Unprecedented Nuclear Strikes of the Invincible Army: A Realistic Assessment of North Korea's Operational Nuclear Capability

Q1 Arts and Humanities North Korean Review Pub Date : 2012-04-01 DOI:10.3172/NKR.8.1.84
P. Hayes, S. Bruce
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引用次数: 6

Abstract

IntroductionAlthough North Korea's KCNA news often threatens to launch "unprecedented nuclear strikes," in reality, the North Korean nuclear program has limited offensive capability.1 Just how limited is a matter of dispute between well-informed observers and analysts. South Korea's defense minister, Kim Kwan-j in, for example noted recently that it was "possible" that North Korea had miniaturized a nuclear warhead as there had been, in his opinion, "enough time for them to have succeeded in miniaturization."2 He based his statement on how long it took other states to miniaturize a nuclear warhead, not on an assessment of North Korea's actual nuclear capability. Additionally, even if North Korea has miniaturized a nuclear warhead, the DPRK lacks an effective delivery mechanism and therefore has a limited ability to offensively use nuclear weapons.In our own assessment of North Korea's nuclear capability we found that the North is capable of operationally using nuclear weapons, but its options for a nuclear strike are severely constrained. We concluded that the only credible use of the DPRK's nuclear arsenal would be to detonate a bomb within North Korea itself to slow down or to stop an invasion in the context of an all-out war. Aside from this nuclear-use scenario, conventional weapons predominate in realistic evaluations of deterrence and war-fighting in the Korean Peninsula.North Korean Declaratory Nuclear PostureThe stated purpose of the North Korean nuclear program has changed over the last decade.3 North Korean statements that once described the nuclear program as a tool to secure the state against outside aggression now describe it as a stabilizing force in the region.During and after the collapse of the Agreed Framework in 2002, KCNA statements described the nuclear program as a substitute for a security guarantee from the United States. If North Korea's security concerns were addressed, they argued, there would be no need for the nuclear program. An October 2002 statement is particularly telling: "The settlement of all problems with the DPRK, a small country, should be based on removing any threat to its sovereignty and right to existence. There may be negotiations or the use of deterrent force to be consistent with this basis, but the DPRK wants the former, as far as possible."4By 2005 this language had changed. North Korea declared itself to be in possession of nuclear weapons and began to depict its nuclear program as a regional stabilizer which prevented war by countering the U.S. nuclear threat to the region.5 KCNA statements even suggested that North Korea's nuclear program benefited South Korea by raising a nuclear umbrella over the entire Korean Peninsula!6By 2010 North Korea had not only openly threatened to use its nuclear weapons for the first time, saying that "those who seek to bring down the system in the DPRK, whether they play a main role or a passive role, will fall victim to the unprecedented nuclear strikes of the invincible army,"7 but also made the first real declaratory statement of its nuclear posture in response to the U.S. nuclear posture review:The mission of the nuclear forces of the DPRK is to deter and repel aggression and attack against the country and the nation until the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the world is realized. The DPRK is invariably maintaining the pol- icy not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states or threaten them with nuclear weapons as long as they do not join the act of invading or attacking us in conspiracy with nuclear weapons states.8Although these statements should be taken very seriously, particularly by South Korea and Japan who are implicated in both via their alliance with the United States, we should not assume that North Korea has the operational military capability to back up this declaratory posture and the stated nuclear threats.North Korean Technical Nuclear CapacityWhen it comes to nuclear threats against the United States, South Korea, and Japan, North Korea vastly overstates its ability to strike. …
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无敌军队前所未有的核打击:对朝鲜作战核能力的现实评估
虽然朝鲜的朝中社新闻经常威胁要发动“前所未有的核打击”,但实际上,朝鲜核计划的进攻能力有限究竟有多有限,这是消息灵通的观察人士和分析人士之间存在争议的问题。例如,韩国国防部长金宽仁(Kim Kwan-j)最近指出,朝鲜“有可能”将核弹头小型化,因为在他看来,“他们有足够的时间成功实现小型化”。他的声明是基于其他国家小型化核弹头所需的时间,而不是基于对朝鲜实际核能力的评估。此外,即使朝鲜已经将核弹头小型化,朝鲜也缺乏有效的投送机制,因此进攻性使用核武器的能力有限。在我们自己对朝鲜核能力的评估中,我们发现朝鲜有能力使用核武器,但其核打击的选择受到严重限制。我们的结论是,朝鲜核武库的唯一可靠用途是在朝鲜境内引爆一枚炸弹,以减缓或阻止全面战争背景下的入侵。除了这种使用核武器的情况外,常规武器在朝鲜半岛威慑和战争的现实评估中占主导地位。北韩核声明的姿态北韩核计划的声明目的在过去十年中发生了变化朝鲜的声明曾将核计划描述为确保国家不受外来侵略的工具,现在则将其描述为该地区的稳定力量。在2002年《框架协议》崩溃期间和之后,朝中社的声明将朝鲜的核项目描述为美国安全保证的替代品。他们认为,如果朝鲜的安全担忧得到解决,就没有必要进行核项目。2002年10月的一份声明尤其说明问题:“解决与朝鲜这个小国的所有问题,应以消除对其主权和生存权的任何威胁为基础。”根据这一基础,可能会进行谈判或使用威慑力量,但朝鲜希望尽可能采用前者。到2005年,这种说法发生了变化。朝鲜宣布自己拥有核武器,并开始将其核计划描述为通过对抗美国对该地区的核威胁来防止战争的地区稳定器朝中社的声明甚至暗示,朝鲜的核计划使韩国受益,为整个朝鲜半岛撑起了核保护伞!到2010年,朝鲜不仅首次公开威胁要使用核武器,称“那些试图推翻朝鲜体制的人,无论他们扮演主要角色还是被动角色,将成为无敌军队前所未有的核打击的受害者”,而且还针对美国的核态势评估报告发表了第一次真正的核态势宣言:“朝鲜核力量的使命是阻止和击退对国家和民族的侵略和攻击,直到实现朝鲜半岛和世界的无核化。”朝鲜民主主义人民共和国始终坚持不对无核国家使用核武器或以核武器进行威胁的政策,只要无核国家不与有核国家共谋侵略和攻击我们。虽然这些声明应该非常认真地对待,特别是韩国和日本,它们通过与美国的联盟而卷入了这两件事,但我们不应该假设朝鲜有实际的军事能力来支持这种声明姿态和声明的核威胁。当谈到对美国、韩国和日本的核威胁时,朝鲜大大夸大了自己的打击能力。…
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来源期刊
North Korean Review
North Korean Review Arts and Humanities-History
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Staying the course: Denuclearization and path dependence in the US's North Korea policy Editor-in-Chief's Comments Managing Editor's Comments Socio-Economic Change in the DPRK and Korean Security Dilemmas: The Implications for International Policy North Korea and Northeast Asian Regional Security
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