efforts to develop its three northeast provinces (Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning), secure its way out to the East Sea (Sea of Japan), and improve accessibility to natural resources, such as oil and gas buried in Russian Siberia.2 North Korea spurs development of its Rason Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in order to overcome prolonged economic difficulties.3 South Korea searches for ways to secure energy resources along with its efforts to develop logistics routes connected throughout the Eurasian continent, which was highlighted in 2013 in the \"Eurasia Initiative\" of the Park Geun-hye government.4 Japan places top priority on ensuring resources near the Tumen River estuary as well. The \"northern region,\" frequently called as such by South Koreans since the late 1980s-and which includes the border areas between Russia, China, and North Korea, part of the Russian Far East and Siberia, and part of Northeast China-has reemerged as a crucial juncture because of the mutual interests of all parties interlinked in the economic and the political spheres.5In addition, because of climate change and the progress of global warming, the availability of a potential route to the Arctic Ocean is emerging. Moreover, this situation increases the availability of Russian Far East ports and natural resources development in the northern region. Logistics infrastructures and their operating systems to access the resources therein are still vulnerable. The closed customs system between China and Russia could be a constraining factor for building a seamless cross-border logistics system. The most critical barrier to growth, however, would be the disconnected maritime and/or inland logistics network to North Korea, under the influence of political factors. As a way to solve political tensions with isolated North Korea, economic cooperation in the northern logistics market (including the Korean Peninsula, China, and Russia) presents itself as a necessary task to accomplish. To ach","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69760674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionChina maintains a special relationship with North Korea, because of the traditional friendship that was first established by Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung during the Korean War in the 1950s. Although North Korea's first nuclear test in 2006 caused uncertainty regarding bilateral relations, high-level official visits continued (see Table 1). Table 1 shows the mutual visits by top leaders between North Korea and China since 2006. Every year for the past seven years, there has been at least one ministerial-level visit from one side to the other. On the Chinese side, former Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, current Prime Minister Li Keqiang (vice prime minister at the time of the visit), current President Xi Jinping (vice president at the time of the visit) and current Vice President Li Yuanchao have all paid visits to North Korea. Despite fluctuating tension between North Korea and South Korea, relations between China and North Korea have entered a different stage, especially noticeable when new leaders came into power in both countries. Xi Jinping was elected president of China during the 18th Plenary Conference of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on November 15, 2012. After the death of his father, Kim Jong-il, in December of 2011, Kim Jong-un became the 1st Chief of Committee of National Defense Committee on April 13, 2012.Since 2006, the United Nations has authorized four rounds of sanctions on North Korea, which mainly limit the import of nuclear- and missile-related equipment and technologies.1 As a result, trade between North Korea and the rest of the world has been affected. The trading of goods and services that were excluded from the sanctions still continue between North Korea and the outside world, including China. Tourism is also an important sector that has not been stopped by the sanctions.From the demand side, China is the neighbor of North Korea, and being a large market, China's economic environment provides a sound basis for tourism. China's per capita GDP reached about 6,000 USD at the official exchange rate and about 9,000 USD in purchasing power parity in 2012. According to empirical research, the tourism and leisure industry of a country will have strong growth when per capita GDP reaches 3,000-5,000 USD. Consequently, customers will have high expectations of service quality.2As more Chinese citizens travel abroad for sightseeing, more destinations are being approved by the Chinese government, after examination of mutual diplomatic relations and the security situation in those destinations. A destination must have unique value to offer to tourists. Several aspects of North Korea are attractive to Chinese tourists. The war in the 1950s left a deep impression on many Chinese, as well as on their relatives and friends, particularly those who served as voluntary soldiers. These individuals go to North Korea hoping to revisit former battlefields to see how they have changed.Members of the younger generation, born after the 1970s, gr
{"title":"China-to-North Korea Tourism: A Leisure Business on a Tense Peninsula","authors":"Jie Yang, Liyan Han, G. Ren","doi":"10.3172/NKR.10.2.57","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.10.2.57","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionChina maintains a special relationship with North Korea, because of the traditional friendship that was first established by Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung during the Korean War in the 1950s. Although North Korea's first nuclear test in 2006 caused uncertainty regarding bilateral relations, high-level official visits continued (see Table 1). Table 1 shows the mutual visits by top leaders between North Korea and China since 2006. Every year for the past seven years, there has been at least one ministerial-level visit from one side to the other. On the Chinese side, former Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, current Prime Minister Li Keqiang (vice prime minister at the time of the visit), current President Xi Jinping (vice president at the time of the visit) and current Vice President Li Yuanchao have all paid visits to North Korea. Despite fluctuating tension between North Korea and South Korea, relations between China and North Korea have entered a different stage, especially noticeable when new leaders came into power in both countries. Xi Jinping was elected president of China during the 18th Plenary Conference of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on November 15, 2012. After the death of his father, Kim Jong-il, in December of 2011, Kim Jong-un became the 1st Chief of Committee of National Defense Committee on April 13, 2012.Since 2006, the United Nations has authorized four rounds of sanctions on North Korea, which mainly limit the import of nuclear- and missile-related equipment and technologies.1 As a result, trade between North Korea and the rest of the world has been affected. The trading of goods and services that were excluded from the sanctions still continue between North Korea and the outside world, including China. Tourism is also an important sector that has not been stopped by the sanctions.From the demand side, China is the neighbor of North Korea, and being a large market, China's economic environment provides a sound basis for tourism. China's per capita GDP reached