Strategic Patience or Back to Engagement? Obama's Dilemma on North Korea

Q1 Arts and Humanities North Korean Review Pub Date : 2011-09-01 DOI:10.3172/NKR.7.2.73
Changsop Pyon
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

IntroductionAre the days of hope for North Korea's nuclear denuclearization over once and for all? North Korea's recent disclosure of its uranium enriched program (UEP), in addition to its plutonium-based nuclear arsenal, the possible instability of power succession from North Korea's top leader, Kim Jong Il, to his son Kim Jong Un, and the North Korean leadership's blind reliance on its nuclear program as the ultimate guarantor of its regime survival, all point to a pessimistic assessment that it would be impossible to persuade North Korea to negotiate away its nuclear program for whatever rewards might obtain from the United States and the international community.Admittedly many people hoped for some sort of breakthrough on the nuclear front as the Obama administration took office in January 2009, expressing its willingness to engage North Korea. Although he didn't mention North Korea by name, President Obama pledged in his inaugural address to reach out to isolated regimes. As Democratic presidential candidate, Obama also expressed an active interest in engaging North Korea in a presidential debate in September 2008 when he criticized the Bush administration's lack of diplomatic engagement with North Korea, and supported "sustained, direct and aggressive diplomacy" to resolve North Korean nuclear issues.2Obama's criticism was clearly directed against the Bush administration's non-engagement policy toward North Korea during its first term. In fact, such an approach was inevitable, given the Bush team's fundamental distrust of the Pyongyang regime that had failed to keep its promises despite a series of previous nuclear pacts with the United States, including the Agreed Framework in 1994. The Bush administration avoided any further nuclear deal with North Korea during its first term, determined not to accept any demands from Pyongyang because "doing so might leave them open to comparison with the Clinton administration." Its North Korea policy was even described as the "ABC (Anything but Clinton) policy."3However, the Bush team's hawkish stance began to crumble when North Korea carried out its first nuclear test in October 2006. Tension was already rising since Washington made a big issue of Pyongyang's secret uranium enrichment program (UEP) in October 2005. North Korea initially acknowledged its presence, but has denied it ever since. Hard pressed by the urgent need to keep North Korea's unfettered nuclear pursuits at bay, chief U.S. negotiator Chris Hill hastened to pull off a series of nuclear deals with North Korea, with the full support of President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. North Korea froze its plutonium activities and finally submitted its nuclear declaration in 2009, for which it received political benefits from the United States, including being removed from the U.S. terrorism list. However, the previously uneventful nuclear talks stalled when both sides failed to iron out the differences on verification of North Korea's nuclear declaration.It was against this backdrop that many people expected some sort of breakthrough in the stalled nuclear talks when the new Obama administration came in. However, such expectations were shattered by North Korea's unexpected provocations right from the beginning of the Obama administration. On April 5, 2009, North Korea launched a l ong-range ballistic missile that, it argued, was the satellite Kwangmyongsong-2, intended to be put into orbit through a space launch vehicle, Unha-2. The strong U.S. condemnation, followed by the unanimous UN Security Council Resolution 1874, prompted North Korea to embolden rather than change its behavior. In defiance of the UN resolution, the North conducted its second nuclear test in May 2009, which dealt a fatal blow to the Obama administration's efforts for engagement. The second nuclear test unequivocally demonstrated once again Pyongyang's intention of not giving up its nuclear program despite a series of nuclear pacts with the previous Bush administration. …
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战略耐心还是回归接触?奥巴马在朝鲜问题上的困境
朝鲜无核化的希望已经一劳永逸地结束了吗?朝鲜最近披露了其铀浓缩计划(UEP),以及其以钚为基础的核武库,朝鲜最高领导人金正日向其儿子金正恩的权力继承可能不稳定,以及朝鲜领导层盲目依赖其核计划作为其政权生存的最终保障,所有这些都指向一种悲观的评估,即无论从美国和国际社会获得什么回报,都不可能说服朝鲜通过谈判放弃其核计划。诚然,2009年1月奥巴马政府上台时,许多人都希望在核问题上取得某种突破,奥巴马政府表示愿意与朝鲜接触。虽然奥巴马总统没有提到朝鲜的名字,但他在就职演说中承诺向孤立的政权伸出援助之手。作为民主党总统候选人,奥巴马在2008年9月的总统候选人辩论中也表达了与北韩接触的积极兴趣,当时他批评布什政府缺乏与北韩的外交接触,并支持通过"持续、直接和积极的外交手段"解决北韩核问题。奥巴马的批评显然是针对布什政府在第一个任期内对朝鲜采取的不接触政策。事实上,考虑到布什政府对朝鲜政权的根本不信任,这种做法是不可避免的。尽管此前与美国签署了一系列核协议,包括1994年的《框架协议》,但朝鲜政权未能履行其承诺。布什政府在第一个任期内避免与北韩达成任何进一步的核协议,决心不接受平壤的任何要求,因为“这样做可能会让他们与克林顿政府相提并论”。对北韩政策甚至被称为“ABC(除了克林顿)政策”。然而,当朝鲜在2006年10月进行第一次核试验时,布什团队的鹰派立场开始崩溃。自从2005年10月美国把北韩的秘密铀浓缩计划(UEP)问题作为大问题以来,紧张局势已经加剧。朝鲜最初承认了它的存在,但此后一直否认。在美国总统布什和国务卿赖斯的全力支持下,美国首席谈判代表克里斯·希尔(Chris Hill)在迫切需要遏制朝鲜不受约束的核追求的压力下,急忙与朝鲜达成了一系列核协议。朝鲜冻结了其钚活动,并最终于2009年提交了核清单,因此获得了美国的政治利益,包括从美国的恐怖主义名单上除名。然而,由于双方未能消除在核实北韩核清单问题上的分歧,此前平安无事的核谈判陷入僵局。正是在这样的背景下,许多人期待奥巴马新政府上台后,陷入僵局的核谈判能取得某种突破。然而,奥巴马政府一上台,朝鲜的意外挑衅就打破了这种期待。2009年4月5日,朝鲜发射了一枚远程弹道导弹,声称这是“光明星2号”卫星,打算通过太空运载火箭“银河2号”进入轨道。美国的强烈谴责,以及联合国安理会一致通过的1874号决议,促使朝鲜更加大胆,而不是改变其行为。朝鲜无视联合国决议,于2009年5月进行了第二次核试验,这对奥巴马政府的接触努力造成了致命打击。第二次核试验再次明确表明,尽管北韩与布什政府签订了一系列核协议,但北韩不会放弃核项目。…
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North Korean Review
North Korean Review Arts and Humanities-History
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Staying the course: Denuclearization and path dependence in the US's North Korea policy Editor-in-Chief's Comments Managing Editor's Comments Socio-Economic Change in the DPRK and Korean Security Dilemmas: The Implications for International Policy North Korea and Northeast Asian Regional Security
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