Reform without Transition: The Economic Situation in North Korea since the July 1, 2002, Measures

Q1 Arts and Humanities North Korean Review Pub Date : 2010-04-01 DOI:10.3172/NKR.6.1.71
U. Yang
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引用次数: 12

Abstract

Poor Economic Performance in North KoreaDespite the severe economic hardship, North Korea has devoted its energy to strengthening its military capabilities. Adhering to the so-called "military first politics, the harsh North Korean regime continues to maintain its stranglehold on the people and attempts to avert political democratization. North Korea propagates a "juche ideology" as the foundation of its legitimacy and uses this to insulate its people from the outside world.1 The fundamental obsession with a self-reliant economy has brought about overall economic inefficiency, including a low level of technology, serious neglect of production facilities, and a decrease of labor productivity. As the resultant economic dilemma accumulated, the North Korean economy tumbled severely in the 1990s. North Korea is well aware of the serious problem of its backward economy, but denies the fact that its economic slump can be ascribed to the accumulated problems of its inefficient system. Instead, North Korea blames the hostile policy of the United States, or its weak external economic relations caused by the collapse of the socialist bloc.The economy ceased to function during the 1990s, especially after North Korea suffered severe flooding in 1995. After several years of famine, North Korea announced that the country had overcome its economic hardship through an "arduous march" of sustained effort by Kim Jung-il and the Korean Workers Party. Positive economic growth in the early 2000s seemed to be made possible by foreign subsidies (see Figure 1). In general, however, the North Korean economy is believed to have failed, losing all its potential and ability to overcome the economic deadlock.Furthermore, North Korea has failed to supply daily necessities and subsistencelevel food to meet the demands of its people (see Figure 2). North Korea needs at least 6.5 million tons of grain to distribute to its people, but its grain supply is far below the demand-by more than a million tons. The poor performance of the agricultural sector is due to the shortage of energy and fertilizer. North Korea was too dependent on Soviet oil and fertilizer subsidies prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union.2In an effort to ride out the economic hardship, North Korea introduced bold measures to improve economic management on July 1, 2002, by increasing salaries and prices and providing its state-run enterprises with some incentives. The socalled July 1st measures are viewed as the most aggressive economic policy adopted by North Korea in recent years. The measures were targeted at curing the country's economic inefficiency within the framework of the state-controlled economy. Although North Korea is encouraging production more practically than in the past, and has pushed ahead with reform-oriented changes in the economic sector, it has yet to find better alternatives that will yield substantial economic growth. The measures were designed only to smoothly manage the planned economy, rather than introducing the merits of the market economy. The most notable example is North Korea's military industry, which is still the top-priority economic expedient under its stratocracy.3Put simply, the July 1st measures worked against economic reform.4 In reality, the overall level of production in North Korea has remained in the doldrums for a considerable period of time. The shortage of capital goods has almost paralyzed production activities in most industrial sectors.During the initial period of the July 1st measures, North Korea faced severe inflation. The drastic increase in wages pushed up the purchasing power of the North Korean people. As time passed, an excess demand, caused by high wages combined with the ever-increasing speculative demand, touched off skyrocketing price increases. This is a typical monetary illusion, which refers to the tendency of people to think of currency in nominal terms. To stop high inflation, there is a need to add up production factors or improve labor productivity. …
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没有过渡的改革:2002年7月1日以后的北韩经济状况
朝鲜经济表现不佳尽管经济形势严峻,但朝鲜一直致力于加强军事能力。北韩坚持所谓的“先军政治”,继续对人民进行压迫,并试图阻止政治民主化。朝鲜宣传“主体思想”作为其合法性的基础,并以此将其人民与外部世界隔离开来对自力更生经济的根本痴迷导致了整体经济效率低下,包括技术水平低下、生产设施严重忽视、劳动生产率下降。随着经济困境的积累,朝鲜经济在20世纪90年代严重下滑。北韩虽然知道经济落后的严重问题,但却不承认经济停滞是由于体制不完善的问题积累起来的。相反,朝鲜指责美国的敌对政策,或社会主义阵营崩溃导致的对外经济关系薄弱。经济在20世纪90年代停止运转,特别是在1995年朝鲜遭受严重洪灾之后。在经历了几年的饥荒之后,朝鲜宣布,在金正日和朝鲜劳动党的持续努力下,通过“艰苦行军”,该国已经克服了经济困难。21世纪初的经济正增长似乎是通过外国补贴实现的(见图1)。然而,总体而言,朝鲜经济被认为已经失败,失去了克服经济僵局的所有潜力和能力。此外,朝鲜未能提供满足其人民需求的生活必需品和维持生计的食品(见图2)。朝鲜至少需要650万吨粮食分配给其人民,但其粮食供应远远低于需求-超过100万吨。农业部门表现不佳是由于能源和肥料短缺。在苏联解体之前,朝鲜过于依赖苏联的石油和化肥补贴。2为了度过经济难关,朝鲜于2002年7月1日采取了大胆的措施来改善经济管理,包括提高工资和物价,并向国有企业提供一些激励措施。所谓的7月1日措施被认为是朝鲜近年来采取的最激进的经济政策。这些措施的目的是在国家控制的经济框架内解决该国经济效率低下的问题。虽然北韩比过去更实际地鼓励生产,并在经济领域推进了以改革为导向的变革,但它还没有找到能带来实质性经济增长的更好的替代方案。这些措施只是为了平稳地管理计划经济,而不是引入市场经济的优点。最明显的例子是朝鲜的军事工业,这仍然是其战略统治下最优先的经济权宜之计。简单地说,7月1日的措施不利于经济改革实际上,北韩的整体生产水平在相当长的一段时间内一直处于低迷状态。资本货物的短缺几乎使大多数工业部门的生产活动陷于瘫痪。在7·1措施实施初期,朝鲜面临严重的通货膨胀。工资的大幅上涨推高了朝鲜人民的购买力。随着时间的推移,高工资导致的需求过剩,加上投机需求的不断增加,引发了价格的暴涨。这是一种典型的货币错觉,指的是人们倾向于用名义货币来考虑货币。为了遏制高通胀,需要增加生产要素或提高劳动生产率。…
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来源期刊
North Korean Review
North Korean Review Arts and Humanities-History
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Staying the course: Denuclearization and path dependence in the US's North Korea policy Editor-in-Chief's Comments Managing Editor's Comments Socio-Economic Change in the DPRK and Korean Security Dilemmas: The Implications for International Policy North Korea and Northeast Asian Regional Security
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