about 6,000 USD at the official exchange rate and about 9,000 USD in purchasing power parity in 2012. According to empirical research, the tourism and leisure industry of a country will have strong growth when per capita GDP reaches 3,000-5,000 USD. Consequently, customers will have high expectations of service quality.2As more Chinese citizens travel abroad for sightseeing, more destinations are being approved by the Chinese government, after examination of mutual diplomatic relations and the security situation in those destinations. A destination must have unique value to offer to tourists. Several aspects of North Korea are attractive to Chinese tourists. The war in the 1950s left a deep impression on many Chinese, as well as on their relatives and friends, particularly those who served as voluntary soldiers. These individuals go to North Korea hoping to revisit former battlefields to see how they have changed.Members of the younger generation, born after the 1970s, gr","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69760743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionDoes economic integration between South and North Korea generate positive spillover effects on their relationship? Or, are geopolitical factors and security issues still powerful enough to dominate Korean politics, limiting the effect of economic integration? The level of economic integration between the two Koreas has deepened over time. The amount of bilateral trade was only about $1.1 million three years after they officially began their trade relationship in 1988. It increased to $400 million in 2000 and then $2 billion in 2012. Currently, South Korea is North Korea's second largest trading partner, accounting for about 38 percent of its total trade in 2007. Considerable research argues that economic integration generates positive spillover effects on economic partners socially and politically.2 Scholars of liberal peace, for instance, claim that bilateral economic interdependence reduces the likelihood of militarized conflict between trading partners.3 Strong economic ties and material gains generated from it may promote economic partners' incentive to maintain or strengthen their relationship and avoid threats that may disrupt their partnership. Frequent interactions can also increase common knowledge, understanding, and interest on various issues. To the extent it occurs, economic partners are likely to narrow their policy preference gaps over various foreign policy issues.4 In this regard, it is reasonable to suspect that increasing economic integration between the two Koreas may have promoted their foreign policy preference similarity, increasing political cooperation in international organizations.Meanwhile, from a realist perspective, military tension and external forces on the peninsula, such as the U.S. and China, are still powerful factors that drive Korean politics. From this perspective, inter-Korean relations and their foreign policies have been shaped and affected by geopolitical issues and regional super powers. Therefore, bilateral economic integration may have a negligible impact on inter- Korean relations.Both claims have solid theoretical grounds. Nevertheless, virtually no empirical studies have tested these claims and show whether economic integration has gen- erated any positive spillover effects on inter-Korean relations. This article examines whether deepening economic integration has promoted cooperation between the two Koreas by analyzing their voting (dis)similarity in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) over the time period, 1991-2011. Also, it tests whether their voting decisions are strongly influenced by the positions of the U.S. and China on the issues. Empirical results show no significant evidence that economic integration promotes cooperation between South and North Korea in the UNGA. However, the two Koreas show relatively similar voting patterns over economic issues and Palestinian issues, while they tend not to agree on nuclear, security, and human rights issues. Meanwhile, their vote c
{"title":"Economic Integration, External Forces and Political Cooperation between South and North Korea in the UNGA 1","authors":"Wonjae Hwang, H. Oh, Jinman Kim","doi":"10.3172/NKR.10.2.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.10.2.5","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionDoes economic integration between South and North Korea generate positive spillover effects on their relationship? Or, are geopolitical factors and security issues still powerful enough to dominate Korean politics, limiting the effect of economic integration? The level of economic integration between the two Koreas has deepened over time. The amount of bilateral trade was only about $1.1 million three years after they officially began their trade relationship in 1988. It increased to $400 million in 2000 and then $2 billion in 2012. Currently, South Korea is North Korea's second largest trading partner, accounting for about 38 percent of its total trade in 2007. Considerable research argues that economic integration generates positive spillover effects on economic partners socially and politically.2 Scholars of liberal peace, for instance, claim that bilateral economic interdependence reduces the likelihood of militarized conflict between trading partners.3 Strong economic ties and material gains generated from it may promote economic partners' incentive to maintain or strengthen their relationship and avoid threats that may disrupt their partnership. Frequent interactions can also increase common knowledge, understanding, and interest on various issues. To the extent it occurs, economic partners are likely to narrow their policy preference gaps over various foreign policy issues.4 In this regard, it is reasonable to suspect that increasing economic integration between the two Koreas may have promoted their foreign policy preference similarity, increasing political cooperation in international organizations.Meanwhile, from a realist perspective, military tension and external forces on the peninsula, such as the U.S. and China, are still powerful factors that drive Korean politics. From this perspective, inter-Korean relations and their foreign policies have been shaped and affected by geopolitical issues and regional super powers. Therefore, bilateral economic integration may have a negligible impact on inter- Korean relations.Both claims have solid theoretical grounds. Nevertheless, virtually no empirical studies have tested these claims and show whether economic integration has gen- erated any positive spillover effects on inter-Korean relations. This article examines whether deepening economic integration has promoted cooperation between the two Koreas by analyzing their voting (dis)similarity in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) over the time period, 1991-2011. Also, it tests whether their voting decisions are strongly influenced by the positions of the U.S. and China on the issues. Empirical results show no significant evidence that economic integration promotes cooperation between South and North Korea in the UNGA. However, the two Koreas show relatively similar voting patterns over economic issues and Palestinian issues, while they tend not to agree on nuclear, security, and human rights issues. Meanwhile, their vote c","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69761024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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